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Judge T. 0. Elias
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Judge T. 0. Elias, Vice President of the International Court of Justice, provides in this article a survey of the major new perspectives and conceptions
in international law as a supplement to his 1979 book, New Horizons in
InternationalLaw. Judge Elias concentrates on five main areas: human
rights, diplomatic law, the law of the sea, wars of national liberation and
humanitarian law, and the legal aspects of the new international economic
order. He concludes that many aspects of the international legal order previously characterized by the enumeration of basic principles and goals are
now shifting towards the actual development of the legal mechanisms necessary to realize and to implement those goals. He cautions that "[t]he
challenge to international law and to international lawyers is to devise legal
instruments in such a way that the aspirations and rights of no state or
people are promoted at the expense of other states or peoples."

ARTICLE
THE IRAN HOSTAGE CRISIS AND THE INTERNATIONAL
COURT OF JUSTICE: ASPECTS OF THE Case Concerning

United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff
in Tehran ...............

...

.............

Amir Rafat

In this article, Dr. Amir Rafat analyzes the May 1980 decision of the International Court of Justice, the Case Concerning the United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran. Dr. Rafat first provides a brief factual
background of the U.S. claims against Iran, as well as the Court's grant of
interim measures of protection on December 15, 1979. Noting that the
Court made important contributions to the international law-making process by illuminating and settling certain questions relating to measures of
interim protection and to the relationship between international adjudication and the political functions and processes of the United Nations, Dr.
Rafat asserts that the decision is "undoubtedly one of the most important
cases ever handled by the International Court." The hostage issue was also
one of the most politicized cases ever brought before an international tribunal, and its disposition by the Court raised crucial questions about the
boundary between law and politics in the world community, and particularly the Court's role as the principal judicial organ of the United Nations
in defining and adjudicating that boundary. Dr. Rafat concludes that these
contributions, important as they are, do not alter the fact that the Court's
role as a dispute-settling institution proved irrelevant to the final resolution
of the crisis. But looking beyond its immediate result, the handling of the
case by the Court and the political agencies of the United Nations offer
creative possibilities for implementing a framework of action for dealing
more successfully with future multidimensional crises.
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FACULTY COMMENT

New Perspectives and Conceptions in
Contemporary Public International Law
T. 0. ELIAS
In my recent book New Horizons in InternationalLaw,' an attempt
was made to analyze the new developments that have arisen since the
commencement of modern international law, dating from the inception of
the United Nations in 1945. Various issues were discussed, touching on
new processes of lawmaking in the International Law Commission,2 new
approaches to judicial process in the International Court of Justice,3 and
the breaking of completely new ground by the establishment of such organizations as the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD), 4 the United Nations Commission on International Trade
Taslim Olawale Elias has served on the International Court of Justice since 1976, and
has been its Vice President since 1979. Professor of Law and Dean of the Faculty of Law,
Lagos University, 1966-1972. Governor, School of Oriental and African Studies, University
of London, 1957-1960. Visiting Professor of Political Science, University of Delhi, 1956. Legal Counsel of Nigeria, 1949-1960. Attorney General of Nigeria, 1960-1972. Chief Justice,
Supreme Court of Nigeria, 1972-1975. Chairman, United Nations International Law Commission, 1970. Chairman, Committee of the Whole, United Nations Conference on the Law
of Treaties, 1968-1969. Member, Expert Committee for Drafting the Charter of the Organization of African Unity, 1963. President, Nigerian Society of International Law, since 1968.
Member, Curatorium of the Hague Academy of International Law, since 1975.NEditor,
Nigerian Law Journal, 1968-1973.
1. T. ELIAS, NEW HORIZONS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1979).

2. The United Nations International Law Commission was instituted by the General
Assembly for the express purpose of undertaking the progressive development of international law and its codification to meet the growing needs of the international community. Its
membership represents the principal legal systems of the world.
3. A most significant step was taken by the General Assembly when it adopted Resolution 3232 (XXIX), Nov. 12, 1974, 29 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 31) 141, U.N. Doc. A/9631
(1974), calling specifically upon the International Court of Justice consciously to develop
international law by means of its judicial decisions. Until this bold request the judicial process of the Court has been confined to applying the law to facts, not to making new law. So
anxious is the modern international community within the United Nations to achieve a
universality of international law that it is ready to throw fiction to the wind by changing the
rules if and when necessary in the course of the judicial decision.
4. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development was established as a
permanent organ in the General Assembly in 1964. The main purposes of UNCTAD are to
promote international trade with the aim of accelerating global economic development, to
initiate action for the adoption of multilateral trade agreements, and to serve as a focal
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Law (UNCITRAL), and the various subsidiary organs of the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). 6 In addition, topics in the
fields of human rights and humanitarian law were addressed. Developments in the law of treaties and the law of the sea were also outlined,
thus spotlighting the expanding frontiers of public international law.
In the present Comment, I propose to attempt a broad survey of the
major new perspectives and conceptions in international law, if only as a
supplement to the earlier study. Five discernible areas call for special attention: human rights, diplomatic law, the law of the sea, wars of national
liberation and humanitarian law, and the legal aspects of the New International Economic Order.
HUMAN RIGHTS

The basic legal documents in the field of human rights are the
United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights,7 the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,8 and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 9 The first of these instruments contains a general summary of the various rights and fundamental
freedoms for all. States are called upon to use the Universal Declaration
as a guideline in their promotion of democracy and the rule of law within
their borders. More than two decades elapsed between the adoption of
the Universal Declaration and of the two human rights covenants, primarily because of the reluctance of states to subject their several sovereign-

point for harmonizing trade and development policies of governments and regional economic groups.
5. The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law was established in
1966 to promote the progressive harmonization and unification of the law of international
trade. UNCITRAL was a response to the perceived need for the United Nations to play a
more active role in reducing or eliminating obstacles to the flow of international trade. The
Commission's work consists of coordinating the tasks of international organizations active in
international trade laws, encouraging their cooperation in the promotion of participation in
existing international instruments, preparing new international conventions and uniform
law, and in training and assistance in international law.
6. The United Nations Economic and Social Council, one of the six principal organs of
the United Nations, coordinates the economic and social work of the United Nations and
the specialized agencies and institutions. ECOSOC makes recommendations and initiates
activities relating to development, industrialization, natural resources, human rights, population, the status of women, social welfare, science and technology, and many other social
and economic questions.
7. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 A (III), U.N. Doc. A/810 at 71
(1948).
8. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, entered into force Mar. 23,
1976, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967),
reprinted in 6 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 368 (1967); Optional Protocol, entered into force, Mar. 23,
1976, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 59, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967),
reprinted in 6 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 383 (1967).
9. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, entered into force
Jan. 3, 1976, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316
(1967), reprinted in 6 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 360 (1967).
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ties to such limitations as are implicit in the adoption of the various pro-

visions guaranteeing the rights and freedoms enshrined therein.
Other rights are guaranteed in other instruments. Prominent examples include the right to self-determination for peoples under colonial
domination,1" the elimination of racial discrimination,"' and the protec-

tion of the rights and status of women" and children.'8 An examination
of these documents illustrates the emergence of the legal personality of
the human being as a significant feature of contemporary international
law. As integral elements of contemporary international law, the fundamental rights and freedoms protected by these documents require imme-

diate recognition in the design of international arrangements and the
structure of international institutions.

Several interesting developments in this field deserve notice. The European Convention on Human Rights, 1 ' through the European Commission on Human Rights, already recognizes the right of the individual to

bring cases involving the contravention of personal human rights before
the European Court of Human Rights. In addition, a regional mechanism
exists in the western hemisphere. On July 18, 1978, the American Con-

vention on Human Rights entered into force.1" Another notable development was the United Nations Conference on Human Rights held in Teheran in 1968,'1 at which certain important decisions were taken for the

elaboration of ideas and processes to improve the implementation of existing human rights instruments.

Efforts are also being intensified for the formulation and adoption of
an African Human Rights Charter with an accompanying Human Rights
Commission. The Organization of African Unity adopted the Monrovia

10. Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,
Dec. 14, 1960, G.A. Res. 1514, 15 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 66, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1961).
11. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
opened for signature Mar. 9, 1966, entered into force Jan. 4, 1969, 660 U.N.T.S. 195, re-

printed in 5 INT'L

LEGAL MAT.

352 (1966).

12. Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Nov. 7, 1967,
G.A. Res. 2263 (XXII), 22 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 35, U.N. Doc. A/6880 (1968); Convention on the Political Rights of Women, done at New York, Mar. 31, 1953, entered into
force July 7, 1976, 27 U.S.T. 1909, T.I.A.S. No. 8289, 193 U.N.T.S. 135; Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Dec. 18, 1979, G.A. Res. 34/180
(XXXIV), 34 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 46) 193, U.N. Doc. A/34/46 (1980).
13. Declaration of the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1959, G.A. Ras. 1386 (XIV), 14 U.N.
GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 19, U.N. Doc. A/4354 (1959).
14. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, done at Rome, Nov. 4, 1950, entered into force Sept. 3, 1953, Europ. T.S. No. 5, 213
U.N.T.S. 221, reprinted in COUNCI. OF EUROPE, EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HuMAN RIGHTS
COLLECTED TEXTS 101 (11th ed. 1976).
15. American Convention on Human Rights, entered into force July 18, 1978, O.A.S.
T.S. No. 36, at 1, OEA/Ser.A/16 [English], reprinted in S. Exec. Doc. No. F, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess§. (1978).
16. Proclamation of Teheran, U.N. Conference on Human Rights, Teheran, April-May
1968, U.N. Doc. St./OPI/326 (1968).
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Resolution to draft an African Charter on Human Rights in July 1979.17
The resolution specifically seeks to promote civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights within Africa, focusing upon the latter three as
requiring special and immediate attention. In September of the same
year, the United Nations sponsored a follow-up seminar in Monrovia,
pursuing the initial program drawn up by the OAU. 18 The outcome will
be a draft report presenting a model African Commission on Human
Rights.
DIPLOMATIC LAW

Very encouraging progress has been made in the field of diplomatic
law. The first two significant attempts at codification of this branch of
customary international law were the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations of 1961,'9 and the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations of
1963."0 For the first time the rights and duties of states in their diplomatic and consular relations were defined, thereby assuring protection,
immunities, and privileges to diplomats and other personnel in the countries in which they were accredited. At the same time, these conventions
protect host countries by prohibiting certain acts and omissions calculated to undermine their interests. The recent Case Concerning United
1 provided an opportuStates Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Teheran"
nity for the application of these conventions. The International Court of
Justice determined that Iran had violated several provisions of the two
conventions guaranteeing the personal inviolability of diplomats and consular staff by holding fifty-three Americans hostage, while demanding the
surrender of the former Shah of Iran by the U.S. Government. The Court
also held that provisions of the conventions guaranteeing the inviolability
of embassies and of their premises, consulates, and archives had been violated by the seizing, ransacking, and looting of the U.S. Embassy and
Consulate.
Soon after the seizure of the American hostages in November 1979,
the United Nations adopted the International Convention Against the
Taking of Hostages."1 This convention condemns the taking of hostages
17. Decision on Human and People's Rights in Africa, Organization of African Unity,
Assembly of Heads of State and Government (July 17-20, 1979), reprinted in 34 U.N.
GAOR, Annex (Agenda Item 23) 92, U.N. Doc. A/34/SS2 (1979).
18. Seminar on the Establishment of Regional Commissions on Human Rights with
Special Reference to Africa, Sept. 10-21, 1979, ch. V (Conclusions and Recommendations),
U.N. Doc. ST/HR/Ser. A/4, GE 79-13767 (1979).
19. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, T.I.A.S.
No. 7502, 500 U.N.T.S. 95.
20. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, T.I.A.S. No.

6820, 596 U.N.T.S. 261.
21. Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Teheran (United
States v. Iran), [1980] I.C.J. 3. See also Rafat, The Iran Hostage Crisis and the International Court of Justice: Aspects of the Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and
Consular Staff in Teheran, 10 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 425 (1981).
22. International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, Dec. 17, 1979, G.A. Res.
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in order to compel a third party to do or to abstain from a particular act.
In addition to these conventions, the United Nations also enacted, in
1973, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes
Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic
Agents.3 This convention calls upon member states to discourage and, if

necessary, to punish persons engaged in acts of terrorism and other unlawful acts against the persons of diplomatic representatives serving in

one another's territory, including the agents and families of diplomatic
envoys. The continuing mistreatment of diplomatic representatives endangers international diplomatic practice. The recalcitrant behavior of
Iran in delaying the release of the American hostages for nearly thirteen
months after the December 15, 1979 Order by the International Court of

Justice angered and dismayed most of the civilized world. Effective international communication demands that diplomatic representatives of all

countries be able to carry on their legitimate tasks without fear for their
personal safety.
LAW OF THE SEA

Another area in which the international community has taken chal-

lenging initiatives is the law of the sea. The initial steps in this direction
were taken at the Law of the Sea Conference held in Vienna in 1958. At
that time it was already clear that customary international law relating to

the use of the sea, the sea-bed, and the ocean floor, no less than the territorial seas, had become inadequate. After detailed consideration of the
draft prepared by the International Law Commission, the Conference

adopted four separate conventions, on the territorial sea and the contiguous zone, 2 4 on the high seas,25 on fisheries and conservation of the living
resources of the high seas," and on the continental shelf.2 7 Apart from
34/146, 34 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. (46) 245, U.N. Doc. A/34/46 (1979), reprinted in 18

INT'L

LEGAL MAT. 1457 (1979).

23. The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, adopted Dec. 14, 1973, G.A. Res. 3166,
28 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 30) 146, U.N. Doc. A/OR/28/S/30 v.1 (1973), 28 U.S.T. 1975,
T.I.A.S. No. 8532, reprinted in 13 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 43 (1974).
24. Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, Apr. 29, 1958, 15
U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205.
25. Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450
U.N.T.S. 82.
26. Convention on Fisheries and Conservation of Living Resources of the High Seas,
Apr. 29, 1958, 17 U.S.T. 138, T.I.A.S. No. 5969, 559 U.N.T.S. 285.
27. Convention on the Continental Shelf, Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. No.
5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311. This convention was first applied in the North Sea Continental
Shelf Cases, [1969] I.C.J. 3, between the Federal Republic of Germany and Denmark and
between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Netherlands. This case raised the question of whether the rule contained in paragraph 2 of article 6 of the Continental Shelf Convention prescribing that in the absence of agreement, and unless another boundary is justified by special circumstances, the boundary should be determined by application of the
principle of equidistance as a rule of customary international law. The Court was of the view
that the equidistance method of delimitation was not obligatory upon the parties and that
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these four conventions, the 1958 Conference adopted an Optional Protocol of Signature Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes.' 8
The Protocol provided for compulsory jurisdiction of the International
Court of Justice if a dispute arose between signatory parties or, if the
parties preferred, for submission of the matter to conciliation or arbitration. The Conference also adopted nine resolutions on various subjects,
including the matter of convening a second law of the sea conference."
The law of the sea conventions and the optional protocol came into
force between 1962 and 1966. In the meantime, however, a second conference called by the United Nations Secretary-General in 1958 was held in
March and April, 1960. This conference had as its purpose the further
consideration of two questions left unsettled by the first conference: the
breadth of the territorial sea and fishery limits. While no substantive proposals were adopted at this conference, a resolution expressing the need
30
for technical assistance in fishery was adopted.
In December 1972, the General Assembly resolved to resume work on
the subject, and established a working group of fifty-two members to formulate fresh proposals on the law of the sea. After a series of meetings in
.Caracas, Geneva, and New York, a substantially revised negotiating text
emerged. Unlike the 1958 Conference on the Law of the Sea, the present
Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea was not based
on an initial draft text prepared by the International Law Commission.
Instead, the plenary body of the Conference began by dividing the law of
the sea into component subjects and complementary committees, each
charged with the task of studying and elaborating upon specific aspects of
the law of the sea. The plenary was entrusted with the task of formulating consistent, comprehensive proposals. The resultant text is an amalgam of the disparate drafts emanating from the committees.
The tenth session of the Third Law of the Sea Conference was
opened in New York on March 9, 1981, by Secretary-General Kurt

since no other single method could be regarded as obligatory, delimitation should be effected by agreement in accordance with the equitable interests so as to leave as much as
possible to each State those parts of the continental shelf constituting a natural prolongation of its land territory into and under the sea, without encroachment on the natural prolongation of the land territory of the other. Where there are areas that overlap, they are to
be divided between them in agreed proportions or, failing agreement, equally, unless they
decide on a regime of joint jurisdiction, use, or exploitation for the zones of overlap or any
part of them.
Another recent case, between Greece and Turkey, is the Aegean Sea Continental Shelf
Case, [1978] I.C.J. 3, in which the continental shelf would have fallen for determination by
the International Court of Justice but for the fact that the Court held that it had no jurisdiction to entertain the Greek application.
28. Optional Protocol of Signature Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes,
opened for signature Apr. 29, 1958, 450 U.N.T.S. 169.
29. See generally NEw DIRECTIONS IN THE LAW OF THE SEA (S. Lay, R. Churchill, & M.
Nordquist eds. 1973).
30. Final Act of the Second United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Apr. 26,
1960, 8 Annex II, at 176, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.19/8 (1960).
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Waldheim. This meeting, it was widely believed, would conclude the
seven years of negotiation and produce a formalized text for the ratification of member states. Unfortunately, the position adopted by the U.S.
Government, in its insistence to review thoroughly the draft convention
and to oppose any attempt to adopt the text before the completion of
that review, has cast a long shadow over the years of hard work leading to
the tenth session. 1
Nevertheless, an optimistic note was struck by Tommy T. B. Koh of
Singapore, who was elected the new President of the Conference, replacing the late H. Shirley Amerasinghe of Sri Lanka. Mr. Koh, sensitive to
the need for universal acceptance of the final instrument and the participation of all major maritime nations, has shown a willingness to await the
United States' review of the draft convention. A brief summary of certain
aspects of the text as it now stands will be attempted.
It would seem that there are three principal features of the proposed
new law of the sea treaty which mark out new perspectives and conceptions of customary international law. First is the almost universal adoption of the twelve-mile limit in place of the traditional three-mile limit as
the accepted breadth of the territorial sea. The second new conception is
the two-hundred mile limit known as the exclusive economic zone. This
zone would give the coastal state jurisdiction over the stretch of adjoining
sea for fishing and the exploitation of the living resources of the sea in
the superadjacent waters beyond the continental shelf. This new conception provoked questions and arguments, mainly between the developed
industrialized countries and the developing countries led by the "Group
of 77. " 11 As the subject was discussed at the various conference sessions,

it appeared that the two-hundred mile economic zone, which embraced
the former ideas of the contiguous zone and the patrimonial sea, had been
accepted. This would mark a decisive shift in the customary conception of
the law of the sea.
The third, highly controversial new conception in the draft convention is that which considers those parts of the ocean formerly regarded as
the high seas, and thus free for purposes of navigation and other uses, as
the common heritage of mankind. The area in question is specifically limited to that portion of the sea beyond the limits of national jurisdiction,
covering the sea-bed and all the minerals and other resources associated
with it. In its simplest form the concept of the "common heritage of mankind" holds that all nations, regardless of their level of economic and
technological development, are equally entitled to the benefits of the min31. For an analysis of different perspectives of the decision of the Reagan Administration, see Moore, Charting A New Course in the Law of the Sea Negotiations, 10 DEN. J.
INT'L L. & POL'Y 207 (1981).
32. The "Group of 77" is now comprised of over 100 countries located primarily in
Africa, Asia, and Latin America. The group was established in 1963 with the introduction of
the Joint Declaration of the Developing Countries, G.A. Res. 1877, 18 U.N. GAOR, Supp.
(No. 15) 29, U.N. Doc. A/5587 (1963).
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eral and other available resources.
It is in connection with this third new conception that controversies
still threaten the successful conclusion of the third law of the sea conference, as evidenced by the United States' decision to review the draft convention. The crux of the problem is how to evolve viable institutions for
the administration and exploitation of these resources in a manner acceptable both to the technologically more advanced states and to the less
advanced states. The problem still awaits solution.83
It may be mentioned parenthetically that one important side-effect
of the notion of the common heritage of mankind is the development of
equitable principles concerning the measure of assistance to be given
landlocked states that have no direct and immediate interest in the exploitation of the living resources of the sea-bed. In addition to ensuring
their right of free passage through coastal states, the new draft provides
that such geographically disadvantaged states should also have a limited
share in the exploration and exploitation of the sea, both within the twohundred mile exclusive economic zone and on the high seas, including the
ocean floor.
WARS OF NATIONAL LIBERATION AND HUMANITARIAN LAW

One of the immediate and indeed inevitable byproducts of the grant
of self-determination and independence to colonial peoples which accompanied the establishment of the United Nations has been the occurrence
of wars of national liberation, particularly in Asia and Africa, the continents which in 1945 had the greatest number of dependent territories.
Similar wars of national liberation had occurred during successive centuries in Europe, and within the last two centuries, in Latin America. These
wars were often conducted with only rudimentary rules of warfare, essentially based upon the idea and practices of "just" and "unjust" wars. Insufficient regard was paid to the needs of the civilian populations of the
territories that were ravaged and conquered in the process. Conquest was
ruthlessly efficient as the principle of "might makes right" prevailed. By
1864, however, the initial steps were taken in the formation of humanitarian principles for the care of the disabled, the sick, the wounded, and the
dead." In the treatment of persons, distinctions were made between combatants and noncombatants. In 1899, the first organized attempt to regulate the conduct of warfare in a more humane manner resulted in the
Geneva Convention of 1899.85 The gruesome experience of the First
World War led to the improvement, in 1929,6 of the foundations laid by
33. See Moore, note 31 supra.
34. Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the
Field, Aug. 22, 1864, 22 Stat. 940, T.S. No. 3770.
35. Convention With Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, July 29, 1899,
32 Stat. 1803, T.S. No. 403.
36. Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick of
Armies in the Field, July 27, 1929, 47 Stat. 2074, T.S. No. 847; Convention Relative to the
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the 1899 convention. Finally, after the Second World War, the modern
rules of warfare were defined in a more precise manner by the four Geneva Conventions of 1949." 7
Since about 1950 and continuing today, wars of national liberation
have become almost the order of the day. Two important forces underlying this trend are the proclamation in the Charter of the United Nations
establishing the right of nations and peoples to self-determination and
independence,"8 and the adoption of the policy prohibiting all forms of
racial discrimination. 9 Yet, despite the universal recognition of the right
of all peoples to self-determination, the achievement of that goal was
often accompanied with bloodshed and internecine struggles, particularly
in Southeast Asia and in Africa.
It therefore became necessary to reconsider and to broaden the Geneva Conventions of 1949, taking into account the new developments in
the field of armed conflict. The International Committee of the Red Cross
accordingly proposed two Protocols to the 1949 Geneva Conventions.
These addressed on the one hand traditional international conflicts,40 and
on the other, non-international armed conflicts,"' primarily wars of national liberation. The Western view held that conflicts between states
should be the only subject for regulation, while the newly independent
African states and their Third World allies contended that wars of national liberation must be regarded as international wars within the meaning of Draft Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. s These ideas
Treatment of Prisoners of War, July 27, 1929, 47 Stat. 2021, T.S. No. 846.
37. Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field, done Aug. 12, 1949, entered into force Oct. 21, 1950, 6 U.S.T.
3144, T.I.A.S. No. 3362, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition
of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea, done Aug. 12,
1949, entered into force Oct. 21, 1950, 6 U.S.T. 3217, T.I.A.S. No. 3363, 75 U.N.T.S. 85;
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, done Aug. 12, 1949, entered into
force Oct. 21, 1950, 6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Convention Relative
to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, done Aug. 12, 1949, entered into force
Oct. 21, 1950, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
38. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 2.
39. Id. para. 3.
40. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), adopted at Geneva
June 8, 1977, by the Diplomatic Conference on Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, opened for signature Dec. 12,
1977, reprinted in 16 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 1391; idso reprintedin 72 AM. J. INT'L L. 457 (1978).
41. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to
the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), adopted June
8, 1977, by the Diplomatic Conference on Reaffirmation and Development of International
Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, opened for signature Dec. 12, 1977. Text
at 72 AM. J. INT'L L. 502 (1978).
42. Protocol I states that it applies to
armed conflicts in which peoples are fighting against colonial domination and
alien occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise of their right of selfdetermination, as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and
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were proposed and discussed at the Diplomatic Conference for the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflict, held in Geneva from 1974 to 1978."1
The Conference included in Article 65 of Protocol I a Bill of Rights
of Humanitarian Law. This document contained provisions requiring,
among other things, that criminal offenses should be tried before independent and impartial tribunals, that the defendant before such tribunals
should be charged with individual responsibility, that there should be a
presumption of innocence in all cases, and that defendants should not be
prosecuted under retroactive laws. The Bill of Rights also provided that
the death penalty must not be pronounced upon persons under the age of
eighteen years and that there should be no execution of any pregnant
women or mothers of young children. Article 65 concluded with the provision that, at the end of an armed conflict, the victorious side should always grant amnesty to as many as possible of the participants in the conflict. It is notable that Nigeria did exactly that at the end of its civil war
in January 1970. A general amnesty was granted to all and there were
neither prosecutions nor military trials of those involved in the secessionist attempt.
Those who took part in the Angolan wars of liberation found themselves subject to a different set of ideas than those mentioned above. In
the Angola trials of the so-called mercenaries and other participants, ex
post facto laws were applied, following the alleged precedents established
by the victorious powers at the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials. In the Angola trials, unlike the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials, the applicable laws
were formulated by the tribunal. They were based upon three species of
crime: crimes against humanity, crimes against peace, and the crime of
mercenarism.
The crime of mercenarism is particularly obnoxious within the African context. In Africa, the mercenary is seen as the representative of
colonialism and of racist oppression-an assassin hired to kill freedomfighters in wars of national liberation and wars against racial oppression.
It is significant that in 1967 the Organization of African Unity adopted a
resolution soundly condemning mercenary activities in the Congo."" In
1969 a resolution was adopted calling upon all nations, especially Western
European powers, to make the recruitment and training of mercenaries a

Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations.
Protocol I, supra note 40, art. 1, para. 4; 72 AM. J. INT'L L. 457, 458 (1978).
43. These conferences were part of an effort initiated by the Red Cross to update the
1949 Geneva Conventions. See generally Baxter, Humanitarian Law or Humanitarian
Politics? The 1974 Diplomatic Conference on HumanitarianLaw, 16 HARv. INT'L L.J. 1
(1975); Cantrell, HumanitarianLaw in Armed Conflict: The Third Diplomatic Conference,
61 MARQ. L. REV. 253 (1977).
44. See Z. CERVENKA, THE UNFINISHED QUEST FOR UNITY: AFRICA AND THE OAU 94
(1977).
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crime.' 5 Another passionate condemnation of mercenary action was registered at the Lagos meeting of the Council of Ministers in 1970. At its
1971 meeting, the O.A.U..adopted a declaration on the preparation of a
legal instrument for the coordination, harmonization, and promotion of
the struggle of the African peoples and states against mercenarism.4 Responding to the persistent and persuasive arguments put forth by the
O.A.U., the United Nations General Assembly has adopted a number of
important resolutions substantially in accord with those of the O.A.U.47
In the discussions prior to the adoption of the Geneva Protocol of
1977 concerning international conflicts,4' 8 the Nigerian delegation put
forth the following definition of the term "mercenary": "A mercenary includes any person not a member of the Armed Forces of a party to the
conflict who is especially recruited abroad and who is motivated to fight
or to take part in armed conflict essentially for monetary payment, reward or other private gain." While not adopting this definition, the Geneva Diplomatic Conference did reach a consensus based upon it.'
An equally important development in the law against racial oppression is the declaration of the United Nations making the policy and the
practice of apartheid in South Africa an international crime." The policy
and practice of apartheid is now on a par with genocide, wars against
humanity, and wars against peace as an international crime. On December 12, 1979, the most sweeping resolution condemning apartheid to date
was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly.5 ' Among the topics covered in this resolution were an international conference on sanctions against South Africa, an arms embargo, an oil embargo, the situation of political prisoners in South Africa, women and children under
apartheid, and foreign investments in South Africa. It is clearly evident
that the international community has managed to marshall ever-increasing pressure to bear upon the inhuman and degrading apartheid policies

45. Res. 58(VI), O.A.U. Assembly of Heads of State and Government (1969).
46. Declaration on the Activities of Mercenaries in Africa, Eighth O.A.U. Summit
Heads of State Conference, Addis Ababa (June 1971).
47. See, e.g., Question of Territories under Portuguese administration, G.A. Res. 2395,
23 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 18) 59, U.N. Doc. A/7218 (1968); Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, G.A. Res. 2465, id.
at 4; Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, G.A. Res. 2548, 24 GAOR, Supp. (No. 30) 5, U.N. Doc. A/7630 (1969);
Basic Principles of the Legal Status of the Combatants Struggling against Colonial and
Alien Domination and Racist Regimes, G.A. Res. 3103, 28 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 30) 142,
U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973).
48. Note 40 supra.
49. Id.
50. International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of
Apartheid, adopted Nov. 30, 1973, entered into force July 18, 1976. G.A. Res. 3068
(XXVIII), 28 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 30) 75, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1974), reprinted in 13
INT'L LEGAL MAT. 50 (1974).
51. G.A. Res. 34/93, Dec. 17, 1979, 34 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 76) 29, U.N. Doc. A/34/
46 (1980).
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practiced in South Africa.
LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER

The New International Economic Order seems to be the current
vogue in contemporary public international law at the United Nations. It
emanates from two main sources. The first is in two parts: United Nations General Assembly Resolutions 3201(S-VI) and 3202(S-VI), which
embody respectively the Declaration and the Programme on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order (NIEO). These were
adopted on May 1, 1974.52 The second main source is General Assembly
Resolution 3281 (XXIX), which embodies the Charter of Economic
Rights and Duties of States, adopted on December 12, 1974.5' The objective of bringing about changes in the existing international economic order have been reinforced by subsequent resolutions of the General Assembly," of UNCTAD IV in 1976,55 and of UNCTAD in 1979," and also
by the agreement reached at the Conference on International Economic
Cooperation in Paris in 1977.57 At the 1978 session of the General Assembly, it was decided that there should be a review of the developments "in
the field of international economic cooperation towards the establishment
of the new international economic order," and that the Commission on
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) should take into account, in its
work, all relevant decisions of the General Assembly."
The Commission accordingly included among its priorities an item
entitled "Legal Implications of the New International Economic Order."

52. Resolution 3201 contains the Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, May 1, 1974, G.A. Res. 3201, (VI-Special) U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No.
1) 3, U.N. Doc. A/9559 (1974), reprintedin 13 Iz'uL LEGAL MAT. 715 (1974). Resolution 3202
contains the Programme of Action on the Establishment of a New International Economic
Order, May 1, 1974, G.A. Res. 3202, (VI-Special) U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 1) 5, U.N. Doc. A/
9559 (1974), reprinted in 13 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 720 (1974).
53. Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, Dec. 12, 1974, G.A. Res. 3281, 29
U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 31) 50, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1975), reprinted in 14 INT'L LEGAL MAT.
251 (1975).
54. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 3362, Sept. 16, 1975, (VII-Special) U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 1) 3,
U.N. Doc. A/10301 (1976) (implementing measures to bring about the NIEO); G.A. Res.
3506 (XXX), Dec. 15, 1975, 30 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 34) 65, U.N. Doc. A/10034 (1976),
(urging prompt implementation of Res. 3362); G.A. Res. 3460 (XXX), Dec. 11, 1975, id. at
58, (authorizing the U.N. Special Fund to convene a pledging conference); G.A. Res. 3510
(XXX), Dec. 15, 1975, id. at 67, (initiating review of U.N. policy toward economic emergencies in developing countries especially); G.A. Res. 3515 (XXX), Dec. 15, 1975, id. at 70,
(requesting governments participating in the Conference on International Cooperation to
ensure that its decisions take full account of the resolutions creating the NIEO).
55. Proceedings of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (Report
and Annexes) 6, U.N. Doc. TD/218 (vol. 1) (1977).
56. Action Taken on Commodities, Development Aid, Technology, Shipping and Other
Issues, U.N. CHRON., May 1979, at 44.
57. See [1977] U.N.Y.B. 385.
58. G.A. Res. 33/92, Dec. 16, 1978, 33 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 45) 216, U.N. Doc. A/33/
45 (1979).
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At its first meeting, held in New York in 1980, a working group established by UNCITRAL included the following topics in its work program:
(1) legal aspects of multilateral commodity agreements; (2) identification
of legal issues arising in the context of foreign investments; (3) intergovernmental bilateral agreements on industrial cooperation; (4) harmonization, unification, and review of contractual provisions commonly occurring with international contracts in the field of industrial development;
(5) identification of concrete legal problems arising from the activities of
transnational corporations; and (6) concession agreements and other
agreements in the field of natural resources. As is evident from this list of
topics, UNCITRAL is actively seeking to create legal channels and techniques conducive to the successful implementation of the principles underlying the NIEO.
While the legal issues have been gaining more importance, the core of
the NIEO philosophy still calls for active economic development among
the less developed countries. It was in this vein that the Third General
Conference of the United Nations Industrial Development Organization
(UNIDO) was held in New Delhi from January 21 to February 9, 1980.
Emerging from this conference was the New Delhi Declaration and Plan
for Action.59 The Conference proposed the establishment of a NorthSouth global fund with the ambitious goal of collecting 300 billion U.S.
dollars by the year 2000 to promote industrialization within the developing countries. In a meeting to be convened by UNIDO in late 1981,
sectoral targets were to be established for important industrial growth areas, such as iron and steel, agricultural machinery, petrochemicals, food
processing, capital goods, and fertilizers.60 It should be noted that the
New Delhi Plan is still at an early stage of development and the acceptance of the plan by the developed countries is by no means certain.
The eleventh special session of the United Nations General Assembly, devoted to global economic matters, met in New York from August
25 to September 15, 1980. While the Assembly was unable to agree upon
a single unified plan to direct the continued economic development strategy, a number of development targets were enunciated. 6' All of the documents presented at the special session were transmitted to the Assembly's
thirty-fifth regular session, which met from September to December 1980.
Among the various decisions taken during the thirty-fifth General
Assembly session was resolution 35/36, of December 5, proclaiming the
Third United Nations Development Decade. 62 This resolution essentially

59. New Delhi Declaration and Plan for Action, Third General Conference of the
United Nations Industrial Development Organization, Apr. 11, 1980, U.N. Doc. ID/CONF.47
22 (1980).
60. See UNIDO to Convene 1981 Conference on $300 Billion, U.N. CHRON., Apr. 1980,
at 27.
61. See New Development Targets Defined As Assembly Ends Special Session, U.N.
CHRON., Nov. 1980, at 27.
62. See Third Development Decade Proclaimed As New International Strategy
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affirmed and reestablished the need for the implementation of the NIEO
programs, and it is to be hoped that the problems and issues that have
arisen with respect to the NIEO can be approached, by all parties, with a
sincere desire to implement the various NIEO programs.
As evidenced by the program of UNCITRAL described above, increasing efforts are being undertaken within the United Nations to establish the legal means necessary to successfully implement the NIEO. It was
in this light that the Assembly adopted resolution 35/166 on December
15, 1980, requesting the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) to prepare a study of the current and evolving norms
of international law "relating to the new international economic order
concerning the economic relations among states, international organizations, other entities of public international law, and the activities of
transnational corporations. ' 63 Member states were urged to submit any
material relevant to the study by July 31, 1981.
In addition to all these developments, other regulatory steps are being taken. Among these is the elaboration by UNCTAD of the International Code of Conduct on the Transfer of Technology. There is also a
Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations, being formulated by the
United Nations Commission on Transnational Corporations. Under contemplation are proposals for the amendment of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade" and of the Paris Convention for the Protection of
Industrial Property." Steps are being taken in the promotion of national
and regional legislation to improve the terms under which technological
advancement can be pursued in developing countries. Finally, continuing
efforts are being made to create new development arrangements giving
effect to the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources.
CONCLUSION

As can be seen from the brief analysis presented above, new perspectives and conceptions are developing in contemporary public international law. Many areas, previously characterized by the enunciation of basic principles and goals, are now shifting towards the actual development
of the legal mechanisms necessary to realize and to implement these
goals. As this process continues, the importance of international law in
the world community will also grow. The challenge to international law
and to international lawyers is to devise legal instruments in such a way
that the aspirations and rights of no state or people are promoted at the
expense of other states or peoples. Clearly, negotiations and multilateral
Adopted, U.N. CHRON., Mar. 1981, at 42.
63. See UNITAR Study Requested on Legal Aspects of New Economic Order, U.N.
CHRON., Feb. 1981, at 63.
64. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, concluded at Geneva Oct. 30, 1947, 61
Stat. pts. 5 & 6, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187.
65. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, revised
July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, T.I.A.S. No. 6923.
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meetings are necessary in this regard and these negotiations must be sensitive to the historical realities of both the developing and the developed
countries. It is within this context that an equitable and just result must
be sought. The basic rights and freedoms contained in the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights must serve as both the underlying goal and minimum requirements of any negotiations.
The developments traced above are but steps in the evolution of
modern international law. While the need for the enunciation of positive
law in important areas of such as the law of the sea and nuclear armaments still exists, other areas have developed beyond the point of enunciation and now require implementation mechanisms. Human rights is a
good example of an area where implementation must become the chief
area of focus. Any law, be it domestic or international, only fulfills its
purpose upon implementation. The new perspectives raised in the foregoing discussion are bound to transform customary international law in a
manner calculated to serve the evolving international community in the
foreseeable future.

ARTICLE

The Iran Hostage Crisis and the
International Court of Justice: Aspects of
the Case Concerning United States
Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran
AMIR RAFAT

I. INTRODUCTION
On November 29, 1979, the United States took its dispute with Iran
over the hostage issue to the International Court of Justice by submitting
an application' under article 40(1) of the Court's Statute" in which it
charged the Government of Iran with violation of various legal principles
embodied not only in customary international law but also in four treaties
to which both countries are party: namely, the Vienna Conventions on
Diplomatic and Consular Relations; the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic
Relations, and Consular Rights; and the 1973 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents.5 In defiance of its commitments under
these treaties, the application alleged inter alia, that Iran. had failed to
protect the American embassy during the events on and following November 4, 1979; had in fact supported and was continuing to support the
© 1981 by Amir Rafat.
Professor of Political Science, DePauw University. Licence, 1955, University of Geneva
(Switzerland); M.A., 1958, University of Nebraska; Ph.D, 1964, University of Minnesota.
1. Application by the United States, United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in
Tehran, [1980] I.C.J. 3, reprinted in 80 DEP'T STATE BULL. 38 (Jan. 1980).
2. The Statute of the International Court of Justice, article 40(1), provides that cases
are brought before the Court "either by notification of the special agreement or by a written
application addressed to the Registrar." The United States brought the case to the Court by
proceeding in the latter of the two methods provided.
3. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3230, T.I.A.S.
No. 7502, 500 U.N.T.S. 241 [hereinafter cited as Diplomatic Relations Convention]; Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, T.I.A.S. No. 6820, 596
U.N.T.S. 261 [hereinafter cited as Consular Relations Convention].
4. Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights, Aug. 15, 1955, United
States-Iran, 8 U.S.T. 899, T.I.A.S. No. 3853 [hereinafter Treaty of Amity].
5. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally
Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, opened for signature Dec. 14, 1973, 28
U.S.T. 1977, T.I.A.S. No. 8532.
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actions against the embassy and its personnel; and was threatening judicial proceedings against the hostages. 6 The United States asked the Court
to find that Iran had violated its international legal obligations to the

United States and to order corrective action, viz., the release of the hostages and their safe departure from Iran, reparations to the United States
and its affected nationals, and the prosecution of those responsible for the
embassy seizure.7 The U.S. Government appended to its principal application a request for interim measures,8 asking the Court to direct Iran to
release the hostages and arrange for their safe departure, to restore the

occupied premises to U.S. control, to ensure that the U.S. diplomatic and
consular staff were accorded the protections necessary to carry out their
official functions, and to refrain from any form of criminal action against
the hostages.'
The action precipitating the crisis occurred during the course of an
anti-American demonstration on November 4, 1979, about two weeks after and in protest against the admission of the former Shah to the United

States for medical treatment.10 On that day, the American embassy was

overrun and its personnel were taken hostage by an armed group of sev-

eral hundred militant students. The United States alleged that the responsible Iranian officials took no action to prevent the embassy seizure

6. Application by the United States, United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in
Tehran, [1980] I.C.J. 3, reprinted in 80 DFP'T STATE BULL. 38, 40 (Jan. 1980).
7. Id.
8. Request for Interim Measures by the United States, United States Diplomatic and
Consular Staff in Tehran, [19791 I.C.J. 7 (order granting provisional measures), reprinted in
80 DFP'T STATE BULL. 40 (Jan. 1980). Under the I.C.J. Statute article 41(1), the Court may
indicate, "if it considers that circumstances so require, any provisional measures which
ought to be taken to preserve the respective rights of either party." The Court's jurisprudence has determined that the rights to be so protected are those which stand in danger of
"irreparable prejudice." Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case (Greece v. Turkey), [1976] I.C.J.
3, 9, para. 25 (order denying interim protection). See Gross, The Dispute Between Greece
and Turkey Concerning the Continental Shelf in the Aegean, 71 AM. J. INT'L L. 31 (1977).
What the term "irreparable" implies is open to varying interpretations. In Aegean Sea,
some judges were inclined to give it a liberal definition. Judge Elias, for instance, contended
in his separate opinion that under certain conditions, offending the national susceptibilities
of a state may satisfy the test. [1976] I.C.J. at 30. In the present case, as will appear below,
note 59 infra, the Court seemed to imply that the rights claimed by the United States stood
in danger of irreparable harm under any definition of the term. For a view that the Court, in
considering whether to indicate interim measures, ought not rely exclusively on the concept
of irreparable harm, see Adebe, The Rule on Interlocutory Injunctions under Domestic
Law and the Interim Measures of Protectionunder InternationalLaw: Some CriticalDifferences, 4 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 277, 289-96 (1976-77).
9. Request for Interim Measures by the United States, United States Diplomatic and
Consular Staff in Tehran, [1979] I.C.J. 7 (order granting provisional measures), reprinted in
80 DEP'T STATE BULL. 40 (Jan. 1980).
10. Chronology of Events in Iran, Nov. 1979, 80 DEP'T STATE BULL. 44 (Jan. 1980). The
following paragraphs describe events pertinent to the issues of law in the case. An extensive
reiteration of all the events surrounding the crisis is beyond the scope of this article and is
not necessary here.
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or to rescue the hostages."1 Repeated protests and attempts at negotiations by the United States produced no positive response from Iran,",
with the result that, except for the release of thirteen female and black
hostages,1 the situation remained essentially unchanged until the final
resolution of the crisis in January 1981.14
Once the embassy seizure was complete, Iranian officials, including
the Ayatollah Khomeini, issued statements endorsing the militants' action."5 These official and semi-official statements prompted the United
States to claim that, having first defaulted on their obligation to protect
the American embassy and its staff, the Iranian authorities had become
wholehearted participants in the violations of international law that had
occurred.' In the m~antime, the militants had proceeded to seize em-

11. Application by the United States, United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in
Tehran, [19801 I.C.J. 3, reprinted in 80 DmE'T STATE BULL. 38, 38 (Jan. 1980).
12. Immediately after the embassy takeover, President Carter commissioned former Attorney General Ramsey Clark to open negotiations with the authorities in Tehran. The
Clark mission, however, aborted after the Ayatollah Khomeini issued an order forbidding
any official of the Iranian government to meet with Mr. Clark. The same order ruled out
negotiations with any other U.S. envoy. Oral Argument by Applicant (U.S. Agent Roberts
Owen), United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, [1980] I.C.J. 3, reprintedin
80 DEP'T STATE BULL. 36, 39 (May 1980). Likewise, representations by other governments on
behalf of the United States proved fruitless, N.Y. Times, Dec. 9, 1979, at 1, col. 6, as did
mediation efforts by representatives of the Palestinian Liberation Organization and the
Pope. See Chronology of Events, supra note 10, at 44-45; N.Y. Times, Nov. 11, 1979, at 1,
col. 6; id. Nov. 12, 1979, at 1, col. 6. The Ayatollah Khomeini also undercut U.N. diplomatic
efforts by opposing plans for a Security Council session to discuss the crisis on the ground
that the outcome had already been dictated by the United States. Id., Nov. 28, 1979, at 1,
col. 6.
13. Three hostages-one woman and two black men-were released on Nov. 18, 1979.
N.Y. Times, Nov. 19, 1979, at 1, col. 6. A second group of ten female and black hostages
were released on Nov. 19, 1979. Id., Nov. 20, 1979, at 1, col. 4.
14. The information supplied to the Court by the United States showed that, after the
release of the 13 blacks and women, 50 hostages remained. Of that number, 28 had recognized diplomatic rank, 20 were employed as members of the administrative and technical
staff and therefore also entitled to protection under article 37 of the Diplomatic Relations
Convention, note 3 supra, and two private U.S. nationals without diplomatic or consular
status. United States Diplomatic & Consular Staff in Tehran, [1979] I:C.J. 7, 17-18, para. 34
(order granting provisional measures). In addition to the 50 hostages detained at the U.S.
Embassy, three diplomatic agents, including the U.S. charg6 d'affaires, were kept at the
Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran,
[1980] I.C.J. 3, 14, para. 25.
15. Immediately after the embassy takeover, the militants received encouragement
from Iranian religious leaders. N.Y. Times, Nov. 6, 1979, at 1, col. 5. The Ayatollah
Khomeini at various points in the crisis expressed support for the militants. See, e.g., id.,
Nov. 8, 1979, at 1, col. 6; id. Nov. 12, 1979, at 1, col. 6; id. Nov. 21, 1979, at 13, col. 1. In a
December 16, 1979 statement, he described the militants' action as reflecting the will of the
Iranian people. Id., Dec. 18, 1979, at 1, col. 4. Bani-Sadr, then Foreign Minister of Iran, also
supported the militants, while pledging to try to find a way out of the crisis. Id., Nov. 11,
1979, at 1, col. 6. See also id., Nov. 14, 1979, at 1 col. 4 for a report on the statement by
Ghotbzadeh, then head of Iranian radio and television, implying endorsement of the embassy takeover.
16. Oral Argument by Applicant (U.S. Agent Roberts Owen), United States Diplomatic
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bassy documents and archives, were interrogating the hostages, and were
threatening to put them on trial for alleged espionage activities. These
threats were periodically echoed
in official judicial and political circles
17
throughout the hostage crisis.
Against this background, the United States instituted parallel proceedings before the political and judicial organs of the United Nations,
that is, the Security Council and the International Court of Justice.' 8 Iran
vigorously denied any jurisdiction on the part of the Court and, following
the precedent set by France,"9 Iceland,2 0 and Turkey" in previous cases of
contested jurisdiction, took no part in the oral pleadings. Nor did Iran
avail itself of its right under the Court's Statute22 to appoint an ad hoc
judge or produce anything like a cohesive statement of its position on the
law and facts of the case. Two brief messages with overlapping contents
constituted the extent of Iran's participation in judicial proceedings. One
was sent on December 9, 1979, while the Court was considering the American request for interim measures. Iran's basic position, as indicated in its
message of December 9, was that the hostage dispute had to be considered in its wider context and, consequently, was not appropriate for adjudication by the Court.23 Iran reiterated the same objection during the
course of the merit proceedings on March 17, 1980.2"
The nonappearance of a party to a dispute submitted to the Court
brings into operation article 53 of the Statute which directs the Court to
"satisfy itself, not only that it has jurisdiction, but also that the case is
well founded in fact and law." 28 The Court concluded that the data sup-

and Consular Staff in Tehran, [1980] I.C.J. 3, reprinted in 80 DEPT STATE BULL. 36, 41
(May 1980).
17. Id. at 50-51.
18. See U.N. CHRON., Jan. 1980, at 5.
19. Nuclear Tests Case (Australia v. France), [1973] I.C.J. 99; (New Zealand v. France),
[1973] I.C.J. 135 (orders granting interim protection); (Australia v. France), [1974] I.C.J.
253; (New Zealand v. France), [1974] I.C.J. 457.
20. Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (United Kingdom v. Iceland), [1972] I.C.J. 12; (Federal
Republic of Germany v. Iceland), [1972] I.C.J. 30 (orders granting interim protection);
(United Kingdom v. Iceland), [1974] I.C.J. 3; (Federal Republic of Germany v. Iceland),
[1974] I.C.J. 175.
21. Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case (Greece v. Turkey), [1976] I.C.J. 3 (order denying interim protection); [1978] I.C.J. 3.
22. The I.C.J. Statute article 31(2) provides that "[i]f the Court includes upon the
Bench a Judge of the nationality of one of the parties, any other party may choose a person
to sit as a judge."
23. Letter to the Court from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Iran (Dec. 9, 1979),
reprinted in United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, [19791 I.C.J. 7, 10-11,
para. 8 (order granting provisional measures) [hereinafter cited as Letter of Dec. 9, 1979].
24. Letter to the Court from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Iran (Mar. 16, 1980),
reprinted in United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, [1980] I.C.J. 3, 8, para.
10.
25. I.C.J. STAT. art. 53. For a discussion of the legal effects of the nonappearance of a
party, see Eisemann, Les Eflets de la Non-Comparution Devant la Cour Internationalede
Justice, 19 ANNUAIRE FRANVAIS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 235 (1973).
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plied by the United States constituted "a massive body of information"
concerning the facts and circumstances of the case."' It also noted that
the information supplied by the United States, which had been communicated to Iranian officials, had evoked neither denial nor questioning on
their part. The bench was thus satisfied that the allegations of fact on
which the United States based its claims were well founded within the
meaning of article 53 of the Statute."'
In its order of December 15, 1979,8 the Court, by unanimous vote,
granted interim relief as requested by the United States. In its judgment
on the merits, delivered May 24, 1980, s 0 the Court unanimously reiterated
the measures already indicated to Iran in its interim order, but split on
the more sensitive issues of the extent of Iran's liability and its obligation
to pay reparations for the harm caused to the United States and its
nationals.80
United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff is undoubtedly one of
the most important cases ever handled by the International Court. The
substantive law issues raised in this case-more specifically, those concerning Iran's violations of its obligations under customary, codified rules
of international diplomacy-were simple ones; they required no unusual
time for decision and afforded little opportunity for judicial lawmaking.
Yet, in two respects, the Court's interim and final judgments are significant even beyond the law and facts of the case. First, the Court made
important contributions to the international lawmaking process by illuminating and settling certain questions of international jurisprudence, notably those related to the indication of interim protection and to the relationship between international adjudication and the political functions
and processes of the United Nations. Second, and more important, the
hostage issue being one of the most politicized cases ever brought before
an international tribunal, its disposition by the Court raises crucial questions about the boundary between law and politics in the world community and, particularly, the role that devolves on the Court as the principal
judicial organ of the United Nations in defining and adjusting that
boundary. This aspect of the case, to be commented on in sections VI and
VII, offers fertile ground for speculation regarding the function and the
potential of the Court in the peacekeeping processes of the international
community.
26. [1980] I.C.J. at 3, 10, para. 13.
27. Id.
28. [1979] I.C.J. at 7 (order granting provisional measures).
29. [19801 I.C.J. at 3.
30. Among the points which divided the Court was the view of the minority that the
unilateral military and economic measures undertaken by the United States between the
interim order and the final judgment-i.e., the aborted rescue mission and President
Carter's Exec. Order No. 12205, 3 C.F.R. 248 (1980) regarding the future disposition of frozen Iranian assets-cast doubt on U.S. intentions to settle the dispute by exclusively peaceful means. [1980] I.C.J. at 51, 58 (Morozov, J., and Tarazi, J., dissenting). For a report on
the rescue operation, see N.Y. Times, Apr. 25, 1980, at 1, col. 6.

DEN. J. OF INT'L

VOL. 10:425

L. & POL'Y

This article examines both the law and certain policy implications of
the interim order and final judgment entered in United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff. Section II discusses the order of December 15,
1979, in which the Court granted interim measures; section III contains
an analysis of the jurisdictional issues in the case; and section IV examines the separation of judicial and political powers in the United Nations.
A discussion of the decision on the merits, with particular focus on the
Court's breakdown in unanimity, is contained in section V. The justiciability of politicized international disputes, together with the broader
implications of the case, are considered in section VI. Section VII summarizes the substantive law contributions and, based on the case concerning
the United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff, suggests the implementation of a wider scope of inquiry in the resolution of adversary
claims in politicized North-South disputes.
II.

THE ORDER OF DECEMBER

15, 1979

The interim measures of protection indicated by the Court coincided
closely with the measures requested by the United States. They enjoined
Iran to restore the occupied premises to U.S. control, to ensure the immediate release of the hostages and their safe departure from Iran, and to
afford to all members of the U.S. diplomatic and consular staff the protections to which they were entitled under customary and conventional
law, including protection from any kind of criminal jurisdiction. At the
same time, the Court took it upon itself to call on both parties to refrain
from any action which might aggravate the tension between them or
render the existing crisis more difficult of solution. 1
A.

The Special Features of the U.S. Interim Claims

One novel feature of the interim order in this case is that, together
with preventive actions-restraint from putting the hostages on trial and
from tension-aggravating acts-the Court, for the first time in its history,
required positive measures,"5 not to preserve the status quo, but to reestablish "the last uncontested status prior to the controversy."3 3 In the absence of any duplication between an application and request for interim
measures, this broadening of the scope of interim protection poses no legal difficulty. It is possible that, as in the present case, affirmative measures would be needed to preserve the rights claimed by one party or
another, and this possibility seems in fact anticipated in the provision of
article 75(1)-(2) of the Court's revised rules of procedure which contemplates the indication of interim measures that "ought to be taken or com-

31. [1979] I.C.J. at 21, para. 47.
32. The Court ordered, inter alia, the release of the hostages, their safe departure, and
the restoration of the occupied premises to U.S. control. Id..
33. This phrase was suggested in E. DUMBAULD, INTERIM MEASURES IN INTERNATIONAL
CONTROVERSIES 187 (1932).
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plied with.""' (Emphasis added.) In the present case, however, the positive actions indicated to Iran created a special situation because they
partially preempted the measures requested by the United States in its
application for a decision on the merits: the U.S. interim request and
principal application both sought, inter alia, the release of the hostages
and their safe departure."8
The duplication of the appeal for the release of the hostages and
their safe departure in the interim request and the principal application
inevitably opened up the United States to the charge that it aimed to
obtain a favorable judgment on the merits through interim relief. Iran
raised this issue in its first message, objecting that the granting of the
interim measures requested by the United States would amount to a
"judgment on the actual substance of the case." 6 Some authority for
Iran's position derived from the Chorz6w Factory case,37 wherein the Permanent Court of International Justice ruled that Poland had acted contrary to its international obligations in expropriating certain German interests. Germany then sued to recover damages, and, pendente lite,
requested interim measures in the form of a prepayment on the final
award. The Permanent Court declined the request on the ground that it
was designed to give the applicant an interim judgment on part of the
substantive claim.3 s
Responding to Iran's objection, the Court in the present case limited
and distinguished the Chorz6w Factory precedent, summarily noting
that, on the one hand, the circumstances in that case "were entirely different," and, on the other, that "the request there sought to obtain from
the Court a final judgment on a claim for a sum of money."3 9 It is difficult
to discern from the elliptical language of the Court what precisely in the
subject matter of the German request or the circumstances surrounding it
operated to make it inapplicable to the facts of the U.S. request in the
hostage case. To help understand the Court's meaning, it is necessary to

34. I.C.J. RULES, reprinted in ACTS
THE COURT,

AND

DOCUMENTS CONCERNING

THE ORGANIZATION OF

No. 4 (1978). Art. 75(1)-(2) provides as follows:

(1) The Court may at any time decide to examine proprio motu whether the
circumstances of the case require the indication of provisional measures which

ought to be taken or complied with by any or all of the parties.
(2) When a request for provisional measures has been made, the Court may
indicate measures that are in whole or in part other than those requested, or
that ought to be taken or complied with by the party which has itself made the
request. [Emphasis added.]
35. See Oral Argument by Applicant (U.S. Agent Roberts Owen), United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, [1980] I.C.J. 3, reprinted in 80 DEP'T STATE BULL. 43,
47 (Feb. 1980).
36. Letter of Dec. 9, 1979, note 23 supra.
37. Case Concerning the Factory at Chorz6w, [1927] P.C.I.J. ser. A., No. 12 (order de-

nying interim measures). The International Court of Justice succeeded the Permanent
Court of Justice.
38. Id. at 10.
39. [1979] I.C.J. at 16, para. 28.
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put the reasoning it applied to justify the indication of protective measures in the context of its case law on the subject. The result is illuminating: the indication of provisional measures in United States Diplomatic
and Consular Staff closes a gap in international jurisprudence by supplying a formula for evaluating the admissiliility of interim claims when they
duplicate and preempt the subject matter of the principal application.
Turning to the Court's case law, it appears that in three
cases-Polish Agrarian Reform and the German Minority,0 Interhandel,4' and Aegean Sea Continental Shelf'2-the Court or its predecessor declined to order interim measures solely'8 or partially 44 because of
the absence of a link between the measures requested and the subject
matter of the principal action. The order in United States Diplomatic
and Consular Staff confirms this line of jurisprudence by noting that "a
request for provisional measures must by its very nature relate to the
substance of the case since, as Article 41 expressly states, their object is
45
to preserve the respective rights of either party.'
United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff is thus consistent with
previous case law in requiring a link between the injunctive measures and
the substance of the principal action. At the same time, the case raised a
related question: Even though a- link between interim and substantive
measures is required, could a case be made that the two measures must
not overlap, for if they did the granting of the request would inevitably
entail a judgment on the merits?" 6 Until the hostage case, the Court's
jurisprudence did not supply a clear answer to this question. As already
noted, the Permanent Court's disposition of the German request in the
Chorz6w Factory case seemed to suggest an affirmative answer on its face:
that any overlap between the two would result in a denial of interim
47
measures.
On the other hand, in two releatively recent cases-FisheriesJurisdiction4' and Nuclear Tests49-the Chorz6w Factory holding notwith-

40. Case Concerning the Polish Agrarian Reform and the German Minority, [1933]
P.C.I.J., ser. A/B, No. 58, at 175 (order denying interim measures).
41. Interhandel Case (Switzerland v. United States), [1957] I.C.J. 105, 111-12 (order
denying interim measures).
42. Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case (Greece v. Turkey), [1976] I.C.J. at 14, para. 46
(order denying interim protection).
43. Case Concerning the Polish Agrarian Reform and the German Minority, [1933]
P.C.I.J., ser. A/B, No. 58, at 178 (order denying interim measures).
44. Interhandel Case, [1957] I.C.J. at 111-12; Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case,
[1976] I.C.J. at 11.
45. [1979] I.C.J. at 16, para. 28.
46. For a discussion of the problems presented by overlapping interim and substantive
claims, see Cot, Affaires des Essais Nucltaires, 19 ANNUAIRE FRANVAIS DE DRorr INTERNATIONAL 252, 266 (1973).
47. See text accompanying notes 37 and 38 supra.
48. (United Kingdom v. Iceland), [1972] I.C.J. 12; (Federal Republic of Germany v.
Iceland), [19721 I.C.J. 30 (orders granting interim protection). The United Kingdom and the
Federal Republic of Germany filed these parallel actions challenging the validity of Iceland's
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standing-the Court acted as if an overlap in itself did not rule out injunctive relief. In Fisheries Jurisdiction, the Court directed the
respondent, Iceland, to withhold enforcement of its new fisheries jurisdic0 The interim measures ordered
tion pendente lite.5
amounted, in effect,
to a provisional judgment on the substantive claims of the applicants, the
United Kingdom and West Germany, but the Court sought to limit the
impact of the interim measures on Iceland by directing the applicants to
restrict the fish catch of their nationals during the pendency of the case.
The interim order in Nuclear Tests was less balanced: France alone
was directed to refrain from action-that is, to refrain from conducting
atmospheric nuclear tests in the Pacific pending a judgment on the substantive issues involved. 5' Since the substantive issues involved the legality or illegality of such tests and therefore their continuance or permanent cessation, Judges Forster 5 and Gros 5 ' protested that the Court was

in fact rendering a provisional judgement on behalf of the applicants."
Preemptive as the orders in Fisheries Jurisdiction and Nuclear
Tests may have appeared, they still left the respondents with the option
of resuming the exercise of their rights-to extend fisheries jurisdiction
and resume tests, respectively-in the event of a decision on the merits in
their favor. The order in the hostage case, on the other hand, left no such
option to the respondent, who was being directed to reinstate the status
quo ante through irreversible acts. The interim order thus appeared not
as a provisional but a final judgment on a portion-and a substantial one
at that-of the principal claims. Indeed, so fully did the interim order
preempt the substantive issues that had the respondent elected to comply
with the order it would have found itself in the awkward position of joining the proceedings only to settle the extent and nature of the reparations
it owed to the United States. It was perhaps with a view to making this

decision to extend its exclusive fisheries jurisdiction to a 50 nautical mile zone. The legal
issues involved in the two actions were identical. See Favoreu, Les Arrts du 2 Fvrier 1973,
19 ANNUAiRE FRANVAJS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 272 (1973).
49. (Australia v. France), [1973] I.C.J. 99; (New Zealand v. France), [19731 I.C.J. 135
(orders granting interim protection). The litigation arose from parallel applications filed by
Australia and New Zealand challenging the legality of the French nuclear tests in the South
Pacific. See Elkind, French Nuclear Testing and Article 41-Another Blow to the Authority of the Court, 8 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 39 (1974-75); Lellouche, The Nuclear Tests
Cases: JudicialSilence v. Atomic Blasts, 16 HAIv. INTL. L.J. 614 (1975); McWhinney, International Law-Making and the JudicialProcess: The World Court and the French Nuclear
Tests Case, 3 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & CoM. 9 (1975).
50. [1972] I.C.J. at 17; [1972] I.C.J. at 35.
51. [1973] I.C.J. at 106; [1973] I.C.J. at 142.
52. [1973] I.C.J. at 111; [1973] I.C.J. at 148 (Forster, J., dissenting).
53. [1973] I.C.J. at 115; [1973] I.C.J. at 149 (Gros, J., dissenting).
54. Judge Forster observed pointedly that the requested measures were "so close to the
actual subject-matter" as to be "practically indistinguishable therefrom .. " He went on to
charge Australia (and, by implication, New Zealand) with seeking "an actual judgement on
the legality, or rather the illegality, of further nuclear tests" through the interim route.
[1973] I.C.J. at 113 (Forster, J., dissenting).
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prospect more acceptable that the Court in its interim order went out of
its way to show how the adjudicative process could be used by Iran not
only to defend itself against U.S. reparation claims, but also to submit
claims of its own related to the alleged inequities attributed to the U.S.
Government." Thus when making the usual disclaimer that the decision
in the interim proceedings did not prejudge "any question relating to the
merits themselves," the Court invited the respondent to present arguments regarding the activities of the United States in Iran "either by way
of defense

. . .

or by way of counterclaims filed under Article 80 or the

Rules of Court."" (Emphasis added.)
The foregoing discussion yields two observations. First, until United
States Diplomatic and Consular Staff, international case law on the
availability of interim protection which anticipates measures requested in
the principal application was inconclusive. The Permanent Court denied
interim measures in Chorz6w Factory on the ground that the measures
sought encroached too heavily on the substantive questions. Later, the
International Court granted interim measures in Fisheries Jurisdiction
and Nuclear Tests in spite of the apparent overlap with the claims advanced for adjudication in the principal applications. Neither Fisheries
Jurisdiction nor Nuclear Tests, taken alone or together, provided clear
guidelines for the consideration of requests for interim measures in future
cases. Second, the U.S. request in United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff preempting, as it did, a pivotal portion of the claims advanced in
the principal application, placed the question of overlapping requests in
its most acute form, and in response, the Court confronted the issues in
terms that seem to have yielded a definitive criterion for the admissibility
of such requests.
The Court's reasoning was as follows. The object of interim measures, it observed, is to protect the rights claimed by either party from
"irreparable prejudice" pendente lite.57 The rights claimed in this case
included those of U.S. nationals to "life, liberty, protection and security"" which, given the conditions under which the hostages were being
held, stood in grave danger of irreparable harm and thus needed protection of the kind requested by the United States."9 That these rights overlapped with those claimed in the principal application, the Court seemed
to imply, was no bar to granting protection as long as it could be shown
that the purpose of the U.S. request was "not to obtain a judgment, in55. [1979] I.C.J. at 10, para. 45.
56. Id. at 15, para. 24. Article 80(1) provides as follows: "A counter-claim may be
presented provided that it is directly connected with the subject-matter of the claim of the
party and that it comes within the jurisdiction of the Court." I.C.J. RuLEs, note 34 supra.
57. [1979] I.C.J. at 19, para. 36.
58. Id. para. 37, quoting from the request for interim measures by the United States.
59. Id. at 20, para. 42. The Court stated that the continuance of the situation which
gave rise to the request would expose "the human beings concerned to privation, hardship,
anguish and even danger to life and health and thus to a serious possibility of irreparable
harm."
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terim or final, on the merits of its claims but to preserve the substance of
the rights in claims pendente lite." 0 Thus, the controlling criterion in
deciding the availability of preemptive interim protection is not the content but the purpose of the request. The question to be asked is whether
the request intends to obtain through the interim route a judgment on
the merits. If so, as in Chorz6w Factory, it must be denied as inadmissable. If, on the other hand, the request seeks in good faith to protect the rights asserted by the claimant state, the preemptive character of
interim claims is only incidental to the circumstances of the dispute and
does not in itself preclude the granting of provisional relief. 1 Whether
relief is granted or not then depends on the existence of the second condition posited by the Court, namely, that the rights claimed by the request0
ing party stand in danger of irreparable prejudice. '
The authority behind the formula implicit in the Court's finding is
doubly impressive: not only was the decision reached by a unanimous
vote, but also the bench included Judges Forster and Gros who rallied to
the official opinion even though the ground they invoked for their dissent
in Nuclear Tests63-the practical indistinguishability of the interim measures from the substance of the principal action--described the circumstances present in United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff perhaps
even better than it described those present in Nuclear Tests."s
B.

The Parties' Reactions to the Interim Order

It is well known that Iran did not comply with the Court's order."
Less well known is the regrettable fact that Iran's reaction in this case fits
the pattern set by respondents in all prior cases of contested jurisdiction.
Since its establishment in 1946, the Court has received nine requests for
interim measures,6s six of which it granted.7 In no case so far has the

60. Id. at 16, para. 28.
61. Jean-Pierre Cot, supra note 46, at 269, suggested an almost identical criterion when
he wrote, "Conservatory measures are distinguishable from a provisional judgment not by
their object but by their objective. The objective is, in [the former] case, to conserve the
rights of the parties; in [the latter], to adjudicate a part of the merits."
62. The irreparable prejudice test was established in Aegean Sea Continental Shelf
Case (Greece v. Turkey), [1976] I.C.J. 3 (order denying interim protection).
63. (Australia v. France), [1973] I.C.J. at 111, 115; (New Zealand v. France), [1973]
I.C.J. at 137, 138 (Forster, J., and Gros, J., dissenting).
64. Since Judges Forster and Gros endorsed the order granting provisional measures
without comment, the reasons for their support of the order in this case as compared with
their opposition to the granting of interim protection in Nuclear Tests cannot be determined with certainty. While their endorsement may indicate a modification of their earlier
emphatically articulated positions, it is not unreasonable to suggest that their support of the
provisional measures indicated in United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff may have
been facilated by (1) the clarity of applicable law as regards both jurisdiction and merits
and (2) the tactical desire of the bench to close ranks and thus enhance the psychological
impact of its opinion in the face of Iran's order-threatening conduct.
65. [1980] I.C.J. at 35, para. 75.
66. In addition to the present case, the Court received requests for interim measures in
Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case (Greece v. Turkey), [1976] I.C.J. 3 (order denying in-
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respondent accepted or complied with the order.
While the prevailing legal opinion holds that Court orders lack binding force,"8 one can hardly avoid the conclusion that widespread noncompliance with Court orders is bound to undermine confidence in the credibility of international adjudication. In United States Diplomatic and
Consular Staff, the challenge to the prestige and authority of the Court
was doubly serious; it emanated not only from the party contesting its
jurisdiction, but from the applicant as well. That challenge came in the
form of the April 1980 military operation within Iranian territory to rescue the hostages." The U.S. action, as the Court did not fail to point out,

terim protection); Nuclear Tests Case (Australia v. France), [1973] I.C.J. 99; (New Zealand
v. France), [1973] I.C.J. 135 (orders granting interim protection); Case Concerning Trial of
Pakistani Prisoners of War (Pakistan v. India), [19731 I.C.J. 328 (order denying interim
measures); Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (United Kingdom v. Iceland), [19721 I.C.J. 12; (West
Germany v. Iceland), [1972] I.C.J. 30 (orders granting interim protection); Anglo-Iranian Oil
Co. Case (United Kingdom v. Iran), [1951] I.C.J. 89 (order granting interim measures); Interhandel Case (Switzerland v. United States), [1957] I.C.J. 105 (order denying interim
measures).
67. The Court issued orders indicating interim measures in Anglo-Iranian Fisheries
Jurisdiction (two orders), Nuclear Tests (two orders), and United States Diplomatic and
Consular Staff.
In Anglo-Iranian Oil, Iran refused to comply with the order, but the order was subsequently revoked when the Court upheld Iran's claim that it lacked jurisdiction to determine
the merits. [1952] I.C.J. at 93. In all the cases so far, refusal to comply has been motivated
by the respondent's denial of the Court's competence to hear the substance of the principal
application. For a discussion of pre-1974 cases, see Mendelson, Interim Measures of Protection in Cases of Contested Jurisdiction,46 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 259 (1972-73).
68. An early and authoritative inquiry into the drafting history of article 41 of the
STATUTE OF THE PERMANENT COURT,

which is reproduced almost verbatim in the present

Statute, concluded, "[tihere is no question of a binding order." E. DUMBAULD, supra note 33,
at 168. See also Adebe, supra note 8, at 299; Goldsworthy, Interim Measures of Protection
in the International Court of Justice, 68 AM. J. INT'L L. 259, 273-76 (1974).
The plain meaning of the relevant provisions in the Court's Statute and procedural
rules reinforces this interpretation. Only "decisions," by implication distinguishable from
"orders," have "binding force." I.C.J. STAT., art. 59. Under article 41, the Court has the
power to "indicate" or "suggest" interim measures, which again reflects the framers' intent
to withhold from "orders" the force of res judicata. More conclusive still, the Court itself
seems to attach no adverse legal or procedural consequences to noncompliance of a party
with interim measures.
There is, however, a minority view claiming binding force for interim orders. See, e.g.,
Hambro, The Binding Characterof the Provisional Measures of Protection Indicated by

the InternationalCourt of Justice, in

RECHTSFRAGEN DER INTERNATIONALEN ORGANISATION

170 (H. von Walter Schatzel & H.J. Schlochauer eds. 1956). See also 6 U.N. SCOR (559th
mtg.) para. 18, U.N. Doc. S/Agenda 554/Rev. 1 (1951), for the view presented to the Security
Council by the U.K. representative following Iran's refusal to comply with the interim order
in Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Case (United Kingdom v. Iran), [19511 I.C.J. 89 (order granting
interim measures). Essentially, that view held that the findings of the Court in an interim
order give rise to international obligations.
69. See N.Y. Times, Apr. 25, 1980, at 1, col. 6, for a report on the rescue attempt. In his
message to Congress, President Carter defended the rescue attempt under the U.N. CHARTER art. 51 and explained that it was carried out in the exercise of a country's inherent right
of self-defense "with the aim of extricating American nationals" who were the victims of the
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was in breach of the spirit of the interim order which, as discussed above,
enjoined the parties from any action which might aggravate tensions between them.
The bench divided in its response to the attempted rescue. The
Court majority showed particular sensitivity to the fact that the operation
had been planned and carried out while the proceedings adjudicating the
claims of the United States were still pending."' It was quick, however, to
point out that the question of the legality of the rescue operation was not
would have no adverse bearing on
before the Court, and, in consequence,
7
the claims of the United States. '
The majority decision against allowing the rescue attempt to have an
adverse impact on the U.S. claims drew protests from two dissenting
judges. Judge Tarazi described the U.S. military attempt as "not conducive to facilitating the judicial settlement of the dispute '""7and invoked it
as partial ground for his conclusion that not only Iran but the United
States too had "incurred responsibility" ' 8 in the present case. Judge
Morozov spoke in sharper terms. In his judgment, by attempting what he
called "a military attack on the territory of the Islamic Republic of
Iran ''7 ' in defiance of the Court's order and "simultaneously with the judicial proceedings,"' "7the United States had "forfeited the legal right as
well as the moral right to expect the Court to uphold any claim for reparation.

16

Neither Tarazi nor Morozov went so far as to claim a binding

quality for interim orders; at the same time, contrary to the majority
opinion, they both implicitly contended that noncompliance with an order can create legal liabilities and thus affect the outcome on their merits.

"Iranian armed attack" on the U.S. embassy. Letter from Pres. Carter to House Speaker
O'Neill and Sen. Magnusen (Apr. 27, 1980), reprinted in N.Y. Times, Apr. 28, 1980, at 11,
col. 3. U.N. CHARTER art. 51 provides in part: "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair
the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a
Member of the United Nations .... " Carter's language reflects a dubious interpretation of
the concept of self-defense which, within the meaning of article 51 of the U.N. Charter,
covers only defense against attacks crossing territorial borders. See P. JESSUP, A MODERN
LAw OF NATIONS 166 (1948); Brownlie, The Use of Force in Self-Defense, 37 BRIT. Y.B.
INT'L L. 183, 266 (1961); Falk, The Beirut Raid and the InternationalLaw of Retaliation,
in GREAT ISSUES OP INTERNATIONAL PoLrrcs 32, 46-48 (M. Kaplan ed. 1970); Wright, The
Cuban Quarantine,57 AM. J. INT'L L. 546, 559-63 (1963).
70. [1980] I.C.J. at 43, para. 93. It was observed by the majority that "an operation
undertaken in those circumstances, for whatever motive, is of a kind calculated to undermine respect for the judicial process in international relations."
71. Id. para. 94.

72. Id. at 64 (Tarazi, J., dissenting).
73. Id. at 65.
74. Id. at 54 (Morozov, J., dissenting).
75. Id. at 55.

76. Id. at 53.
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JURISDICTIONAL ISSUES

Incidental Jurisdiction

In proceedings before the International Court no less than in domestic judicial proceedings, the preliminary question of jurisdiction must be
resolved before the bench can reach the substantive legal issues. Furthermore, since international jurisdiction is consensual-that is, established
by the will of the party against whom it is invoked-the Court's power to
adjudicate a claim hinges on the existence of an instrument conferring
jurisdiction on it to do so. When, as in the present case, the principal
application is accompanied by a request for interim measures, the jurisdictional issues must be addressed for purposes both of the interim order
(incidental jurisdiction) and of the merit judgment (substantive jurisdiction). Incidental jurisdiction inevitably confronts the Court with a delicate legal question: To what extent is it necessary to investigate its substantive jurisdiction at this early stage? The need to act expeditiously to
protect the rights of one party or the other militates against an exhaustive, and consequently prolonged, investigation. Yet, there must be at
least a presumption in favor of jurisdiction on the merits before the Court
can consider a request for interim relief. Predictably, the Court's attempt
to achieve a balance between the two considerations has provoked considerable controversy.
The first time the Court faced the issue of its incidental jurisdiction
was in connection with the British request for interim measures in AngloIranianOil Co." There, the Court overruled Iran's objection and granted
interim relief, observing simply that it could not "be accepted a priori"
that a claim based on an alleged violation of international law, as the
British claim in that case was, "falls completely outside the scope of international jurisdiction." 8 In the Fisheries Jurisdictioncase 7 9 the Court
abandoned the a priori test in favor of a somewhat more conclusive showing of substantive jurisdiction as a precondition for the indication of interim measures. This time it settled on two tests suggested by Sir Hersch
Lauterpacht in his concurring opinion in the Interhandel Case.80 In its
adoption of these two tests, the Court observed: first, that the bench "will
not act under Article 41 in cases in which absence of jurisdiction on the
merits is manifest"; and then, that a 1961 exchange of notes invoked by
the United Kingdom as the foundation for the Court's jurisdiction appeared, "prima facie, to afford a possible basis on which the jurisdiction
of the Court might be founded."81
77. (United Kingdom v. Iran), [1951] I.C.J. 89 (order granting interim measures).
78. Id. at 93.
79. (United Kingdom v. Iceland), [1972] I.C.J. 12; (Federal Republic of Germany v.
Iceland), [1972] I.C.J. 30 (orders granting interim protection).
80. [1957] I.C.J. 105, 117 (order denying interim measures) (Lauterpacht, J.,
concurring).
81. Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (United Kingdom v. Iceland), [1972] I.C.J. 12, 15-16 (order granting interim protection).
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Thus, Fisheries Jurisdiction marks the point at which the Court
moved to the use of a positive test-that of prima facie evidence of a
basis on which jurisdiction might be found-in determining whether incidental jurisdiction exists. In all subsequent decisions, the Court has applied the positive test in generally the same terms as appeared in Fisheries Jurisdiction.As a result, the prima facie possibility test has become,
in the words of Judge Singh, "not only the latest but also the settled
jurisprudence of the Court on the subject.""2 At the same time, majority
opinions, regardless of the test applied, have invariably provoked dissent
from those who favor a fuller investigation into the Court's substantive
jurisdiction before the examination of grounds for provisional protection.88 Judges Winiarski and Badawi Pasha, for instance, in their AngloIranian Oil Co. dissenting opinion, took the position that the Court
"ought not to indicate interim measures of protection unless its competence.

. .

appears.

. .

to be..

. reasonably probable."'" Judge Forster,

in his Nuclear Tests dissent, went even further, stating that he would
require that substantive jurisdiction be established with "absolute certainty" at the interim stage.88
In only one case prior to United States Diplomatic and Consular
Staff did the Court's interim order produce something like a unanimous
vote. This was in Aegean Sea Continental Shelf where all twelve titular
judges participating in the proceedings voted to decline Greece's request
for interim measures.8 " Even so, the vote was nonetheless characterized
82. Nuclear Tests Case (Australia v. France), [1973] I.C.J. 99, 108-109 (Singh, J.,
concurring).
83. See, e.g., Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case (Greece v. Turkey), [1976] I.C.J. 3, 32
(order granting interim protection) (Tarazi, J., dissenting); Nuclear Tests Case (Australia v.
France), [1973] I.C.J. 99, 113 (order granting interim protection) (Forster, J., dissenting),
123 (Gros, J., dissenting), 160 (Petren, J., dissenting); Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (United
Kingdom v. Iceland), [1972] I.C.J. 12, 20 (order granting interim protection) (Nervo, J., dissenting); Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Case (United Kingdom v. Iran), [1951] I.C.J. 89, 96 (order
granting interim measures) (Winiarski, J. and Badawi Pasha, J., dissenting).
84. [1951] I.C.J. 89, 96-97 (order granting interim measures) (Winiarski, J. and Badawi
Pasha, J., dissenting).
85. [1973] I.C.J. 99, 113 (order granting interim protection) (Forster, J., dissenting).
Judge Forster's opinion, however, included the following qualification which seems to imply
that the "absolute certainty" test was suggested for cases where there are obstacles to the
Court's taking jurisdiction to determine the merits. He stated as follows: "The Order made
this day is an incursion into a French sector of activity placed strictly out of bounds by the
third reservation of 16 May 1966. To cross the line into that sector, the Court required no
mere probability but absolute certainty of possessing jurisdiction." Id.
The third reservation referred to in Judge Forster's opinion was one excluding from the
Court's compulsory jurisdiction all matters relating to "national defense." The French Government contended that the subject matter of the applications-the legality of atmopheric
nuclear tests-fell under the "national defense" reservation. See generally Lacharriere,
Commentaires sur la Position Juridiquede la France d I'Egard de la Lic~itk de ses Expgriences Nuclkaires, 19 ANNUAIRE FRANAIS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 235 (1973).
86. (Greece v. Turkey), [1976] I.C.J. 3 (order denying interim protection). The sole dissenting opinion was filed by the ad hoc judge appointed by Greece under the Statute of the
International Court of Justice, article 31(2).
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by serious differences among the judges as to jurisdictional and other
questions. Of the twelve judges participating, eight concurred specially in
six separate opinions, one of which-that of Judge Morozov-endorsed
the "absolute certainty" test 8 7 which had been articulated by Judge For-

ster in his dissenting opinion in Nuclear Tests.'8 Set against this background, the Court's unanimity at the interim stage of the hostage case
was remarkable: not only did all fifteen judges vote in favor of provisional
measures, but none filed separate opinions, a record all the more impressive because the bench included such erstwhile dissenters as Judges Forster and Morozov.
In spite of the adherence of these former dissenters, the interim order appears not to have resolved the question of the Court's incidental
jurisdiction. Rather, the language of the opinion indicates the continued
coexistence of the two views concerning the requisite degree of certainty
that the Court has substantive jurisdiction. After reiterating the usual
pronouncement that "on the request for provisional measures . . . the

Court ought to indicate such measures only if the provisions invoked by
the Applicant appear, prima facie, to afford a basis on which the jurisdiction of the Court might be founded,"' the order indicated that at least
two of the provisions invoked by the United States provided "in the
clearest manner" for the Court's compulsory jurisdiction 0 and that it was
"manifest" that the terms of these provisions furnished "a basis on which
the jurisdiction of the Court might be founded .

. . ."9

This language

leaves little doubt that, from an early stage in the proceedings, the balance of the probabilities weighed heavily in favor of the Court's taking
jurisdiction, and, consequently, in the interest of achieving unanimity, the
interim order was couched in terms that accommodated not only the
prima facie possibility test, but also the more stringent requirements posited by Judges Forster and Morozov in their former opinions.
B.

Substantive Jurisdiction

Pronouncements on incidental and substantive jurisdiction often
overlap, and this case was no exception. In the following paragraphs, relevant portions of the interim and merit opinions are considered together
for the purpose of reconstructing the Court's findings on the subject. In
rendering its decision, the Court based its substantive jurisdiction on
three of the four treaties cited in the U.S. memorial: 9 the two Protocols
attached to the Diplomatic and Consular Relations Conventions s and the
87. [1976] I.C.J. at 21 (Morozov, J., concurring).
88. [1973] I.C.J. at 113 (Forster, J., dissenting).

89. [1979] I.C.J. at 13, para. 15.
90. Id. at 14, para. 17.
91. Id. para. 18.
92. Memorial of the United States, United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in
Tehran, I.C.J. Pleadings 1 (1980).
93. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations Optional Protocol Concerning the
Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3374, T.I.A.S. No. 7502; Vi-
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1955 Treaty of Amity between Iran and the United States."
There was never any doubt that articles one in each of the two Protocols appended to the Vienna Conventions" conferred jurisdiction on the
Court. In identical terms, these articles provide that disputes about the
interpretation and application of each convention "shall lie within the
compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice and may accordingly be brought before the Court by an application made by any
Party to the dispute being a Party to the present protocol."" After satisfying itself that both Iran and the United States had acceded to the Optional Protocols, 97 the bench concluded that articles one of each of the
two Protocols furnished a basis "on which the jurisdiction of the Court
might be founded" with respect to all but two of the hostages." s
In support of the Court's jurisdiction to hear the claims involving its
two private nationals, the United States invoked the Treaty of Amity"
between itself and the respondent. This treaty obligates each party to ensure that within its territory, the nationals of the other party receive "the
most constant protection and security,"' 0 0 and that any dispute regarding
the interpretation and application of the treaty "not satisfactorily adjusted by diplomacy, shall be submitted to the International Court of
Justice."' 0 '
Thus, unlike the jurisdictional clause in the Protocols to the Vienna
Conventions,0 2 the provision in the Treaty of Amity for the submission
of disputes to the I.C.J. 0° does not create in express terms a unilateral
right to take a dispute to the Court. Nevertheless, the United States contended that it had been the intention of the negotiating parties to create,
just as analogous clauses in other amity and establishment treaties generally do, a right of unilateral recourse."04 The bench accepted this interpre-

enna Convention on Consular Relations Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 325, T.I.A.S. No. 6820 [hereinafter cited as
Protocols to the Vienna Conventions].
94. Note 4 supra.
95. Note 93 supra.
96. Id.
97. [1979] I.C.J. at 13-14, para. 16.
98. Id. at 14, para. 18.
99. Treaty of Amity, note 4 supra.
100. Id. art. II, para. 4.
101. Id. art. XXI, para. 2.
102. Protocols to the Vienna Conventions, note 93 supra.
103. Treaty of Amity, art. XXI, para. 2, note 4 supra.
104. The United States also contended that, while the Treaty of Amity provides that
disputes "not satisfactorily adjusted by diplomacy" be taken to the Court, Iran's persistently negative attitude toward negotiation in the hostage case made it "indisputable that
under the treaty of amity," the case was properly before the Court. Oral Argument by the
United States (U.S. Agent Roberts Owen), United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in
Tehran, [1980] I.C.J. 3, reprinted in 80 DEP'T STATE BULL. 40, 45 (Feb. 1980). The Court
majority accepted the U.S. contention, noting "the refusal of the Iranian Government to
enter into any discussion of the matter." [19801 I.C.J. at 27, para. 51.
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tation in the merit judgment; 10 5 for purposes of the interim order, how-

ever, it was satisfied that the Protocols to the Vienna Conventions had
sufficiently established the Court's jurisdiction to cover all U.S. claims
including those related to the two private individuals.'"1 The interim order reached this result with great subtlety of argument, pointing out that
the acts against the private individuals had been committed in the embassy compound and as such came within the purview of the same jurisdictional clause which conferred authority on the Court to adjudicate disputes arising under the Vienna Conventions.107 Thus, striking a blow for
the promotion of international human rights, the Court went beyond the
literal meaning of the Vienna Conventions to create rights for nondiplomats when found on internationally protected grounds.
The merit decision addressed the issue of the jurisdictional significance of the Treaty of Amity. The American Government contended that
article XXI, paragraph 2 of the Treaty created a right of unilateral appeal
to the International Court.0 8 The Court had reserved its position on that
question in the interim order, 0 9 but it agreed with the United States in
its judgment on the merits. It observed, "Provisions drawn in similar
terms are very common in bilateral treaties of amity or of establishment,
and the intention of the parties in accepting such clauses is clearly to
provide for such a right of unilateral recourse to the Court .... ."1"o Two
of the judges did not share the majority's endorsement of the U.S. views
on the applicability of the Treaty of Amity, and that difference of opinion
was one of the questions over which the unanimity which characterized
the interim order broke down."' Judge Morozov faulted the Court's reliance on the Treaty of Amity as both unnecessary for the jurisdictional
needs of the case-as shown by the Court itself in the interim order-and
legally unsound.'" The latter conclusion rested on the premise that, being indisputably consensual, the jurisdiction of the Court cannot be inferred unless expressly provided for by the parties in prior or ad hoc
agreements. 1 8 Moreover, both Judges Morozov and Tarazi invoked the
unilateral measures taken by the United States against Iran to conclude
that the applicant had forfeited the right to rely on the Treaty of
105. [1980] I.C.J. at 27, para. 52.
106. [1979] I.C.J. at 14, para. 19.
107. Id.
108. See text accompanying note 104 supra.
109. [1979] I.C.J. at 14-15, para. 21.
110. [1980] I.C.J. at 27, para. 52. Given the common use of clauses analagous to art.
XXI, para. 2 in the Treaty of Amity, note 4 supra, the Court's consecration of the right of
unilateral application amounts to a considerable widening of its potential jurisdictional
base. The U.S. Memorial cited 17 treaties of establishment concluded by the United States
since 1945 which contain jurisdictional provisions analogous to art. XXI, para. 2. Memorial
by the United States, United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, I.C.J. Pleadings 1, 72-73 (1980).
111. [1980] I.C.J. at 51, 58 (Morozov, J., and Tarazi, J., dissenting).
112. Id. at 51-52, para. 3 (Morozov, J., dissenting).
113. Id. at 52.

1981

U.S. DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR STAFF

Amity. 114

Next, the Court addressed the question of the justiciability of the
dispute, a question raised by Iran in its message of December 9, 1979.
The objection is stated in the following passage, quoted at length here
because the language indicates the perspective from which Iran viewed
the hostage crisis:
[The hostage] question only represents a marginal and secondary aspect of an overall problem, one such that it cannot be studied separately, and which involves, inter alia, more than 25 years of continual
interference by the United States in the internal affairs of Iran, the
shameless exploitation of our country, and numerous crimes perpetrated against the Iranian people, contrary to and in conflict with all
international and humanitarian norms.
The problem involved in the conflict between Iran and the United
States is thus not one of the interpretation and the application of the
treaties upon which the American Application is based, but results
from an overall situation containing much more fundamental and
more complex elements. Consequently, the Court cannot examine the
American Application divorced from its proper context, namely the
whole political dossier of the relations between Iran and the United
States over the last 25 years. This dossier includes, inter alia, all the
crimes perpetrated in Iran by the American Government, in particular
the coup d'etat of 1953 stirred up and carried out by the CIA, the
overthrow of the lawful national government of Dr. Mossadegh, the
restoration of the Shah and of his regime which was under the control
of American interests, and all the social, economic, cultural, and political consequences of the direct interventions in our internal affairs, as
well as grave, flagrant and continuous violations of all international
norms, committed by the United States in Iran.115

Its excessive rhetoric notwithstanding and even though only cryptically
formulated, the above-quoted passage raised a serious question about the
justiciability of the dispute. Iran's position, as appears from this passage,
was that more fundamental principles of international and humanitarian
laws which the United States allegedly violated in its relations with Iran
over the twenty-five years previous overcame the U.S. claims. Implicit in
Iran's objection was the position that a highly politicized dispute could
not be separated from its politico-historical context.
The Court rejected Iran's objection with two arguments. In the interim order, it unanimously responded that the seizure of an embassy and

114. Id. at 52, 65 (Morozov, J., and Tarazi, J., dissenting).
115. Letter of Dec. 9, 1979, note 23 supra. Iran's position in this message rests on a
typical Third World premise encountered frequently in legal disputes arising from the
decolonization process-namely, that legal claims must be assessed in their larger historical
and political contexts to arrive at an equitable allocation of rights and responsibilities. See
generally J. GAMBLE & D. FISCHER, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JusncE 23 (1976); S.
ROSENNE, LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT 103 (1965); Anand, Attitude of
the Asian-African States Toward CertainProblems of InternationalLaw, 15 INT'L & COmp.
L.Q. 55 (1966).

DEN. J. OF INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 10:425

its internationally protected staff "cannot. . . be regarded as something
'secondary' or 'marginal', having regard to the importance of the legal
principles involved . . . ."
To this, the Court majority added a second
argument in its merit decision, to wit:
[N]ever has the view been put forward before that, because a legal
dispute submitted to the Court is only one aspect of a political dispute, the Court should decline to resolve for the parties the legal
questions at issue between them. Nor can any basis for such a view of
the Court's functions or jurisdiction be found in the Charter or the

Statute of the Court ....

117

In its first response to Iran's objection to the justiciability of the dispute, the Court missed a subtle but critical element in Iran's reasoning:
that reasoning did not imply, as the Court seemed to assume, that the
hostage issue was "secondary" or "marginal" in itself; rather, it described
the issue as a secondary and marginal aspect of the "overall problem" of
Iran's grievances against the United States. Nonetheless, the Court's second response deserves particular attention as it confirms and expands an
important point of its Aegean Sea Continental Shelf jurisprudence. In
that case, the Court held that a dispute with "some political element" '
is neverthless justiciable when "it is manifest that legal rights lie at the
1' "
root of the dispute."
(Emphasis added.) In the present case, the majority went beyond Aegean Sea Continental Shelf by holding justiciable legal claims which are "only one aspect of a political dispute."120 (Emphasis added.)
IV.

THE SEPARATION OF JUDICIAL AND POLITICAL POWERS IN THE LAW
OF THE UNITED NATIONS

In terms of the law of the United Nations, the most interesting feature of the hostage case is that it was brought simultaneously before the
Security Council and the International Court. 2" This parallel pursuit of
political and judicial remedies in turn led the Court to address the question of the separation of powers between the Court and the Security
Council-a matter of central importance in the workings of the United
Nations and one which had been left unclear after the Aegean Sea Continental Shelf case. 2 ' Because the Court went opposite ways on similar
facts in Aegean Sea and United States Diplomaticand ConsularStaff,122
this section discusses both cases and concludes with suggestions as to the
meaning of United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff for the law on
116. [1979] I.C.J. at 15, para. 23.
117. [19801 I.C.J. at 20, para. 37.
118. [1978] I.C.J. at 13.
119. Id.
120. (1980] I.C.J. at 20, para. 37.
121. See U.N. CHRON., Jan. 1980, at 5.
122. Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case (Greece v. Turkey), [1976] I.C.J. 3 (order denying interim protection).
123. [19801 I.C.J. at 21-22, para. 40.
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concurrent jurisdiction between political and judicial organs of the
United Nations.
While it is beyond the scope of this article to offer an indepth examination of the actions and proceedings of the Security Council in connection with the hostage crisis, a brief review of the activities of the Council
will help pinpoint the parallels and differences between the present case
and Aegean Sea Continental Shelf. As noted above, shortly after the embassy takeover, the U.S. Government reported the incident to the Security Council and requested that it undertake deliberations as to what
might be done to resolve the crisis. 2 ' Following this initiative, the U.N.
Secretary-General, Kurt Waldheim, urgently requested the Security
Council to act on the Iran hostage situation which he described as posing
a serious threat to international peace and security."" This request came
on November 29, 1979, only four days after the United States submitted
its application and request for interim measures to the Court. The Council convened on November 29 and December 4, and on the latter date it
unanimously passed resolution 457, calling on Iran to free the embassy
personnel immediately, to provide them with protection, and to allow
them to leave the country. '2 6 The resolution called on the parties to take
steps to resolve by peaceful means the remaining issues between them
and instructed Secretary-General Waldheim to lend his good offices for
achieving the object of the resolution and report to the Council of his
efforts. 127 In the meantime, the Council was to "remain actively seized of
the matter."''
The Security Council met again on December 31, 1979-sixteen days
after the Court handed down its interim order-and adopted a second
resolution in which it reiterated the content of resolution 457 and once
again instructed the Secretary-General to lend his good offices to bring
about a peaceful resolution of the crisis.' 2 ' Acting on this instruction, Secretary-General Waldheim visited Tehran January 1-3, 1980, and on February 20, in agreement with the Governments of the United States and
Iran, set up a Commission of Inquiry to undertake a fact-finding mission
in Tehran, to hear Iran's grievances against the United States and to seek
an early solution to the crisis. 80 The Commission went to Tehran, held

124. For a review of U.N. action on the hostage issue, see U.N.

CHRON.,

Mar. 1980, at

17.
125. Letter from Secretary-General Waldheim to the Security Council Pres. (Nov. 25,
1979). 34 U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/13646 (1979).
126. S.C. Res. 457, 34 U.N. SCOR, Supp. (Res. & Dec.) -, U.N. Doc. S/Res/457 (1979),
reprinted in U.N. CHRON., Jan. 1980, at 13.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. S.C. Res. 461, 34 U.N. SCOR, Supp. (Res. & Dec.), U.N. Doc. S/Res/461 (1979),
reprinted in U.N. CHRON., Mar. 1980, at 26.
130. The Commission was composed of Andres Aguilar (Venezuela), Mohamed
Bedjaoui (Algeria), N.W. Jayewardene (Sri Lanka), Louis-Edmond Pettiti (France), and
Adib Daoudy (Syria). U.N. CHRON., Apr. 1980, at 16.
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several meetings with the Iranian authorities, but under the political conditions prevailing in Iran, was unable to meet the hostages as had been
promised. "1 On March 10, it suspended its activities, announcing however that it was prepared to return to Tehran when conditions changed in
order to complete its mandate"'
The United Nations' political involvement in the crisis raised questions about the impact such proceedings would have on the Court's handling of the U.S. application and interim request in light of the denial of
provisional measures in Aegean Sea Continental Shelf. That case arose
from competing claims by Greece and Turkey to the continental shelf of
the sea separating the two countries. Greece brought the case before the
International Court and the Security Council in parallel actions.'
In the
proceedings before the Court, the Greek Government requested that the
Court order both parties to refrain from all exploration activity and scientific research in the continental shelf areas and to refrain from actions
which might endanger their peaceful relations."' The Court declined this
request on the ground that, the Security Council having met on the issue
with the participation of the representatives of Greece and Turkey and
having urged the parties to do anything in their power to reduce tensions
in the area, it was inappropriate for the Court to duplicate the recommendation of the Council.13 5 The Court went on to observe that "both
Greece and Turkey . . . have expressly recognized the responsibility of
the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security" and that "it is not to be presumed that either State will fail to
heed the recommendation of the Security Council .... "136
Thus, Aegean Sea Continental Shelf raised the important constitutional question of concurrent jurisdiction between the political and judicial organs of the United Nations, or, more specifically, whether the pursuit of parallel political action in a policy-making organ inhibits the Court
from ruling on issues submitted for adjudication. The tenor of the decision lends itself to the interpretation that the Court was giving application to the rule electa una via,13 perhaps not as a general principle of the

131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

Id., May 1980, at 5.
Id.
See generally Gross, note 8 supra.
[1976] I.C.J. at 4-5, para. 2.
Id. at 13, paras. 41-42.
Id. para. 41.

137. Under electa una via, a state must exhaust the procedure of settlement already

selected. Applied to United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff, it would have required
the exhaustion of the political remedies through the Security Council and allowed resort to
another mechanism or forum only in case of failure. That the Court's decision in Aegean
Sea Continental Shelf may be interpreted as an application of the rule electa una via is
suggested by Coussirat-Coustere, Indication de Mesures Conservatoires dans l'Affaire de
Personnel Diplomatique et Consulaire des Etats-Unis & Thran, 25 ANNUAIRE FRANVAIS
DE D)Rorr INTERNATIONAL 297, 300 (1979). For a general discussion of the doctrines of litispendence and electa una via in the context of the law of the United Nations, see Ciobanu,
Litispendence Between the InternationalCourt of Justice and the PoliticalOrgans of the
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law of the United Nations, but at least as a matter of self-restraint practiced by the Court with a view to preventing conflicting resolutions of the
same issue by two or more organs of the World Organization. At the same
time, this judicial deference to the Security Council resolution provoked
reservations from some judges who, even though supportive of closer integration of the Court in the U.N. system, nonetheless favor a more dynamic approach to its power assignment under the Charter. This position
was set out with force and logic by Judge Lachs whose separate concurring opinion in Aegean Sea ContinentalShelf merits quotation at length
because, after United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff, it now reflects the official opinion of the Court.
There are obviously some disputes which can be resolved only by negotiations, because there is no alternative in view of the character of
the subject-matter involved and the measures envisaged. But there
are many other disputes in which a combination of methods would
facilitate their resolution. The frequently unorthodox nature of the
problems facing States today requires as many tools to be used and as
many avenues to be opened as possible, in order to resolve the intricate and frequently multi-dimensional issues involved. It is sometimes
desirable to apply several methods at the same time or successively.
Thus no incompatibility should be seen between the various instruments and fora to which States may resort, for all are mutually complementary. Notwithstanding the interdependence of issues, some
may be isolated, given priority and their solution sought in a separate
forum. In this way it may be possible to prevent the aggravation of a
dispute, its degeneration into a conflict. Within this context, the role
of the Court as an institution serving the peaceful resolution of disputes should, despite appearances, be of growing importance. 39s
In the case instituted by the United States against Iran, the parallels
with the facts of Aegean Sea Continental Shelf were inescapable. Here
too the Security Council had met and adopted, in advance of any action
by the Court, a resolution which called for the very same thing that the
United States request aimed to achieve, namely, the release and safe departure of the hostages. That the United States was concerned lest the
Aegean Sea Continental Shelf holding adversely affect its case before the
Court was clear from a statement by its U.N. representative following the
Security Council's unanimous vote on resolution 457. In that statement,
Mr. McHenry reminded his Council colleagues that their vote "was not
intended to displace peaceful efforts in other organs of the United Nations," and further that "[n]either the United States nor any other member intended that the adoption of the resolution should have any prejudicial impact whatever on the request of the United States for the
indication of provisional measures of protection by the ICJ.'" ss In pro-

United Nations, in THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 209, 216 (L. Gross
ed. 1976). See also S. ROSENNE, note 115 supra.
138. [1976] I.C.J. at 19, 20 (Lachs, J., concurring).
139. 34 U.N. SCOR (_ mtg.) 11, U.N. Doc. S/P.V. 2178 (1979).
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ceedings before the Court, the U.S. Agent pursued the same line by first
distinguishing the present case from Aegean Sea Continental Shelf on
several grounds including Iran's persistent refusal to negotiate, and then
reminding the Court that no disposition in any text governing its functions precluded the Court from adjudicating in accordance with international law such disputes as are properly brought before it. ' "
The interim order in United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff
implicitly accepted the United States' position by indicating the measures
requested, but without addressing the question of concurrent jurisdiction
at all.1"" In the merit decision, however, the Court returned to the subject,
and this time offered a reasoned presentation of its views regarding the
relationship between I.C.J. proceedings and activities of other U.N. organs."4 In summary, the basic proposition the Court sought to establish
is that there is no constitutional obstacle to the exercise by the I.C.J. of
its judicial functions with regard to a question which is pending before
the Security Council or, by extension, before any other principal or subsidiary organ of the United Nations. To establish this, the judgment invoked article 12 of the Charter 143 which, while expressly forbidding the
General Assembly from taking any action with regard to disputes or situations under consideration by the Security Council, puts no such restriction on the functions of the Court. 14 An illuminating passage in the decision states that "[i]t is for the Court, the principal judicial organ of the
United Nations, to resolve any legal questions that may be in issue between parties to a dispute; and the resolution of such legal questions by
the Court may be an important, and sometimes decisive, factor in promoting the peaceful settlement of a dispute."' 5 The Court also pointed
out that article 33 enumerates arbitration and judicial settlement together with the political processes of negotiation, inquiry, mediation, and
conciliation as methods for the peaceful settlement of conflicts " e Following a detailed examination of events in the Security Council and the establishment of the Commission of Inquiry, the Court concluded that
"neither the mandate given by the Security Council to the Secretary-Gen-

140. Oral Argument by the United States, United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff
in Tehran, [1980] I.C.J. 3, reprinted in 80 DEP'T STATE BULL. 40, 47-48 (Feb. 1980).
141. The order made only a brief reference to the Security Council action on the hostage issue, and that in a context unrelated to the issue under discussion here. [1979] I.C.J. at
15, para. 23.
142. [1980] I.C.J. at 20-24, paras. 39-44. This part of the judgment is all the more re-

markable as it was included without the invitation of either party. It was as if the judges
were looking for a way to set the record straight as to their place in the overall U.N.
peacekeeping framework.
143. Article 12, paragraph 1 provides: "While the Security Council is exercising in respect of any dispute or situation the functions assigned to it in the present Charter, the
General Assembly shall not make any recommendation with regard to that dispute or situation unless the Security Council so requests."
144. [1980] I.C.J. at 21-22, para. 40.
145. Id. at 22, para. 40.
146. Id. at 23, para. 43.
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eral in resolutions 457 and 451 of 1979, nor the setting up of the Commission by the Secretary-General, can be considered as constituting any obstacle to the exercise of the Court's jurisdiction .... ,,147 Even though the
Court did not discuss it, indirect support for its holding can be drawn
from the practice of the political organs themselves, which, while in some
cases finding it unwise to take action on an issue which is before the
Court, have never acknowledged the principle of unity of proceedings as a
148
binding rule in the law of the United Nations.
United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff therefore suggests a
division of functional responsibilities between the Court and other U.N.
organs, one that does not preclude, or indeed may even dictate, the simultaneous application of political and legal methods to the resolution of inter-state disputes. This dynamic view of the Court's power assignment is,
however, balanced in the merit judgment by two unstated but implicit
qualifications. First, the tenor of the decision suggests that, even though
entitled to the independent exercise of its judicial functions, the Court
nevertheless would exercise self-restraint if it is shown that its activities
might obstruct the political organs. Thus, the Court would have at least
postponed its proceedings had it been given to understand that their continuance would impede the efforts of the Security Council, the SecretaryGeneral, or the Commission of Inquiry." 9s The judges went out of their
way to show that neither the Government of Iran, nor that of the United
States, 50 nor any spokesman for the United Nations had suggested that
the Court's proceedings might be affected by the existence of the Commission of Inquiry or by the mandate given to the Secretary-General.' 6'
A second qualification implicit in the decision is that Court proceedings might be affected by the decision of a political organ to set up an
adjudicative or quasi-adjudicative body with respect to the dispute under

147. Id. at 23-24, para. 44.
148. See S. ROSENNE, supra note 115, at 226. In Aegean Sea Continental Shelf, the fact
that the legal aspects of the dispute had been submitted to the Court was well known to the
Security Council but did not prevent it from passing a resolution on the matter. See text
accompanying notes 135, 136 supra. The Government of South Africa raised the objection of
sub judice in the General Assembly debate in connection with the South West Africa Cases
but without success. Gross, supra note 8, at 37.
149. This conclusion is based on the language and tone of the Court's opinion in
paragraphs 40, 41, and 42. [1980] I.C.J. at 21-22. See, e.g., note 150 infra.
150. The Court noted that, at one point in the proceedings, the U.S. Government requested that the Court defer setting a date for the opening of oral argument. In making the
request, the U.S. agent invoked the delicate stage of negotiations then pending on the release of the hostages. The following day, February 20, 1980, the U.N. Commission was established. Responding to an invitation to clarify the U.S. position as regards the future proceedings, the U.S. agent advised the Court on February 27 that the Commission would not
address itself to the legal claims of the United States and that his government was anxious
to secure an early judgment on the merits. The United States suggested March 1 for the
opening of the oral proceedings, but still reserved the right to request a postponement if the
circumstances warranted. [1980] I.C.J. at 22, para. 41.
151. Id. at 22-23, para. 42.
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consideration. Had the Secretary-General, in fulfilling the mission given
him by the Security Council, opted to set up a tribunal instead of a nonadjudicative commission to examine the matter of law in dispute between
Iran and the United States, United States Diplomatic and Consular
Staff may not have been decided as it was. In its opinion, the Court observed that the Commission of Inquiry "was not set up by the SecretaryGeneral as a tribunal empowered to decide the matters of fact or of law in
dispute between Iran and the United States; nor was its setting up accepted by them on any such basis." 152 In exactly what way the appointment of a tribunal would have affected the Court proceedings is not clear.
The Court's observations nonetheless indicate that it acknowledges that,
while the principal judicial organ of the United Nations, it does not have
a monopoly on the adjudicative processes contemplated under article 33
of the Charter.
V.

THE MERIT DECISION

To determine the existence and nature of Iran's liability, the Court
took a two-step approach to the facts, examining first the extent to which
the acts in question were imputable to the Government of Iran, and second, the status of those acts under applicable treaty and general international law provisions.153 It found Iran guilty of acts of omission and commission: in the initial phase, by failing to protect the embassy and its
staff,'" and, in the second phase, by endorsing the continued occupation
of the embassy and detention of the hostages. 15 5 Repeated endorsements
of the militants by official organs of the Iranian State fundamentally
transformed the legal nature of the hostage situation. "The militants,"
the Court concluded, "had now become agents of the Iranian State for
whose acts the State itself was internationally responsible."' "
The bench was unanimous in upholding the American claim that the
acts thus attributable to Iran were incompatible with the norms of customary international law as codified in the 1961 and 1963 Vienna Conventions. Particularly, Iran had violated its obligations, laid down in identical terms in the two conventions, to protect the diplomatic and consular
premises, archives, and other documents," 7 to ensure respect for the free-

152. Id. at 23, para. 43.
153. Id. at 28-29, para. 56.
154. The Court concluded that the militants' attack on the embassy had an "initially
independent and unofficial character." Id. at 30, para. 59. This, however, did not absolve
Iran of responsibility in regard to the attack. Iran, the Court observed, failed to carry out its
obligations under the Diplomatic and Consular Relations Conventions, note 3 supra, "to
take appropriate steps to ensure the protection" of the embassy, its staff, and archives.
(1980] I.C.J. at 30, para. 61.
155. Id. at 33-37, paras. 71-78.
156. Id. at 35, para. 74.
157. Articles 22 and 24 of the Diplomatic Relations Convention, note 3 supra, proclaim
the inviolability of the premises and archives of a diplomatic mission. Analogous provisions
are found in articles 31(3) and 33 of the 1963 Consular Relations Convention, note 3 supra,
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dom and dignity of the embassy personnel,588 and to allow them full facilities and protection for the performance of their official functions.'
Likewise, Iran had defaulted on its obligation under the Treaty of Amity
to afford protection within its territory to U.S. private nationals. 1'" In
light of these findings, the merit decision unanimously renewed the ear-

lier call for the release and safe departure of the hostages and the restoration of the embassy compound to U.S. possession.61e Once again the Iranian authorities were warned against subjecting the detained diplomats
and consular agents to any form of judicial proceedings.'6 2
The Court's unanimity broke down when it came time to assess the
legal consequences of the violations set out in the judgment. Still, there
was a large majority to uphold most of the remaining U.S. claims: the
judges voted thirteen to two that Iran had incurred responsibility vis-a-

vis the United States"' and twelve to three that it owed reparations to
the U.S. Government.'" The Court did not rule on the U.S. request for
the prosecution of the militants.
The implicit but major point of disagreement between the majority

and dissenting judges was whether Iranian assertions regarding the alleged pattern of indirect U.S. aggression against Iran had legal validity

and, if so, whether these assertions could be considered in assessing the
blame of one side or the other. Iran's communications to the Court'"

cited various U.S. acts going back to and including alleged CIA complicity
in the events of 1953 as overriding the U.S. claims.'" In a passage re-

markable for its adherence to the strict rules of judicial procedure, the
Court majority rejected these charges, first, as unsupported by evidence

owing chiefly to Iran's failure to plead its case, 167 and second, as irreleregarding consular premises and archives.
158. Article 29 of the Diplomatic Relations Convention, note 3 supra, provides as follows: "The person of a diplomatic agent shall be inviolable. He shall not be liable to any
form of arrest or detention. The receiving state shall treat him with due respect and shall
take all appropriate steps to prevent any attack on his person, freedom, and dignity." For
consular officers, article 40 of the Consular Relations Convention, note 3 supra, provides as
follows: "The receiving state shall treat consular officers with due respect and shall take all
appropriate steps to prevent any attack on their person, freedom, or dignity," but article
41(a), while exempting consular officers from liability to "arrest or detention," provides that
such exemption does not apply "in the case of a grave crime and pursuant to a decision by
the competent judicial authority."
159. Article 25 of the Diplomatic Relations Convention, note 3 supra, and article 28 of
the Consular Relations Convetion, note 3 supra, obligate the receiving state to "accord full
facilities for the performance of," respectively, "the functions of the [diplomatic] mission"
and "the consular post."
160. Treaty of Amity, art. II, para. 4, note 4 supra.
161. [19801 I.C.J. 3, 44-45, para. 3.
162. Id. at 45, para. 4.
163. Id. at 44, para. 2 (Morozov, J., and Tarazi, J., dissenting).
164. Id. at 45, para. 6 (Lachs, J., Morozov, J., and Tarazi, J., dissenting).
165. See text accompanying notes 23 & 24 supra.
166. Id.
167. [1980] I.C.J. at 38, para. 82.
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vant to the merits even if established with requisite proof. 6 8 To defend
this second proposition, the majority appealed to what it called the "selfcontained" 1s character of the rules of diplomatic law, which, in the majority's description, balances the obligations imposed on the receiving
state with "efficacious" 110 means of defense against illicit actions by diplomatic and consular agents. These means include, first, the privilege accorded to the receiving state to declare any member of a diplomatic mission persona non grata and secure that person's recall, 71 and second, the
more radical remedy of breaking diplomatic relations with the offending
state. 17 s Having failed to resort to remedies afforded by diplomatic law
for dealing with alleged U.S. activities, Iran could not1 78cite those activities
to justify its conduct or mitigate its responsibilities.
Judges Morozov and Tarazi, by contrast, acknowledged the validity
of Iran's allegations and concluded that they must be brought to bear on
the final assessment of the parties' contending claims.1 74 Iran's liabilities,
in the words of Judge Tarazi, were "relative," not "absolute. 1 7 It was
chiefly for this reason that both judges voted to dissent from the majority
finding that Iran owed reparations to the United States.
VI.

JUSITICIABILITY OF POLITICIZED DisPuTEs: THE BROADER
IMPLICATIONS OF THE CASE

That United States Diplomatic and ConsularStaff made important
contributions to the international law-making process has been amply
demonstrated in the preceding pages. In addition to these contributions,
there is yet another respect in which the case is likely to stand out as a
landmark in the annals of the International Court. Since its founding, the
Court has remained on the periphery of the major international
problems.1 7

With one possible exception,1

7

7

no major order-threatening

168. Id. para. 83.
169. Id. at 40, para. 86.
170. Id. at 40-41, para. 87.
171. Under article 9(1) of the Diplomatic Relations Convention, note 3 supra,
The receiving State may at any time and without having to explain its decision, notify the sending State that the head of the mission or any member of
the diplomatic staff of the mission is persona non grata ....In any such case,
the sending State shall, as appropriate, either recall the person concerned or
terminate his functions with the mission.
172. [1980] I.C.J. at 39-40, para. 85.
173. Id. at 40-41, paras. 87 & 89.
174. Id. at 52 (Morozov, J., dissenting), and 59 (Tarazi, J., dissenting).
175. Id. at 61 (Tarazi, J., dissenting).
176. See generally J. GAMBLE & D. FISCHER, note 115 supra.
177. South West Africa Cases, [1966] I.C.J. 6. These cases dealt with the status of
Namibia. South Africa failed to comply with the Court's advisory opinions which recognized
the United Nations as the successor to the League of Nations in the supervision of the
surviving League mandates. Ethiopia and Liberia then filed separate proceedings with the
object of transforming the advisory opinions into binding decisions. The Court was thus
invited to rule on a major international issue. However, it dismissed the actions on the narrow procedural ground that the applicants lacked sufficient legal interest to file a claim. See
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issue arising from the Cold War or the decolonization process-the two
major axes of conflict in post-War politics-was brought to the Court for
adjudication. Against this background, the hostage case is an exception to
the trend: in it the Court was invited to rule on one of the most complicated, politicized, tension-laden cases in the post-War period. Accepting
the challenge, the Court reaffirmed the justiciability of politicized disputes and suggested that the range of justiciable disputes is even broader
than the range suggested by the language on that question in Aegean Sea
Continental Shelf."'
Such disputes, however, confront a court of law with the problem of
deciding whether and to what extent judicial inquiry can be extended to
include the history or the nonlegal, usually political, aspects of the case.
Faced with this question, the Court majority came down squarely on the
side of narrowly defined, conservative notions of justiciability-hence, its
terse dismissal of all Iranian charges against U.S. diplomacy as either unrelated to the issues before the Court or only vaguely defined and therefore unsubstantiated.
The possible reasons for the Court's decision in this regard are varied. To be sure, Iran's absence from the proceedings made it difficult for
its claims to be articulated with requisite precision and proof. Perhaps
too, considerations of judicial strategy played a role in influencing the
majority's choice of justiciable issues: faced with an action that struck at
one of the foundations of the international public order, the judges may
have felt the need to define in the most uncompromising terms the overriding character of the norms being violated. Any manifestation of judicial sympathy for Iran's long-standing political grievances, the judges may
have felt, would only dilute what was intended to appear as an emphatic
and unambiguous defense of the institutions governing the conduct of inter-state relations. Finally, considerations of judicial strategy aside, there
was solid theroretical grounding for the Court's reluctance to extend the
range of inquiry into the history and politics of the case-namely, the
traditional notion that the judiciary must shun involvement in essentially
political activities. According to this view, politicized disputes are justiciable, but only to the extent that they involve legal issues which must be
separated from their context and adjudicated through impartially administered rules of international law.
Whatever the practical or theoretical merits of the majority's methodological choice, it is arguable that, since it was characterized by a narrow framing of relevant issues, the majority's approach was less than
commensurate with the challenge presented by politicized disputes which
occur in the context of North-South politics. 71 Such disputes often in-

R.

FALK, THE STATUS OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL SociETY

378 (1970).

178. See text accompanying notes 118-120 supra.

179. The term "North-South" is used to describe relations between developing and developed, i.e., Western countries.
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volve deep-seated, long-standing grievances, and it is difficult to see how
the international adjudicatory machinery can resolve them equitably unless it applies a wide enough framework of judicial appraisal to accommodate the claims arising from the historical antecedents or even from the
politics of the case. This point was implicit in Judge Tarazi's dissenting
opinion in the present case. He wrote as follows:
It has been argued that more [that is, delving more deeply into the
history of U.S.-Iran relations] would mean examining deeds of a political nature which lay outside the framework of the Court's powers.
But is it possible to ignore historical developments which have direct
repercussions on legal conflicts? 18 0

Following Judge Tarazi's lead, this section examines the relevance of
some of Iran's claims arising from the historical and political contexts of
the hostage crisis. It inquires whether the majority's reluctance to allow
the historical or political aspects of the case to affect its final determination impaired its ability to produce fair and effective results. Based on
this analysis, the discussion then focuses on whether a historically based,
less judicially inhibited framework of inquiry would be more suitable to
the resolution of adversary claims in politicized North-South disputes.
A.

Iran's Historically Based Claims

Undoubtedly, some Iranian charges against U.S. policies were exaggerated and, moreover, so vaguely framed that in Iran's absence from the
proceedings, they remained unsubstantiated. Among these were Iranian
charges related to "the social, economic, cultural, and political consequences of. . . [American] intervention in internal [Iranian] affairs" ' or
"flagrant and continuing violations of all international norms committed
by the United States in Iran."1 82
On the other hand, the central and most far-reaching piece in the
catalogue of Iranian allegations has been so amply documented by nonIranian, notably American sources, as to have been easily verifiable
through independently conducted Court inquiry. 8 3 The reference is to
the events surrounding the 1953 coup in Iran that overthrew the lawfully
elected and popular Mossadegh government and brought the Pahlavi dynasty back to the throne. Even though absent from the proceedings, in its
written communications Iran charged the CIA with responsibility for the
1953 coup.184 The issue was thus properly before the Court, and given the
vast volume of information on the subject, the Court could have inquired
180. [1980] I.C.J. at 60 (Tarazi, J., dissenting).
181. Letter of Dec. 9, 1979, note 23 supra.
182. Id.
183. See R. COTrAM, NATIONALSM IN IRAN 332 (2d rev. ed. 1979), described as the most
reliable interpreter of Iranian political developments by Falk in Editorial Comment, 74 AM.
J. INT'L L. 411, 411 (1980). For an account by a participant in the 1953 events, see K.
ROOSEVELT, COUNTERCOUP: THE STRUGGLE FOR THE CONTROL OF IRAN

184. Letter of Dec. 9, 1979, note 23 supra.

(1979).
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on its own initiative into the truth of the Iranian assertions. Authorization for such inquiry could be found in article 53 of the Court's Statute
which grants the judges wide powers of investigation into the facts and
law of cases where a party fails to go through Court proceedings.' 88
There is nothing in the language of the Court's merit decision that
indicates why the Court chose to disregard Iran's 1953-based allegations.
It is arguable, however, that, as Judge Tarazi intimated in the abovequoted passage,186 the majority's disregard, and thus implied dismissal of
these allegations, stemmed partly from a methodological choice-that is,
from its choice of a narrow time frame for selecting legally relevant issues,
which led it to exclude the issues related to the historical antecedents of
the case. Yet, Iran's allegations regarding the U.S. role in the overthrow
of the Mossadegh government raised questions related not only to the
application of diplomatic law, but also to the central issue before the
Court: if established, Iran's allegations would have shown that the United
States had derogated in 1953 from the same body of legal rules as it now
invoked to condemn the lawlessness of Iran's course of action during the
hostage crisis.
Iran's assertions charged that in 1953 the United States had used its
embassy as a staging ground for a CIA coup that overthrew the constitutional government of the country. Such conduct, if proven, would derogate from the Diplomatic and Consular Relations Conventionss8 which
simply codified the pre-existing customary law and which impose a duty
on diplomats and consular agents not to interfere in the internal affairs of
the receiving state or use
the protected grounds in any manner incompat188
ible with their mission.
The principle of reciprocity is fundamental to the diplomatic system.
It means that the receiving state respects the inviolability of diplomatic
missions and assumes responsibility for their protection, while the sending state obligates itself to ensure that its diplomats do not interfere in

the internal affairs of the receiving country. To be sure, interference is a
flexible and relative notion and minor measures of it may be deemed
harmless and tolerable, just as minor violations of diplomatic immunity
sometimes go unnoticed or are overlooked. But Iran's assertions against
the United States raised a serious charge, pointing to acts that dislodged
a legally constituted government and subjected the country to a long pe185. Article 53 of the I.C.J. Statute mandates that in case of nonappearance of a party,

the Court must satisfy itself that "the claim is well founded in fact and law." In his dissenting opinion, Judge Tarazi noted as follows: "In spite, and perhaps because, of the absence of
the Government of Iran from the proceedings, it behoved the Court to elucidate this particular point [the respondent's claim concerning post-1953 U.S. involvement in Iran's internal
affairs] before pronouncing on the responsibility of the Iranian State." [1980] I.C.J. at 60
(Tarazi, J., dissenting).
186. See text accompanying note 180 supra.
187. Note 3 supra.
188. Diplomatic Relations Convention, art. 41(1) and (3), note 3 supra; Consular Relations Convention, art. 55(1) and (2), note 3 supra. See [19801 I.C.J. at 38, para. 84.
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riod of dictatorial, often brutal rule. That Iran in 1979-80 had failed to
live up to its obligations under the Diplomatic and Consular Relations
Conventions was readily acknowledged by both the majority and dissenting judges. But the majority's condemnation of Iran's culpability without
inquiry into the U.S. role in the events of 1953 could only raise serious
questions about the ability of the international adjudicatory process to
deliver equal justice.
The Court majority's choice of a narrow time frame in selecting justiciable questions also accounts for a major flaw in a central point in its
opinion, namely, its interpretation
of diplomatic law as constituting a
"self-contained regime." 1 9 The regime was so described, it will be recalled, in the sense of carrying within itself "efficacious" means of defense
available to the receiving state against illicit activities by diplomats and
consular agents. The means of defense consist of expulsion of the offending agents or the severance of diplomatic ties with the rule-breaking
state. From this the Court majority concluded that the proper remedy
"for dealing with [U.S.] activities of the kind of which [Iran] now complains" were available within the diplomatic system.' 90 It added that
"Iran did not have recourse to the normal and efficacious means at its
disposal, but resorted to coercive action against the United States Embassy and its staff."1 91
The Court's description of diplomatic law as "self-contained" has
practical validity if the U.S. activities of which Iran complained were
committed after the collapse of the Shah's regime-February 1979-that
is, in the period when Iran had a genuine option to exercise the means of
defense supplied by the rules of diplomatic law. But the language of
Iran's communications to the Court made it clear that its assertions
against the United States related to actions undertaken prior to the fall
of the Shah, most notably actions during the events of 1953.'" Since expulsion of diplomatic personnel as undesirable or severance of diplomatic
relations or both are more appropriate responses to immediate situations,
the diplomatic system provided less than adequate means by which Iran
could frame its response. Once the 1953 coup was complete, the only authority internationally competent to bring the diplomatic means of defense into operation was the Shah's government itself; is it realistic to
expect that a government put in place through a foreign-sponsored coup
would call to account the coup-sponsoring power for the very acts that
put the client government in power in the first place? If not, which seems
to be the obvious answer, the opportunity for Iran to call the United
States to account for alleged misdeeds committed in 1953 did not effectively arise until after the fall of the Shah. Under these circumstances,
the denial of an effective hearing on Iranian claims on the
189.
190.
191.
192.

[1980] I.C.J. at 40, para. 86.
Id.
Id.
See Letter of Dec. 9, 1979, note 23 supra.
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grounds-implicit in the majority opinion-that the Court could not consider the historical or political context, amounted, in effect, to a denial of
justice.
The question of what the effect on the Court's findings would have
been had it opted for a broader time frame to accommodate Iran's 1953based claims is now in order. Had the Court established the truth of
Iran's assertions, there are at least two possible results to consider. One
was suggested by Judge Tarazi who, having unsuccessfully invited the
bench to investigate Iran's allegations, conducted his own inquiry and
concluded than Iran's "responsibility [in the hostage affair] ought to be
qualified as relative and not absolute."19 An alternative solution would
have been for the Court to condemn Iran's delinquency in unqualified
fashion as was done in the majority opinion, but couple this denunciation
with parallel pronouncements regarding the U.S. offense against Iran in
derogation of established diplomatic norms. In the latter case, the Court
might have declared two separate breaches of international undertakings,
each entailing a separate obligation to make reparations.
B. Political Conditions
In addition to the historically based claims, there are several conditions surrounding the hostage case that a less inhibited method of inquiry
would cite as circumstances which would affect the nature and amount of
reparations owed by Iran to the United States. Two such conditions are
of particular importance and may be reviewed in brief. One was the admission of the Shah into the United States against warnings by the Iranian government-then headed by Bazargan, a moderate in the post-revolutionary spectrum-that such action may provoke hostile mob action
against the U.S. embassy. 19'
In their dissenting opinions both Judges Morozov and Tarazi invoked
the depth of Iranian feelings about the man as well as the history of U.S.
dealings with him to conclude that the admission of the Shah constituted
a provocative act that must enter into the assessment of the respective
responsibilities of the two parties. To be sure, nothing in the established
norms of international law would preclude a sovereign state from opening
its borders to a former head of state or from refusing to extradite him in
the absence of an extradition treaty, which, in any event, as normally
drafted would not cover "political crimes." 1' 9 So, as the Court majority
assumed, the Carter Administration was technically within its rights as
regards its dealings with the former Shah. Yet, there is a question
whether a panel more sensitive to the equities of the case would not have
regarded these aspects of U.S. relations with the former Shah as some-

193. [1980] I.C.J. at 60 (Tarazi, J., dissenting).
194. See Kifmer, How a Sit-In Turned into a Siege, N.Y. Times, May 10, 1981 (Magazine), at 54; Smith, Why Carter Admitted the Shah, id., at 36.
195. See Bassiouni, The Political Offense Exception in Extradition Law and Practice,
in INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND POLITICAL CRIMES 398 (C. Bassiouni ed. 1975).
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thing more than, to quote judge Morozov's characterization of what the
majority judgment suggests, "merely ordinary acts which just happened
to give rise to a 'feeling of offense.'"""
The second condition which might have been considered in assessing
the responsibilities of Iran and the United States toward one another has
to do with the chaotic political situation in post-revolutionary Iran, a situation in fact approaching a state of anarchy. Generally speaking, international law looks at the state as a monolithic entity, disregarding for
purposes of assessing rights and liabilities the peculiarities of its internal
structure and decisional processes. Each state has a government to speak
for its people in international fora, to accept obligations and press claims
on their behalf. This model of inter-state relations is useful in normal
times when there is a need for the Court to keep variables relevant to the
determination of claims and responsibilities within manageable proportions. But a case can be made that under revolutionary conditions or in
situations approaching anarchy, which seems an apt description of Iran in
the post-revolutionary period, the internal circumstances of a defaulting
state must be brought to bear on the final allocation of liabilities. Judge
Tarazi touched on this essential point: in his view it was "unjust to lay all
the facts complained of at the door of the Iranian government without
subjecting the circumstances in which the acts took place to the least preliminary examination."'' Instead, the Court majority uncritically accepted the information supplied by the United States and proceeded
under the assumption that Iran enjoyed a coherent structure of power in
the ordinary sense, when it was quite clear from the press and media reports-as indeed conceded by the Carter Administration itself in pronouncements not intended for the Court'"s-that this picture of a responsible government in control of Iranian administration and policy was wide
off the mark.
The above paragraphs may be summarized as follows. The analysis in
this section indicates that a wider framework of appraisal than the one
used in the majority opinion is more likely to arrive at fair and equitable
results for politicized disputes arising in the context of relations between
developing and developed, i.e. Western states. Furthermore, the international adjudicatory process being essentially consensual-in the sense of

196. (1980] I.C.J. at 57 (Morozov, J., dissenting).
197. Id. at 63 (Tarazi, J., dissenting).
198. See, e.g., Hearings Before the Subcomm. on InternationalEconomic Policy and
Trade and the Subcomm. on Europe and the Middle East of the House Comm. on Foreign
Affairs, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980) (statement of Peter Constable). Then Deputy Assistant
Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Mr. Constable said,
We are dealing with a government in Iran that has few of the attributes we
expect of national authorities. Iran is a country torn apart by continuing revolutionary turmoil. Our people are hostage not only to the militants but to internal power struggles and rivalries. And we are dealing with a nation that
faces not only the threat of internal disintegration but external threats to its
independence and territorial integrity from nations on its borders.
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depending for enforcement on consensus and cooperation of the parties-a framework of inquiry and appraisal that is capable of producing
fair results also stands a better chance of meeting the requirements of
effectiveness, that is, of producing results with which parties may voluntarily comply. Of course, it is arguable that no matter what method of
inquiry the Court had selected and regardless of its ultimate findings, the
decision would not have been "effective" in this case since the chaotic
political conditions and near total lack of leadership in Iran made it all
but impossible for any Court-based solution to be accepted. This is a
plausible argument; but the Court's choice of method and the impact of
this choice on its findings must be evaluated in terms of their longerrange effects on state attitudes, particularly attitudes in the Third World
in view of the North-South overtones of the hostage case. Viewed from
this perspective, the Court's refusal to adjudicate the equities of the hostage case is likely to have an adverse effect on its future business by reinforcing Third World perceptions of the international adjudicatory process
as unable to accommodate claims arising from the politics of North-South
relations.1 99
VII.

CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

The Court's handling of the Iran hostage crisis is relevant beyond the
substantive law contained in its two opinions, and deserves more comprehensive analysis. Accordingly, this article has examined not only the law
of the case, but also the implications of the scope of inquiry adopted by
the Court.
On the one hand-as evidenced by the cohesion achieved by the
bench on most issues-the hostage case presented the Court with simple,
clear-cut questions of law. Neither the jurisdiction of the Court nor the
substance of applicable law left room for argument. The clarity of applicable procedural and substantive rules enabled the Court to produce bases for decision around which the entire bench could rally; and this, in
turn, added authority and effectiveness to the Court's pursuit of its traditional judicial function of illuminating, settling, and developing points of
international judicial doctrine. This point is worth making in view of the
recent trend in the Court toward plural-opinion judgments which, even in
cases of unanimous opinions like the one rendered in Aegean Sea Continental Shelf, has often made it difficult to discern the Court's ratio
decidendi, thus diminishing the precedent-setting value of its findings. In
United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff, by contrast, the Court
produced two disciplined opinions which together appear to confirm, clarify, and settle several important issues of its case law. Five areas of contribution may be singled out for emphasis.
First, the Court has confirmed the "irreparable prejudice" test as a

199. The non-Western, Third World countries have been notoriously skeptical of the
content and processes of customary international law. See note 115 supra.
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condition for the indication of interim measures of protection. Clearer
guidelines, however, as to what constitutes "irreparable prejudice" are
still needed. In Aegean Sea Continental Shelf, the Court held that an
injury which is "capable of reparation by appropriate means" did not
qualify as "irreparable. ' 20 0 Without explicitly saying so, the ruling in
United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff seems to have applied a
similar criterion of "irreparability." The language of the interim opinion
implied that the injury capable of becoming "irreparable" in United
States Diplomatic and Consular Staff case was the exposure of the detained personnel to "privation, hardship, anguish and even danger to life
and health" 2 0 1-in other words, the kind of injury which cannot be compensated either monetarily or in kind.
Second, the interim opinion can also be read as indicating the continued adherence of a majority of the bench to the "prima facie possibility
of jurisdiction" test, namely, the view that for contemplating an award of
interim protection no more is required than a showing that there is prima
facie some possibility of jurisdiction on the merits. It will be recalled that
the interim opinion took pains to reaffirm this test 02 even though it was
"manifest" that the Court had jurisdiction to determine the merits. 0 3
Third, the Court has now established a judicial principle for evaluating the admissibility of interim claims which overlap with those advanced
for decision on the merits. In future cases, the Court should examine the
purpose behind such claims to determine whether-they are submitted in
good faith to protect the rights asserted in the principal application.
Fourth, the decision on the merits reformulates the 1976 Aegean Sea
Continental Shelf holding on the separation of powers in the law of the
United Nations in a manner that will allow closer integration of the Court
in the political activities of the world organization. At the very least, this
reformulation should lift any constitutional obstacle that may have been
inferred from Aegean Sea Continental Shelf to preclude collaborative judicial and political actions for the resolution of international conflicts.
Finally, the Court has reaffirmed-in language which indicates a
range which may exceed that of its previous jurisprudence-the justiciability of legal issues arising from political disputes.
Beyond the legal contributions of United States Diplomatic and
Consular Staff,2 4 the case presents a unique opportunity to examine the
relationship between law and politics in the society of states or, more precisely, the question, ever present in politicized legal disputes, of which the
hostage crisis was a prime example, of whether and to what extent inquiry into legal claims can be extended to cover the underlying historical

200.
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204.
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[19791
Id. at
Id. at
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I.C.J. at 11, para. 32.
I.C.J. at 20, para. 42.
13, para. 15.
14, para. 18.
I.C.J. 7 (order granting provisional measures); [19801 I.C.J. 3.
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setting of a dispute. On this issue, the Court came down squarely on the
side of traditional judicial notions that discourage inquiry into situations
not directly or immediately related to the claims submitted in litigation;
hence, its terse dismissal of Iran's political allegations as unsubstantiated
and in any case irrelevant to the determination of the merits. The analysis contained in the above sections has suggested that a historically based
and equity-oriented framework of inquiry is more likely to produce results that are fair and effective. It is suggested here too that such a framework would have a positive impact on the Court's future business by allaying doubts among the Third World countries about the adequacy of
Court-based adjudication for the vindication of claims arising in NorthSouth political contexts.
Perhaps the most encouraging aspect of the United Nations' handling of the hostage crisis is that, haphazard as it may have appeared at
times, 0 5 in its broad outlines it set forth a model of inquiry that can be
adapted to meet the operational requirements of a framework of judicial
appraisal and settlement of the kind recommended in this article. This
section concludes with some general observations about the creative possibilities implicit in the U.N. model of inquiry and offers comments on
how this model can be developed and refined to implement a more suitable approach than afforded by the present processes of international adjudication for the resolution of claims arising from politicized disputes.
The model of inquiry implicit in parallel Court-U.N. commission actions suggests that the task of implementing a multidimensional framework of appraisal does not necessitate a restructuring of the Court and its
processes. Indeed, it seems desirable to retain the Court's present structure and processes as best suited for the pursuit of its judicial functions
in nonpoliticized cases. On the other hand, for disputes requiring a wider
scope of appraisal, Court-based action can be supplemented by investigation into the extra-legal dimensions of the conflict by a panel like the
U.N. Commission of Inquiry. The attempt failed in the present case in
part because neither the task of the Commission nor its relations, if any,
with the Court were clearly defined, and in large measure because of the
inability of the revolutionary leadership in Iran to exploit the advantages
which the U.N. approach offered. But failure in one case need not prevent
inquiry into the creative possibilities that the parallel approach holds for
the future.
To explore in detail how this approach can be improved for future
action is beyond the scope of this article. Two critically important steps,
however, are suggested below. First, the investigating panel must be institutionalized on a continuing basis and its functions must be clearly defined. Second, a link, missing in the present case, must be established

205. For the conditions surrounding the formation and workings of the U.N. Commission, see Smith, Putting the Hostages' Lives First,N.Y. Times, May 10, 1981 (Magazine), at
77 & 88-91.
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between the International Court and the proposed panel. The latter
would report its findings to the Court, which could then use them in
reaching a decision on the claims of the contending parties. The panel
itself could operate under one of the U.N. political organs or, alternatively, as an agency of the Court under the terms of article 50 of its Statute which empowers the bench to "entrust any individual, body, bureau,
commission or any other organization that it may select with the task of
carrying out an inquiry. '"
Entrusting the essentially political task of investigating the equities of a given situation to a panel linked to but separate from the Court has the advantage of protecting the Court's integrity
as a judicial body. At the same time, closer integration of the Court into
the dispute-settling processes of the United Nations would enhance the
Court's institutional capital, making it more relevant to the resolution of
order-threatening international conflicts. In the long run, it may be the
most effective means for reversing the trend towards underuse of the
Court's adjudicatory processes-a trend which has virtually brought the
Court's contentious business to a vanishing point.
No doubt the Court's increased involvement in the politics of international disputes, even if carried out indirectly as proposed here, would
conflict with traditional notions that define the function of the judiciary
as one of declaring and applying the law. But the post war experience
with international adjudication has shown that application of this definition in the existing world context places the Court at risk of atrophy. The
solution suggested here, on the other hand, offers a promising compromise between the requirements of protecting the judicial integrity of the
Court while at the same time transforming it into a more relevant and
frequently-used body in the settlement of international disputes.

206. I.C.J.
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SYMPOSIUM: GLOBAL
CLIMATIC CHANGE

Introduction
VED

P. NANDA

Two recent reports-The Global 2000 Report to the [U.S.] President' and World ConservationStrategy2 prepared for the United Nations
Environment Programme (UNEP)-contain a sober warning that the
world environment and resources currently are under severe stresses
which could seriously damage the Earth's carrying capacity. The Global
2000 report projects long-term trends and concludes that unless urgent
actions throughout the world are taken now, human suffering and environmental damage will worsen with a consequent potential for international strife. The World Conservation Strategy book warns that the
"planet's capacity to support people is being irreversibly reduced in both
developed and developing countries," s and recommends institutional and
planning guidelines for better management and conservation of living
resources.
These reports are useful in enhancing public awareness of the nature
and immensity of the problem which modern civilization faces. The gravity of the situation was dramatized in the early 1970's in the Club of
Rome's controversial but valuable study, The Limits to Growth,4 which
painted a rather grim picture of man's future. Since then there has grown
a genuine interest and concern in studying the various aspects of the
problem, exploring available alternatives, and fashioning innovative approaches toward amelioration of the existing conditions.
One such exploratory effort was made in the summer of 1980 when
Distinguished Visiting Professor of International Law, IIT Chicago-Kent College of
Law, Fall Semester 1981; Professor of Law and Director, International Legal Studies Program, University of Denver College of Law.
1. COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENT QUALITY AND U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, THE GLOBAL 2000 REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT: ENTERING THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, SUMMARY REPORT (1980)

[hereinafter cited as GLOBAL 2000].
2. INTERNATIONAL UNION FOR THE CONSERVATION OF NATURE AND NATURAL RESOURCES,
WORLD CONSERVATION STRATEGY: LIVING RESOURCE CONSERVATION FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (1980).

3. Id., Introduction.
4. D. MEADOWS, D. MEADOWS, J. RANDERS & W. BEHRENS, THE LIMrrs To GROWTH (Report to the Club of Rome, 1972).
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the Aspen Institute of Humanistic Studies and the International Legal
Studies Program of the University of Denver College of Law assembled a
group of distinguished scientists, international lawyers, and social scientists in Denver to discuss selected issues of world climate change. The
Denver meeting followed the World Climate Conference which had met
earlier in Geneva and had "flashed some ominous signals about the number of disturbing trends relating to the world climate which could have
disastrous effects on the biosphere and on humanity."' Two of the participants at the Denver meeting, William Kellogg and Robert Schware,
have also concluded after a recent year-long study: "If the consensus of
the international climatological community is correct, and if worldwide
use of fossil fuels continues to increase atmospheric carbon dioxide, mankind is likely to cause a significant average warming of the Earth's surface
-a greenhouse effect-within the next 50 years."'
Although the damaging effects of coal smoke and auto emission in
combination with other compounds in the atmosphere are not fully understood, it is widely recognized that acid precipitation has killed fish in
many lakes in the United States, Canada, and in the Scandinavian countries.7 According to a recent news story,
not until the state [of New York) reported last December that hundreds of Adirondack lakes were dead or dying from acid precipitation
was the gravity of the threat clear. And even that report did not convey what several days of interviews with several residents and state
conservation officials established: Not only fish, but also other species
are starting to disappear in one of the nation's wildest places.'
Recognizing the seriousness of the situation, the Eighth World Meterological Congress in 1979 established the world climate program, one
of whose four major components is its Impact Studies Program.' The first
phase of the program, to last from 1980 to 1983, includes efforts to: (1)
reduce the vulnerability of food systems to climate change, (2) anticipate
the impact of climate change caused by human activity, (3) improve the
science of climate impact studies, and (4) identify human activities that
10
are most sensitive to climate.
At the two-day Denver meeting, on July 10 and 11, 1980, papers were
presented identifying the nature of the problem, exploring the existing
and alternative public and private international law institutions as re5. U.N. Dept. Public Information, Non-Governmental Organizations Section, World
Environment, U.N. Doc. DPI/NGO/SA/80/6 (1980), at 1.
6. W. KELLOGG & R. SCHWARE, CLMATE CHANGE AND SOCEy 1 (1980).
7. U.S. EPA Research Summary, Acid Rain 674 (1979). See also GLOBAL 2000 at 336.
8. Blumenthal, Acid Rainfall in the Adirondacks Disrupting the Chain of Life, N.Y.
Times, June 8, 1981, at 11, col. 1.
9. See World Meteorological Organization, Outline Plan and Basis for the World Climate Programme 1980-1983, WMO No. 540 (1979). See also W. KELOGG & R. SCHWARE,
CLIMATE CHANGE AND SocIry 125 (1981).
10. Id., Appendix C.
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sponses to weather and climate problems, and discussing policy implications of the various feasible remedies. The papers prepared for the conference will be soon released in a book entitled World Climate Change:
The Role of International Law and Institutions." Four chapter of the
book comprise this symposium issue.
While all of these essays focus on various options of atmospheric
management, Professors Edith B. Weiss and Ray Jay Davis are concerned
primarily with the management itself, Professor Howard J. Taubenfeld
surveys the legal responses, and Mr. Armin Rosencranz raises questions
of feasibility of actual international cooperation.
Professor Taubenfeld provides a broad survey of the legal implications of controversies created by human responses to and manipulation of
atmospheric change, with the underlying sense that "In many instances,
the nature of the problems is already discernible and action is already
necessary, for the effects of a failure to act immediately may not be felt
for decades, and when these effects are felt, they may have become irreversible."' He raises the problem of national endeavors to the benefit of
such interests as agriculture and industry, such as the reversal of river
flow and conversion and harvestation of the great forests that are proving
to have massive impacts on the cycles of nature. Against these practices,
considered "domestic" issues by the actors and thus without the province
of international regulation, international law has little authority. "Even
raising the question may be considered an unwarranted interference with
domestic concerns."' s
Taubenfeld then discusses radical but inadvertent changes wrought
upon the environment by the interaction of modern human activity and
the workings of nature, and contemporary legal reactions to these
problems. With respect to acid rain, for example, the ECE's recently
made Convention on Transboundary Air Pollution calls for the joint development of control strategies in opposition to C02 pollution. While
many nations accept the need for action, "[flew support any kind of international management or controls."' 4 On the subject of chlorofluorocarbons-a problem of uncertain, but global, consequences-action has
centered in the individual nations. A change in the behavior of those most
responsible industrialized nations would have a substantial ameliorative
effect.
Considering the 1972 Declaration of the United Nations Conference
on the Human Environment,' 5 Taubenfeld recognizes that, although the

11. WORLD CLIMATE CHANGE: THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS (V.

Nanda ed. 1981).
12. Taubenfeld, The Atmosphere: Change, Politics and World Law, 10 DEN. J. INT'L L.
& POL'v 469, 469 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Taubenfeld].
13. Id. at 473.
14. Id. at 477.
15. Report of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (Stockholm,
5-16 June 1972), 1 U.N. GAOR (21st. plen. mtg.), U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14 Rev. 1 (1972),

DEN. J. OF INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 10:463

Declaration states useful norms and goals of the world community to salvage and recover the environment, yet there is not at present any mechanism for "resolving disputes as to scientific facts, for evaluating claims of
injury and making binding awards, or for dealing with activities which
affect the environment generally."1 6 Taubenfeld concludes his essay by
briefly analyzing several of the existing bilateral and multilateral arrangements for curbing the overwhelming dangers of unchecked abuse of the
environment, urging the wider use of intergovernmental agreements and
agencies, to the ultimate extent of "a responsible world government with
the ability to assure the equitable distribution of the rights to life, to
'1 7
material welfare, and to security.
Professor Weiss considers the carbon dioxide problem to be a challenge for the international community which can be met by breaking
"new ground to handle [C02's] unique blend of political, economic, legal,
and scientific issues."18 After describing the predicament, Weiss draws
upon pertinent past prescriptions in international law for the management of carbon dioxide accumulations-agreements on international rivers and international basins, air pollution, and the evolving law on the use
of shared resources. It is in this historical context that she presents national and international preventive and adaptive strategies for carbon dioxide pollution. She deems it essential that "the C02 problem should be
viewed foremost as a problem in developing the appropriate transition
strategy for moving from a fossil fuel to a nonfossil fuel economy in the
next fifty to one hundred years." 1'
While an intensified search is likely "for technical solutions, such as
ways to expand the capacity of oceans to absorb carbon dioxide or to
limit carbon dioxide emissions,' 0 she considers it essential to anticipate
and address "the effects of possible climate change, particularly upon
water supplies and migration patterns, and upon the general dislocation

of a country's economy.

. . . "2

She advises "countries that are likely to

be adversely affected to join together in measures to alleviate the stress
and damage caused by climatic changes."
Mr. Rosencranz draws the reader's attention to the inadequacy of the
existing norms of international law and the available institutional structures in abating SOx emissions sufficiently to remedy the problems
caused by transboundary acid rain. The major causes are the unwillingness of nation states to comply with such norms unless it is in their na-
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16. Taubenfeld, supra note 12, at 481.
17. Id. at 486.
18. Weiss, A Resource Management Approach to Carbon Dioxide During the Century
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20. Id. at 508.
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tional interests, and the ineffectiveness of the institutional structures to
compel compliance. Rosencranz, too, broaches the subject of the ECE
convention and its implications for air pollution control, but he sees in
this "breakthrough" that ultimately "no country has to alter its status
quo unless it chooses to."2 As a particular example of the obstacles to
international cooperation, he discusses the Canada-United States SOx
treaty negotiations, based essentially on mutual self-interest and yielding
no alleviation of the problem.
Optimistically, Rosencranz postulates a bright picture will emerge
when a nation's courts first use the principles of the Stockholm Declaration in enforcement against its offending nationals. Despite the unpromising current outlook, Rosencranz sees the greatest advantage of the Declaration and efforts like it as being their effect in raising the world
consciousness in environmental protection, particularly the danger of acid
rain.
Professor Davis discusses the subject of weather modification and legal options for governmental management of atmospheric resources.
Among the means discussed is incidental control, or the control exercised
over weather modification activity, absent legislation directed at such activity, by application of existing regulation in related areas. For example:
Because much of cloud seeding is done from federally owned land,
"[ilssuance or denial of permits [for special use of the land] would be a
form of control over cloud seeding incidental to the general permit granting authority."' " Under this section Davis also deals with the applicabillity of traditional legal rules of resource rights and tort liability.
He proceeds to discuss regulatory consequences of the flow of information, permitting and licensing of modification operations, the government's contract capacity and its own modification activity, and, ultimately, outright prohibition of modification by governments. Davis'
assessment of these elements of governmental control on weather modification culminates in a recommendation that "there be careful consideration of control devices so that a proper combination of them will protect
against indiscriminate weather modification programs, and secure
an at'
mospheric environment favorably affecting the quality of life." "2
The conclusion seems inescapable that while further study is required on the part of scientists and social scientists into the technical
issues of environmental pollution and ways to alleviate it, it is imperative,
too, that international lawyers contribute to the future of control in three
particular areas: (1) enhancing awareness, (2) refining norms and
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strengthening institutional structures, and (3) exploring preventive and
adaptive strategies in cooperation with science and social sciences.

The Atmosphere: Change, Politics and

World Law
HOWARD

J.

TAUBENFELD

It may have been true a century ago that "everyone talked about the
weather, but no one did anything about it." In recent years, however,
while humans have been talking ever more about weather and climate,
they are also doing something about it. In general, human activities have
affected or may affect weather and climate in at least three ways: (1) conscious efforts to change weather and climate; (2) conscious national
projects with unintended environmental shifts; and (3) major inadvertent
environmental and climatic change. These effects, intended or not, create
political issues, some of which are potentially issues of national and
human survival. It is far from premature to focus attention on these areas. In many instances, the nature of the problems is already discernible
and action is already necessary, for the effects of a failure to act immediately may not be felt for decades, and when these effects are felt, they
may have become irreversible.

I. CONscious

EFFORTS TO CHANGE WEATHER AND CLIMATE

Throughout recorded history, and perhaps for as long as humans
have been able to formulate the thought, men have sought to change or at
least influence the "gods of weather." They have danced, sung, sacrificed,
prayed, fired cannons, and exploded dynamite taken aloft by kites. Only
since the mid-1940's has science been involved in earnest. Just after the
Second World War, Langmuir and Schaefer demonstrated that it was
both theoretically and practically possible to affect water in the atmosphere by the introduction into a cloud of tiny particles of matter.' Dry
ice was used initially; silver iodide has been used in most efforts since.
Given a precipitation-pregnant situation in the atmosphere, the introduction of additional nuclei to which water vapor may cling appears to produce more precipitation than would otherwise have occurred. An excess
introduction of particles might inhibit the creation of large hailstorms or,
indeed, might lessen precipitation if it was so desired.
The efforts of the past thirty-five years to deliberately modify
weather appear to have produced modest results. They have, however,
Howard J. Taubenfeld is a professor of law at Southern Methodist University. A.B.,
1947; LL.B., 1948; Ph.D., 1958, Columbia University.
1. Langmuir, Schaefer, and Vonnegut, addresses to the American Physical Society, reported in N.Y. Times, Jan. 31, 1947, at 16, col. 1; Schaefer, Man-made Snow, 69 MEcs.
ENG. 32 (1947); Schaefer, Production of Ice Crystals in a Cloud of Supercooled Water
Droplets, 104 ScIENcE 457 (1946); see generally Ball, Shaping the Law of Weather Control,
58 YALE L.J. 213 (1949).
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created substantial domestic and even international controversy.' At present, there is no real evidence that large-scale climatic effects can be intentionally produced. We know that we can remove supercooled fog from
airports for limited periods; that individual cumulus clouds can be made
to grow and often to produce rain; that orographic clouds (those already
rising as they are carried from west to east over the United States' western mountains, for example) can be induced to precipitate more than we
would expect in nature.8 From increasing rain production from other
large storm systems to decreasing hail or hail damage, and in modifying
hurricanes to reduce their wind speed and hence damage due to wind and
storm surge, the evidence is promising but unproven.
What are the risks at the international level from this promising if
partially unproven technology? First, there is the possibility that an experiment or operation in one country will cause direct, demonstrable
harm in another.' It is conceivable, for example, that augmenting the flow
of an international river might cause damage to a lower riparian state.
Where the cause-effect relationship is clear, there are precedents in the
developing law of international rivers to make responsibility clear. The
mechanisms for recouping losses are not as well developed.
Second, there is the possibility, demonstrated repeatedly in the
United States, that a state or its citizens may feel that weather modification activities in another nation are causing harm to them even though no
cause-effect relation can be shown. There is also the human perception
that can be summarized as the "rob Peter to pay Paul" principle. There
is an ingrained human feeling that an increase of rain in one place must
correspondingly decrease it somewhere else. Most scientists feel this is
not true, that there is so much water in the air that cloud seeding may
increase precipitation outside a target area, or not affect the area at all.
Yet even if scientifically demonstrable, many people will find this hard to
believe. Disputes of this type have arisen, however, with respect to a perceived harm when in fact no weather modification activities have taken
place. Since perceptions are as strong as reality, perhaps in such cases
some form of impartial fact-finding will ameliorate the problem.
2. See generally G.

BREUER, WEATHER MODIFICATION, PROSPECTS AND PROBLEMS

(1980);

Danielson, Sherk, & Grant, Legal System Requirements to Control and Facilitate Water
Augmentation in the Western United States, 6 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 511 (1976); Samuels, Prospective InternationalControl of Weather Modification Activities, 21 U. TORONTO
L.J. 222 (1971); Sigel, InternationalControl of Weather Modification in a Regime of LongRange Weather Forecasting,19 HARv. INT'L L.J. 535 (1978); Wood, The Status of Weather
Modification Activities Under United States and InternationalLaw, 10 NAT. RESOURCES
LAW. 367 (1977-78); Note, Weather Genesis and Weather Neutralization:A New Approach
to Weather Modification, 6 CALIF. W. INT'L L.J. 412 (1976).
3. Samuels, InternationalControl of Weather Modification Activities: Peril or Policy?,
13 NAT. RESOURCES J. 327 n.1 (1973); Taubenfeld, International Environmental Law: Air

and Outer Space, 13

NAT. RESOURCES

J. 315, 321 (1973).

4. LEGAL AND SCIENTIFIC UNCERTAINTIES OF WEATHER MODIFICATION (W. Thomas ed.
1977). See generally Hassett, Weather Modification and Control: InternationalOrganizational Prospects, 7 TEx. INT'L L.J. 89 (1971-72); Samuels, note 3 supra.
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Third, there is the problem of risk-sharing between nations. Hurricanes (called typhoons in the Pacific) produce wind damage, storm surge
damage, and flooding rainstorms. Many nations, however, depend on
these storms for much of their needed rainfall. If it becomes possible to
diminish the wind but spread the storm, or to dissipate much of the
storm, who would make the decision? If, to avoid great damage to Texas,
we could turn a hurricane toward Cuba, is this a permissible act of selfdefense against a devastating natural phenomenon? While much of this is
fanciful at present, it is important to consider the appropriate international approaches to channeling these capabilities for weather modification into internationally acceptable patterns.5
One further issue cannot be avoided although the threat may have
been laid to rest for the present. Weather has always been of importance
in military operations. s As a Navy scientist stated to the Congress many
years ago: "We regard the weather as a weapon. Anything one can use to
get his way is a weapon and the weather is as good a one as any.'" The
modest efforts of American forces to enhance rainfall to interdict enemy
forces in some stages of the war in Vietnam do not seem to have produced
any long-lasting physical effects. The general feeling that it is somehow
wrong to tamper with "Mother Nature," however, combined with more
realistic fears of the potentially untoward and unpredictable effects of attempting large-scale climatic shifts have led to a treaty, accepted by the
world's major powers, renouncing the use of such environmental modification as a weapon.8 It is unclear whether humans could do these things to
each other and to the environment. It is well that they have agreed not to
try.
II.

CoNscious NATIONAL PROJECTS WITH UNINTENDED ENVIRONMENTAL

SHIFrs
Of potentially far greater importance to a politically stable world
than intentional weather modification are those human activities which
have or may have inadvertent impacts on weather and climate. e Two ma-

5. Taubenfeld, Weather Modification and Control: Some InternationalLegal Implications, 55 CALIF. L. REV. 493 (1967). See also Hassett, note 4 supra; Samuels, note 2 supra;
Wood, note 2 supra.
6. Examples would include the storm that helped save England from the Spanish Armada and the determination of D-Day for Europe in 1944 by the weather outlook. The
possibility of using weather to deny information to an enemy, to create battlefield hazards,
and to destroy crops have all been considered.
7. 13 NAT. RESOURCES J. 315, 323 n.23 (1973).
8. Convention on the Prohibition of Military or any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques, done at Geneva, May 18, 1977, entered into force for the
United States, Jan. 17, 1980, T.I.A.S. No. 9614.
9. A review of the impacts of a number of human activities on the atmosphere can be
found in INADVERTENT CLIMATE MODIFICATION: REPORT OF THE STUDY OF MAN'S IMPACT ON
CLIMATE

(SMIC) (1971) [hereinafter referred to as

INADVERTENT CLIMATE MODIFICATION).

See also Coppoc, The Environment: No Respecter of National Boundaries, 43 ALB. L. REv.
520 (1979); Dickstein, National Environmental Hazards and InternationalLaw, 23 INT'L &
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jor examples may be cited.
First, scientists and engineers in the Soviet Union have from time to
time announced major engineering plans to reverse the flow of major Siberian rivers.10 River flows can be altered. In the United States, the flow
of the river at Chicago was reversed in this century. Russia has already
reportedly shifted the flow of a river in Central Russia. Plans to shift the
by both Israel
flow of the Jordan River some decades ago were denounced
11
it.
did
other
the
if
belli
causus
a
as
and Jordan
The Soviet plans for Siberian rivers are not, however, "hostile." They
are designed to serve several national purposes. The changes would provide increased flows of water for irrigation over wide areas and would
help replenish the waters in Russia's inland seas. Moreover, since fresh
water freezes more rapidly than salt water, the diminished flow of fresh
water into the Arctic Sea from the rivers which would now, in major part,
flow south rather than north, would serve to help keep Russian Arctic
ports ice-free for somewhat longer periods. Irrigation, more reserve water,
and ice-free ports are all important for domestic purposes. Why is there a
potential problem?
In analyzing this situation, scientists have pointed out that an irreversible chain reaction may be started. As the areas around the river
mouths remain ice-free longer, more "black" water is available to absorb
solar heat. Ice, in contrast, reflects more heat upward. As more heat is
absorbed by the water, more ice will melt. As more ice melts, more open
water is available to absorb heat until, at some point, the relatively thin
ice cover on the Arctic Sea may disappear completely. We know that the
Arctic has been ice-free many times in geological history. We do not
know, however, what the short or long-term effects would be on regional
and world climate if the Arctic ice disappeared rather precipitously in the
next decades."'
Second, we are now witnessing a rather remarkable assault on many
of the world's major forests. Brazil and other countries are making major
inroads on the great forests which cover substantial portions of their territory. Brazil, for example, has been engaged in a large-scale effort to replace its forests with farm land. The dramatic increases in the price of
wood and forest products in recent decades have further accelerated demand for the removal of the trees.
Again, it is reasonable to ask why a country's domestic policies can
be suggested as an important area of international concern and scrutiny
Comp. L.Q. 426 (1974); Jackson, The Dimensions of InternationalPollution, 50 OR. L. REv.
223 (1970-71); Joyner & Joyner, Global Eco-Management and InternationalOrganization:
The Stockholm Conference and Problems of Cooperation, 14 NAT. RESOURCES J. 533 (1974);
Muir, Legal and Ecological Aspects of the InternationalEnergy Situation, 8 INT'L LAW. 1
(1974).
10. Taubenfeld, supra note 3, at 322; Wood, supra note 2, at 385 n.67.
11. Taubenfeld, supra note 5, at 501 n.43.
12. See Taubenfeld, note 3 supra.
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and, again, the answer is the same. The forests, as tremendous green areas (especially those in the equatorial belt), are the "source" of much of
the world's climate. A dramatic change in these forests is certain to produce changes elsewhere, but no one is sure what these changes will be.
Furthermore, as will be discussed in more detail later, the world is
already facing a number of potential problems due to the vast increase of
carbon dioxide (CO,) resulting from human activities. One major natural
"sink" for carbon dioxide is the green areas of the globe. As forests are
eliminated, the cutting and clearing apparently releases CO., as does the
burning of wood, and the replacement of a forest with an open or an urban area means that there is less green surface available to absorb CO2 .
These "domestic" practices and policies may have extremely widespread,
if completely unintended, effects.'8 At present, the international legal system has but the most embryonic techniques for dealing with such national activities. Even raising the question may be considered an unwarranted interference with domestic concerns. Still, the awesome
possibilities of unwanted and irreversible change do exist.

III. MAJOR INADVERTENT ENVIRONMENTAL AND CLIMATIC CHANGE
In a broad sense, every human activity affects the climate, at least on
a tiny microscale. When humans replace farm or pasture land, or a forest,
with a city, the local weather changes. A city is a "heat island." Air is
warmed and rises as it moves over the city. Industry, specifically the
burning of fossil fuels, places large numbers of particles in the air. This
unintentional cloud seeding has an effect similar to that sought by intentional weather modification. Extensive studies in and around St. Louis
and its "downwind" areas, for example, show that, as contrasted with
some decades ago, the downwind areas are subjected annually to a substantially greater number of serious storms and to an increased amount of
hail. 4
In a different way, some scientists have suggested that desertification
is, in part and in some areas, due to patterns of animal husbandry. Cattle
will eat growing greens but leave a stubble; sheep will eat to the earth;
goats will dig the roots as well. Where goats graze on the margins of a
desert, they permanently destroy the grass and the desert widens. As the
desert widens, some argue, more dust and nuclei are released to the heavens. The result is that clouds are overseeded, rain does not fall and desertification is reinforced.
With the spread of industrialization, the increased demand for electric power, and the creation of new products, the use of the atmosphere

13. Id.
14. See, e.g., Gatz, An Investigation of Pollutant Source Strength- Rainfall Relation-

ships at St. Louis, in

SEVENTH CONFERENCE ON INADVERTENT AND PLANNED WEATHER MODIFICATION 9 (1979) (American Meteorological Society, Banff, Alberta, Canada, Oct. 8-12,

1979).
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as a disposal sink for industrial wastes has of course increased tremendously. The atmosphere has changed, is changing, and will change. It is a
tremendous machine which has historically managed to absorb "insults"
from volcanic eruptions to manmade intrusions, without long-term disturbance of an equilibrium."5
It is rapidly becoming apparent that certain activities of mankind are
in the process of altering the world climatic balance. The implications of
such alterations for a world where climate is an important part of a nation's well-being and where nations are increasingly armed with nuclear
weapons are also becoming apparent. At least three issue areas require
attention: (1) acid rain; (2) carbon dioxide and the "greenhouse" effect;
and (3) the effect of chlorofluorocarbons (CFC's) on the ozone layer of the
stratosphere.
Of these three issue areas, only one-acid rain-is of international
concern, only because it affects many countries and the source of the
problem is often in another nation. Acid rain does not appear to involve
worldwide climatic effects. The other two-the increase of carbon dioxide
in the atmosphere and the effects of CFC's on the ozone layer of the
stratosphere-are truly global issues in that they both threaten change in
the overall world climate and cannot adequately be ameliorated by the
action of any one or even several countries. A worldwide response is
clearly required.
A.

Acid Rain

There is substantial evidence that acidity levels in precipitation have
varied throughout history. Many natural sources such as volcanoes and
forests increase the atmospheric loading of sulphur oxides, especially
sulphur dioxide (SO,), and nitrogen oxides (NOx) which, on chemical reaction in the atmosphere, precipitate as rain or snow containing higher
acidity levels.
We have, however, come to realize two important sets of facts. On
one hand, the greater the acidity of precipitation in an area, the more
likely it is to cause erosion of stone surfaces of buildings and other structures, to harm crops, and to kill fish in ponds, lakes, and streams. 6 On
the other hand, it now seems clear that many human activities-the
burning of coal and oil, other industrial pursuits such as smelting, automobile exhaust, even farming-are adding substantially in various regions
to the already present natural causes of acid precipitation or are creating
new areas of acid precipitation damage." Many of the effects of these

15. This does not mean, of course, that atmospheric norms have not changed drastically
over the countless years of the existence of the atmosphere.
16. See Ferenbaugh, Acid Rain: Biological Effects and Implications,4 ENVT'L AFF. 745
(1975).
17. Other sources add to the quantities of both sulfur oxides and nitrogen oxides released into the atmosphere.
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activities are felt in countries other than the source of the pollution.' e
There is already widespread national and international concern
about the effects of acid precipitation and about ways of dealing with
them. As the United States moves increasingly to the use of coal to generate power, for example, increases in emissions may be anticipated unless
steps are taken immediately to forestall adverse effects. Furthermore,
remedies must be carefully evaluated. The introduction of very tall
smokestacks may lead to a lessening of pollution in the immediate vicinity of the pollutant source, but it also places particulates higher in the
atmosphere and makes it easier for them to travel great distances.
Before great strides can be expected internationally, countries with
an avowed interest in pollution problems must be prepared to put "their
own houses in order." Many nations have begun this process. The United
States, among many other countries, has extensive legislation and regulations concerning the basic pollutants involved in acid rain. However,
much more could be done. Permissible atmospheric releases of both SOx
and NOx could be lowered. Research efforts could be increased. Coal
washing could be made mandatory where appropriate. Use of tall stacks
could be restricted. The worst offending plants could be phased out.
On the international level, an agreement between the United States
and Canada, signed in August 1980, includes plans for major studies and
recommendations for dealing with perceived perils.1 9 The United States
and Canada share major geographic areas where the underlying bedrock
has a low capacity to buffer acids and is therefore susceptible to damage.
John Fraser, Canada's Minister of the Environment, has called acid rain
"the most serious environmental problem that Canada faces."' 0 President
Carter's 1979 Environmental Message recognized acid rain as a global
threat of great importance and set up a ten-year Federal Acid Rain Assessment Program."1 In 1977, the United States Clean Air Act was
amended to make it clear that air pollution from the United States causing problems abroad could lead to a requirement of action by the states."
Thus, a beginning has been made on the North American continent.
In 1979, the Economic Commission for Europe (ECE), a United Nations regional organization with thirty-four members including the United
States and Canada, promulgated the Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution." This Convention recognizes the necessity of in18. There are at present substantial emissions in the northeastern United States, in
southeastern Canada, and in northern Europe. Jackson, supro note 9, at 226-27.
19. Acid rain agreement, signed Aug. 5, 1980, by Secretary of State Edmund Muskie
and Ambassador to the United States Peter Towe; discussed in 209 SCIENCE 890 (Aug. 22,
1980).
20. Speech of Nov. 2, 1979, Action Seminar on Acid Precipitation, Toronto, Canada.
21. 15 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Doc. 1353, 1372-73 (Aug. 2, 1979).
22. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401 et seq. (1977) (amending 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401 et seq. (1967)).
23. Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, done Nov. 13, 1979, 1
U.N. ECE, Annex I, U.N. Doc. E/ECE/HLM.1/2 (1979), reprinted in 18 INT'L LEGAL MAT.
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ternational cooperation in monitoring and research. It is the first major
direct acknowledgement of the issues. Despite the absence of a mechanism for compelling pollution abatement, the Convention calls for the
joint development of air pollution control strategies. The parties pledge
to make efforts "to limit, and as far as possible, gradually reduce and
prevent air pollution." 4 This is a first step for Europe. It should be followed, in time, by additional agreements to establish the liability of nations for damage caused and to award compensation where appropriate.2
B. Carbon Dioxide
While the magnitude of our lack of knowledge and understanding
about the chemical and other processes which take place in the upper
atmosphere is appallingly large, the last few decades have witnessed dramatic gains in this area. Satellite probes, computers and computer modelling, and vast cooperative scientific programs covering large areas of the
globe now make possible a better understanding of what the atmosphere
is and how it functions. Such research has also made it possible to estimate the inroads and changes in the atmospheric commons which
humans have made. Of the immediate insults to the environment (and to
a decent life for humans), we can readily recognize the prevalence of such
problems as smog in our cities and harmful acid rain. There are other,
larger-scale effects which may be even more deleterious over time than
these more visible, immediate examples.
For several decades, scientists have noted an increase in atmospheric
carbon dioxide (CO,). It is predicted, that carbon dioxide in the atmosphere will about double in the period 1960 to 2030 (perhaps even to
2050) .26

Since carbon dioxide tends to prevent the escape of heat from the
earth, if this doubling occurs it could raise the global mean temperature
of the earth some 1.5 to 4.5 degrees Celsius, with less warming at the
Equator and more at the poles. 7 Shifts in the location of the earth's rain
belts could also occur. While some nations might find their weather improved, others are certain to be worse off, and at this stage, no one can
1442 (1979).
24. Id. art. 2.
25. A number of authorities have considered both the legal and biological causes and
effects of acid rain. See Babich, Davies, & Stotzky, Acid Precipitation:Causes and Consequences, ENVIRONMENT, May 1980, at 6; Coppoc, note 9 supra; Ferenbaugh, note 16 supra;
Graves, Rain of Troubles, SCIENCE 80, July/Aug. 1980, at 75 (includes Rosencranz, International Forecast:More Acid Rain, at 79); Likens, Wright, Galloway, & Butler, Acid Rain,
SCIENTIFIC AM., Oct. 1979, at 43.
26. Becker, Does a CO, CatastropheImpend?, 38 PuB. POWER 24, 25. See generally
COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY,

GLOBAL ENERGY FUTURES AND THE CARBON DIOXIDE

PROBLEM (1981); W. KELLOGG & R. SCHWARE, CLIMATE CHANGE AND SOCIETY: CONSEQUENCES
OF INCREASING ATMOSPHERIC CARBON DIOXIDE (1981).
27. COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, supra note 26, at 8; KELLOGG & SCHWARE,

supra note 26, at 45.
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predict with certainty that anyone will be better off overall. Any improvements are hard to forecast and might not be net national benefits at all.
Local gains might be overbalanced by planetary disasters.
Carbon dioxide enters the atmosphere from many natural sources. In
addition, however, the advent of the industrial revolution led to a demonstrable increase in the atmosphere's CO, load. It is estimated that approximately three-fourths of the CO. in the atmosphere comes from the
industrialized nations. "s Less developed countries contribute a limited
share by their own industrial processes. To a larger degree these countries
contribute to CO, increases in the atmosphere by removing forests and
burning the wood.
A CO-induced warming of the planet (in fact, any warming of the
planet) would cause changes in the environment. Some areas may become
more usable for farming. Other areas may lose warmth and moisture or
may have too much heat for traditional crops. Increased heating at the
poles may be enough to cause polar ice to melt with unpredictable climatic consequences. The West Antarctic ice sheet is considered less stable than other land-based ice and might melt, raising the earth's water
level by perhaps ten feet. If this and the other Antarctic and Greenland
ice sheets were to melt, water levels might rise as much as eighty feet
worldwide. These are true catastrophes in the making. It is not that they
are likely. It is simply that we can no longer ignore these possibilities.
A relatively limited number of countries are the major contributors
to CO, emissions. They are also the primary beneficiaries of the industrialization which is based on the use of fossil fuels. The United States, the
Soviet Union, and China are also the great sources of coal, the use of
which will increase because of petroleum shortages. Only a few countries,
such as Brazil, are the major holders of vast forest resources. Determined
action by a relatively few states, therefore, could make a major contribution to changing the rate of CO. loading in the atmosphere. Individually,
several of these nations have accepted the need to act. All question what
steps should be taken. Few support any kind of international management or controls. Although the results of the "greenhouse effect" might
not be observed for a century, the process having already begun may lead
inexorably to unacceptable, perhaps even unforeseen consequences if actions are not taken in the immediate future. Without a beginning now,
the processes may become irreversible.'2
C.

Chlorofluorocarbons
Chlorofluorocarbons (CFC's), perhaps best known under DuPont's

28. M. TOLBA, THE STATE OF THE WoRLD ENVIRONMENT 1980: THE 1980 REPORT OF THE
EXEcuTV DIRECTOR OF THE UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME (1980).
29. See also INADVERTENT CLIMATE MODIFICATION, note 9 supra; Bleicher, An Overview
of International Environmental Regulation, 2 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1 (1972); Joyner & Joyner,
note 9 supra.

DEN. J. OF INT'L

L. & POL'Y

VOL. 10:469

trade name "freon," are a class of wonder chemicals. They are made up of
extremely inert molecules which do not readily bond with others. They
are versatile, nontoxic to humans, and are long lived. They have been
widely used in aerosol spray cans, as industrial solvents, in air conditioning and refrigeration, and in foams used for cushioning, insulation, and
packaging. They are the blowing agents used to make the cups and trays
used by fast-food chains, for "plastic" egg cartons, and the like. They are
also relatively inexpensive. The United States has accounted for about
thirty percent of the world's emission of CFC's.30 In 1976, this amounted
to approximately 250 million pounds from nonaerosol applications. 1
With all their good qualities, why are CFC's of current concern? In
1974, certain scientists first advanced the theory that CFC molecules, because of their inertness, rise to the stratosphere essentially unchanged.
Once in the stratosphere, the sun's rays cause them to change and combine with molecules of ozone in a manner which lessens the ozone in the
stratosphere. Since it is the ozone layer which shields humans, crops, animals, and life near the surface of the waters from damaging ultraviolet
radiation, a decrease in ozone could lead to increases in skin cancer in
areas of the earth where meteorological conditions and skin color make
this disease an existent threat, not to mention damage to crops and other
life forms. Moreover, another predicted result of CFC's in the stratosphere is an increase in the earth's temperature by the middle of the next
century. By itself, CFC temperature increases are modest. When added to
a CO 2 temperature-induced increase (an increase perhaps four times
greater than that produced by CFC's alone), it assumes a far more serious
potential for disruption.
One additional point warrants consideration. The escape of CFC's
into the atmosphere is not limited to the time of their manufacture. Some
escape slowly as the product is used, as in the case of rigid foams. Others
are stored and released only when the product is discarded, as in the case
of home refrigerators. This "bank" of CFC's is expected to grow rapidly
over the decades unless a halt occurs now. While waiting, the quantity of
CFC's is growing and will become increasingly more costly to police and
control.
Reaction to the perceived long-range effects of CFC's remains mixed
internationally. Some scientists suggest that further proof needs to be
produced. This reluctance to act exists despite identification of the problem in authoritative reports issued by the National Academy of Sciences
in 1977 and 1979, by the World Meteorological Organization, and by the
staff of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP).32

30. See NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCE, HALOCARBONS: EFFECTS ON STRATOSPHERIC
OZONE (1976); see also NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCE, THE NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL IN

1977 (1977).
31. Id.
32. Note 28 supra.
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Present International Safeguards Against Pollution

Action to date has been primarily national, with the United States
taking the lead by banning the use of CFC's in aerosol spray cans and by
proposing overall limits on production. A few other nations, such as Canada, have acted as well. The Common Market countries have moved
slowly. Scandinavian countries are taking action. The British and French
have noted their doubts that there is as yet a demonstrable problem.
There is a UNEP program in place for studying and monitoring the ozone
layer. The critical question is whether these actions are adequate.
In the future, nations might enter into accords to set rules, to ban
CFC's where appropriate, to use taxes and other incentive systems to
limit their use, to regulate imports and exports, to encourage makers and
users to find substitutes, and to use those CFC's which cause the least
damage to the ozone layer. However, even before a worldwide consensus
on this issue is developed, an agreement among the industrialized nations
could dramatically change the outflow of CFC's. 8
With both CO2 and CFC's, the problem is truly global. The activities
of one or even a small number of countries can have an immediate impact, but amelioration or a cure is ultimately the responsibility of all
states. In each case, while the source of the problem exists in both, present and future activities, actual "visible" proof of deleterious change
may not be available for decades. Thus, for both CO, and CFC's, if preventative action is not begun at once, and on a broad scale, it is probable
that the feared consequences will have occurred, or at least that the trend
toward such consequences will be irreversible when they become widely
perceived.
IV.

CLIMATE MODIFICATION AND THE POTENTIAL FOR INTERNATIONAL
CONFLICT

A common feature of all of the types of climate modification noted
here is their potential for causing international tension and conflict. In-

ternational modification of local weather, if it involves a border area, and
of large scale storms (hurricanes, for example), is likely to be viewed as a
"zero sum game,"'" where one party loses if another gains. This may or
may not be scientifically accurate, but any change may be perceived as a
loss by some party. If the Chinese and Japanese governments advise the
United States that a proposed typhoon suppression experimental program to be based on Guam is a potentially dangerous experiment, it is
probably appropriate for the United States not to proceed, even if American scientists are certain that no effects could be felt in China or Japan.
Once a typhoon was seeded, the United States would be blamed for all of
its eventual damages regardless of whether the seeding could have con33. A range of activities resulting in impacts on the stratosphere is considered in chapter 9 of INADVERTENT CLIMATE MODIFICATION, note 9 supra.
34. Taubenfeld, supra note 5, at 494 n.10.
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tributed to it.3
With an operational experiment in the Gulf of Mexico,
even unseeded and uninvestigated hurricanes led to claims by some Mexican politicians that the United States is "stealing" Mexico's rainfall.
Perhaps only a highly visible, truly internationalized experimental
program could eliminate or dampen such a clamor. But what if it is
proved that at least some modification efforts do cause certain losses?
There is no mechanism for decision at the international level. Are states
free to make choices having domestic benefits regardless of the effects of
such choices on other nations? Who speaks in defense of the international
"commons"-the seas, the atmosphere?

A. Present InternationalLegal Standards
Although international law to date is embryonic at best, there is law
in these areas. It is generally recognized as law that no nation may permit
activities on its soil which will cause harm in another nation. In the classic case on this issue, the Trail Smelter Arbitration,6 the tribunal was
asked to deal with a smelter in British Columbia, and the effect of its
pollution on properties in the state of Washington. Finding that damage
was in fact being caused, the tribunal assessed damages and required that
the pollution be monitored and diminished. While it did not, and could
not, order the smelter to cease operations (a point worth noting for future
cases), the tribunal did state that:
[N]o State has the right to use or permit the use of its territory in
such a manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of
another or the properties or persons therein, when the case is of serious consequence
and the injury is established by clear and convincing
37
evidence.

A similar but broader statement was made by the International Court of
Justice in a dissimilar situation in The Corfu Channel Case" when the
Court said that a state has an obligation "not to allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other States."'
These ideas have been increasingly included in international instruments in the past several decades.' 0 The 1972 Declaration of the United
35. Id. at 496 n.19, 498-99 n.33.
36. The Tribunal gave a preliminary award on April 16, 1938, and the final award on
March 11, 1941. Trail Smelter Arbitration (United States v. Canada), 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards
1911 (1938); id. at 1905 (1941). The decisions of the Trail Smelter Arbitral Tribunal are also
reported in 33 AM. J. INT'L L. 182 (1939) and 35 AM. J. INT'L L. 684 (1941). For an in-depth
discussion of the case, see Rubin, Pollution by Analogy: The Trail Smelter Arbitration, 50
OR. L. REv. 259 (1971).
37. 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards at 1965.
38. The Corfu Channel Case (Albania v. United Kingdom), [1949] I.C.J. 4.
39. Id. at 22.
40. The Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers, for example,
state that no nation can pollute so as to cause "substantial injury" to another nation and
that the injured nation could call for abatement or compensation for damages. U.N. Doc. A/
CN.4/274, reprinted in YEARBOOK OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION, U.N. Doc. A/
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Nations Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm gave us
several directly relevant principles relating not only to damage to another
state but to the environment generally.4 1
For all sources of atmospheric modification, therefore, the basic
norms have been stated and generally accepted. These norms apply regardless of whether the modification is intentional or not and whether it
affects another nation specifically or the world's environment in general.
No state may permit activities on its territories which seriously injure another state or its citizens, nor may it permit serious damage to the environment as a whole. Despite these principles and except for limited bilateral and special multilateral arrangements, there are now no widely
accepted international mechanisms for resolving disputes as to scientific
facts, for evaluating claims of injury and making binding awards, or for
dealing with activities which affect the environment generally. In each
case, some start has been made. Before reviewing progress to date and
offering some suggestions for the future, however, one vitally important
stumbling block in the path of any effective international control of pollution must be considered. This relates to the tension between development
and the use of the atmospheric commons to dispose of the waste products
of development.

CN.4/SER.A/1974/Add.1(Part 2), at 357; also reprinted in INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION,
REPORT OF THE FIFTY-SECOND CONFERENCE, HELSINKI 484, 496-97 (1966). See generally
Bleicher, note 29 supra. Several other shared river and lake treaties are in accord. See, e.g.,
The Indus Waters Treaty, Sept. 19, 1960, India-Pakistan-I.B.R.D., 419 U.N.T.S. 125; Agreement for the Full Utilization of the Nile Waters, Nov. 8, 1959, U.A.R.-Sudan, 453 U.N.T.S.
51; Treaty Relating to the Uses of the Waters of the Niagara River, Feb. 27, 1950, United
States-Canada, 1 U.S.T. 694, T.I.A.S. No. 2130; Treaty Relating to the Utilization of the
Waters of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers, and of the Rio Grande, Feb. 3, 1944, United
States-Mexico, 59 Stat. 1219, T.S. No. 994.
41. Principle 6, for example, expressly states that:
The discharge of toxic substances or of other substances and the release of
heat, in such quantities or concentrations as to exceed the capacity of the environment to render them harmless, must be halted in order to erasure that serious or irreversible damage is not inflicted upon ecosystems ....
This concept is later reinforced in Principles 21 and 22:
Principle 21. States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations and the principles of international law, the sovereign right to exploit
their own resources pursuant to their own environmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not
cause damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits
of national jurisdiction.
Principle 22. States shall co-operate to develop further the international
law regarding liability and compensation for the victims of pollution and other
environmental damage caused by activities within the jurisdiction or control of
such States to areas beyond their jurisdiction.
Report of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (Stockholm, 5-16
June 1972), 1 U.N. GAOR (21st plen. mtg.), U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14 Rev.1 (1972) reprinted in 11 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 1416 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Stockholm Conference on
the Human Environment]. See also Sohn, The Stockholm Declarationon the Human Environment, 14 HAzy. INT'L L.J. 423 (1973).
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Industrialization in the Developing Countries

Just as the United Nations has recognized the damage of pollution
both to the human environment and to peace between neighbors, it has
also firmly and repeatedly recognized a "right" to development. Although
this right is often asserted by the less developed nations, the more developed nations also support the goals of development. While the more industrialized nations acknowledge the inherent instability caused by tensions between rich and poor, they seemingly trust the apparent efficacy of
development and industrialization as the "invisible hand" in the eventual
self-limitation of population growth, and hope that development will help
in the alleviation of disease, starvation, infant mortality, and short life
expectancy.
Scientists and decisionmakers in many of the more developed countries have, however, become increasingly aware of the dangers to the environment the industrial revolution has created. Through the traditional
free use of waters, oceans, and the atmosphere as dumps for our wastes,
we endanger not only our countries and ourselves, but also our neighbors
and, potentially, the very survival of human life. We are thus presented
with a dichotomy. Industrial development has resulted in vastly increased
health, well-being, and life expectancy for most humans in those countries which are already well on the path of industrialization. Conversely,
industrialization also brings threats to those it helps and to the world
environment.
Since it is clear that countries will industrialize, we need to devise
strategies immediately to begin to cope with potential consequences even
if they are decades away. We need to understand, to accept, and to plan
for a world in which there are tensions between development (which
means burning more fossil fuels, cutting more forests, using marvelous
products like CFC's) and the more general but eventually overwhelming
need of environmental survival.
V.
A.

FUTURE WORLD ORDER

Protection of the International "Commons"

As we turn to the future, it seems clear, at least in principle, that the
international "commons" must be protected from harmful activities arising in any state. The effects of large-scale industrialization, the omnipresence of the automobile, the increasing knowledge of the deleterious effects of many waste materials, acid rain, smog, high level atmospheric
pollution-all this has led not only to discussion and studies but to legislation and the creation of domestic and international mechanisms for
problem solving. The efforts thus far are limited. Not all countries are
concerned. Not all problems are recognized as problems. Nevertheless,
while it would be unwise to assume that, internationally, all nations are
realistically assessing the potential problems or even that they have
moved forcefully to cope with existent and demonstrated perils, it would
also be foolish to ignore the important steps that have already been
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taken.
In the United States, activities have included the creation of and the
decade of work by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Water
and air quality are monitored, research is intense, and standards have
been set. From its origins, the EPA has been concerned with international
issues. As Senator Henry Jackson, the principal author of the National
Environmental Protection Act, said on the Senate Floor, the Act is a
"congressional declaration that. . . we will not intentionally initiate actions which will do irreparable damage to the air, land and water which
support life on earth.""' The Act applies to the entirety of the "human
environment," including "international aspects."' 8
On the issues of potential international concern, efforts have been
focused on the amelioration of CO, and acid rain problems, and vigorous
action has been taken with respect to CFC's. The use of CFC's in aerosol
spray cans has been prohibited and regulations limiting overall production are being developed." Several other countries have also taken action
to limit the escape of the chemical contributors to acid rain and to cut
back air and water pollution. 4 Several countries have followed the United
4e
States' lead to limit the movement of CFC's into the stratosphere.
Bilaterally, the United States has been working with Mexico on
water and air quality problems,'4 7 and with Canada on the problems of
water use, water pollution, and acid rain.4 8 The United States, France,

42. 115 CONG. REc. 40416 (1969).
43. The National Environmental Policy Act § 102(2)(C) (1969) (current version at 42
U.S.C. §§ 4321 et seq. (1976 & Supp. III 1979). See also H.R. REP. No. 378,91st Cong., 1st
Sess. 7 (1969).
44. In March 1978, the EPA and the FDA issued bans on the use of CFC's in aerosol
applications. The ban became effective Oct. 15, 1978. Exemptions from the general prohibition on manufacture, processing and distribution as well as essential use and special exemptions are discussed in 40 C.F.R. §§ 762.45 et seq. (1981). The FDA has promulgated separate
regulations on the use of CFC's in articles at 21 C.F.R. § 2.125 (1978).
45. Bleicher, supra note 29, at 44-45 nn.177-78, where various reports and problems of
Norwegian "black snow" are discussed.
46. Sweden, Norway and Canada have enacted the most comprehensive limitations on
the manufacture of CFC's. Concern has been expressed in Germany and the Netherlands.
47. Agreement of Cooperation Regarding Pollution of the Marine Environment by Discharges of Hydrocarbons and Other Hazardous Substances, July 24, 1980, entered into force
Mar. 30, 1981, United States-Mexico, noted in 81 DEP'T STATE BULL. 61 (June 1981); Memorandum of Understanding for Cooperation on Environmental Programs and Transboundary
Problems, June 14-19, 1978, United States-Mexico, 30 U.S.T. 1574, T.I.A.S. No. 9264;
Agreement on the Permanent and Definitive Solution to the International Problem of the
Salinity of the Colorado River, Aug. 30, 1973, United States-Mexico, 24 U.S.T. 1968,
T.I.A.S. No. 7708; Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes
and Other Matter, opened for signature Dec. 29, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 2403, T.I.A.S. No. 8165
entered into force for the United States, Aug. 30, 1975.
48. Agreement on Great Lakes Water Quality, Nov. 22, 1978, United States-Canada, 30
U.S.T. 1383, T.I.A.S. No. 9257; Agreement on Contingency Plans for Spills of Oil and Other
Noxious Substances, June 19, 1974, United States-Canada, 25 U.S.T. 1280, T.I.A.S. No.
7861.
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and the United Kingdom are parties to an innovative treaty on monitoring the stratosphere.' 9 European countries have entered into several bilateral and multilateral agreements to curb pollution, especially in multinational lakes and rivers.50 As discussed above, the ECE promulgated a
treaty on transfrontier, long-range, airborne pollution. 1 The Scandinavian countries are not only cooperating nationally with respect to transborder pollution, but have also opened their courts and administrative
mechanisms to citizens of neighboring states affected by pollution."
B.

Progress in InternationalInstitutions

At an even broader level, the United Nations, while stressing the
right of each nation to develop, has adopted resolutions pointing out the
need to limit the dangers from pollution." The U.N. Environment Programme (UNEP) has been given a special role as overseer of the international programs concerning the ozone layer. Other agencies, including inter alia the World Meteorological Organization (WMO), the World
Health Organization (WHO), and the Food and Agriculture Organization
(FAO), have special assignments as part of the effort to assess the state of
the upper atmosphere and to find indications of change while there is still
time to act. Such nongovernmental scientific agencies as the International
Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU)5 have also played important roles in
advancing our knowledge and, therefore, in contributing to issue identification and potential resolution.
VI.

CONCLUSIONS

Despite these signs of progress, the
and sharing resources is not good. The
due to human rapaciousness, despite
them, is a case in point. Perhaps what

international record in preserving
potential loss of the great whales
international efforts to preserve
is now needed is a dual strategy,

49. Agreement on Monitoring of the Stratosphere, May 5, 1976, United States-FranceUnited Kingdom, 27 U.S.T. 1437, T.I.A.S. No. 8255, reprinted in [1978 Reference File] 1
INT'L ENVIR. REP. (BNA) T 21:2501.
50. Convention for the Protection of the Rhine Against Chemical Pollution, done at
Bonn, Dec. 3, 1976, reprinted in 16 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 242 (1977); Convention on the Protection of the Rhine Against Pollution by Chlorides, done at Bonn, Dec. 3, 1976, reprinted in
16 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 265 (1977); The Nordic Convention on the Protection of the Environment, done at Stockholm, Feb. 19, 1974, reprinted in THE NORDIC ENVIRONMENTAL PROTEC-

(Swedish Royal Ministry for Foreign Affairs and
Royal Ministry of Agriculture), also reprinted in 13 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 591 (1974) [hereinaf-

TION CONVENTION, WITH A COMMENTARY

ter cited as The Nordic Convention].
51. Note 23 supra.
52. The Nordic Convention, supra note 51, art. 3.
53. Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment, note 42 supra.
54. The International Council of Scientific Unions together with the World Meteorological Organization are partners in preparing, coordinating and directing a major international
study, the Global Atmospheric Research Program. Taubenfeld, supra note 3, at 323. For a
discussion of the 9 scientific committees and 16 scientific unions within ICSU, see Joyner &
Joyner, supra note 9, at 551-52 n.93.
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one which would press forward along the lines of observation, monitoring,
fact-finding, standard-setting and, eventually, enforcement at an international level, while at the same time we search for techniques which would
permit humanity a decent environmental future.
We should press forward vigorously in each nation to continually set
the highest standards of environmental protection consonant with decent
survival and progress. We should press for a growth of international activities in monitoring and, in time, in developing stringent rules for national action. Uniform rules may well help an enterprise avoid a competitive disadvantage if other enterprises are not obligated to take steps to
avoid pollution. Over time, effective rules should be developed and upheld by national courts and, perhaps, by the International Court of Justice or by a new environmental law tribunal for assessing facts and awarding recompense. 56
It must be noted, as some scientists are now pointing out, that climatic change is inevitable. If humanity disappeared, climate would still
change over time. Mankind may be benefited or harmed by a particular
change, and it is appropriate to prevent where possible human-induced
damaging change. However, change is the order of the universe. Because
of this fact, it is appropriate to urge decisionmakers in all nations to give
present and continuing attention to strategies which accept very longterm change in climate as certain, and to work to reduce the risks of damage to humanity from such changes. Cooperation in developing weather
modification techniques, stronger, more resistant crops, cattle with better
tolerance for temperature and moisture changes, programs for improved
storage of crops, cooperation in distribution of necessities worldwide, and
assistance in alternative programs of development, could make nations
more immune from climatic change.
There is clearly room for the wider use of international agencies
(UNEP, WMO, WHO, FAO, and others) while a general agreement or
agreements could be promulgated through the United Nations General
Assembly or at special conferences. This is not a plea for a technological
"fix" which would obviate the need for the control of pollution, for preserving the atmosphere, or for trying to cope directly with insults to the
environment. Indeed, we need to develop international regulation and
control as rapidly as we can. The rate and magnitude of man-made
changes in the world environment may already be exceeding our capacity
to cope effectively. What is proposed is a dual strategy. Solutions to our
environmental problems will come slowly. We need to move to protect
against human impacts on the environment and to ameliorate future conditions regardless of the cause.
In general, we can point with pride to certain major national and
55. See Sigel, supra note 2, at 576. For a discussion of incidents involving trananational
airborne pollution that have been referred to the International Court of Justice, see
Bleicher, supra note 29, at 44 n.174.
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international efforts to identify dangers to the human "commons" and,
primarily on a national basis, to cope with them. Since the problems are
global, multinational efforts to control transfrontier pollution and assaults on the atmosphere are essential. No single nation can do it alone.
These efforts have begun, but the conflicts of interest are very real.
International cooperation must be forcefully pursued with assurance
for the less developed nations (or for any nation especially affected) of
favorable terms for pollution-free or pollution-moderating technology, for
substitute goods, or for whatever it takes to encourage development while
safeguarding the human future. Perhaps then we can face the future with
some degree of certainty. Still, if there comes to be recognized a true crisis of the environment, threatening the lives of all or most humans or at
least requiring strict rationing of the right to industrialize, then major
changes in the present world system would be required. We would in that
case need something like a responsible world government with the ability
to assure the equitable distribution of the rights to life, to material welfare, and to security.

A Resource Management Approach to

Carbon Dioxide During the Century of
Transition
EDITH BROWN WEISS

Abstract
The atmosphere is a global resource which countries must manage
for mutual benefit. The increasing accumulationof carbon dioxide (CO)
in the atmosphere is expected to raise the temperature of the earth,
which would have major impact on world climates, ocean currents, and
growing seasons. The CO, buildup arisesprimarily from the use of fossil
fuels and to a much lesser extent from deforestation and poor management of soils. This means that the CO2 problem should be viewed foremost as a problem in developing the appropriatetransitionstrategy for
moving from a fossil fuel to a nonfossil fuel economy in the next fifty to
one hundred years. A CO, strategy should seek to manage carbon dioxide emissions so as to limit the increase in temperature or at least to
delay it sufficiently to develop new technologies for storing and recycling
carbon dioxide and to prepare for anticipated changes in climate. Proposed measures include controls on CO 2 emissions, selective use of renewable resources and of those fossil fuels with relatively low CO 2 content, conservation of energy resources, and environmentally sound
management of forests and soils for substained yields. These elements
comprise the "CO, transitionstrategy" for managing the atmosphere.
I.

INTRODUCTION

Partly as a result of the world's increasing use of fossil fuels, carbon
dioxide is accumulating in the atmosphere at a rate estimated to double
the present concentrations by the year 2050.1 Carbon dioxide in the atmoEdith Brown Weiss is Associate Professor, Georgetown University Law Center. A.B.,
1963, Stanford University; LL.B., 1966, Harvard University; Ph.D., 1973, University of California at Berkeley. Member of the District of Columbia Bar.
This research was supported by the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS)-U.S. Department of Energy Project on "Environmental and Societal Consequences of a Possible CO,-Induced Climate Change." The author thanks Michelle Giusiana
for research assistance.
1. CLIMATE RESEARCH BOARD, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, U.S. NATIONAL ACADEMY OF

SCIENCES, CARBON DIOXIDE AND CLIMATE: A SCIENTIFIC ASSESSMENT (1979), [hereinafter cited
as NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL REPORT]; G. WOODWELL, G. MACDONALD, R. REVELLE & C.
KEELING, THE CARBON DIOXIDE PROBLEM: IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY IN THE MANAGEMENT OF

ENERGY AND OTHER RESOURCES (1979), [hereinafter cited as CEQ REPORT], reprinted in SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 96TH CONG., 1ST SESS., SYMPOSIUM ON CARBON DIOXIDE ACCUMULATION
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(1979)
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sphere traps infrared radiation coming from the earth's surface and prevents it from escaping into outer space, thereby raising the temperature
of the earth's surface. This phenomenon is commonly known as the
"greenhouse effect." If the present atmospheric concentration of carbon
dioxide doubled, world climate models predict an average global surface
warming between 20C and 3.5*C, with greater temperature increases at
2
higher latitudes.
This increase in the global surface temperature would have a major
impact on the world's climates, ocean currents, and growing seasons. It
would significantly disrupt agricultural production and water supplies in
some areas.8 At some point, increased concentrations of carbon dioxide
could cause the floating ice in the Arctic to disappear and could trigger
the disintegration of the West Antarctic Ice Sheet, consequently raising
the sea level as much as fifteen to twenty feet." The President's Council
on Environmental Quality has concluded that this projected increase in
carbon dioxide poses "one of the most important contemporary environmental problems" and "threatens the stability of climates worldwide and
therefore, the stability of all nations."8
The rapid increase in the atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide is well documented. Scientists do not agree, however, on the rates of
projected increases and their climatic effects, the sources of a carbon dioxide buildup, or the capacity of existing reservoirs in the global system
to absorb future increases in carbon dioxide. Yet there is a clear warning
from the scientific community that the process of managing the carbon
dioxide buildup must be initiated, and that strategies for adapting to its
impact must be designed and implemented. The problem becomes particularly important in light of the nation's new policy favoring rapid development of coal resources. The President's Commission on Coal concluded
that in order to reduce dependency on foreign oil, coal must replace oil
and natural gas as the primary energy source.' Coal releases much more
carbon dioxide than oil or natural gas. 7
The carbon dioxide problem challenges the international community
to break new ground to handle its unique blend of political, economic,

[hereinafter cited as CO, SYMPOSIUM].
2. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 1, at 1. For a general description of
the "greenhouse effect," see CEQ REPORT, supra note 1, reprinted in CO, SyMPOSiuM, supra

note 1, at 45-47.
3. Schneider, So What If Climate Changes?,reprinted in CO, SYMPOSIUM, supra note
1, at 78. See also S. SCHNEIDER, THE GENESIS STRATEGY (1976).
4. S.Schneider & R. Chen, Carbon Dioxide Warming and Coastline Flooding: Physical
Factors and Climatic Impact (1980) (unpublished paper available from the National Center
for Atmospheric Research, Boulder, Colorado).
5. CO, SYmpOSiUM, supra note 1, at iii.

6. President's Commission on Coal, Recommendations and Summary Findings (1980).
7. MacDonald has concluded that coal releases 2.5 (x 1015 g) of carbon dioxide per 100
quads of energy, while oil releases 2.0 and gas 1.45. CEQ REPORT, supra note 1, reprinted in
CO. SYMPOSIUM, supra note 1, at 50.
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legal, and scientific issues. How, in the face of serious scientific uncertain-

ties, should states manage the emission and release of carbon dioxide into
the atmosphere, when many states contribute to the problem in widely
varying degrees, when all states will be affected by the resulting climate
change but in different ways, when the activities contributing to a carbon
dioxide buildup are central to the energy and land-use practices of states,
and when costly preventive strategies, to be effective, would have to be
initiated at least a decade or more before the full effects of CO-induced
climate change would be felt? As a preliminary approach to the problem,
this article briefly reviews international law as it is concerned with transboundary environmental pollution and shared resources, and discusses
both its usefulness and its limitations as precedent for handling the carbon dioxide problem. It then suggests possible strategies for managing the
increasing emissions of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere.
II.

DESCRIPTION OF THE CARBON DIOXIDE PROBLEM

Conceptually, the global increase in carbon dioxide is a problem in
the management of a scarce natural resource: the quality of the global
atmosphere. Part of this is an international pollution problem: states
dump carbon dioxide pollutants into the atmosphere; this can lead to a
decrease in the quality of global resources. Since fossil fuel resources are
limited and likely to be replaced by alternative energy supplies in the
future, the steady buildup of carbon dioxide is a phenomenon which will
take place only for the next fifty to one hundred years. The problem is
thus one of managing the atmosphere during the transition from a fossil
fuel economy to a nonfossil fuel economy.
Carbon dioxide is a gaseous byproduct of the use of fossil fuels, of
deforestation, and of other activities. It may be viewed as a pollutant. 8 In
economic terms, countries that develop fossil fuels and emit carbon dioxide into the atmosphere are using the atmosphere as a free good in developing their own resources. They are not internalizing the cost of the diseconomies they are inflicting upon the atmosphere by developing these
resources. One can approach this problem either by regulatory mechanisms which seek to limit the amount of emissions or by economic incentives, including taxes, which prompt contributors to take measures to
limit the amount of emissions. Domestically, the United States has had
some experience in managing air,9 water,"0 noise," and other forms of pol-

8. While there is evidence that increased CO, concentrations in the atmosphere will
have a positive impact on agriculture in some parts of the world, the author believes the
predicted adverse consequences of the "greenhouse effect" justifies its classification as a
pollutant. See also text accompanying notes 4-5 supra, and notes 70-80 infra on incentives
for cooperation.
9. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
10. Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251 et seq. (1976 & Supp. III 1979); Safe Drinking
Water Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300(f)-(j-10) (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
11. Noise Control Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4901 (1976).
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lution.12 Internationally, various countries and organizations have had experience in dealing with pollutants which destroy the ozone layer,1s and
with ocean, 1' river,' 5 outer space,"6 and air pollution."' Conceptually, the
issues are not completely new. What makes the carbon dioxide problem
so uniquely difficult is that it is caused by many point sources of pollution and that the pollutants emerge as byproducts of the use of critical
natural resources-the consumption of fossil fuels, and to an extent yet
unknown, the harvesting of forests and the misuse of soils. Moreover, the
problem develops slowly with no immediate health or environmental effects, making it all the more difficult to convince decisionmakers to take
immediate action.16 Approaching the CO, problem as a pollution problem
reveals its basic nature: it is a problem in energy management.
There appear to be two major sources for the buildup of carbon dioxide: (1) fossil fuels; and (2) deforestation. The first is well documented,
but there is considerable uncertainty about the net contribution of the

12. See, e.g., Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2601 (1976); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6901 (1976).
13. See, e.g., Agreement on Monitoring of the Stratosphere, May 5, 1976, United
States-France-United Kingdom, 27 U.S.T. 1437, T.I.A.S. No. 8255, reprinted in [1978 Reference File] 1 INT'L ENVIE. REP. (BNA)
21:2501. For further discussion, see notes 56-68
infra and accompanying text.
14. See, e.g., International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by
Oil, opened for signature May 12, 1954, 12 U.S.T. 2989, T.I.A.S. No. 4900, 327 U.N.T.S. 3,
as amended Apr. 11, 1962, 17 U.S.T. 1523, T.I.A.S. No. 6109, 600 U.N.T.S. 332, as amended
Oct. 21, 1969, 28 U.S.T. 1205, T.I.A.S. No. 8505; reprinted in [1978 Reference File] 1 INT'L
ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 21:0301; Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, opened for signature Dec. 29, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 2403,
T.I.A.S. No. 8165, entered into force for the United States, Aug. 30, 1975.
15. See, e.g., Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.4/274, reprinted in YEARBOOK OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION, U.N.
Doc.A/CN.4/SER.A/1974/Add.1 (part 2), at 357; also reprintedin INTERNATIONAL LAW AssoCIATION, REPORT OF THE FIrY-SECOND CONFERENCE, HELSINKI

484 (1966) [hereinafter cited as

Helsinki Rules]; Treaty Relating to Boundary Waters Between the United States and Canada, Jan. 11, 1909, United States-United Kingdom, 36 Stat. 2448, T.S. No. 548 [hereinafter
cited as 1909 U.S.-Canada Treaty]; Convention on the Protection of the Rhine Against
Chemical Pollution, done at Bonn, Dec. 3, 1976, reprinted in 16 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 242
(1977) [hereinafter cited as Rhine Chemical Convention]. For further discussion, see notes
25-47 infra and accompanying text.
16. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use
of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, done Jan. 27, 1967, art, IX,
18 U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347, 610 U.N.T.S. 205.
17. Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, done Nov. 13, 1979, 7
U.N. ECE, Annex I, U.N. Doc. E/ECE/HLM.1/2 (1979), reprinted in 18 INT'L LEGAL MAT.
1442 (1979) [hereinafter cited as TBAP Convention]; The Nordic Convention on the Protection of the Environment, done at Stockholm, Feb. 19, 1974, reprinted in 13 INT'L LEGAL
MAT. 591 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Nordic Convention]. For further discussion, see notes
48-66 infra and accompanying text.
18. In contrast, the fact that scientific studies linked depletion of the ozone layer to
increased incidence of skin cancer undoubtedly contributed to prompt adoption of legislation banning the use of chlorofluorocarbons in aerosol spray cans. See text sec. IV(E) infra.
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latter.' 9 To the extent that the CO2 buildup is primarily attributable to
the use of fossil fuels, the problem is one arising mainly from the activities of developed countries. To the extent that deforestation is involved, a
wider community of states are contributing actors. Identification of those
states that are sources of carbon dioxide is important in fashioning the
appropriate international regime. Rotty has estimated the percentage
contribution of various areas of the world to atmospheric carbon dioxide
emissions, as of 1974 and projected to the year 2025. In 1974, the United
States, the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and Western Europe accounted
for seventy percent of all CO. emissions, with the United States and
Western Europe accounting for forty-five percent.2 0 This suggests that at
present it is potentially feasible for a handful of countries to join in multilateral initiatives aimed at curtailing carbon dioxide emissions, although
it will be essential to build support for such measures in the larger world
community."'

III.

INTERNATIONAL LAW AND CARBON DIOXIDE POLLUTION

International law embodies two principles which apply to the management of carbon dioxide accumulations: (1) a principle of "equitable
use," applicable to countries using a shared natural resource; and (2) a
principle which makes states responsible for damage caused to the environment of other states in areas beyond their jurisdiction. The Stockholm
Declaration on the Human Environment, adopted in 1972, provides that

"States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and
the principles of international law . . . the responsibility to ensure that
activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the
environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction." 2 These principles have been adopted in some international

19. See generally Adams, Mantovani & Lundell, Wood Versus Fossil Fuel as a Source
of Excess Carbon Dioxide in the Atmosphere: A PreliminaryReport, 196 SCIENCE 54-56
(1977); Bolin, Changes of Land Biota and Their Importance for the Carbon Cycle, id. at
613-15; Stuiver, Atmosphere Carbon Dioxide and Carbon Reservoir Changes, 199 SCIENCE
253-58 (1978); Woodwell, Whittaker, Reiners, Likens, Delwiche & Botkin, The Biota and
the World Carbon Budget, id. at 141-46.
20. CO, SyMposiuM, supra note 1, at 158. Rotty projects that by the year 2025, the
primary contributors of carbon dioxide accumulation will shift from developed to developing
countries. He estimates that, in 50 years, the LDC's will comprise 40% of the global emissions of carbon dioxide while the emissions from the U.S., U.S.S.R., and European nations
will total 28%. Id. For detailed analysis of projected rates of energy use by region, see R.
Rotty & G. Marland, Constraints on Carbon Dioxide Production from Fossil Fuel Use (May
1980) (Institute for Energy Analysis, Oak Ridge).
21. The total picture narrows when the carbon wealth of nations is viewed exclusively
in terms of coal. In such an analysis, the -U.S., U.S.S.R., and China are the main
contributors.
22. Stockholm Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (Stockholm, 5-16 June 1972), 1 U.N. GAOR (21st plen. mtg.), U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/*
14 Rev. 1 (1972), reprinted in 11 INr'L LEGAL MAT. 1416 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Stockholm Declaration]. The final report of the Stockholm Conference is conveniently reprinted
in a Senate Foreign Relations Committee publication: SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RmLA-
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agreements governing air and water pollution and the use of international
rivers.2" They have been used to develop processes for information exchange, coordination, consultation, and compensation for harm suffered.24
A.

InternationalRivers

The underlying legal standard embodied-either explicitly or implicitly-in arrangements for managing international rivers and river basins
is that of "equitable utilization." The principle is implemented primarily
through water allocation and quality control mechanisms and compensatory schemes.
The Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers, adopted by the International Law Association in 1966, impose a duty
on states to prevent future pollution of international drainage basins"
and require violators to cease the wrongful conduct and compensate the
injured co-basin state.2 The rules also suggest that states should take "all
reasonable measures" to abate existing problems2 7 and enter into negotiations to achieve-this end.2 8 The 1909 Treaty between the United States
and Great Britain Relating to Boundary Waters and Questions Arising
Between the United States and Canada, which was designed to prevent
boundary water disputes, also prohibits transboundary water pollution.2 '
The 1978 Agreement Between the United States and Canada on Great
Lakes Water Quality carries this provision forward and requires the parties to use "best efforts" to ensure water quality standards are met.30 The
International Joint Commission, a fact-finding body established to imple-

TIONS,

92D CONG., 2D SEss., UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE

HUMAN

ENVIRON-

MENT-REPORT TO THE SENATE BY SENATOR CLAIBORNE PELL AND SENATOR CLIFFORD CASE 12-

90 (Comm. Print 1972). A House Public Works Committee print includes a summary of the
Conference's recommendations and outlines the position taken by the United States on the
matters discussed at the Conference. STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON PUBLIC WORKS, 92D CONG.
2D SEss., REPORT

ON THE UNITED NATIONS

CONFERENCE

ON THE HUMAN

ENVIRONMENT

(Comm. Print 1972).

23. See Handl, The Principle of "Equitable Use" as Applied to Internationally
Shared Resources: Its Role in Resolving Potential International Disputes over Transfrontier Pollution, REVUE BELGE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL (1978-79). See also The Indus
Water Treaty, Sept. 19, 1960, India-Pakistan-I.B.R.D., 419 U.N.T.S. 125; Agreements for
the Full Utilization of the Nile Waters, Nov. 8, 1959, U.A.R.-Sudan, 453 U.N.T.S. 51; Treaty
Relating to the Uses of Waters of the Niagara River, Feb. 27, 1950, United States-Canada, 1
U.S.T. 694, T.I.A.S. No. 2130, Treaty Relating to the Utilization of the Waters of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers, and of the Rio Grande, Feb. 3, 1944, United States-Mexico, 59
Stat. 1219, T.S. No. 994.
24. Weiss, International Liability for Weather Modification, 1 CLIMATIC CHANGE 267
(1978).
25. Helsinki Rules, supra note 15, art.-X(1)(a).

26. Id. art. XI(1).
27. Id. art. X(1)(b).
28. Id. art. XI(2).
29. 1909 U.S.-Canada Treaty, supra note 15, art. IV.
30. Agreement on Great Lakes Water Quality, Nov. 22, 1978, United States-Canada,
art. II, 30 U.T.S. 1383, T.I.A.S. No. 9257 [hereinafter cited as 1978 Great Lakes Agreement].
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ment the 1909 Treaty,8 ' assists in implementing the 1978 Agreement.3"

As between the United States and Mexico, an 1889 convention 8 and
a 1944 treaty

4

govern water allocation and boundary line disputes. An

International Boundary and Water Commission implements these agreements. 8 The United States and Mexico are expanding their efforts to include measures for water quality control. A memorandum of understanding between the Sub-secretariat for Environment Improvement of Mexico

and the United States Environmental Protection Agency, signed on June
14-19, 1978, provides for consultation and an exchange of experts to re-

solve environmental problems." It calls for periodic meetings and parallel
efforts toward research and monitoring of pollution. These two agencies
are also to devise an early warning system for potential environmental
problems.8

There are a number of river basin agreements designed to promote
the harmonious development of a region, such as the Treaty on the Plat6
River Basin of 1969," to which Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Paraguay and
Uruguay are contracting parties. Such agreements- traditionally provide
for a committee to coordinate use of the water resources.3 The problem is
that these provisions usually exist only in form.
Several Western Europe countries-France, West Germany, Luxem-

bourg, Switzerland and the Netherlands-have undertaken measures to
prevent and abate pollution of the Rhine. "0 Under the Convention on the
Protection of the Rhine Against Chemical Pollution, the parties agree to
eliminate or reduce the discharge of certain enumerated pollutants to
specified emission standards." The International Commission for the
Protection of the Rhine Against Pollution coordinates the implementa-

31. 1909 U.S.-Canada Treaty, supra note 15, art. VIII.
32. 1978 Great Lakes Agreement, supra note 30, art. VII.
33. Convention to Facilitate the Carrying Out of the Principles Contained in the Treaty
of November 12, 1884, Mar. 1, 1889, United States-Mexico, 26 Stat. 1512, T.S. No. 232
[hereinafter cited as 1899 U.S.-Mexico Convention].
34. Treaty Relating to the Utilization of Waters, Feb. 3, 1944, United States-Mexico,
arts. 2 & 3, 59 Stat. 1219, T.S. No. 944 [hereinafter cited as 1944 U.S.-Mexico Treaty].
35. 1899 Convention U.S.-Mexico, supra note 33, art. II; 1944 U.S.-Mexico Treaty,
supra note 34, art. 1.
36. Memorandum of Understanding for Cooperation on Environmental Programs and
Transboundary Problems, June 14-19, 1978, United States-Mexico, 30 U.S.T. 1574, T.I.A.S.
No. 9264.
37. Id. V 8.
38. Treaty on the Plat6 River Basin, signed at Brasilia, Apr. 23, 1969, art. 1, reprinted
in 8 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 905 (1969).
39. The Plat6 River Basin Treaty establishes the Inter-Government Committee to perform this function. Id. art. III.
40. Rhine Chemical Convention, note 15 supra; Convention on the Protection of the
Rhine Against Pollution by Chlorides, done at Bonn, Dec. 3, 1976, reprinted in 16 INT'L
LEGAL MAT. 265 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Rhine Chloride Convention].
41. Rhine Chemical Convention, supra note 15, arts. 1-4.
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tion of the agreement.4 A more recent agreement, the Convention on the
Protection of the Rhine Against Pollution by Chlorides, has not yet entered into force.48 This convention calls for the reduction of the chloride
content in the Rhine waters along the Dutch/German border, which has
resulted from the injection of chloride wastes into the subsoil in the Alsace region."" Potassium mining in that region is the primary source of
this pollutant. 45 The French safeguard is its unilateral right to cease injections when they appear to pose a "serious danger to the environment. '4 Nevertheless, this convention has met with considerable opposition in France. Consequently, the French government has been unable to
ratify the agreement in Parliament, much to the distress of the Dutch.47
Experience with international rivers and river basin agreements suggests that it will be difficult to negotiate effective arrangements to manage carbon dioxide accumulations. In general, these agreements have
shown that upstream users put downstream users at their mercy. Experience with the Rhine conventions demonstrates the political obstacles that
confront the implementation of multilateral efforts to control water
pollution.
B.

Air Pollution

Existing conventions concerned with air pollution, like the water pollution agreements, break down into two basic groups. The first impose an
obligation on a contracting party to inform and consult with another state
when activities within the jurisdiction of the former may adversely affect
the environment of the latter. These agreements also typically contain
arrangements for coordinated research programs and data exchanges. Ex-amples include the 1979 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air
Pollution48 and the 1976 Agreement on Monitoring of the Stratosphere. 4 9
The second kind of agreement goes one step further to include provisions
for dispute resolution, such as a right of access to domestic courts or administrative bodies, or establishment of an impartial fact-finding commission. The Nordic Convention on the Protection of the Environment 0 and
the United States-Canadian International Joint Commission's MichiganOntario Air Pollution Board 1 are good examples of the latter kind.

42. Id. art. 2.

43. [1979] 2 INT'L ENVIR.

REP.

(BNA) 975.

44. Rhine Chloride Convention, supra note 40, art. 2.

45. [19791 2 INT'L

ENVIR. REP.

(BNA) 975.

46. Rhine Chloride Convention, supra note 40, art. 2.
47. The Dutch, the downstream recipients of pollution in the Rhine, recalled their ambassador from Paris after the French government withdrew its bill for ratifying the Convention from Parliament. Moreover, the Dutch requested the EEC to pressure the French to
ratify the agreement. [1979] 2 INT'L ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 975.
48. TBAP Convention, note 17 supra.
49. Agreement on Monitoring of the Stratosphere, note 13 supra.
50. Nordic Convention, note 17 supra..
51. 1974 Michigan/Ontario Memorandum of Understanding on Transboundary Air Pol-
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The most recent international agreement concerned with air quality
is the Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, which
has been signed by thirty-five countries including the United States, Canada, and most of the countries in Eastern and Western Europe." The
agreement imposes an obligation on contracting parties to consult on request on activities which affect or pose a "significant risk" of long-range
transboundary air pollution.5 3 The legal duty to combat the discharge of
air pollutants is admittedly weak. States are merely required to act "without undue delay."" To its credit, the Convention contains lengthy provisions on research, monitoring, and information exchange, which are aimed
at mitigating sulphur dioxide (SO2 ) emissions."5
The 1976 Agreement on Monitoring of the Stratosphere-to which
the United States, France, and the United Kingdom are the contracting
parties-concentrates solely on increasing scientific understanding of the
ozone layer." It requires the parties to collect, exchange, and analyze information on the stratosphere, and to fully integrate their activities with
the existing international networks of the World Meteorological Organization and the U.N. Environment Programme." One purpose of the
agreement is to demonstrate the feasibility and utility of collaborative international action in this area."
The Nordic Convention, in contrast to the above-mentioned agreements, provides a framework for abatement and for compensatory relief
for persons injured by transboundary air and water nuisances.5 ' It requires the contracting parties-Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden-to accord to noncitizens equal access to administrative agencies and
domestic courts, and guarantees of nondiscriminatory treatment." It
gives to any person who is affected or may be affected "by environmentally harmful activities" the right to ask for measures to prevent damage," and provides for compensatory relief." Although this process could
conceivably be applied to enjoin activities until carbon dioxide standards
are met, it is probably not practical as a workable solution to the carbon

lution Control (June 26, 1975) (available from the International Joint Commission); Reference from the Governments of the U.S. and Canada (July 8, 1975) (available from the International Joint Commission).
52. [1979] 2 INT'L ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 976-77.
53. TBAP Convention, supra note 17, art. 5.

54. Id. art. 3.
55. Id. arts. 6-9.
56. Agreement on Monitoring of the Stratosphere, supra note 13, arts. II-IV.
57. Id. art. VI.
58. Id. art. I.
59. Nordic Convention, note 17 supra. See also OECD Council Recommendation on the
Equal Rights of Access to Information, Participation in Hearings and Procedures by Persons Affected by Transfrontier Pollution, adopted May 11, 1976, reprinted in 15 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 1218 (1976).

60. Id. art. 3.
61. Id.
62. Id.
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dioxide situation.
Coordinated monitoring and emission regulations, on the other hand,
are not only viable but have been utilized in other transboundary air pollution situations. The International Joint Commission (IJC) between the
United States and Canada undertook in the early 1970's to mitigate air
pollution problems between Michigan and Ontario.e To assist its efforts,
the IJC established, in 1976, the International Michigan-Ontario Air Pollution Board." The function of this board is to coordinate the implementation of air pollution control programs, including setting a minimum basis for emission standards." As a result of this effort, the air quality in
the area seems to have improved, with the percentage of those air quality
readings failing to meet the IJC objectives declining throughout the
region."
International agreements concerned with managing air pollution offer
at least some limited positive experiences to draw upon in developing a
framework for managing carbon dioxide accumulations. Certainly, they
suggest that international scientific cooperation in the gathering and exchange of data and in monitoring CO, accumulations would be a desirable
and feasible step. The monotoring of CO, might even be included in the
existing networks for monitoring sulphur dioxide, chiorofluorocarbons,
and other air pollutants.
In addition to the formal agreements concerned with air and water
pollution, there are a number of arbitral decisions and negotiated settlements which incorporate the principles of equitable use and state responsibility for environmental harm. The Trail Smelter Arbitration is one of
the most frequently cited cases.67 In this case Canada was held liable for
damage in the State of Washington from the fumes emitted by a Canadian smelting company. Even though Canada had admitted liability in
the compromis establishing the Tribunal, the final decision in 1941 declared that
[t]he tribunal, therefore, finds [that]

. .

. under the principles of in-

ternational law, as well as of the law of the United States, no state has
the right to use or permit use of its territory in such a manner as to
cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of another or the properties or persons therein, when the case is of serious consequence and
the injury is established by clear and convincing evidence."
63. See note 51 supra.
64. International Joint Commission, Second Annual Report on Michigan/Ontario Air
Pollution 2 (1977) (available from the IJC).
65. Id. at 1-2.
66. Id. at 2-4.
67. Trial Smelter Arbitration (United States v. Canada), 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 1911
(1938), id. at 1905 (1941), reprinted in 33 AM. J. INT'L L. 182 (1939) and 35 AM. J. INT'L L.
684 (1941).
68. Id. at 1965. Decisions of such arbitral tribunals are binding only on the parties to
the arbitration, yet nevertheless remain important indicators of international law and derive
much of their force from the extent to which principles enunciated therein are incorporated
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A number of diplomatic settlements at least implicitly recognized
state responsibility for the consequences of pollution inflicted upon other
countries. For example, Mexico complained to the United States that the
water it received from the Colorado River was too saline to be useful to
Mexico and hence in violation of the 1944 treaty between the two countries. The Mexicans argued that the treaty included a water quality standard, a point disputed by the United States. In settling this dispute with
Mexico, the United States agreed to provide compensation in the form of
assistance to rehabilitate the Mexicali Valley from the damages suffered
from the saline pollution, although it did not actually acknowledge any
obligation to do so in international law.6
The U.N. General Assembly Resolution on Environmental Cooperation Concerning Natural Resources Shared by States calls for an exchange of information and for prior consultation in the use of shared resources.7 0 States engaging in activities which potentially could cause
pollution harmful to other states may have a duty to consult with those
states or at least offer them an opportunity to engage in consultation. The
value of consultation is that it offers a process by which to minimize harm
and political conflict and, in the best of cases, to negotiate mutually acceptable arrangements between the concerned states.
IV.

A.

POLLUTION MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES

Introduction

The increasing concentration of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere
may be viewed as a global pollution problem caused primarily by point
sources of pollution. If it turns out that the main polluters (that is, the
main producers of CO) are also the countries that would be most hurt by
a change in climatic conditions triggered by a CO2 buildup, then it would
be in their interest to develop jointly an allocation regime for CO. emissions in order to delay or avert such climatic change. If, on the other
hand, there are important contributors to the CO, concentration in the
atmosphere that stand to benefit from C0 2 -induced climate changes, it
will be very difficult to develop an effective allocation regime.
This is complicated by the fact that most of the scientific factors are
still unclear: the relative importance of different sources for the higher
CO 2 concentration in the atmosphere, the eventual fate of CO 2 in the
global system, and the impact of a given level of CO, on the climate of
specific regions and countries. Moreover, the elucidation of these underlying phenomena will probably require at least a decade of scientific
research.

in future decisions or agreements.
69. Agreement Confirming Minute 242 of the International Boundary and Water Commission, Aug. 30, 1973, United States-Mexico, 24 U.S.T. 1968, T.I.A.S. No. 7708.
70. G.A. Res. 3129, 28 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 30) 49, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973), re-

printed in 13

INT'L LEGAL MAT.

232 (1974).

DEN. J. OF INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 10:487

For this reason, predictions of the political consequences of future
climatic changes can be useful as illustrations of the kinds of political
alignments that could take place as the world grapples with the carbon
dioxide problem. Fortunately, the impact of carbon dioxide accumulation
is still distant enough that countries can wait for better scientific information before taking difficult political actions.
Bearing this caveat in mind, preliminary data indicate that the
United States and Europe are at once major contributors to the carbon
71
dioxide increase and potential victims of CO2 -induced climate change.
In particular, U.S. agricultural production is predicted by some calcula71
tions to decrease as a result of warmer, drier weather in the grain belt,
while other portions of the country could be permanently submerged in
the less likely event of the melting of the polar ice caps.78 These predictions depend on uncertain scientific theories and do not take into account
the ability of the United States to respond by technological innovation,
for example, by developing new crop varieties or species adapted to the
new climatic conditions. The United States and other developed nations
may be able to adapt far more easily than other countries to adverse climatic change because of greater technical capabilities. Still, the possibilities enumerated above do suggest that the United States has considerable
incentive to reduce CO, accumulations. From this projection, it appears
to be in the interest of at least the United States and Europe to explore
strategies for managing carbon dioxide emissions during the coming
century.
Under some calculations, countries located in monsoon regions would
benefit as warmer global temperatures trigger more favorable rains with
accompanying improved crop production."' If these predictions are accepted, the possibility of such benefits can significantly affect the formation of an international consensus to control CO, emissions. Moves by the
United States to limit CO. "pollution" would understandably be seen as
another example of "environmental imperialism," especially to those beneficiaries who would not view the problem as "pollution" at all. But even
those countries that would benefit will find the process of adapting to
CO,-induced climate change difficult. Moreover, the calculations of climate effects are still uncertain. Since developing countries are predicted
by Rotty to become significant sources of CO, emissions by the year

71. R. Rotty, Growth in Global Energy Demand and Contribution of Alternative Supply Systems (Institute for Energy Analysis, Oak Ridge Associated Universities, 1979); R.
Rotty, Past and Future Emission of Carbon Dioxide (Institute for Energy Analysis, Oak
Ridge Associated Universities, 1980).

72. W. BACH, IMPACT OF WORLD FOSSIL FUEL USE ON GLOBAL CLIMATE: POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, reprinted in CO. SyMPosIum, supra note 1, at 121; Cooper,
What Might Man-Induced Climate Change Mean? 56 FOREIGN AFT. 500, 513 (1978).
73. Schneider, note 3 supra.
74. Cooper, supra note 72, at 507. For a complete analysis, see Bryson, A Perspective
on Climate Change, 184 SCIENCE 753 (1974).
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2025,"' their participation in any program to limit CO, emissions will be
important. Unless the United States and other developed countries presently responsible for most of the CO, emissions are willing to initiate
measures to limit CO 2 buildup in the atmosphere, developing countries
are unlikely to be willing to shoulder the burden later, and maximum
U.S. initiatives then may have only minimal impact on abating the
problem.
One of the major contributors of CO, emissions today, the U.S.S.R.,
is a possible net gainer. Warming global temperature is predicted to increase agricultural productivity by lengthening the growing season for
some presently unproductive land. 7 6 China, which holds a major share of
the earth's coal, could also benefit agriculturally. Rice yields are predicted
to increase and multiple seasons are possible.7 7 If these predictions are
accepted, there may be few incentives for the Soviet Union and China to
engage in international cooperation to manage CO, accumulations.
Predictions as to the likely effect of a given increase in carbon dioxide on specific regions are still far from certain and more research is
needed. If it can be assumed that the United States and other developed
countries in the northern hemisphere either would benefit from the climatic change or could easily adapt to it and that areas in the developing
world will become increasingly arid and agriculturally unproductive, then
there may be significant incentives for international cooperation flowing
from the demands of the developing world for a redistribution of the
78
wealth.
A complete analysis of the possible effects of an increase in carbon
dioxide on key CO, contributors-those emitting now and in the future-is essential to an elimination of the shroud of uncertainty currently
surrounding this issue.
In order to devise appropriate strategies for managing carbon dioxide
emissions, data which will demonstrate who the important actors are and
what proportion they are contributing to the pollution problem are
needed. Such data should give a breakdown by states or major contributors to the increased carbon dioxide pollution, both now and projected
into the future, and a breakdown which shows how much of the pollution
is from fossil fuels, how much from deforestation, and how much from
still other sources. Within the fossil fuel category, it is necessary to know
which fuels contribute most to the carbon dioxide buildup. While Rotty's

75. See note 20 supra and accompanying text.
76. Cooper, supra note 72, at 505. While Canada will experience a similar lengthening
of its growing season, this change will be less beneficial since much of the land affected
would be located on the Laurentian Shield. Id. at 513. See Rotty, note 71 supra.
77. Bach, reprinted in CO. SyMPOSIUM, supra note 1, at 138; Cooper, supra note 72, at
514-15.
78. See Report of Thomas C. Shelling, Ad Hoc Study Panel on Economic and Social
Aspects of Carbon Dioxide Increase, to Philip Handler, National Academy of Sciences (Apr.
18, 1980).
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data shows global carbon dioxide production by world segments for the
year 1974 and projected to the year 2025,79 Steinberg, Albanese and Vi-

Doung have prepared a table showing carbon dioxide generation as a
function of fuel source.8 0 Such tables are essential for later assessments of
appropriate institutional arrangements. It will also be useful to have a
breakdown in the use of fossil fuel as to residential heating, gasoline, petrochemicals, and other fossil fuel products, and what part of this use, current and projected, involves coal.
Carbon dioxide as a pollution problem is foremost an energy policy
problem. This means that it is important to analyze the workings of the
current oil economy, to investigate the private sector's and the public sector's outlook for the development and marketing of coal resources and to
consider and involve the private sector in the management of the carbon
dioxide problem. The internation'al oil companies have substantial investments in coal and oil shale and thus they will continue to be important
actors in the future. More importantly, the feasibility of technological innovations to reduce or recycle CO. emissions and the incentives needed to
stimulate innovation must be explored and developed with the industries
that use fossil fuels. To date little attention has been given to the question of how private industry might be involved in a resolution of the carbon dioxide problem.81
Much of the literature tends to discuss the problem in policy terms
that suggest an immediate switching to a nonfossil fuel economy or leap
to a discussion of managing the impacts of future climatic change. 82 Certainly these are policy elements that ought to be evaluated. But the question that has been largely overlooked and that needs to be addressed is
how carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuels are to be limited to a
"manageable" amount that will delay the projected warming and allow
time to develop new methods for preventing the release of CO, or recycling it to mitigate the climatic effects and for adapting to the resulting
climatic change. This means that it is necessary to determine what kind
of output of carbon dioxide would result in what kind of buildup in the
system, and what rate of buildup of carbon dioxide can be absorbed over
what periods of time. Action may be taken at that point to determine

79. CO, SYMPOSIUM, supra note 1, at 158.
80. Id. at 159.
81. No representatives from private industry were invited to the Senate Governmental
Affairs Committee's carbon dioxide symposium. The West German government, however, is
pursuing intensive research in conjunction with the German. coal industry to develop a
technical fix, scrubbers, for the carbon dioxide problem. CO. SYMPOsIUM, supra note 1, at
28. In a study for the U.S. Department of Energy, Albanese & Steinberg, of Brookhaven
National Laboratory, investigated the practicability of alternative CO, control systems.
They concluded that most potential CO, control systems reduce power generation efficiency
and require significant energy input. Of the several options studied, the most promising is to
store CO, in the deep ocean. Albanese & Steinberg, Environmental Control Technology for
Atmospheric Carbon Dioxide (May 1980) (Brookhaven National Laboratory).
82. See, e.g., Cooper, note 72 supra.
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what measures may be necessary to insure that states do not exceed these
amounts in their production and use of fossil fuels. Given these calculations, it would then be possible to prepare for worst case scenarios, as
utility companies do in planning for fuel consumption during winter
seasons.
The management of carbon dioxide pollution requires processes for
risk assessment and impact evaluation, and preventive strategies at the
national and international level.
B.

National Preventive Strategies

Carbon dioxide pollution raises the possibility of significant, adverse,
and irreversible climatic impacts which could be catastrophic to certain
sectors of the economies of some countries. Yet, as discussed above, most
of the important factors are still scientifically unknown and in dispute.
This requires states to balance the economic costs of taking action at the
present time with the economic costs of not acting, all in the face of scientific uncertainty. Since the former are usually easier to quantify, decisions are usually struck for the latter. Project Westford, which dispersed
very fine copper needles into space, and the early NASA space experiments, are examples of situations where officials had to decide what confidence levels they required in assessing risks from the experiments.
The United States can take steps to control carbon dioxide emissions, if needed.as But the costs of these measures are not known and
certainly need to be carefully assessed. Substantive measures which might
be taken include the following: (a) requiring any federal environmental
impact statement" concerned with a project that relies on fossil fuels to
identify explicitly the impacts of carbon dioxide emissions into the atmosphere; (b) exploring the feasibility of the development and utilization of
scrubbers to reduce carbon dioxide emissions or of methods- to recycle
carbon dioxide and analyzing the experience with the provisions of the
Clean Air Act as they affect innovation in industry; (c) providing incentives to industry to engage in research and development which could lead
to measures to reduce carbon dioxide emissions, and analyzing the export
market potential for such measures; (d) imposing substantive limits on
the production and consumption of coal (or other fossil fuels) and on the
export of this resource to other countries, particularly Western Europe;
(e) investigating other measures, such as provisions in the terms of lease
for development of coal deposits and oil shale, which could provide for

83. Some action has already been taken, for example, the July 30, 1979, Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs hearings exploring the relationship between carbon dioxide
accumulation and synthetic fuels production. CO, SymposiuM, note 1 supra. As a result of
these hearings, Senator Ribicoff introduced an amendment authorizing the National Academy of Sciences to undertake a two-year study of the carbon dioxide problem. That amendment, with the bill, is now part of the Synthetic Fuels Act.
84. On the requirement of federal environmental impact statements, see National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c) (1976).
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public intervention if needed, to manage the level of carbon dioxide emissions; and (f) allocating fuels, taking into account carbon dioxide generating power, with exemptions for plants with scrubbers or other means of
limiting CO. emissions. Whether emissions control is a technically feasible goal is still unclear and controversial. Such controls will be adopted
only if the costs to economic growth are acceptable, and these costs have
yet to be defined.
C. InternationalPreventive Strategies
Since the major contributors to the carbon dioxide buildup are presently only a handful of developed countries," it should be possible to focus the initial discussions among these primary contributors-the United
States, Western Europe and, if possible, the Soviet Union and Eastern
Europe. Initial consultations might begin with the United States and
Western European countries under the umbrella of the European Economic Community or the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD),one component of which is the International Energy Agency. Again, it would be necessary to analyze the role that private
industry could play. The oil market is an international one, and the coal
market promises to be likewise. Discussions might focus on emission controls, as has been the case with air pollution in the United States s and in
Europe. Emission controls ought to be keyed to acceptable limits which
have been determined scientifically to be linked with given levels of temperature increases in the climate. Admittedly this requires considerable
advances in our scientific knowledge, but obtaining sufficient knowledge
to establish such limits should be a primary objective.
The OECD's Environment Committee at its May 1979 meeting recognized the potential concern of a carbon dioxide buildup from coal production.8 7 The OECD's Council on Coal and the Environment specifically
recommended that "member countries, in the light of appropriate research results, seek to define acceptable fuel qualities, emission levels or
ambient media qualities, as appropriate for carbon dioxide."8 8 This seems
to encompass a scheme to control carbon dioxide emissions which would
be similar to that employed in the United States: an international ambient standard for carbon dioxide, together with emission limitations
designed to meet that ambient standard, which could be implemented at
85. The Soviets have moved to convene a ministerial meeting of the United Nations
Economic Commission for Europe (ECE) to discuss the world energy situation. A similar
Soviet initiative last November resulted in the Convention on Long-Range Transboundary
Air Pollution. While such a meeting would be an appropriate forum for discussing the carbon dixoide problem (the U.S., Canada, and Eastern and Western Europe are all members
of the ECE), the chances for such a meeting are probably slim as long as Afghanistan and
other situations remain unresolved, [19801 339 ENERGY USERS REP. (BNA) 15. See note 20
supra and accompanying text. See also note 21 supra.
86. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (1980).
87. OECD Environment Comm. Press Release (Paris, May 8, 1979).
88. Recommendation of the Council on Coal and the Environment, id. at 12.
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the national level. In considering any such scheme, it would be important
to analyze critically the experience of the United States with the Clean
Air Act,89 which provides for ambient air quality standards, to be
achieved through emission controls, and the Clean Water Act,90 which focuses mainly on effluent limitations, to be implemented by best available
control technology. 9' If countries were to agree to an ambient standard
for CO,, it would be essential to have scientific input in establishing the
standard. The allocation of emission limitations between countries would
be a highly political decision, one which could prove to be intractable.
Applying the emission limitations within each country would entail difficult political decisions about who had the right to contribute what
amount of carbon dioxide to the atmosphere.
Predictions by Rotty indicate that by the year 2025, forty percent of
the carbon dioxide buildup may come from the developing countries,
which now contribute less than twenty percent. 92 Even if the projected
contributions of the developing countries were considerably less, it would
be essential to involve the participation of the rest of the world in any
system of ambient standards and controls to be established. Initially this
means at a minimum that efforts must be undertaken to build international consciousness of the problem and to elicit participation of other
countries at conferences discussing the problem. Any system that is developed for limiting carbon dioxide concentrations in the atmosphere will
eventually need to be carried forward with the participation of the developing countries. The issues raised at that point would be similar to those
that arose at the Stockholm Conference on the Environment in 1972, at
which developing countries expressed legitimate concern over the potential conflict between development strategies appropriate for their countries and the concerns of the international community which would make
those strategies either more expensive or would otherwise impede their
development.9"
Various international institutions are concerned with the increased
concentration of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. These include the
OECD, the EEC, the World Meteorological Organization, the U.N. Environment Programme (UNEP), the U.N. Development Programme, the
U.N. Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, the International

89. 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (1980).
90. E.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (Supp. I 1976).
91. The U.S. Clean Air Act embodies a two-step approach to maintaining and enhancing air quality. First, the federal government establishes a primary (for the protection of
public health) and a secondary (for the protection of public welfare) national ambient air
quality standard for each pollutant listed in the Act. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1980). Second, the
states, through state implementation plans, formulate emission standards defining specific
quantitative limits on the amount of the pollutants individual sources may release. 42

U.S.C. § 7410 (1980). For a discussion, see W.

RODGERS, HANDBOOK ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

254-59 (1977).
92. See note 71 supra and accompanying text.
93. See Stockholm Declaration, note 22 supra.
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Council of Scientific Unions, the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, and the NATO Committee on the Challenges of Modern
Society. To date the role of these institutions has been limited to identifying the problem, monitoring and evaluating scientific data, collecting
and exchanging information regarding the buildup, and the facilitation
and coordination of national and international programs related to it. At
least to some extent, these organizations, or an appropriate mix of them,
could be employed in analyzing the impact of various policy choices regarding the management of carbon dioxide.
D.

Preventive Strategies for Deforestation

In order to develop appropriate management strategies for a carbon
dioxide buildup from deforestation, it is necessary to assess the amount
to which deforestation does, in fact, contribute to an increase in carbon
dioxide. The problem is to determine the direction and magnitude of the
biospheric signal. Are the forests of the world being cut down at a rate
that exceeds reforestation and that exceeds the progressively faster
growth rates of forests that may result from increases in carbon dioxide?
The dispute within the scientific community regarding the contribution of
deforestation makes it especially difficult to develop strategies to manage
it. After the geographical areas of concern have been identified, alternative ways to slow down the rate of deforestation, or to counteract its effects, must be developed and assessed. Some argue that it is not deforestation per se that produces CO,, but rather the destruction of the organic
matter of the soil that follows misuse of cleared land.
The problem for international attention is the development and implementation of environmentally sound strategies for sustained yield
management of the forests and the soils. Any success in controlling CO,
emissions is likely to come as a byproduct of progress on this general
problem. A regime of separate emission limitations for CO, from the deforestation of tropical forests is not likely to be a useful or viable
approach.
Any effort to control deforestation frontally assaults cherished notions of national sovereignty over the exploitation of a state's natural resources. States can therefore be expected to resist such measures. A first
and necessary step will be to encourage efforts to raise international consciousness about the implications of forest and soil management strategies for levels of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, the impact of these
levels on global temperature, and the long-range implications of a rise in
temperature for the economy and well-being of individual countries.
The community of actors in deforestation differs from that in the
fossil fuel area. Most forests are in the developing world. Multinational
companies and governments of at least some of the developed countries
are frequently responsible for clearing forests. Thus, the appropriate forum for discussing this problem would be a broader based community
than either the EEC or OECD. UNEP or FAO are possibilities.
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UNEP has already focused some attention on the problem of deforestation. In 1979, UNEP's Governing Council adopted a resolution, introduced by the United States, calling for a meeting of experts to develop
proposals for an integrated international program on the conservation
and wise utilization of tropical forests. " The UNEP meeting in April
1980 in Kenya 5 also discussed the destruction of tropical forests, but
without making any decisions.
In the United States, former President Carter's second environmental message to Congress on August 2, 1979, addressed two global environmental problems: acid rains and deforestation of tropical forests." The
President referred to estimates that the world forest could decline by
twenty percent by the year 2000 and noted that "[florest loss may adversely alter global climate through the production of CO,. These changes
and their effects are not well understood and are being studied by scientists but the possibilities are disturbing and warrant caution."' This was
followed by the U.S.-sponsored resolution in the UNEP Governing Council mentioned above.' 8 In a memo to the Secretary of Agriculture, the
President also directed that:
[High priority be given to: (1) improved monitoring of world forests;
(2) research on preservation of natural forest ecosystems; (3) research
on tropical forest multiple use management; (4) studies on increasing
yields of tropical agriculture; (5) demonstration of integrated projects
of reforestation, efficient fuel wood use and alternative energy sources;
and (6) examination of how U.S. citizens and corporations can be encouraged to follow sound forest management practices."
An interagency task force of deforestation, established in November
1979,100 recommended that assessments of deforestation be a component
of environmental impact statements and that any overseas U.S. projects
by federal agencies and private institutions contain assessments of the
effects of the planned activities on tropical forests. 10 1
Efforts can also be made at the regional level to address the problem
of deforestation. In South America, for example, the new Amazon Pact'02
offers a possible umbrella for such discussions and for an exchange of
data.
94. [1979] 2 INT'L ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 839-41.
95. Id. The UNEP meeting in Kenya advocated that the global community should give
"urgent consideration" to the building up of alternative energy supplies such as solar power
and windpower, which should take over from the carbon dioxide producing fuels. 3 Int'l
Envir. Rep. (BNA) 241.
96. 15 WEEKLY COMP. OF PREs. Doc. 1353, 1371-73 (Aug. 2, 1979).
97. Id. at 1371.
98. [19791 2 INT'L ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 839-41.
99. Id.

100. Id.
101. [1978] INT'L ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 48-49.

102. Treaty for Amazonian Cooperation, done at Brasilia July 3, 1978, reprintedin 17
INT'L LEGAL MAT. 1045 (1978).
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E. Preventive Strategies for Chlorofluorocarbons
The experience of the United States in attempting to limit emissions
of chlorofluorocarbons, which damage the ozone layer, offers useful insights into the problems associated with limiting carbon dioxide emissions. In March 1978, the Food and Drug Administration and the Environmental Protection
Agency issued regulations banning the
manufacturing and shipping of fluorocarbons for nonessential aerosol
uses.1 0 3 The ban is expected to reduce total chlorofluorocarbon emissions
by considerably less than twenty-five percent globally.10' The Clean Air
Act requires the Environmental Protection Agency, inter alia, to conduct
studies of the ozone problem in an effort to determine what further regulation of chlorofluorocarbons is necessary'01 In October 1980 EPA proposed a set of rules which would impose mandatory emission controls for
users of chlorofluorocarbons and would limit chlorofluorocarbon production through distribution of marketable production permits. 106 In response to comments to the proposed rulemaking, EPA has backed off
from these approaches and is now trying to develop with NASA an early
warning system to detect ozone depletion. The Clean Air Act also requires the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration to establish
a continuing program of research and monitoring of changes in the stratosphere and of climatic effects resulting from this change. 10 7 The results to
date indicate that chlorofluorocarbon concentration is increasing at five to
ten percent per year, but do not show positive evidence of chlorofluorocarbon depletion of the ozone layer.10 1 The impact of the aerosol ban may
not be visible for a number of years. Two states-Oregon and Michigan-have passed legislation banning nonessential aerosol use of
chlorofluorocarbon compounds in an effort to protect the ozone layer. 109
Action has also been taken in the European Community to limit the
use of chlorofluorocarbons in aerosol sprays. On December 17, 1979, the
Environment Ministers of the European Economic Community adopted a
proposal which would reduce chlorofluorocarbons in aerosol sprays by
thirty percent of 1976 levels over the following two years (December 1979
to December 31, 1981), and which would limit production of chlorofluoro-

103. 43 Fed. Reg. 11,301-26 (1978). See also 40 C.F.R. §§ 762.45 et seq. (1981).
104. Stoel, Compton & Gibbons, InternationalRegulation of Chlorofluoromethanes, 3
ENWT'L POL'Y & L. 130 (1977).
105. 42 U.S.C. § 7453 (1980).
106. Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 45 Fed. Reg. 66726 (1980).
107. 42 U.S.C. § 7454 (1980).
108. Conversation with Dr. Lester Machta, Director of Air Resources Laboratories,
NOAA (Jan. 13, 1980).
109. Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 468.605, 468.996(6); Mich. Comp. Laws. Ann. §§ 336.103, 336.107
(effective Mar. 31, 1977). Maine and Minnesota also enacted legislation prohibiting aerosol
sprays containing chlorofluorocarbons for certain uses. [19771 8 ENvIR. REP. (BNA) 179, 666.
The New York Department of Environmental Conservation adopted regulations requiring
warning labels on aerosols with chloroflurocarbons. Id. at 135. At one time, 20 states were
considering some type of legislation. Id. at 1693-94.
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carbons F-11 and F-12 to present levels. 10 Several delegations pushed for
a stricter standard, since the standard is less strict than in some existing
national laws. Support for a stricter standard also came from two other
directions: (1) the European Parliament's Environment, Public Health
and Consumer Protection Committee, which adopted a resolution at a
meeting in Brussels in November 1979 calling for a fifty percent reduction in the use of chlorofluorocarbons by 1981, and a total ban by 1983;111
and (2) the conclusion of UNEP's International Scientific Committee at
its third session in Paris in November 1979, that aerosol propellants, such
as hydrofluorocarbons, could destroy fifteen percent of the ozone layer
within one hundred years if present levels were maintained.' I The European Economic Community called for a reexamination of the problem "in
light of available scientific and economic data" in order to adopt necessary and new measures by June 30, 1981.
Some countries have acted unilaterally. Sweden banned aerosol manufacture and importation in December 1977."' West Germany, through
cooperative government-industry consultation, has been able to get German industries to agree to reduce aerosol chlorofluorocarbon use by
twenty-five percent by 1979 and fifty percent by 1981."' Canada has initiated "voluntary" reductions of aerosol use of chlorofluorocarbons."'
The OECD has limited its involvement to studies of the economic
impact of chlorofluorocarbon regulation. UNEP has assumed the role of
coordinating scientific research on the subject for the international
community.
Developments in the regulation of chlorofluorocarbons offer some insights into the issues that will be raised in regulating carbon dioxide
emissions. On the one hand, it should be possible to develop further and
maintain the scientific network necessary for proper monitoring of carbon
dioxide. On the other hand, it will be very difficult to obtain the international agreement necessary to manage a global pollution problem. The
countries that have been most willing to regulate chlorofluorocarbons, except for the United States, have been those which contribute least to the
problem. Canada is responsible for only two percent of the world's
chlorofluorocarbons and Sweden does not manufacture any." 6
The central problem in the transnational regulation of chlorofluorocarbons has been the inability of countries to agree upon a strict standard
110. [1980] 3

INT'L ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 3.

111. Id.
112. Id.

113. Amendment of Ordinance 1973-334 on Products Hazardous to Health and the Environment adding Section 486, [1977] Swedish Fed. Stat. 1095, codified in [1973] SWEDISH
CODE OF STATUTES 329.
114. T. Stoel, International Regulation of Fluorocarbons V-(1-2) (Apr. 17, 1979) (draft
paper available from the Natural Resources Defense Council).
115. II CAN. STAT. Ch. 72 (1975).
116. Stoel, supra note 114, at VII-(6-7).
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limiting the use of certain aerosol sprays containing these chemical components. In many ways the chlorofluorocarbon and carbon dioxide
problems are the same. The number of countries which are major contributors-the developed countries-is small. The effect of polluting the
ozone layer with chlorofluorocarbons is the depletion of a global resource.
The effect of an increase in carbon dioxide is a global rise in temperature.
Yet the modest success both in the United States and most recently in
the European community in achieving at least some form of regulation on
the emission of chlorofluorocarbons offers some hope for building such
measures to control the emission of carbon dioxide. Carbon dioxide poses
a much tougher problem. Unlike chlorofluorocarbons, its source is at the
heart of a country's economy-the production and use of fossil fuels for
energy or the removal of its forests.
F.

Adaptive Strategies for Carbon Dioxide Pollution

If significant climatic changes occur as a result of temperature increases from carbon dioxide, adaptive strategies will be necessary, at least
some of which are likely to focus on preventing the problem from worsening. The experience of dealing with problems of air and water pollution
suggests that one potential response should be an attempt to diminish the
levels of CO. pollution. Thus, one component of the adaptive strategy is
likely to be an intensified search for technical solutions, such as ways to
expand the capacity of oceans to absorb carbon dioxide or to limit carbon
dioxide emissions. Nevertheless, the effects of possible climatic change,
particularly upon water supplies and migration patterns, and upon the
general dislocation of a country's economy, must also be anticipated.
How states adapt to climatic change will depend on whether or not
the changes are beneficial or adverse to their economic and strategic interests. Studies are needed in order to determine who is likely to be affected, in what manner, and at what time, by what degree of climatic
change. In the absence of hard data, probably the best contribution is to
explore the consequences of various credible climate scenarios. It will be
in the interest of those countries that are likely to be adversely affected to
join together in measures to alleviate the stress and damage caused by
climatic changes. The implications of such alternative state responses to
climate change for our international economic and monetary system and
for international political stability must also be addressed.
CONCLUSIONS

Carbon dioxide accumulation in the atmosphere is a problem during
this century of transition from a fossil fuel to a primarily nonfossil fuel
economy. A strategy must be developed for managing the atmospheric
concentration of carbon dioxide so that CO, levels do not cause either
serious adverse climate changes or changes in climate which overwhelm
the capacity of countries to adapt to them. The strategy should include
control of CO 2 emissions, use of those renewable energy resources that
are environmentally sound, energy conservation, and management of for-
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ests and soils for sustained yields.
But the management of carbon dioxide must be put into perspective-many scientifically generated facts concerning projected increases
and resulting climatic changes are still unclear. This means that the topic
should not be pushed into high-level political debates that would cause
countries to adopt premature positions based on inconclusive premises
and embedded in national political rhetoric. On the other hand, international scientific collaboration on the climatic and societal impact of increased concentrations of carbon dioxide should be promoted and systematic assessments of alternative strategies for managing carbon dioxide
emissions should be commenced. It is time to initiate serious discussions
with industry about the feasibility of technological innovation to control
or recycle CO, output, and about the incentives that would be needed. A
dialogue should be initiated with other countries about developing
processes for managing the CO, problem, building upon existing institutional networks.
More fundamentally, the carbon dioxide issue needs to be treated as
an integral part of the international energy question. As things now
stand, decisions as to whether to shift to nuclear energy, promote renewable energy sources, or rely on coal and synfuels will likely be taken largely
independently of CO, considerations, but they will have a dramatic impact on the timing and rate of CO, accumulations. It is therefore essential
that strategies for managing the atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide be integrated into national and international energy policy. Raising
international public consciousness of the problem is a necessary first step.

The International Law and Politics of Acid
Rain
ARMIN ROSENCRANZ
I.

INTRODUCTION

.The Environmental Law Institute, headquartered in Washington,
D.C., has conducted an international comparative study of transboundary
air pollution since early 1979. This study focuses on sulfur oxides (SOx)
and acid rain. Its findings and conclusions, however, may also apply to
carbon dioxide CO,' another airborne pollutant which crosses national

boundaries, even though sulfur dioxides are primarily regional pollutants,' whereas carbon dioxide envelops the entire globe. But CO, and
SOx both have been unamenable to abatement primarily for scientific
and economic reasons.' This article will be limited to a discussion of
transboundary air pollution by SOx and acid rain,4 and will leave to
Armin Rosencranz directed the International Comparative Study of Transboundary Air
Pollution, Environmental Law Institute, Washington, D.C. A.B., 1958, Princeton University;
J.D., 1962, Ph.D., 1970, Stanford University. The research for this article was supported by
the German Marshall Fund of the United States.
1. CO, is the most likely cause of world climate change in the next century, and SOx is
the main cause of acid rain. Both enter the atmosphere and can be carried across national
boundaries. The continuing increase of both compounds is due largely to the increased combustion of coal and oil to produce electric power in industrial countries. Coal and oil are
carbon-based and contain significant quantities of sulfur. The Secretariat of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (ECE) estimates that energy consumption in Europe and North America will increase 70% by 1990 and will triple by 2020. See [1980] 3
INT'L ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 101. Even if this demand were to stabilize at current levels, the
environmental changes are likely to be both irreversible and irremediable. To protect the
environment and maintain current levels and patterns of agricultural productivity, future
power must be generated from renewable, sulfur-free and carbon-free energy sources, such
as solar, wind, geothermal, or tidal sources. Otherwise, our only hope is that natural homeostatic processes will somehow buffer and neutralize the effects of sulfur and carbon
compounds.
2. Sulfur oxides originating in the United States may travel to Canada and those
originating in Britain or Germany may travel to Scandinavia. Sulfur oxides generally travel
hundreds of miles, although some scientists conjecture that the Arctic haze may consist of
sulfates (SO,) originating two thousand miles away in the United States.
3. Both CO. and SOx have not been amenable to abatement for several reasons. First,
scientists have been uncertain about the nature and extent of their effects. Second, the general public has been largely complacent about CO, and SOx increases and their supposed
effects. Third, with the exception of sportfishing communities in acid-sensitive regions, no
vocal economic interest group yet perceives a sufficient economic disadvantage from increased CO, and SOx to compel governmental abatement action. Fourth, utilities have persistently minimized the danger of increased CO, and SOx and have steadfastly resisted
costly and energy-intensive abatement pressures.
4. The Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution is not, on its face, limited to acid rain, but that is what the proposers, Norway and Sweden, and the signatories,
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others to draw any comparisons with CO.
The major thesis of the article is that, notwithstanding the legal doctrines clearly recognized by the Trail Smelter Arbitration5 and Principle
21 of the 1972 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment in
Stockholm, 6 international law is ineffective in the field of transboundary
air pollution, and invariably gives way to considerations of national and
international politics. Nations control pollution only if and when it is in
their national interest to do so, and not because of any obligation under
international law to do so.

II.

INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TRANSBOUNDARY

POLLUTION

At the 1972 Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment, the

problem of Scandinavian lake acidification from airborne sulfur compounds originating outside Scandinavia was first brought to international
attention. The Conference produced a Declaration of Principles: Principle
21, the most pertinent to this discussion, provides that "States have, in

accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of
international law . . . the responsibility to ensure that activities within
their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of
other States. ...
This principle has impressive antecedents. In 1949, the International
Court of Justice held in The Corfu Channel Case$ that Albania had an
obligation to warn British users of its waters that those waters contained

minefields. The Court recognized "every State's obligation not to allow
knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other
States."
With respect to transboundary pollution, the Trail Smelter Arbitration,"0 which helped to resolve a protracted air pollution dispute in the
1920's and 1930's between Canada and the United States, is particularly

had in mind. The Convention was drawn up and adopted by the United Nations Economic
Commission for Europe. Done Nov. 13, 1979, 1 U.N. ECE, Annex I, U.N. Doe. E/ECE/
HLM.1/2 (1979), reprinted in 18 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 1442 (1979) [hereinafter cited as ECE
Convention]. For a more exact definition of "acid rain," see note 51 infra.
5. The Tribunal gave a preliminary award on April 16, 1938, and the final award on
March 11, 1941. Trail Smelter Arbitration (United States v. Canada), 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards
1911 (1938); id. at 1905 (1941). The decisions of the Trail Smelter Arbitral Tribunal are also
reported in 33 AM. J. INT'L L. 182 (1939) and 35 Am.J. INT'L L. 684 (1941). For an indepth
discussion of the case, see Rubin, Pollution by Analogy: The Trail Smelter Arbitration, 50
OR. L. REV. 259 (1971).
6. Report of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (Stockholm,
5-16 June 1972), 1 U.N. GAOR (21st plen. mtg.), U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14 Rev.1 (1972),
reprinted in 11 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 1416 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Stockholm Declaration].
7. Id. For a general discussion of other principles of the Stockholm Declaration dealing
more specifically with transboundary pollution, see J. BARRos & D. JOHNSTON, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF PoLLTIroN (1974).
8. The Corfu Channel Case (Albania v. United Kingdon), [1949] I.C.J. 4.
9. Id. at 22.
10. 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 1905 (1941).
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relevant. Canada conceded that fumes from a smelter at Trail, British
Columbia, were causing damage in adjacent areas in the state of Washington' and a tribunal was created to determine, inter alia, the amount of
damages. In widely quoted dictum, the tribunal asserted that "[n]o State
has a right to use or permit the use of its territory in such a manner as to
cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of another.. . when the case
is of serious consequence and the injury is established by clear and convincing evidence.""
Long before the Trail Smelter Arbitration, the United States Supreme Court had declared through Justice Holmes in Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co.,'2 that:
[I]t is a fair and reasonable demand on the part of a sovereign that
the air over its territory should not be polluted on a great scale by
sulphurous acid gas, that the forests on its mountains, be they better
or worse, and whatever domestic destruction they have suffered,
should not be further destroyed or threatened by the act of persons
beyond its control, that the crops and orchards on its hills should not
be endangered from the same source."3
Generally, these principles derive from the Roman legal maxim sic
utere tuo, ut alienum non laedas.1' Unfortunately, neither principles nor

maxims are of much consequence in the case of transboundary air pollution."3 Nations rarely relinquish jurisdiction over cases of pollution emanating from their territory, and even more rarely admit liability for such
pollution. The Trail Smelter Arbitration's is, in fact, sui generis: Canada
admitted liability and agreed to allow U.S. courts to assess damages.
When the U.S. courts declined to do so, both countries agreed to let a
special binational tribunal "arbitrate" the amount of damages. There has
been no case like this before or since, and the circumstances of the case
are unlikely to arise again.

11, 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards at 1965.
12. 206 U.S. 230 (1907).
13. Id. at 238.

14. "Use your own property in such a manner as not to injure that of another."

BLACK's

1238 (5th ed. 1979).
15. Transboundary water pollution is more susceptible to international adjudication

LAW DICTIONARY

and dispute settlement referring to these principles because the sources of water pollution
are more determinable than the sources of air pollution, especially long-range air pollution.
For the prevailing view in the international community regarding transboundary water pollution, see Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers, art. X, U.N.
Doc. A/CN. 4/274, reprinted in YEuOOK OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1974/Add.1(Part 2), at 357; also reprinted in INTERNATIONAL LAW AsSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE FIrYy-SECOND CONFERENCE, HELSKIKI 484 (1966) [hereinafter cited
as Helsinki Rules]. The Helsinki Rules provide for abatement of pollution causing "substantial injury" to another state and for the offending state to compensate the injured co-basin
state for any damages. For a general history of international efforts, see R. M'GONIGLE & M.
ZACHER, POLLUTION, POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (1979); L. TELCLAFF & A. UrroN, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (1974).

16. 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 1905 (1941).
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Nations today are exceedingly protective of both their sovereignty
and their pollution prerogatives. They are especially resistant to suggestions that they add pollution control costs to the already high cost of
producing electric power, even though they may admit that the production of that power causes unintended but real damage in other countries. 17 In the words of one international diplomat, "one can't expect Europe to reduce its sulfur emissions just to save some Scandinavian fish." '
Scandinavian environmental officials themselves concede the temerity
and impracticality of their request for abatement of European sulfur
pollution.
III.

MULTILATERAL AGREEMENTS

The recent Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution
(ECE Convention)1" seems to be the perfect solution to the victim countries' need for international recognition of the acid rain problem and the
polluting countries' need to continue to pollute. The ECE Convention dutifully invokes Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration in its preamble,
but the West German government reportedly stipulated that preambles
have no force of law and that in any case it does not hold itself legally
bound by Principle 21.20 The ECE Convention is the first international
accord on air pollution and was hailed by its chairman, Olof Johansson of
Sweden, as "a breakthrough in the development of international environmental law." 1 However, it provides merely for the sharing of information,
collaborative research, and continued monitoring of pollutants and rainfall. It contains no numerical goals, limits, timetables, abatement measures or enforcement provisions. Signatories have merely undertaken to
"endeavor to limit, and, as far as possible, gradually reduce and prevent
air pollution, including long-range transboundary air pollution. 2 They
have also agreed to adopt "the best available technology economically
feasible."' No country has to alter its status quo unless it chooses to. To
date, there are few indications that any but the victim countries (Sweden,
Norway, Canada, and the United States) are considering further sulfur
pollution control measures.

17. See Bird, Environmental Policy Making: Liability for Externalities in the Presence of TransactionCosts, 20 NAT. RESOURCES J. 487 (1980); d'Arge & Kneese, State Liability for InternationalEnvironmental Degradation:An Economic Perspective, id. at 427.
18. Interview with Henri Smets, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Environment Directorate (Apr. 20, 1979).
19. ECE Convention, note 4 supra. The Economic Commission for Europe is a United
Nations regional organization with 34 member states, including Eastern and Western European countries, Canada, and the United States.
20. Reported from an interview with Henri Smets, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Environment Directorate (Nov. 20, 1979).
21. Official remarks of the Chairman of the High Level Meeting within the Framework
of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe on the Protection of the Environment (Nov. 15, 1979).
22. ECE Convention, supra note 4, art. 2. [Emphasis added].
23. Id. art. 6. [Emphasis added].
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The European Community, whose memberstates include Western
Europe's major polluters (Britain, West Germany, France, Italy, Denmark, the Netherlands and Belgium), enacted on July 15, 1980, its longawaited SO, Directive.' 4 The resolution accompanying this directive incorporates verbatim the ECE Convention formula "to endeavor to limit,

and, as far as possible, gradually reduce and prevent air pollution.. ..
The Directive is so weak that at least two environmentally progressive

countries, the Netherlands and Denmark, were reluctant to approve it.
The senior air pollution official in the Dutch Ministry of Health and the
Environment estimated that less than five percent of the land area of
European Community member states would fail to conform to the new
SO, standard at the time of its enactment." Member states can apparently comply with virtually no change in present practices and with no

appreciable impact on SO, emissions or on the total sulfur load in the
atmosphere over Europe.
IV.

BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS: CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES

Multilateral action is necessary to cope with the problem of trans-

boundary SOx pollution in Europe since numerous countries contribute
to the sulfur load. In the context of North American SOx emissions and
the resulting acid rain, however, a bilateral arrangement between the

United States and Canada would be both more efficient and easier to enforce than would a multilateral treaty. Both countries are "victims" of

acid rain since both have large acid-sensitive regions.2 7 The United States
sends three times as much sulfur pollution to Canada as it receives from
that country, but Canada exports far more SOx per capita than does the

United States."8 Thus, acid rain is a mutual problem and the two coun-

tries have a mutual interest in abating its flow across their common bor-

der. But Canadian and American negotiators are still far away from a
formal agreement after three years of talks. Moreover, both countries are
now contemplating energy programs which would increase their SOx pollution" in the face of this supposed mutual interest and, more impor-

24. Directive on SO, and Suspended Particulates, O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 229) 779
(1980), reported in [1980] 2 COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 3315.281.
25. ECE Convention, supra note 4, art. 2.
26. Interview with Albert Adriaanse, Dutch Ministry of Health and the Environment,
The Hague (Apr. 26, 1979).
27. Typically, these are regions with granite bedrock which have no capacity to neutralize or "buffer" any acid introduced to the water or soil above the bedrock. Much of eastern
Canada and the northeastern United States is acid-sensitive.
28. SIERRA, May-June, 1980, at 41.
29. For example, during 1980, at President Carter's urging, the U.S. Congress considered legislation under which 80 oil-fired power plants will be converted to coal. Coal-fired
plants in the United States emit considerably more sulfur oxides than oil.
No provision was
to be made to install scrubbers or other pollution-reducing technology in these converted
plants. Similarly, in June 1980, President Carter conferred in Venice with the leaders of six
other industrial countries (Britain, Canada, France, Italy, Japan, and West Germany), and
all conferees determined to double coal use during the next 10 years, notwithstanding the
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tantly, in abrogation of the ECE Convention which they both so recently

signed.
In the waning days of the Carter presidency, presumably in anticipation of a new administration even less disposed to controlling power plant

emissions than were their predecessors, the Canadian Parliament enacted
legislation authorizing its federal government to reduce pollution from
sources contributing to problems (viz. acid rain) in other countries.30 The

immediate and perhaps sole effect of this legislation was to give life to
section 7415 of the U.S. Clean Air Act,"1 under which the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) can compel states to reduce air pollution when such pollution has been found by a duly constituted interna-

tional agency82 to endanger public health and welfare in a foreign
country, if and only if the foreign country has the legal ability to take
reciprocal action under the same circumstances. The effectiveness of section 7415 has been at stake because it was unclear whether Canada,
whose federal government has generally deferred to its provinces in pollution control matters, could reciprocate. The recent Canadian legislation
apparently removed that cloud, but in actuality it has accomplished little

more than to enable the then EPA Administrator to issue a hortatory
statement saying that his staff would examine the issue and recommend
that the offending state be formally notified. Such recommendations must

come before President Reagan's EPA Administrator, and prompt or significant remedial action seems highly unlikely.

The above example serves as one indication that the whole subject of
transboundary air pollution is fraught with political and economic considerations which have little to do with international law and agreements,
and which may effectively neutralize domestic law with international
purposes.
V.

THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS

Numerous agreements, most notably the 1979 ECE Convention, promote international consultation and cooperation in research, monitoring,

and assessment of the environmental impacts of present or planned
fact that six of the seven conferees are signatories of the ECE Convention.
Finally, Canada has gone ahead with its pre-ECE Convention plans to build two new
large power plants adjacent to pristine wilderness areas in Montana and Minnesota. Responding to suggestions that these plants could result in significant deterioration in the air
quality of adjacent areas in the United States, John Messer, the former Saskatchewan Minister of Energy, declared: "It is our position that we don't have to abide by the laws of other
countries." Interview with Robert Sugarman, Former Chairman, United States Section, International Joint Commission (Mar. 20, 1981).
30. Clean Air Amendment Act, [19811 C.C.L. 706, at 9.
31. 42 U.S.C. § 7415 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
32. The agency is the United States-Canada International Joint Commission, which has
repeatedly found that acid rain results from the long-range transport of air pollutants
originating from sources in both countries. See SEVENTH ANNUAL REPORT ON GREAT LAKES
WATER QUALITY OF THE INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION (Oct. 1980).
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sources of pollution." However, nothing in the present international legal
framework effectively fosters preventive action. General principles concerning the responsibilities of nations to compensate for the damages
caused by transboundary pollution may occasionally be useful in allocating expenses and may have some deterrent value, but they do little to
avoid the permanent environmental damage that can be expected from
acid rain and perhaps from the greenhouse effect of increased CO production." These general principles are no help in describing the point at
which a nation's interest in industrial development must yield to concerns
over the effects of transboundary pollution.
Moreover, there is no mechanism to enforce any international legal
doctrine that is not made part of a sovereign nation's domestic law. No
international agency is ceded the power to enforce international environmental principles or, indeed, "binding" international treaties and agreements.3 5 The most respected of international adjudicatory bodies, the International Court of Justice, may rule on a case only after the involved
countries have consented to a referral, which is a rare occurrence."6 In the
only two major international environmental cases where the involved nations consented to be bound by the decision of a neutral tribunal, 7 the
claimants were required to demonstrate specific causes of specific environmental injury."8 Unfortunately, because of the incomplete scientific
understanding of both the atmospheric chemistry and the effects of transported sulfur pollutants, one cannot yet establish that specific sources are
responsible for acidification of distant lakes and soils." If action had to
await a clear link between emissions and distant environmental effects, or
the full determination of the damage by acidity, irreversible damage
40
would almost certainly take place in various parts of the world.
VI.

DOMESTIC PROCEDURES TO RESOLVE TRANSBOUNDARY

DISPUTES

Domestic procedures are sometimes successfully enlisted to resolve
international environmental disputes," especially when there are no diffi-

33. This discussion primarily addresses transboundary air pollution, but may also apply
to transboundary water pollution.
34. See generally texts cited in notes 7 & 15 supra.
35. Directives of the Council of the European Communities are incorporated into the
domestic laws of the member states and, accordingly, have a status different from that of
other multilateral agreements.
36. I.C.J. STAT. arts. 36, 37.
37. Trail Smelter Arbitration (United States v. Canada), 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 1905
(1941); The Lac Lanoux Arbitration (Spain v. France), 12 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 281 (1957).
38. The Trail Smelter Arbitration, for example, refers to a state's obligation not to
allow the air pollution to affect another state where injury is established by clear and convincing evidence.
39. See generally the sources cited in note 17 supra.
40. See note 2 supra.
41. See W. Poro v. Houillieres du Bassin de Lorraine, OLGE Bayern, Saarbrocken
(1957), where a German motel owner sued a French electric power plant, whose emissions of
soot and smoke damaged crops, flowers, and the recreation business in German territory
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cult choice of law questions and where the source of the injury and
amount of damages are determinable. The effects of increased acidification such as loss of fish stocks, enhanced corrosion, and reduced agricultural productivity, are compensable types of injury; but judgments for
damages are poorly suited to disputes arising from transboundary acid
rain pollution. The multiplicity of sources and their relative contribution
to atmospheric loadings make it difficult to prove a claim, assign liability,
or provide effective remedies.
If polluters' national courts were willing, for example, to apply Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration or any of its predecessors or successors42 against their own offending citizens, then such principles of international law would have teeth. Thus far, no country's courts have been so
aggressive, although several courts have entertained suits involving extraterritorial damage..4 Attitudes of self-interest and national autonomy regarding environmental problems are shared by judges as well as by legislators and bureaucrats, and these attitudes seem unlikely to change in the
foreseeable future.
VII.

PROGNOsIs: LIMITED ABATEMENT BUT INCREASED AWARENESS

Current controls, including general principles of international law
and the ECE Convention, are not adequate to abate SOx emissions sufficiently to remedy the transboundary acid rain problem." Numerous control strategies, policies, and technologies are available and could be extremely effective, but few nations seem willing to bear the cost. 45 Indeed,
the pressures today are in the opposite direotion, viz., to relax air quality
and emissions standards to thereby make coal-generated electric power
more efficient and economical. 46
The prospects for timely action look bleak. Sweden and Norway will
undoubtedly call on the ECE Convention signatories to implement its
principles. The polluting countries will probably continue to call for proof
of damage, identification of specific sources, and resolution of scientific
uncertainties. The polluters may propose to bear the modest costs of lim-

across the border. The German court awarded damages pursuant to French law. Subsequently, the defendant company installed effective pollution control equipment financed by
joint French-German government contributions pursuant to a pre-existing French-German
treaty dealing, inter alia, with boundary pollution control.
42. See notes 5, 8, 12 & 37 supra.
43. In Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemicals Corp., 401 U.S. 493 (1971), the United States Supreme Court declined to exercise its original jurisdiction, but implicitly confirmed the competence of Ohio's state courts to deal with the transnational disputes involved. See also
Michie v. Great Lakes Steel Division, Nat'l Steel Corp., 495 F.2d 213 (6th Cir. 1974). See
generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 53 (1963); RESTATEMENT (SEcoND)
OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES § 18 (1962).
44. Notes 22 & 29 supra.
45. Note 17 supra.
46. See, e.g., note 29 supra, for a discussion of industrialized nations' decision to switch
from oil to coal.
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ing acidified lakes, an offer which the recipient countries will undoubtedly
reject as an inadequate substitute for abatement and as potentially dangerous to aquatic ecosystems.
The Stockholm Declaration stimulated the creation of numerous national institutions to protect the environment and promoted world awareness of the acid rain phenomenon, if not of its danger. The ECE Conven4
tion, like multilateral agreements on water quality and marine pollution, 7
may at a minimum help maintain the environmental status quo and perhaps bring about voluntary improvements in the environment. Nevertheless, no international principles or practices, and certainly not the qualified language of the ECE Convention,"' can compel remedial action.
The most likely area for progress may come through implementing
the ECE Convention's provisions for exchanging available information on
"major changes in national policies and in general industrial development, and their potential impact, which would be likely to cause significant changes in long-range transboundary pollution. 4 9 Aggressive implementation by victim countries of this provision and of its attendant
notice and consultation requirements would afford an opportunity to attract media and citizen attention in the polluting countries. This could
exert a salutary influence on the polluters' plans for sulfur control.
The projected dissemination by the Secretariat of the Economic
Commission for Europe of member states' energy scenarios could offer
another wedge for victim countries to influence the policies of the polluting countries. Information exchanges among ECE countries on developing
coal-utilization technologies should guarantee rapid dissemination of new
technological developments. Broad multilateral subscription to such technologies may yield economies of a scale sufficient to make them affordable. Finally, ECE-mandated multilateral research on crop damage and
health effects from sulfate aerosols and acid rain may sooner or later
demonstrate clearly both the cost-effectiveness and the necessity of controlling and abating sulfur emissions throughout the industrial world. Ultimately, that should induce responsible officials to revise upward their
estimates of what is economically feasible. 50

47. Probably the most notable are the Convention for the Protection of the Marine
Environment of the Baltic Sea Area, Helsinki, Mar. 22, 1974, reprinted in 13 Irr'L LEGAL
MAT. 544 (1974); Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution from Land-Based
Sources, adopted Feb. 21, 1974, opened for signature June 4, 1974, reprinted in 13 INT'L
LEGAL MAT. 352 (1974); and the Convention for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea
Against Pollution, done at Barcelona, Feb. 16, 1976, reprinted in 15 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 290
(1976) [hereinafter cited as Mediterranean Sea Convention].
In the recent Draft Protocol to the Mediterranean Sea Convention signatories have for
the first time undertaken to change national policies, including industrial siting policies, to
accord with the Protocol's terms. See [19801 3 INT'L ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 189 for a reprint of
the full text.

48. See art. 2 of the ECE Convention, quoted in the text accompanying note 22 supra.
49. Id.
50. See notes 3 & 17 supra.
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Transboundary air pollution is governed not by international law but
by national self-interest. That self-interest, however, combined with the
consciousness-raising effect of vigorous international discussion and negotiation about sulfur and carbon pollutants and their potentially irreversible effects, can induce thoughtful and enlightened public officials to show
concern and try to abate acid rain and CO, for their own nation's future.
In this respect, 1980 was an important year. With government support, West German scientists began ambitious research programs on the
effects of acid deposition"1 on conifer forests and on buildings and monuments, including the Cologne Cathedral. The United States committed
large sums to research the effects of acid deposition and to develop new
pollution control technology. Significant progress has been made in developing a unique "low NOx" boiler to drastically reduce nitrogen oxide
emissions from coal burning facilities.52 The Ontario Ministry of the Environment ordered the INCO smelting plant at Sudbury, Ontario-the
single largest pollution source in the world, emitting one million tons of
sulfur pollutants annually into the atmosphere-to reduce SO, emissions
by more than fifty percent by December 1982.58 Finally, most Western
European countries reduced their annual S0 2 emissions by efficiently employing low-cost sulfur control strategies, such as burning low-sulfur coal
and oil, washing coal before combustion, and producing more electricity
from sulfur-free nuclear power."
VIII.

CONCLUSION

International organizations and agreements serve the essential function of educating the international political community. They help to

build a consensus about a transnational problem and to develop a context
in which sovereign states pursue pro-international policies by perceiving

51. "Acid depostion" is more technically correct than "acid rain." It encompasses rain,
snow, sleet, mist, hail, fog, dew, and frost, as well as dry deposition of fine sulfate
particulates.
52. Nitrogen oxides are precursors to nitric acid, which accounts for one-third of the
acid in North American acid rain. See President Carter's Second Message to Congress on
the Environment, 15 WEKLY COMP. oF PREs. Doc. 1353 (AUG. 2, 1979).
53. Ontario and Canadian federal officials made it clear that the INCO control order
was designed to strengthen Canada's position in the United States-Canada negotiations and
to pressure the United States to take corresponding measures against U.S. sources of acid
rain. See [1980] 3 INT'L ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 234-35. Environmental officials in both countries
seem to be telling one another, in effect, "If you lean on us more, we'll be able to justify
stronger control measures."
54. It is, of course, impossible to know whether the same strategies would have been
employed in the absence of international discussion ("consciousness-raising") of transboundary air pollution and the effects of acid rain. The net result, however, is to reduce the
total sulfur load in Europe's atmosphere. There are indications, however, that increased
emissions from Eastern Europe may have offset any Western Europe reductions. But Eastern European countries, all signatories of the ECE Convention, have become conscious of
the long-range transboundary air pollution problem much more recently than Western Europe, where the Europe-dominated Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development has been discussing transboundary air pollution for almost a decade.
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that it is in their own interest to do so. By making and keeping issues like
transboundary air pollution or world climate change salient topics for international investigation, discussion, and negotiation, they create a ripple
effect. International monitoring, data gathering, and scientific research
help to form a consensus among scientists that a problem is serious and
deserves remedial action. Sooner or later these ripples are bound to reach
policymakers and concerned citizens and to influence national agendas. In
this lies the main hope for progress in international environmental protection generally, and in long-range transboundary air pollution
specifically.

Options for Public Control of Atmospheric
Management
RAY JAY DAVIS
INTRODUCTION

Intentional modification of weather is a goal which has been partly
reached by treating the atmosphere with chemicals. Clouds have been
"seeded" to trigger changes in their behavior. Although much needs to be
learned before weather resources can be managed to the extent scientific
theories postulate, several types of weather phenomena can now be influenced by weather modification technologies:
(1) Supercooled fog and stratus clouds can be treated to improve
visibility;
(2) Snowpack, and the resulting runoff, can be augmented by modifying winter clouds rising over some mountain barriers;
(3) Rain can be increased from some kinds of summer cumulus
clouds, and their potential for precipitation can be enhanced by increasing the size of clouds; and
(4) Hail suppression is attempted in many places, and although experiments are not conclusive, evaluations of some projects suggest that
hail damage in some kinds of storms can be reduced.1
Because the atmospheric environment deeply affects the quality of
life,2 management of atmospheric resources has been subjected to legal
control by governmental institutions. In the United States, courts have
been employed in a number of instances to provide public means for control of weather modification activities.8 There is cloud seeding legislation
5 Australia,6 and the
in several countries, including South Africa, 4Canada,
Ray Jay Davis is Professor of Law, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, B.A., 1948, Idaho State University; J.D., 1953, Harvard University; LL.M., 1956,
Columbia University. Member of the Indiana and Arizona bars.
1. WEATHER MODIFICATION ADVISORY BOARD, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, THE MANAGEMENT OF WEATHER RESOURCES 5 (1978) (Report to the Sec'y of Comm.). See also A. DENNIS,
WEATHER MODIFICATION BY CLOUD SEEDING

(1980); L.

BATTEN, HARVESTING THE CLOUDS: AD-

VANCES IN WEATHER MODIFICATION (1969); B. MASON, CLOUDS, RAIN AND RAINMAKING (2d ed.

1975).

2. See M.

GLANTZ,

H.

VAN LOON & E. ARMSTRONG, MULTIDISCIPLINARY RESEARCH RE-

LATED TO THE ATMOSPHERIC SCIENCES
ASSESSMENT (1973); W.

3.
(1974).
4.
5.
6.

(1978); W.

SEWELL, MODIFYING THE WEATHER:

A SOCIAL

SEWELL, HUMAN DIMENSIONS OF WEATHER MODIFICATION (1966).

See Davis, Weather Modification Law Developments, 27 OKLA. L. REV. 409, 412-15
Weather Modification Control Act, Act No. 78, June 12, 1972 (S. Aft.).
E.g., An Act Respecting Artificial Inducement of Rain, Bill 6, Mar. 11, 1970 (Que.).
E.g., Rain-making Control Act, Act No. 7637, Dec. 19, 1967 (Vict.).
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United States. 7 In some nations there are administrative rules and regulations concerning weather resources management."
Some governmental control over intended weather alteration activities takes place at a local level. 9 However, in the United States, it is more
common to regulate cloud seeding through agencies of state governments.10 In many countries public control of atmospheric management
takes place at the national level."
Various legal options are available for public control of atmospheric
management. Among those which have been employed and which will be
considered herein are:
I.

Incidental Control
A. Delivery of Seeding Materials
B. Water Resource Rights
C. Liability Claims
II. Informational Control
A. Technological Expertise
B. Disclosure
III. Administrative Control
A. Project Registration
B. Operational Permits
C. Professional Licensing
IV. Contractual Control
A. Authorization Laws
B. Appropriation Statutes
C. Procurement Laws and Regulations
V. Governmental Operations
VI. Prohibition of Weather Modification Activities
A. Partial Ban
B. Complete Ban
I.

INCIDENTAL CONTROL

Prior to the time of scientific cloud seeding there were no statutes,
7. National Weather Modification Policy Act of 1976, 15 U.S.C. § 330 (1976).
8. E.g., 15 C.F.R. §§ 908.1-.21 (1981); Rain-making Control Regulations, 1968, Statutory
Rules 2237/68 (Vict.).
9. See, e.g., Pennsylvania ex. rel. Township of Ayr v. Fulk, No. 53 (C.P. Fulton
County, Pa., Feb. 28, 1968).
10. Davis, State Regulation of Weather Modification, 12 ARIz. L. REv. 35 (1970). See
also Davis, Weather Modification Interstate Legal Issues, 15 IDAHo L. REV. 555 (1979).
11. Such efforts at national control have not been very successful in the United States.
See Johnson, Federal Organization for Control of Weather Modification, 10 NAT. REsouRcEs J. 222, 237-52 (1970). See also Taubenfeld, Weather Modification and Control:
Some InternationalLegal Implications, 55 CALi. L. Rav. 493 (1967). Legal control over use
of weather modification as a weapons system is discussed in Davis, Weather Warfare: Law
and Policy, 14 ARIZ. L. REv. 659 (1972). Proposed international rules respecting weather
resources management are noted in Davis, WMO/UNEP Weather Modification International Law Proposals,12 J. WEATHER MODIF. 127 (1980).

1981

CONTROL OF ATMOSPHERIC MANAGEMENT

administrative regulations, or judicial decisions concerning weather modification activities. Many jurisdictions, including forty percent of the
states in the United States, still have no legislation relating specifically to
weather resource management. 2 This does not mean, however, that
weather modification is uncontrolled by governmental agencies in such
places. Control incidental to the use of other kinds of governmental
power is widespread. Regulation of the delivery of seeding materials into
the atmosphere is one type of control. Allocation of atmospheric water
rights is another control device. A third type is legal response to liability
claims.
A.

Delivery of Seeding Materials

Flight control regulations in statutes and administrative rules are intended to protect the public convenience and safety. They include rules
concerning transportation of hazardous materials. Carriage on board aircraft of inflammables in the United States is subjected to Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) rules."8 Some cloud seeding materials dispensed from aircraft are inflammable. Examples are pyrotechnics, which
are mounted on racks on aircraft wings, and mixtures of silver iodide (the
major cloud seeding chemical) with acetone, which are burned in wing tip
generators. The FAA has given exemptions from its hazardous materials
rules to weather modifiers.' 4 In doing so, or refusing to grant permission
to drop pyrotechnics or burn generators, that agency regulates weather
modification incidentally to its role as the guardian of aircraft safety.
In some parts of the United States over half of the opportunities for
treating the atmosphere take place at night. The occupation of a cloud
seeding pilot thdis involves unusual hours. Pilots can spend many days
grounded because no seedable clouds are available, and when there are
seedable events it may be necessary for them to work many successive
hours. Aviation control agencies, such as the Australian Department of
Civil Aviation, have flight time rules. These restrictions are, however,
waived for seeding aircraft operations. It is not necessary to employ duplicative pilots who actually work only when atmospheric conditions require seeding beyond the time set for usual aircraft piloting.1 5 Authority
to make flight-time rules and then to grant or withhold waivers therefore
constitutes the power to control airborne weather resources management.
Cloud seeding flights take place in and near storm clouds, and in12. Davis, supra note 3, at 415 (1974). See also Davis, State Regulation of Weather
Modification, 12 ARIZ. L. REV. 35, 55-63 (1970).
13. 49 C.F.R. §§ 107.1-.373, 175.1-.90 (1980).
14. Exemptions are given under the procedures set forth in 49 C.F.R. § 107.113 (1980),
and standardized in F.A.A. Weather Control Exemptions, 49 C.F.R. § 175.10(12) (1980).
They are processed by the Exemption Branch of the Office of Hazardous Materials
Regulation.
15.

DIVISION OF RADIOPHYSICS, COMMONWEALTH SCIENTIFIC AND INDUSTRIAL

ORGANIZATION, FOURTH COURSE OF INSTRUCTION IN CLOUD-SEEDING TECHNIQUES

RESEARCH

26 (1968).
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volve problems of air traffic control. There must be coordination of flight
instructions relayed from project managers on the ground who have
weather radar information and traffic instructions from governmental air
traffic controllers who direct commerical and general aviation movements.
The formal agreement on flight control between the North Dakota stateoperated weather modification managers and the FAA is an example of
air traffic control cooperation.16 The administrative power to determine
flight patterns can, however, be used to regulate seeding from aircraft.1"
Much weather modification activity takes place on the ground. Persons who control access to ground facilities can exercise incidental control
over treating clouds. Many of the prime areas for American seeding
projects are on or in the atmosphere above federally owned land. Some
National Forest Service units have asserted that persons wishing to use
ground-based seeding generators or monitoring equipment must obtain
special land use permits for those activities in the national forests.1" Issuance or denial of permits would be a form of control over cloud seeding
incidental to the general permit-granting authority.
In order to preserve certain areas from development, the United
States Congress has designated nationally owned areas of primitive character and ecological significance as part of the national wilderness system. 19 Both cloud seeding and the collection of hydrometeorological data
needed to evaluate its impact may intrude upon wilderness areas.
Through use of their power generally to prevent uses inconsistent with
the wilderness character of such areas, some administrators of national
forests and parks have taken the position that mechanized access to data
collection instruments in wildernesses will not be allowed.20 Proposals to
reduce the impact of this sort of incidental control by setting up a procedure for approval of various means of data collection have not been enacted into law.2 '
B.

Water Resource Rights

Precipitation enhancement is advocated by persons and organizations
wishing to obtain additional water. They may not, however, be able to use

16. Interview with John Odegard, Department of Aviation, University of North Dakota
(Oct. 30, 1980).
17. Interview with Thomas Henderson, President of Atmospheric Inc., Kenya Tea
Growers Association, Department of Civil Aviation (Apr. 1975); interview with Alex Alusa,
Meterologist, Department of Agriculture (Kenya).
18. Sterns, Weather Modification Activities and National Forest Land Use Permits, in
HAIL SUPPRESSION: SOCIETY AND ENVIRONMENT

241 (B. Farhar ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited as

Farhar].
19. National Wilderness Preservation System, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-36 (1976 & Supp. III
1979).
20. Sterns, Weather Modification and Collection of HydrometeorologicalData in Wilderness Areas, in Farhar, supra note 18, at 238.
21. Davis, Legal Response to Environmental Concerns about Weather Modification, 14

J.

APPLIED METEOROLOGY

681 (1975).

1981

CONTROL OF ATMOSPHERIC MANAGEMENT

the water unless they have a legal right to exclude others from its use.
Who owns the water in the atmosphere? The meager case law on this
point is scattered, comes from lesser courts, and reaches different conclusions.22 Montana has a constitutional provision asserting state ownership
of atmospheric waters;23 and states have statutes reaching the same result.2 ' These provisions, however, do not allocate water rights. They, like
similar laws concerning surface and underground waters, 5 are merely intended to be a basis for exercise by states of the power to regulate the use
of water rights.
Of more importance to sponsors of rain and snow augmentation
projects than rights in the skies is the right to use additional waters on
the ground and in the streams. Case law does not deal with this issue;
three American states have statutes addressing it. Colorado's law provides
that water flow generated by weather modification activities will be
treated like other water. Seeding project sponsors can obtain a legal right
of use if, but only if, they file to appropriate it."' A somewhat similar
Utah statute has been interpreted to give the right of use to the added
water to the appropriator whose unfilled water priority stood the highest
in rank.7 North Dakota by law rules that artifically induced precipitation
will be treated the same as natural precipitation." By granting or withholding inducements to mount projects, these rules form a type of control
over atmospheric water resources management.
C.

Liability Claims

When most persons think of law and weather modification their attention turns first to liability claims by land owners and others against
weather modifiers. In spite of its fears about litigation the industry has
been very successful in liability lawsuits. Plaintiffs have won only one

22. In Slutsky v. City of New York, 197 Misc. 730, 731, 97 N.Y.S.2d 238, 239 (1950), a
trial court judge stated that property owners "clearly have no vested property rights in the
clouds or the moisture therein." In Southwest Weather Research, Inc. v. Duncan, 319
S.W.2d 940, 945 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958), however, an intermediate appellate court judge said
that the landowner has a right to "such precipitation as Nature designs to bestow . . . to
such rainfall as may come from clouds over his own property that Nature, in her caprice,
may provide." Yet another trial judge has declared that "every landowner has a property
right in the clouds and the water in them," but that that right is subject to "weather modification undertaken under governmental authority." Pennsylvania Natural Weather Ass'n v.
Blue Ridge Weather Modification Ass'n, 44 Pa. D. & C. 2d 749, 759-60 (C.P. Fulton County,
Pa., 1968).
23. MONT. CONST. art. IX, § 3(3).
24. E.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37:2201 (West 1974); NEB. REV. STAT. § 2-2401(1) (1977);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 75-3-3 (1978); S.D. ComP. LAws ANN. § 46-3A-2 (Supp. 1980).
25. 1 R. CLARK, WATER AND WATER RIGHTS § 39.3 (1967).

26. COLO. REV. STAT. § 36-20-103 (1973); COLORADO LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, CONTROLLING
WEATHER MODIFICATION ACTIVITIES (Research Publication 147) 10 (1977).
27. 1980 7c UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-15-4 (Supp. 1979); R. DEWSNUP & D. DENSEN, LEGAL
ASPECTS OF WEATHER MODIFICATION IN UTAH 72-73 (1977) (Report to Utah Div. Water
Resources).
28. N.D. CENT. CODE § 2-07-01 (1975).
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case. 2' Judicial control through use of tort law has been more of a threat
than a reality. Of course, assessment of damages and imposition of injunctions could be an effective means of control when plaintiffs manage to
prove the elements of their tort claims.
Various liability theories have been advanced. For example, in a
Michigan lawsuit, a farmer whose crop had been damaged by a storm
sued a weather modification company and sponsoring farmer groups asserting theories of trespass, negligence, nuisance, and ultrahazardous activity.80 Although the jury found for the defendants, this multiple theory
approach to litigation seems to be the best way81of getting before the
courts a theory upon which liability can be based.
Probably the basic reason for failure by most complainants in
weather modification litigation has been their inability to prove a causal
relationship between the cloud seeding activity and their harm. For example, in a Pennsylvania case,8 ' plaintiffs alleged that hail suppression
efforts had brought about a drought. They proved that there had been
seeding and that there was a drought; but they could not establish any
connection between the two. It is not surprising that this should be the
case. Even scientists who use sophisticated statistical analyses of longterm projects debate findings.8 8 Proof of a causal connection in a single
instance of seeding is obviously more difficult.
If liability claims are proven, defendants still can prevail by proving
an affirmative defense. The privilege of public necessity is one such defense. Anglo-American common law gives persons a right to protect the
public from an imminent disaster by performing acts which might otherwise be tortious. For example, a firefighter may pull down buildings to
form a fire break to stop a conflagration." So too, it might be argued,
could a cloud seeder bring about an inundation of forest lands to stop a
fire. Public necessity and other defenses diminish the number of cases in
which the judiciary would be able to control weather modification efforts.

29. Southwest Weather Research, Inc. v. Rounsaville, 320 S.W.2d 211 (Tex. Civ. App.
1958), and Southwest Weather Research, Inc. v. Duncan, 319 S.W.2d 940 (Tex. Civ. App.
1958), both aff'd sub nom., Southwest Weather Research, Inc. v. Hones, 160 Tex. 104, 327
S.W.2d 417 (1959).
30. Reinhold v. Sumner Farmers, Inc. and Irving P. Krick, Inc., No. 2734-C (Cir. Ct.,
Tuscola County, Mich., 1974); see Davis & St.-Amand, Proof of Legal Causationin Weather
Modification Litigation: Reinbold v. Sumner Farmers, Inc. and Irving P. Krick, Inc., 7 J.
WEATHER MODIF. 127 (1975).
31. See, e.g., Adams v. California, Civil No. 10112 (Sup. Ct., Sutter County, Cal., 1964);
Mann, The Yuba City Flood: A Case Study of Weather Modification Litigation, 49 BULL.
AM. METEOROLOGICAL Soc'y 690 (1968).
32. Pennsylvania Natural Weather Ass'n v. Blue Ridge Weather Modification Ass'n, 44
Pa. D. & C. 2d 749 (C.P. Fulton County, Pa., 1968).
33. See A. DENNIS, supra note 1, §§ 6.1-6.5. A defendant who acts to prevent a threatening injury from some force of nature, or some other independent cause not connected with
the threat, is said to be acting under necessity.
34. W. PRossaR, LAw oF TORTS 124-27 (4th ed. 1971).
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II.

INFORMATION CONTROL

Information about weather modifications is freely exchanged among
scientists, cloud seeding companies, and nations." A professional organization, the Weather Modification Association, holds semiannual meetings
during which cloud seeders exchange information on techniques and activities. The organization also publishes a journal." Other meteorological
publications, such as the Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society and the Journal of Applied Meteorology, contain articles relating to
weather management technologies.3 " Numerous official reports are also
available."8 Consequently persons knowledgeable in the field can keep
current.
In spite of this cooperation and information exchange, much remains
to be learned about the properties, dynamics, and behavior of the atmosphere and about its response to different seeding techniques. Additionally, there are many persons interested in weather resources management
who are not well versed in the science and technology. Withholding information from such persons, or requiring information disclosure by people
who propose and carry out experimental or operational projects has impeded proper seeding operations.
A.

Technological Expertise

Persons who seek to launch cloud seeding projects in Australia usually have become aware of weather modification through reading of the
activities of the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organization (CSIOR). This science agency of the Australian government has
been successfully involved in weather modification research and development for over thirty years. Although they share their expertise with state
governments, 39 CSIOR scientists do not assist in private projects.40
Through informational control the government has kept the private sector from performing cloud seeding.

35. J. HOBBS, APPLIED CLIMATOLOGY § 8.3 (1980).
36. The Journal of Weather Modification, published by the Weather Modification Association, P.O. Box 8116, Fresno, California 93747. The association has published a short
explanation in lay terms of the processes involved in cloud seeding. WEATHER MODIFICATION:
SOME FACTS ABOUT SEEDING CLOUDS (1977). Copies can be obtained from the Association.
37. The bulletin covers meteorology and climatology generally. The journal deals with
the application of meteorological principles, including cloud physics and cloud seeding. Both
are published by the American Meteorological Society, 45 Beacon Street, Boston, Massachusetts 02108.
38. E.g., the series of reports by the World Meteorological Organization on its weather
modification project, PEP. Through May 1980 there have been twenty reports in the series.
Report No. 13, WMO Training Workshop on Weather Modification for Meteorologists:
Lecture Notes (1979), is in essence a handbook on cloud seeding science and technology.
39. See Smith, Cloud Seeding in Australia, in W. HEss, WEATHER AND CLIMATE MODIFICATION 444 (1974).
40. See Davis, The Law of PrecipitationEnhancement in Victoria, 7 LAND & WATER L.
REV. 1, 6-9 (1972) [hereinafter cited as PrecipitationEnhancement in Victoria].
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B. Disclosure
The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 directs that all agencies of the federal government shall include in every recommendation or
report on proposals for legislation and other major federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, a detailed statement by the responsible official on the environmental impacts and consequences of the proposed action.41 Federal projects, which include a large
portion of experimental projects in the United States,' 2 must not be conducted without complying with this advance disclosure requirement if
they will have a significant environmental impact. Preparation of adequate impact statements requires analysis of meteorological and hydrologic records and consideration of the "natural and social sciences and the
environmental design arts in planning and decisionmaking. ' '14 Public access to environmental impact statements gives people a means of ascertaining whether environmental considerations have been adequately incorporated into the projects.
When there are laws and rules mandating that cloud seeding records
be kept and that reports based upon them be made, the public also has
access to information about weather resources management. The federal
government in Canada has a record keeping and reporting statute" which
is supplemented by administrative regulations. "5 Weather modification
cannot legally be practiced without public and official knowledge. Adverse
publicity can have a very real impact upon an industry."
III.

ADMINISTRATrVE CONTROL

Weather modification activities are now regulated by state administrative agencies in about half of the United States.' Agencies, acting
under statutory authority, use a variety of administrative control techniques. Among them are project registration, operational permits, and
professional licensing.
A.

Project Registration
In Idaho persons doing cloud seeding must register with the state

41. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2)(c) (1976).
42. For a number of years a federal Interdepartmental Committee on Atmospheric Sciences made annual reports on expenditures of national agencies for weather alteration research and development, and since 1972 federal agencies report their activities to the De-

partment of Commerce. See M.

CHARAK, WEATHER MODIFICATION REPORTING PROGRAM,

1973-1978 (1979), which lists, among others, all federal projects.
43. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2)(A) (1976).
44. Weather Modification Information Act, 1971, ch. 59 (Can.).
45. See Canada: Weather Modification Information Act and Regulation Administrative
Guidelines (1974) (government publication).
46. See Gellhorn, Adverse Publicity by Administrative Agencies, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1380
(1973).
47. Davis, supra note 3, at 415; see also Davis, State Regulation of Weather Modification, 12 Amiz. L. REv. 35, 55-63 (1970).
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Department of Agriculture."8 Although the department has no discretion
to reject attempted registration of inappropriate seeding projects, it at
least has an official register of operations in the state.
The World Meteorological Organization (WMO) also has a register of
projects. 49 Member nations in the organization pass along to WMO information as to what projects are being carried out in their jurisdictions.
One of the rather hesitant steps toward international legal control over
weather modification is the recommendation by experts designated by
member governments that the register be maintained by WMO and that
members report the required information needed for it. 60
B.

OperationalPermits

Use of the power to issue operational permits is a more effective form
of administrative regulation. Illinois has a law under which state officials
have the power to impose conditions upon persons who desire to carry out
weather modification operations in the state."1 The time and place of
seeding, materials and amounts, radar, kinds and numbers of personnel,
target and control areas, and other particulars of proposed operations are
reviewed by the regulators. They can shape permits to fit their perception
of the public interest as well as that of the project sponsors.
Interim administrative modification of permits allows for adjustments required by unforeseen or changed circumstances. The Council of
State Governments' recommended that weather control law delegates administer such power. 52 There are also provisions for emergencies when
permits can be suspended, for revocation and refusals to renew permits
and for hearings to protect the rights of permitholders.5s In order for
these requirements to be effective it is necessary to have competent administrative personnel who monitor projects so they can know when administrative intervention is needed."
C.

ProfessionalLicensing

People selling their services as cloud seeders should be both competent and honest. The Weather Modification Association has a system for

48.

IDAHO CODE ANN.

49.

WORLD METEOROLOGICAL ORGANIZATION, REGISTER OF NATIONAL WEATHER MODIFICA-

TION PROJECTS

§§ 22-3201, 3202 (1977).

(1979).

50. Davis, WMO/UNEP Weather Modification International Law Proposals, 12 J.
WEATHER MODIF. 127, 129 (1980).
51. ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 111 § 7391 (d) (1978). See Ackerman, Changnon & Davis, The
New Weather Modification Law for Illinois, 55 BULL. Am. METEOROLOGICAL Soc'y 743
(1974).
52. 1978 SUGGESTED STATE LEGISLATION, Weather Modification Control Act, § 409 at 9,
20 (Council of State Governments, 1977).
53. Id. § 410.
54. Davis, supra note 3, at 415. There has been effective monitoring in, for example,
Illinois, North Dakota, South Dakota, Texas, and Utah. Those states have been given resources necessary to carry out monitoring.
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certification of weather modification managers and operators. They must
demonstrate competency to be certified.5 5 Unfortunately, some cloud
seeders are not members of the Association. It is necessary, therefore, for
governments wishing to check on the qualifications of seeders to set up a
licensing system. California, as an example, requires minimum levels of
educational and practical experience as a prerequisite to being licensed.5 1
In addition to competency, there is a need for integrity by weather
modifiers. Literature is full of stories of swindling "rainmakers," boastful
"experts," and athletic "rain dancers. ' 57 Arizona, in order to protect the
public from persons who promise much and deliver somewhat less, requires that persons seeking authority to modify the clouds file with the
regulatory agency copies of their advertising.5 8 Revelation of dishonesty
can be a step in the direction of its prevention.
IV.

CONTRACTUAL CONTROL

Mr. Justice Holmes once remarked that "men must turn square corners when they deal with the government." By requiring people who use
government monies to meet conditions imposed by contract, officials can
exercise very extensive control over publicly funded weather resource
management.6 0 Three types of laws relate to such contractual control: authorization laws, appropriations statutes, and procurement laws and
regulations.
A.

Authorization Laws

Under the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence, government
spending programs cannot be undertaken without prior legislative approval. Such authorization legislation in some jurisdictions takes the form
of giving power to agencies which are already in existence to carry out
cloud seeding. Thus in New York there is a law which authorizes incorporated municipalities to spend money on weather modification; 61 in California the law stipulates that any agency empowered to develop water
resources can seed clouds;63 and a 1980 Illinois law grants the state water
63
survey authority to evaluate cloud seeding.
In the Great Plains states, statutes authorize the creation of special
weather modification districts which may levy and collect taxes and then

55. The Association's qualifications and procedures for certification are set forth at 12
J. WEATHER MODIF. 142-44 (1980).
56. CAL. WATER CODE § 408.5 (Supp. 1981).
57. See D. HALACY, THE WEATHER CHANGERS (1968).
58. AmIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 45-2405 B (Supp. 1980).

59. Rock Island, A. & L. R.R. v. United States, 254 U.S. 141, 143 (1920).
60. R. DAVIs, THE LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF ATMOSPHERIC WATER RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT AND MANAGEMENT § 13 (1968).
61. N.Y. GEN. MUNIc. LAW § 119 (p) (McKinney Supp. 1980).
62. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 53063 (West 1966).
63. Ill.
H.B. 2841 (1980) (final version).
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spend their funds on weather resource management." These authorization laws stipulate procedures for creation of the districts, outline procedures for them to follow, and provide means for their dissolution. In
North Dakota, for example, a petition process has been used to set up
and dissolve weather modification authorities.6 5
B.

Appropriation Statutes

In addition to authorization legislation, it is necessary that expenditure of governmental funds be carried out in accordance with the purposes of appropriation. When appropriations are not forthcoming, government supported programs must shut down. For example, in South
Dakota, which was the first state to have a statewide weather modification program, failure by the legislature to continue funding killed the program."6 The appropriations power is a double-edged sword: the public can
use it to encourage cloud seeding by paying the bill, or can use it to halt
government-funded weather resources management.
C.

Procurement Laws and Regulations

In addition to the sort of fiscal arrangements found in most contracts, government contracts contain clauses inserted because of the requirements of procurement legislation. Bidders also must comply with negotiated terms of the agreement. The manner of cloud seeding can
thereby be controlled. Accordingly, federal agencies, which are the major
source of research and development funds, have been able to control
weather modification experimentation in the United States. They use the
67
power of the purse and of contract to get their way.
V.

GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS

At one time the Utah cloud seeding law permitted only the Utah Division of Water Resources to perform atmospheric water resource development in the state.68 In the Australian state of Victoria, seeding permits
are given only to governmental entities. 69 In communist and many socialist countries cloud seeding is a government monopoly.7 0 At least in the-

64. S.

CHANGNON,

R.

DAVIS,

MANN, G. MORGAN, S. SONKA, E.

B.

FARHAR,

J. HAAS, J. IVENs, M. JONES, D.

KLEIN,

D.

SWANSON, C. TAYLOR & J. vAN BLOCKLAND, HAM SUPPRES-

ISSUES 146-48 (1977).
65. N.D. CENr. CODE § 2-07-06.5 (1975).
66. See Donnan, Pellot, Leblang & Ritter, The Rise and Fall of the South Dakota
Weather Modification Program,8 J. WEATHER MODnp. 2 (1976).
67. Davis, State Regulation of Weather Modification, 12 ARIz. L. REv. 35, 60-62 (1970).
68. UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-15-1 (Supp. 1973). The law provided that the "State of Utah
... shall be the only entity . . . that shall have authority to sponsor and develop cloud
seeding research or implementation projects to alter precipitation or cloud forms within the
State of Utah."
69. PrecipitationEnhancement in Victoria, supra note 40, at 10-11.
70. See WORLD METEOROLOGICAL ORGANIZATION, REGISTER OF NATIONAL WEATHER MODSION: IMPACTS AND

IFICATION PROJECTS

(1979).
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ory, government operation of atmospheric alteration programs is a complete form of public control over them.
VI.

A.

PROHIBITION OF WEATHER MODIFICATION ACTIVITIES

PartialBan

One of the most intrusive forms of control over atmospheric management is a partial ban of cloud seeding activities. The ban could be partial
in that it bars seeding unless some condition is met. The Illinois law provides that there shall be no cloud seeding in the state unless it is done
under the authority of a permit and carried out under the supervision of
a licensed cloud seeder.7 1 Such conditional bans form the basis for administrative controls.
Another type of partial ban is a prohibition of a particular kind of
activity. Minnesota, for example, bans delivery of cloud seeding materials
from ground-based generators.7 2 Pennsylvania disallows seeding for the
78
purpose of suppressing lightning.
B.

Complete Ban

The most intrusive type of regulation of atmospheric alteration is a
complete ban. Maryland is the only jurisdiction which has enacted such a
74
law. The ban there, however, is no longer in effect.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Intentional weather modification is partially attained by treating the
atmosphere with chemicals. Government institutions at all levels and
within each branch control atmospheric resources management because
the atmospheric environment deeply affects the quality of life. Various
legal options available for public control of atmospheric management
have been considered in this article.
Incidental control includes regulation of delivery of seeding materials
and allocation of atmospheric and ground water rights. Rules governing
carriage on board aircraft of inflammable and other hazardous materials,
flight time, flight patterns, access to ground facilities and activities, and
the use of water rights have proved effective means of control. Judicial
control through the use of civil liability claims has been rendered ineffective by plaintiffs' inability to prove a causal relationship, and by defendants' ability to prove the affirmative defense of public necessity.
Informational control of technological expertise curtails improper
seeding operations, and the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969
requirement of advance disclosure by a responsible official concerning en-

71.
72.
73.
74.

ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 111, § 7310 (1978).
MINN. STAT. § 42.09 (6) (Supp. 1980).
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 1115 (Supp. 1980).
MD. CODE ANN. art 66C, § 110A (1967).
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vironmental impact provides public knowledge of seeding operations. Adverse publicity insures incentives for self-regulation of the cloud seeding
industry.
Administrative agencies use a variety of control techniques including
project registration, operational permits and professional licensing. State
and national requirements to register projects within the respective jurisdictions provide observation of activities. Member nations of the WMO
pass along this information to maintain international coordination of
weather modification. Operational permits impose conditions on the time,
place, and manner of seeding, while governmental licensing encourages
competent and honest weather modifiers.
Governments exert control over seeding programs through authorization by legislative approval and evaluation of weather resource management districts. These districts secure control through negotiated terms of
the contract and through expenditure of governmentally appropriated
funds. Some governments either grant permits only to governmental entities or completely prohibit weather modification activities. Although no
complete ban is in effect now, governmentally imposed conditions provide
one of the most intrusive forms of control over atmospheric management.
Many routes have been taken for public control of atmospheric management. Control strategy usually relies upon a mix of options. It is important that there be careful consideration of control devices so that a
proper combination of them will protect against indiscriminate weather
modification programs, and secure an atmospheric environment favorably
affecting the quality of life.

STUDENT COMMENT

United States Export of Banned Products:
Legal and Moral Implications
PATRICK

I.

B.

SEFEROVICH

THE PROBLEM

The extent of human suffering and environmental harm resulting
from trade in banned or restricted pesticides cannot be fully
documented.'

In 1975, the Texas-based Velsicol Chemical Corporation exported the
nerve-attacking pesticide Leptophos (Phosvel) to thirty countries. Over
half of its total export was shipped to Egypt, a country with no procedures for pesticide regulation or tolerance setting. The use of Leptophos
in Egypt resulted in the deaths of several Egyptian farmers and severe
convulsions and speech impairments in others. American workers also became partially paralyzed from similar amounts of exposure, and traces of
the pesticide were found on tomatoes in the United States which were
imported from Mexico.' Despite the harm that was done, the Velsicol
Corporation continued to export the product while proclaiming its

Patrick B. Seferovich, a J.D. candidate at T.C. Williams School of Law, University of
Richmond, Virginia, is currently completing his final year of law school as a special student
at the University of Denver College of Law. M.A., 1973, University of Virginia; B.A., 1969,
Arizona State University.
1. U.S. Export of Banned Products: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Commerce,
Consumer and Monetary Affairs of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 35 (1978) (statement of S. Jacob Scherr, Attorney for the Natural Resources
Defense Council) [hereinafter cited as Hearings]. Neither the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) nor the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) is able to collect data
regarding export volume. Trade statistics on the export of particular products are either
nonexistent or incomplete and difficult to obtain. Monitoring problems stem in part from
the present inadequacy in export laws: products manufactured for export only are generally
exempt from reporting requirements of U.S. laws. Furthermore, many of the records which
are maintained are often considered as trade secrets and thus are never disclosed to the
public nor to the appropriate regulatory body. While the Department of Commerce does
compile records of all exports, the department's method of compilation makes it virtually
impossible to ascertain which products were banned or restricted in the United States.
The export of banned products is not limited to restricted or banned pesticides. Currently, exports include several categories of hazardous products banned in the United
States: food dyes, cyclamate food sweetners, certain foods, cosmetics, drugs, and other consumer products. Id. at 3.
2. Wash. Post, Feb. 25, 1980, at A], col. 1.
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safety.3 Leptophos was never registered with the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).
In Guatemala, a country with widespread poverty, mothers' milk has
been contaminated with DDT.4 Most of it has come from the United
States." The export of grain coated with mercury fungicides, a chemical
banned in the United States, resulted in the deaths of at least 400 Iraqis
and the hospitalization of 5,000 more.' Herbicide 2.4.5-T, a pesticide similar in makeup to Agent Orange 7 was exported to South America even
after the EPA canceled its registration for most domestic uses. In Columbia, tests have shown a link between the consumption of food products
coated with this herbicide and a number of miscarriages and deformed
babies. Approximately 500,000 persons worldwide are poisoned each year
and as many as 5,000 die from herbicide 2.4.5-T.8 The World Health Organization (WHO) adds that this figure does not include thousands of
people who are affected by the chemical in some other way, such as those
who develop cancers ten to fifteen years later.'
The problem is not confined to the exportation of banned drugs or
pesticides. In June 30, 1977, a ban on U.S.-manufactured baby pacifiers
which caused choking deaths in infants was proposed by the Consumer
Products Safety Commission. 0 Following this proposal, notice of which
was given to appropriate U.S. manufacturers, over 500,000 of these pacifiers were exported. 1 Even after the proposal became effective on February
26, 1978, at least one manufacturer continued to export the banned
pacifier.12
Should U.S. manufacturers be allowed to export, without restriction,
products which are either banned or strictly controlled domestically? Although this question has received considerable debate in government and
business circles in recent years, an answer remains elusive. Despite a
growing export trade with Third World countries, often involving exports
of domestically banned substances, the United States has yet to adopt an
export policy which comprehensively addresses this question."3 The focus
3. Hearings, supra note 1, at 35.
4. Wash. Post, Feb. 25, 1980, at Al, col. 1-2.

5. Id.
6. Farvar, The Interaction of Ecological Social Systems, in OUTER LIMITS
NEEDS 70 (W. Matthews ed. 1976).
7. Hearings, supra note 1, at 49.
8. Wash. Post, Feb. 25, 1980, at Al, col. 2.
9. Id.
10. Hearings, supra note 1, at 2.
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11. Id.
12. Id.
13. And yet a number of factors indicate that this problem will continue to grow over
the next few years: Significant increases in world population will generate increased worldwide needs for food, drugs, pesticides, and other products; demand for these products has
already begun to accelerate due to an increase in the number of consumer-oriented societies;
economic pressures for U.S. firms to increase exports in order to increase U.S. production
and offset a growing trade imbalance will also exacerbate the problem.
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of this paper will be to identify and discuss the more narrow issues this
question poses, with a view to proposing the establishment of a uniform

export policy.
II.

BRIEF HISTORY

Historically, Third World countries provided only limited markets
for U.S. products, but as domestic regulation increased, sales in these developing countries increased accordingly. The banning of products manufactured in the United States for domestic consumption frequently creates large inventories, making Third World markets prime targets for the
sale and distribution of these "banned" substances. While products
designed for use by U.S. citizens often are subject to a barrage of legislative and administrative restrictions, the policy of the United States toward the export of products prohibited from domestic sale can be described as caveat emptor." Often this "buyer beware" attitude has
involved a benign refusal to disclose information as to what an export
shipment actually contains. Sometimes the problem lies with improper
labeling, incomplete instructions, or inaccurate ingredient lists. Often the
accompanying advertising is false or misleading.
. Awareness of this problem came rather suddenly after an incident
involving the export of Tris-treated sleepwear in October, 1977.15 Banned
in the United States, large surplus inventories of sleepwear treated with
this substance were quickly exported to developing countries in Africa,
Asia, and South America.' This incident brought to light one fact: The
United States has no export policy to prevent the indiscriminate dumping
of questionable products. The irony of the situation is obvious: Why
would legislators pass laws preventing the use of dangerous products at
home, but allow a loose export policy of the same commodities? The most
common explanation is that conditions in some importing countries rampant unemployment, overpopulation, and epidemics of insect-caused
diseases-often make U.S. standards of health and safety inappropriate.

These conditions necessitate standards that weigh risks against results,
thus allowing the use of proven products despite possible side effects.
Unfortunately this weighing of risks versus benefits has not been
done and today there are a growing number of developing countries which
are beginning to question this unfettered worldwide marketing. Some
14. Schulberg, United States Exports of Products Banned for Domestic Use, 20 HAny.
INT'L L.J. 331 (1978).
15. HousE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS REPORT ON EXPORT OF PRODUCTS
BANNED BY U.S. REGULATORY AGENCIES, H.R. REP. No. 1686, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as 1978 SuBCOMMrIrEE REPORT]. See also Hearings, supra note 1, at 3.
16. Wash. Post, May 6, 1978, at D10, col. 1. See also Schulberg, supra note 14, at 334.
Although the CPSC eventually prohibited Tris exports, several million dollars worth of
materials treated with Tris had already been exported. Furthermore, the decision to prohibit overseas sales of Tris-treated materials applied only to products manufactured for U.S.
consumption and not to products originally intended for export. Id. See also 43 Fed. Reg.
25,711 (1978).
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complain about being the "dumping grounds" of U.S. companies.17 In a
congressional report by the Subcommittee on Commerce, Consumer, and
Monetary Affairs of the House Committee on Government Operations,",
it was stated that "approximately 68 percent of foreign countries surveyed indicated interest in receiving notification of U.S. regulatory
action." 19
The dichotomy between those countries that may need domestically
restricted products and those who are working to prevent this dumping
only serves to illustrate the pressing need we have in this country for a
comprehensive export policy. The repercussions of exporting banned
products are not confined to the effects felt by foreign consumers. Products banned for sale in the United States are manufactured here, transported here, and are often used abroad in the production of products
which eventually are reimported into the United States. Thus, many concerned citizens and legislators here at home are beginning to ask for a
stricter export policy.
Clearly the U.S. government is faced with the task of formulating an
export policy which will not only reflect the capability of the importing
countries to assess the risks and benefits of the product, but will also be
attentive to the needs of those developing countries where the benefits of
some products may outweigh the risks involved. This policy must also
reflect domestic considerations: What dangers are posed by manufacturing and transporting such products within the United States and what
dangers are there with the reimportation of products containing a banned
substance?
No single control policy restricting the export of all domestically
banned products will legitimately cover the entire range of exports that
include such items as pesticides, drugs, toxic chemicals, and effective but
risky medicines. In each case the nature and the certainty of the risk will
be different and, given the opportunity, the conditions within the importing country will have to be weighed against the risk.
III.

CONSTRUCTING AN EXPORT POLICY: ISSUES

To

CONSIDER

The task of developing a uniform export policy involves a number of
separate but interrelated questions.
A. Does the United States Government Have a Moral or Legal Responsibility to Prevent the Export of a Substance or Product it

17. 1978 SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 15, at 11-12.
18. See 1978 SUBCOMMITEE REPORT, note 15 supra.
19. Id. at 4. The need for better standards has been expressed worldwide. In May 1978
the United Nations Environmental Program Governing Council conducted extensive discussions on the sale of banned or restricted chemical products. Both developed and developing
countries were represented. The Governing Council's recommendation to exporting and importing countries was that each should institute adequate monitoring, evaluative, and protective measures in regard to international commerce and chemical products. See Hearings,
supra note 1, at 34-37.
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Knows or has Reason to Believe is Dangerous?
B. Is There an International Legal Basis for Imposing a Restrictive Export Policy?
C. Assuming a New Export Policy is Needed, What is the Present Capability of the United States Regulatory System to Monitor
and Enforce Such a Policy?
D. How Would a Restrictive Export Policy Affect Developing
Countries?
E.

What Reforms in the Export System Should be Instituted?

A. Does the United States Government Have a Moral or Legal Responsibility to Prevent the Export of a Substance or Product it Knows or Has
Reason to Believe is Dangerous?
Unquestionably the moral obligation of the United States to institute
a uniform export policy should stem from general principles of fairness
and human decency. Surely there is little or no justification for allowing
an uninformed, poverty-stricken country to use a substance that we created but will not use ourselves because we know it is harmful. United
States adherence to the principles of the Helsinki Accords, 0 and recent
attempts by former President Carter to incorporate a sensitivity for
human rights into our foreign policy is an indication of a long-term American commitment to the protection of human rights and the global
environment.
As a member of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD),31 the United States has subscribed to internal policies which seek to protect the earth's environment by restricting the manufacture of certain chemical substances.21 As a member of the United
Nations, the United States has supported the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP),2" the purpose of which has been "to provide
early warning of significant environmental risks and opportunities, and to
ensure that governments have access to the best available environmental
data.""' The United States has also subscribed to the Food and Agriculture Organizaton (FAO) and to the World Health Organization (WHO) -

20. Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, done at Helsinki, Aug. 1, 1975, Dept. State Pub. No. 8826 (GEN'L FOR POL. SER. 298), reprinted in 14
INT'L LEGAL MAT. 1292 (1975) [hereinafter cited as The Helsinki Accords].
21. The OECD was established in 1960 as an intergovernmental organization consisting
of developed nations. The governing body of the OECD is the Council, which can make
decisions that are binding on member states.
22. Alston, International Regulation of Toxic Chemicals, 7 EcOLOGY L.Q. 397, 423
(1978).
23. G.A. Res. 2997, 27 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 30) 43, U.N. Doc. A/8370 (1973). UNEP
was established subsequent to the 1972 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment "to promote international environmental cooperation and to act as a catalyst, stimulator, and coordinator for the work on other agencies and programs." Alston, supra note 22, at
411.
24. Alston, supra note 22, at 422.
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both specialized agencies of the United Nations - whose Environmental
Health Criteria Programme (EHCP) attempts to collect data on every aspect of potentially dangerous chemicals.2" It seems clear from its participation in these agreements and organizations that the United States has
in fact "promised" to concern itself with those very things which the
present export system has failed to do: protect human health and the
world environment.
The long-time role of the United States as a dominant worldwide exporter adds another dimension to this obligation. If only from a political
or foreign policy standpoint, the United States does not stand to gain
international respect if it continues to pollute and harm others through
the dumping of dangerous substances abroad.
A comprehensive U.S. export policy, which would operate to prevent
the unwarranted export of dangerous products would be consistent with
U.S. principles of products liability law, which have virtually eliminated
the principle of caveat emptor. A reformed export policy would also remove one of the most blatant inconsistencies in U.S. national legislation:
While the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA)2 advocates strict guidelines for the possible environmental effects of the activities of all federal agencies, the laws that govern exports cannot prevent
(except in a few narrow instances) the indiscriminate unloading of dangerous U.S. products on foreign consumers.
The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) was designed to establish environmental values as an "important element" in all planning
done by U.S. Government agencies.2 7 NEPA has been interpreted as applying to the export of products to foreign countries - products which
were banned or strictly regulated in the United States2 s and the harmful
consequences of direct or indirect federal agency activity in foreign countries.2 9 This interpretation of NEPA could form the basis of a new, more

25. The EHCP has published a number of materials relating to the composition and
effects of several chemical substances. Some of these include lead, mercury, polychlorinated
biphenyls (PCB's), and nitrates. The EHCP has also established a number of "national"
data collecting centers, which gather information relating to the use and effects of chemicals
in that environment. Id. at 412-13.
26. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-61 (1976).
27. See Note, Exports and Environmental Injury: Applying NEPA to the Export-Import Bank, 12 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 247 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Exports and Environmental Injury].
28. See Development, Executive Order on ExtraterritorialEnvironmental Impacts, 13
J. INT'L L. & ECON. 455, 455-57 (1979).
29. Id. at 456-57. See also Applebaum, Controlling the Environmental Hazards of InternationalDevelopment, 5 ECOLOGY L.Q. 321, 344 (1976). NEPA requires that U.S. government agencies consider the possible environmental "effects" of their proposed activities. Ostensibly, this requirement could extend to federal agencies which conduct activities abroad
affecting the environment. The extraterritorial reach of NEPA has been a topic of some
concern recently. To date no clear answer as to the extent of its application has been established. A number of interpretations in the form of amendments or proposals have been
made. In 1978 the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) issued preliminary regulations
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clearly delineated U.S. export policy.
Realizing that the standards of some countries might not be the same
as those of the United States, one method of balancing ethical responsibility, practical economic considerations and respect for the decisions of
other countries is to require that the importing country be made fully
aware of the potential risks of the product.
Critics of a notification policy argue that this approach would require
full publication of the thousands of regulatory actions-bans, suspensions, registrations, judicial injunctions-occurring each year. They argue
that requiring a document from the government of the importing. country
indicating that it had received and considered the information would create masses of paperwork, and would require thousands of additional manhours for processing. 0 Some concede that while this might be feasible in
the United States, it would be prohibitively expensive in the host country, especially in the developing countries who do not have the personnel
to handle enormous amounts of paperwork. 3 ' For example, two years ago
the Ministry for Environment in Nigeria, one of the larger and richer developing countries, consisted of the Minister, one assistant and one secretary."' A high level of scientific and technical expertise would also be necessary to evaluate the risk-benefit trade-offs posed by a possible import.
And even if this step could be accomplished, many governments lack the
procedures and the degree of central control necessary to set and implement standards for safe use.
These arguments are legitimate concerns, but should not act to bar
the establishment of a more restrictive export system. One solution would
be to incorporate into the export policy mechanisms by which the importing country could establish or upgrade its own regulatory system for assessing the risks and benefits of products intended for export.
An alternative solution, one which is used to some extent today, involves the role of international organizations, including the OECD, WHO

requiring full-scale environmental impact statements (EIS) for actions affecting the United
States, the global commons, and Antarctica. The proposal also called for a detailed "Foreign
Environmental Statement" for actions affecting only the environment of one or more foreign
nations. Since the focus of these proposed amendments was international activities actually
conducted by federal agencies, it is unclear whether the export action or inactions of the
FDA, EPA, and the CPSC would come under NEPA's EIS requirements, even if the CEQ
amendments were enacted. Nonetheless, a logical connection does exist between these three
federal agencies and the "effects" of their action relative to the exportation of banned pesticides, drugs, etc. in foreign countries. CEQ preliminary draft regulations are reprinted in
124 CONG. REc. S6513-14 (daily ed. Apr. 27, 1978).
The CEQ proposal met with disfavor in many circles. In response, President Carter and
Senator Adlai Stevenson proposed alternatives, both of which provide for sharp limitations
on the extraterritorial reach of NEPA. For a more indepth discussion of this topic, see Exports and Environmental Injury, note 27 supra.
30. Wash. Post, Feb. 25, 1980, at Al, col. 2.
31. Id.
32. 1978 SUaCOMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 15, at 27.
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and FAQ. s Many of these international agencies presently provide data
banks on substances which are potentially dangerous to health and environment. Thus, the understaffed countries could turn to these organizations in order to make the important risk-benefit analysis. 34 To those
countries with a small regulatory agency, or none at all, the international
body might be used as their "own" regulatory agency away from home.

This would also give these countries the necessary training and expertise
to eventually establish their own systems.
The developing countries which have in the past imported many of
these banned substances are becoming increasingly aware of the potential

hazards posed by certain chemicals and consumer products. The president of Sierra Leone recently turned down an offer of $25 million from a
Colorado firm wanting to export toxic wastes from U.S. factories.3 5 Mexico recently shut down several pesticide (DBCP) factories.36 A physician

in Bangladesh stated that he was "especially outraged at the number of
useless drugs being sold at high prices, and at the fact that infant formula
is being promoted by Western companies as a substitute for more nour'3 7
ishing breast milk.
The result of this seems to be that developing countries, in spite of
their understaffed ministries, will increasingly search for products that
have some indicia of reliability and safety. As a matter of fact, many of

these countries have actually come forward and asked that the United
States should not allow the export of products that are dangerous to man
or the environment. In 1977, Dr. Kiano, Kenya's Minister for Water Development, called for "international action to stop countries being used as
experimental dumping grounds for drugs and chemical products.""

33. See text accompanying note 25 supra. Other international organizations which
could play a role in resolving this important problem are: Global Environmental Monitoring
System (GEMS), the International Referral Service (IRS), the International Register of Potentially Toxic Chemicals (IRPTC), the Codex Alimentarius Commission (the CAC was established in 1962 to implement the Joint Food and Agriculture Organization-World Health
Organization (FAO/WHO) Food Standards Programme), and the International Agency for
Research on Cancer (IARC). This list is not exhaustive but only representative of some of
the more significant international bodies which have the capability of effecting changes with
present exportation problems.
34. This author does not advocate "passing" to international organizations U.S. responsibility for enacting and implementing protective export measures. The goal should be one
of cooperation between exporter, importer, and international bodies able to offer assistance.
Others have expressed more extreme positions:
I am very concerned about the suggestion that we [the United States] should
solve this problem by giving some international organization the responsibility.
I think it is kind of an elegant way of saying we are going to pass the buck...
. I would prefer to see it being done directly by the exporting countries.
Hearings, supra note 1, at 41 (statement of S. Jacob Scherr).
35. Wash. Post, Feb 25, 1980, at Al, col. 2.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Dr. Kiano urged that "unless a product has been fully tested and certified and
widely used in the countries of origin, it should not be used for export." Hearings, supra
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American industry, nevertheless, argues that "[wihat the United
States won't export, West Germany and other countries will. '" Since
many of these countries will remain without export controls, American
industry, under a strict export policy, would face a competitive disadvantage in world markets and might be forced to relocate in areas without
such regulation or countries with more hospitable regulatory surroundings, such as the less-developed countries (LDC's).
This argument-that with increased export regulation U.S. industry
would be at a competitive disadvantage in world markets-assumes that
all importers make decisions based on price alone, and is therefore misplaced. The imposition of regulations may very well enhance the desire
by developing countries for U.S. exporters vis-A-vis other unregulated exporting countries. 0 The argument also ignores the "boomerang effect" of
many of these exported chemicals and pesticides. Nerve-damaging kepone, for example, was manufactured in Virginia for export only and was
sprayed on Guatemalan bananas destined for U.S. markets. 41 Other
chemicals, such as aldrin, dieldrin, ehptachlor, and chlordane-banned
here but made available for export-often come back to haunt this country in the form of cacao from Ecuador, coffee from Costa Rica, and sugar
and tea from India. 4

The argument that U.S. manufacturers might be forced to relocate in
foreign countries (especially in LDC's) if export regulations are increased
is also not persuasive. Many of the products banned here were never originally intended for Third World markets and it is unlikely that these industries would seek to relocate on this basis alone.
Unless those exporting companies derive a substantial percentage of
sales from exports, it is unlikely they will seek to relocate. However, even
assuming there are a sufficient number of relocated industries to cause
concern, there are a number of measures that could be taken to reverse or
reduce relocation. Positive measures might include subsidies or low interest rate loans to pay the costs of meeting new standards.'8 Negative measures might include the "withdrawal of government business or fiscal incentives from the offending firm, the blocking of foreign exchange
transfers to finance new development, or the threat of harsher import
standards." 44 Further obstacles to relocation would be the political and
economic instability of many underdeveloped countries and the fact that
note 1, at 34 (quoted statement of S. Jacob Scherri.
The fifty-eight nation UNEP Governing Council incorporated Dr. Kiano's views into its
decision that "there have been unethical practices concerning the distribution of chemicals,
drugs, cosmetics, and food unfit for human consumption and that there is a need for harmonious cooperation between exporting and importing countries." Id.
39. Wash, Post, Feb. 25, 1980, at Al, col. 2.
40. Alston, supra note 22, at 401. See also Schulberg, supra note 14, at 362.
41. Wash. Post, Feb. 25, 1980, at Al, col. 2.
42. Id.
43. Alston, supra note 22, at 450.
44. Id.
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demanding standards may be enacted after the company has arrived"4'-thus nullifying any real savings.
B. Is There An International Legal Basis for Imposing a Restrictive
Export Policy?
There are no international agreements or treaties which focus directly on the liability of an exporter of domestically banned substances.
In recent years, however, several multilateral arrangements and organizations have arisen which indicate a trend toward stricter international cooperation in world trade and technological development.
As an outgrowth of the 1972 Stockholm Conference on the Human
Environment, the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) was
established to promote international environmental cooperation and to
act as a coordinator of other related agencies and programs.4" One of
UNEP's objectives is to establish a warning system to provide notice to
countries whose environment and human health may be affected by the
export of hazardous substances.4 7 To this end UNEP has established the
International Register of Potentially Toxic Chemicals (IRPTC),4 the
purpose of which is to reduce the health and environmental hazards
presented by chemicals by facilitating universal access to existing scientific and regulatory data."9 The United States was a participant in the
1972 Stockholm Conference and is a member of UNEP.
As a member of such international organizations as FAO, WHO, and
OECD' 0 the United States has supported an international policy which
seeks "to protect the health of consumers and to ensure fair practice in
the trade, [and] to promote coordination of all food standards

...

,

45. Id. at 451. Alston also suggests that development assistance might be withheld from
an industry proposing to relocate in LDC's by organizations such as the World Bank and
the U.S. Agency for International Development (AID), unless appropriate environmental
controls are incorporated into their relocation program.
46. Id. at 411. See also United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (Stockholm, 5-16 June 1972), 1 U.N. GAOR (21st. plen. mtg.), U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 48/14 Rev. 1
(1972), reprinted in 11 Isrr'L LEGAL MAT. 1416 (1972).
47. Schulberg, supra note 14, at 369.
48. Alston, supra note 22, at 422. In practice the IRPTC will be closely linked to two
major components of the UNEP Earthwatch program: the International Referral System
(IRS) and the Global Environmental Monitoring System (GEMS). One of IRPTC's objectives is to register all chemicals that have been objectively assessed to possess either toxic or
potentially toxic properties. But the IRPTC will have to rely on such agencies as WHO,
UNEP, and IARC to effectively assess and evaluate the wide spectrum of data they obtain.
The ultimate burden of evaluating the data, which the IRPTC has prepared, will be on the
using country. Theoretically, the cost of research, duplication of research, and uninformed
decision making can be reduced under the IRPTC program. Unfortunately, communication
and understanding gaps still exist between the information gathered by the IRPTC and the
ill-equipped and untrained officials from many importing countries who desperately need
this information.
49. Id. at 423.
50. See text accompanying note 25 supra.
51. Alston, supra note 22, at 412.
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The OECD, probably the most effective international group to date, has
advocated the "polluter pays" principle 2 and, in cooperation with the
United Nations and the European Economic Community, has been able
to restrict the manufacture and use of certain chemicals in all twenty-four
of the OECD member nations."
In 1975 the United States along with thirty-four other nations signed
the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe (CSCE). Among the general provisions of the Act it is stated that:
The participating States...
[1] consider that their trade in various products should be conducted in such a way as not to cause or threaten to cause serious
injury...
[21 will take measures further to improve conditions for the expansion of contacts between representatives of official bodies, of the different organizations, enterprises, firms and banks concerned with foreign trade, in particular, where useful between sellers and users of
products and services.
[3] reaffirm their interest to achieve the widest possible international
harmonization of standards and technical regulations.

....

The act also puts forth the following objectives on international environmental cooperation:
The participating States ...

[1]

[agree]

to study, with a view to their solution, those environmental

problems which, by their nature, are of a multilateral, bilateral, re-

gional or subregional dimension . . .

52. Id. at 422.
53. Id. at 423. Alston's thesis is that currently there are several institutional barriers to
effective international regulation of toxic chemicals. Some of these are: nonexistent or inefficient testing programs; reluctance of manufacturers and national governments to provide
their own data to international bodies; and the lack of referrable international testing standards which are critical in overcoming the fear and inertia of nations who would rather rely
on their own information. Aiston suggests that four existing international initiatives or programs could significantly improve the results of international regulatory efforts, which in the
past have been piecemeal in their problem-solving approach. Alston seems to believe that
this "piecemeal or categorical" approach has now been abandoned in favor of a comprehensive and cohesive program involving four international organizations: (1) The International
Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC); (2) The International Register of Potentially Toxic
Chemicals (IRPTC); (3) The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD); and (4) The European Economic Community (EEC). Id.
Unfortunately, it is doubtful even this innovative approach will quickly overcome the
fear of inertia that characterizes most nations when asked to rely on an international body
for vital information and support. With the establishment of a consortium of international
bodies one obstacle toward greater international reliance may have been overcome. But the
credibility of international bodies vis &vis national-state reliance will probably not become
functional until there is greater participation in the international consortium by respected
and highly qualified representatives from a majority of the most influential nations.
54. The Helsinki Accords, supra note 20, at 1300, 1301, 1304. [Emphasis added.]
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to increase the effectiveness of national and internationalmea-

sures for the protection of the environment, by the comparison and, if
appropriate, the harmonization of methods of gathering and analyzing
facts, by improving the knowledge of pollution phenomena and rational utilization of natural resources, by the exchange of information
.. . in the field of the environment;
[3] to take the necessary measures to bring environmental policies
closer together and, where appropriate and possible, to harmonize
them;
[4] to encourage, where possible and appropriate, national and international efforts by their interested organizations, enterprises and

firms in the development, production and improvement of equipment
designed for monitoring, protecting, and enhancing the environment. 5
The most logical step the United States could take to bring itself in
line with these international commitments (especially with those sections
italicized above) would be to enact a new export policy - a policy which
would generally monitor U.S. foreign trade through comprehensive notification and certification procedures.
In spite of the implied commitment in these multilateral arrangements, it is not clear whether an international tribunal would hold an
exporting country liable for causing harm to the importing nation (assuming the parties to the suit were also parties to the agreement). Since many
of these arrangements are couched in general terms serving primarily to
promote world peace and "future" cooperation through diplomacy, it is
doubtful that a defendant-exporter would be held liable based on these
arrangements.
From an international law standpoint, these international statements
become increasingly significant in light of several earlier international decisions where two countries were held liable by an international tribunal
for causing harm to another country. In the Trail Smelter Arbitration,"
emission of sulphur dioxide fumes from a private smelting operation in
British Columbia caused harm to timber and crops in Washington State.
An international tribunal held Canada liable under international law for
57
the acts of its nationals.
In The Corfu Channel Case,58 Albania was held liable for the damage
to two British vessels which hit sea mines in Albania's territorial waters,

55. Id. at 1307-08. [Emphasis added.]
56. Trail Smelter Arbitration (United States v. Canada), 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 1911
(1938), id. at 1905 (1941), reprinted in 33 AM. J. INT'L L. 182 (1939) and in 35 Am. J. INT'L
L. 684 (1941).
57. Id.
58. The Corfu Channel Case (United Kingdom v. Albania), [1949] I.C.J. 4, 18. See also
Schulberg, supra note 14, at 371. For a more detailed discussion of state liability for causing
environmental harm to another state, see generally Arbitblit, The Plight of American Citizens Injured by Transboundary River Pollution, 8 ECOLOGY L.Q. 339 (1979); Schneider,
State Responsibility for Environmental Protection and Preservation: Ecological Unities
and a Fragmented World Public Order, 2 YALE. STUD. IN WORLD PUB. ORD. 32 (1975).
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despite the fact that Albania had not placed them there. In this case the
International Court of Justice stated that is is "every State's obligation
not to allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the
rights of other States."" Thus, in both cases liability was imputed to the
state because it knew that its nationals (or others) were engaged in potentially harmful acts. 0
In The Lac Lanoux Arbitrationbetween France and Spain, a distinction was made between activities that have purely domestic implications
for the exporting national and those that have regional or even global
consequences."
These three cases stand for the proposition of international law that
a nation may not use its resources or property or permit the use of its
territory in such a manner as to injure another state. One commentator
has suggested that the logical extension of this norm would be to include
potentially dangerous exports into the class of such activity that can
cause injuries abroad." Ostensibly, if liability were to attach to the exporter of hazardous products which cause harm in the importing country,
then some form of self-imposed restraint (e.g., better export regulations)
would be forthcoming, enforcement mechanisms aside. At a minimum,
there is a basis in international law for establishing a duty to prevent one
country from harming another through "dumping" dangerous substances
on an uninformed or misinformed underdeveloped country.
While the holding in Trail Smelter has been the most frequently
cited basis in customary international law for a state's obligation to prevent extraterritorial injury,3 it does not totally proscribe injury to a
neighbor's property, but requires a balancing of interests." Some argue

59. (19491 I.C.J. at 22.
60. Schulberg, supra note 14, at 370.
61. Lac Lanoux Arbitration (France v. Spain), 12 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 281 (1963) (in
the original French), reprinted in 53 AM. J. INT'L L. 156 (1959) (condensed English
translation).
62. Schulberg, supra note 14, at 371. Schulberg argues that a state's responsibility
should extend "to assisting importing nations to ensure that known dangerous pesticides
being produced in [the exporting country's] factory do not injure the foreign farm worker'or,
the consumers of the agricultural products grown in that neighboring country." Id.
Schulberg's rationale appears to be that if a state can be held responsible for "emissions" from its factories which cause harm to another state, then a state which allows "exports" from factories which also cause harm to another state should also be held liable.
Schulberg suggests that the result of such a holding could be the establishment of a standard imposing a responsibility on producer nations to provide recipient nations with warnings that it is foreseeable that the products they are about to export could cause serious
human and environmental harm. Id.
Under this analysis, products banned or restricted for domestic use in the United States
would automatically require warnings to importing countries, since the foreseeability of
harm would clearly be established by the U.S. determination that such products should be
banned or restricted.
63. Arbitblit, supra note 58, at 362.
64. Id. at 363.
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that a state violates the principle of Trail Smelter when "it avails itself of
its right in an arbitrarymanner in such a way as to inflict upon another
state an injury which cannot be justified by a legitimate consideration of
'6 5
its own advantage."
It is arguable, therefore, that when a state arbitrarily (without giving
proper disclosure or receiving informed consent from the importing country) dumps dangerous products on another and causes injury therein, liability would attach, unless full disclosure was made, since to hold otherwise would impose too great a burden on international trade. A more
precise test would require a balancing of the interests and responsibilities
of the countries involved (as suggested by Trail Smelter), and would involve a consideration of the principle of foreseeability of harm, which applies in a negligence cause of action under U.S. law. Under this theory,
although full disclosure would not necessarily be a complete defense to
liability, it would create a presumption in favor of the exporting country.
Increased export regulation could guarantee full disclosure by exporters
and a freer exchange of information between exporter and importer.
C. Assuming a New Export Policy is Needed, What is the Present Capability of the United States Regulatory System to Monitor and Enforce
Such a Policy?
The regulation of domestic commerce is administered by three agencies: The Food and Drug Administration (FDA), the Consumer Products
Safety Commission (CPSC), and the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA).6 While these agencies have reasonably clear statutory authority

65. Id. For a recent analysis of the legal steps a state might take in preventing environmental injury to itself, see Bilder, The Role of UnilateralState Action In Preventing International Environmental Injury, 14 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 51 (1981).
66. How the FDA, CPSC, and the EPA will manage under the Reagan Administration
is unclear. However, Reagan's antiregulatory campaign statements have proved to be, in the
short time he has held office, more than just rhetoric. Five days before President Carter left
office he issued Executive Order 12264 which sharply restricted the export of products
banned or restricted in the United States. Exec. Order No. 12264, 46 Fed. Reg. 4659 (1981),
reprinted in [1981] 12C U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 11750. On February 17, 1981, President Reagan issued Executive Order 12290 which revoked President Carter's order in its
entirety. Exec. Order No. 12290, 46 Fed. Reg. 12943 (1981), reprinted in [1981] 1 U.S. CoDE
CONG. & AD. NEWS B4.
Reagan's approach has been to reduce both government expenditures and government
regulations. In early May 1981 funding for the CPSC floundered before the Senate Commerce Committee. On May 12, 1981, against the express wishes of the Reagan Administration, the Committee finally decided to fund the CPSC for another two years. Nevertheless,
the CPSC's budget was reduced by 30 percent. Wash. Post, May 31, 1981, at D8, col. 1.
An inadequate budget will severely limit the work an agency can undertake. Domestic
considerations will likely be given priority over export concerns. In September 1981 it was
reported that the Reagan administration was drafting a White House Policy statement
which would ease the way for U.S. companies to export hazardous goods that have been
banned or restricted in this country. The types of products that may be affected range from
highly toxic chemicals such as PCB's and chloroflourocarbons to the banned pesticides
DDT, lindane, and eldrin. Consumer products such as Tris-treated sleepwear may also be-
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to regulate products and substances designed for domestic consumption,
there is substantial ambiguity in their authority over exports. The Department of Commerce has the statutory authority to restrict the exportation of any U.S.-made product if it finds that its exportation would cre-7
ate a domestic shortage, or affect national security or foreign policy.
However, when U.S. foreign policy is involved, the State Department will
usually make the final decision.
The inadequacies of our present ill-defined export policy were
brought to light in October 1977 when the CPSC decided it did not have
the statutory authority to prevent the export of domestically banned
Tris-treated sleepwear.6 8 Prompted by several U.S. Congressmen, an Interagency Working Group on the Exportation of Hazardous Materials
(Group) was formed in May 1978 to review our present export policy. The
Group consisted of representatives of all regulatory agencies as well as the
Departments of State, Agriculture, Commerce, Energy, Justice and the
Treasury. In July 1978, the Group presented its findings at hearings conducted by the Commerce, Consumer and Monetary Affairs Subcommittee
of the Committee of Government Operations. The Subcommittee determined that the lack of export controls was not confined to the CPSC,6 but
extended to the FDA, the EPA, and the Department of Commerce. 0
Under the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA),'7 0 the FDA can regulate certain products in the domestic market. A product removed from
the domestic market can be exported without prior notice to the FDA if it
meets .four criteria:
1. The product is in line with specifications of the foreign purchaser.

come unrestricted for export under this proposed policy.
According to the White House statement, the change in export policy is needed because
current pre-export notification requirements place U.S. exporting companies at a competitive disadvantage relative to foreign exporters. The draft policy would replace the present
system with a broader and more general information and education campaign. Instead of
notifying governments when a banned or restricted product is to be exported, the Reagan
administration would provide "brief summary information" to either foreign governments or
international organizations. Under this proposed policy, notification to foreign governments
could theoretically occur years before the product is actually exported. Such a system would
seriously impede the ability of foreign governments to make an "informed choice."
Thus, the outlook for the enactment of appropriate export legislation under the Reagan
Administration is not favorable. Consequently, Congress must not be easily dissuaded from
the views expressed in the 1978 Subcommittee Report, note 15, supra. Foreign policy objectives alone offer important reasons for pursuing comprehensive export legislation which is
responsible to the needs of the importing country and the United States. Wash. Post, Sept.
9, 1981, at Al, col. 1-3.
67. The Export Administration Act of 1979, 50 U.S.C. §§ 2401-20 (1976 & Supp. 1980).
The Export Administration Act of 1979 has superseded the Export Administration Act of
1969, 50 U.S.C. §§ 2401-13 (1976).
68. 1978 SUBCoMMIrrE REPORT, supra note 15, at 2.

69. Id. In practice the Department of Commerce cannot impose export controls without
a State Department determination that national security or foreign policy considerations
require them.
70. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-92 (1976).
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2. The product is not in conflict with the laws of the importing
country.
3. The product is labeled as intended for export.
4. The product is not sold or offered for sale in domestic commerce.'
The effect of these requirements has been at most superficial. Presently the FDA cannot compel exporters to inform the FDA of an intent to
export banned products. As a result, information as to what exactly has
been exported by the United States is extremely scarce. 2 Notwithstanding statutory requirements, the FDA's policy with respect to some drugs
varies with conditions. The FDA can prevent the export of new drugs
which are unlicensed for domestic use, but it cannot prevent the export
of domestically licensed drugs "even if they are adulterated, misbranded,
out-of-date, or otherwise unfit for human consumption in the United
States." ' s
The FDCA also does not require the FDA to notify a foreign government of an FDA ban on drugs, food additives, or medical devices.74 Ironically, the FDA has a policy of notifying foreign officials of health hazard
problems after shipment of adulterated products to that country. FDA
Commissioner Donald Kennedy testified at the Subcommittee Hearings
that the current state of the FDA export policy was "so internally incon75
sistent that it is very hard to know what the policy is.")
In 1978 legislation was proposed to bring the FDA out of the export
maze. Under the Drug Regulation Reform Act of 19787s two new standards would apply to all drugs:
1. Approved drugs in compliance with domestic requirements could
be freely exported.
2. Unapproved drugs or approved drugs not in compliance with domestic requirements could be exported only after an export permit
had been approved by the Secretary."
An export permit would be granted only if the exporter demonstrates
that the foreign buyer had assented to its importation after being informed of its legal status here and the basis for that status. 78 Scientific

71. 1978 SUBCOMmiTTE REPORT, supra note 15, at 18.
72. For a discussion of what is presently known about the extent of exports regulated
by the FDA, see id. at 11.
73. Id. at 18. A product regulated by the FDA is not considered adulterated or misbranded under the FDC Act, Section 801(d), if it (1) meets the specifications of the foreign
purchaser, (2) is not in conflict with the laws of the country to which it is intended for
export, and (3) is labeled that it is intended for export, and (4) is not sold or offered for sale
in domestic commerce. A product which meets these criteria can be legally exported. Id.
74. 21 U.S.C. §§ 355-59 (1976). See also 1978 SuacoMmirr REPORT, supra note 15, at
18-20.
75. Hearings, supra note 1, at 150.
76. H.R. 11611. Discussed in 1978 SUBCOMMITr REPORT, supra note 15, at 19. See also
Hearings, supra note 1, at 92 (statements of Dr. Donald Kennedy, FDA Commissioner).
77. 1978 SUBCOMMrrEE REPORT, supra note 15, at 19.
78. Id.
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and other technical data would also be made available to the importing
government. Finally, "where such export would be contrary to public
health,"' the Secretary of the FDA could unilaterally deny the permit.
Under this proposed legislation the peculiar nature of one country's
needs could be assessed against the risk of the product. A drug that could
pose dangers in one country might provide "overriding benefits in another
country."80 Commissioner Donald Kennedy also testified at the Subcommittee Hearings that this permit procedure would give added protection
against the export of adulterated and misbranded old drugs and would
make needed drug products more available to foreign countries.81
The problem with this proposed legislation is that it would result in
an increase in the export of nonapproved drugs to developing countries
which do not have the technical and scientific sophistication to make
judgments regarding drug safety. Since a complete ban on unapproved
drugs would not take into consideration the peculiar needs of the importing country, the Subcommittee suggested an alternative: "Instead of allowing the export of all drugs if certain conditions are met, [the draft
legislation] could be changed to prohibit all nonapproved drug exports
except those meeting certain reasonably strict criteria."8' One commentator has stated that this change would in effect shift the presumption from
allowing a permit before meeting the criteria to prohibiting a permit until meeting the criteria.83 In this way only a limited but vitally necessary
amount of nonapproved drugs will enter foreign markets.
The CPSC administers the Federal Hazardous Substances Act
(FHSA)," the Flammable Fabrics Act (FFA),85 and the Consumer Products Safety Act (CPSA)." The purpose of these acts is to allow the CPSC
to promulgate safety standards and to ban unreasonably dangerous products from the domestic market. Prior to the Tris-sleepwear incident,

79. Id.
80. Schulberg, supra note 14, at 341.
81. 1978 SUBcoMMIrrE REPORT, supra note 15, at 19.
82. Id. at 20.
83. Schulberg, supra note 14, at 341.
84. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1261-74 (1976). Section 1273 was amended in 1978 to require U.S.
exporters to file a notification statement with the CPSC. This section is almost identical to
the notice requirement under section 1202(c) of Flammable Fabrics Act (FFA) discussed
infra note 85.
85. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1191-1204 (1976). Under a 1978 amendment, products intended for
export are exempt from the provisions of this statute, unless the CPSC determines that
exportation would present an unreasonablerisk to persons residing in the United States. 15
U.S.C. §§ 2401-20 (1976 & Supp. .1980). U.S. exporters of materials or products that fail to
conform to an applicable flammability standard or regulation must file a statement with the
CPSC not less than 30 days before exporting the product to the foreign country. The statement must include date of shipment, destination, type of product, and quantity to be
shipped. Notification to the importing country is not required under this new amendment.
Moreover, the CPSC may, for good cause shown, exempt the U.S. exporter from this re-.
quirement. 15 U.S.C. § 1202(c) (1976 & Supp. 1980).
86. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-81 (1976).
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products that had not been introduced into domestic commerce could be
exported without restriction, regardless of the degree of hazard they
presented. Consequently, the Commission has asked Congress to amend
the present statutory authority so that it could prohibit exports of hazardous products. Under these proposed amendments, U.S. exporters
would be required to notify the CPSC of an intended export of a hazardous product not in conformity with the CPSA, and the Commission would
in turn be required to notify foreign governments of the product's status
(within the United States). As long as the exported product was labeled
in accordance with the laws of the importing country, the product would
be exempt from export restrictions.
The Subcommittee also recommended that CPSC authorization
should contain (1) a certification requirement by the importing country,
(2) a labeling requirement by U.S. exporters, and (3) a grant of Commission discretion to ban outright the export of hazardous products.8

7

It is

not clear from these proposed changes that the foreign purchaser will be
given adequate notice upon which to make a sound judgment about the
product's acceptability (i.e. risks versus benefits). Because developing
countries either have no labeling standards or inadequate standards,
these amendments do not ensure that labeling or quality control of products intended for export will be carried out properly.
The EPA, which implements the Toxic Substances Control Act
(TSCA)" and the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act'
(FIFRA),19 can temporarily suspend, ban outright, or limit the use of certain chemicals and pesticides from the U.S. market. Under section 12 of
TSCA any chemical substance intended for export and so labeled is exempt from TSCA's regulatory provisions. The only other requirements
relating to export are that the U.S. exporter notify the EPA of an intent
to export and that the EPA notify the importing government of the availability of the data about the chemical.
At present regulatory action under TSCA has been limited to two
chemicals and neither has been completely banned from exportation."
Thus, without specific rules for implementing section 12 of the Act, the
notification requirement remains ineffective.
While TSCA's export provisions have not received the attention they
should have, the investigation of FIFRA-due mainly to the potential
worldwide danger pesticide use now poses-has been different. Originally
enacted in 1947, FIFRA was amended in 1972 to require the EPA to notify foreign governments and international organizations through state
department channels of pesticides which were cancelled or suspended
87.
88.
89.
90.
n.78.

1978 SuBcoMmiar
REPORT, supra note 15, at 17.
15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-29 (1976).
7 U.S.C. §§ 13 6 -136y (1976 & Supp. 1980).
1978 SuaCOMMira REPORT, supra note 15, at 14; Schulberg, supra note 14, at 345
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from use in the United States. 91 The amendment also exempted from further U.S. regulation pesticides which conformed to the specifications of
foreign purchasers and were intended solely for export."2
Like the notification provisions of TSCA, the notification provision
of FIFRA (section 17) has rarely been invoked by the EPA. In the past,
the EPA limited its notification to foreign governments to only those situations where the EPA had taken final action on a substance, where all
pesticide use had been cancelled, or where the cancellation was initiated
by the EPA.98
The drawbacks of this practice were several. First, the EPA rarely
considered its actions as final and gave no definition of a final action;
second, if a pesticide was cancelled for a particular use or several uses,
notification would still not be required as long as at least a sirfgle domestic use remained; third, U.S. exporters would initiate their own cancellation of a pesticide from domestic use-usually when cancellation by EPA
was imminent-and thereby avoid the notification requirement. Ironically, many regulatory actions were taken by the EPA, having both national and international significance." In short, the ability or desire of the
EPA to control adverse impacts of exported pesticides was a nullity.
In an attempt to correct these shortcomings, Congress amended
FIFRA in 1978 by enacting the Federal Pesticide Act of 1978." Among
the major changes were:
1. statutory labeling and misbranding requirements on exported pesticide products;
2. registration of establishments producing pesticides solely for export (previously exempted from this requirement);
3. a requirement that all pesticides that are not registered, including
those whose approval have previously been denied or revoked by
EPA, be marked accordingly;
91. The State Department acts primarily as a conduit between the federal regulatory
agency and the importing country. The agency notifies the State Department of actions it
has taken with respect to specific substances or products. The State Department then relays
this information to the U.S. embassy in the importing country who in turn relays the information to the appropriate ministry or official. Unfortunately, this process has not worked.
Either the federal agency fails to notify the State Department or the U.S. embassy fails to
relay the information to the proper official. Often State Department notices are delayed and
rarely-if ever-are they considered for their content. See Hearings,iupra note 1, at 239-55
(statements of Sharon E. Ahmad and Rauer H. Meyer).
92. 1978 SuBcoMMrrrEs REPORT, supra note 15, at 14.
93. Id. at 21.
94. Schulberg, supra note 14, at 352. Schulberg states that after the Kepone incident in
1976, "the Senate Subcommittee on Agricultural Research and General Legislation concluded that manufacturing plants producing pesticides and related chemicals exclusively for
export did not have to comply with the Insecticide Act's requirement of registration of pesticide manufacturing establishments." Id. Thus, prior to the 1978 amendment, it was legal
to export any pesticide without notifying the EPA. Hearings,supra note 1, at 69-70 (statement of S. Jacob Scherr).
95. 7 U.S.C. § 136(o) (1976 & Supp. 1980).
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4. requirements that the foreign purchaser of an unregistered pesticide sign, prior to export, a statement acknowledging that the pesticide cannot be sold in the United States;
5. a copy of the acknowledgment statement (in No. 4 above) would
be transmitted to the appropriate official of the importing country;
and finally,
6. a requirement that the EPA provide upon request of a foreign
government all information related to the cancellation or suspension
of a pesticide registration."
Certainly these amendments have improved the ability of the EPA to
control pesticide exports. However, they stop short of requiring certification by an appropriate foreign official that the information about the status of a particular product has been conveyed. Without this certification
element, there is no guarantee that proper notification will be carried out.
In this same vein, none of the amendments require U.S. pesticide
manufacturers who export both cancelled and unregistered pesticides to
inform EPA of the country of destination of the proposed export. Such
information would expedite notification to those countries.
Although these regulatory agencies lack the necessary authority to
properly restrict the export of banned produdts, under the Export Administration Act of 1969 the Department of Commerce has the authority
and general responsibility of controlling U.S. exports when they significantly affect U.S. foreign policy. 97 Despite this statutory authority the
Department of Commerce has been virtually powerless whenever the issue of foreign policy has arisen, deferring instead to the State Department. Unfortunately the State Department has advocated a "hands off"
policy with respect to the export of banned products, arguing that foreign
governments are in the best position to establish their own standards of
public health and safety and that our only role is to provide them with
certain information when U.S. regulatory bodies require it. 9 This position ignores three important considerations. First, most developing countries do not have the means or know-how to establish health and safety
standards which will adequately protect their citizens. Second, although
the State Department has acted as a conduit for passing information to
foreign governments in limited situations, even this limited procedure has
proved ineffective because the notices sent by the regulatory agencies
through the State Department often are not received by the importing
country. Third, present regulations calling for notification to foreign governments only require notification in limited situations. A wide range of
hazardous substances still remain untouched by any controls.
Evidently the only avenue for change with respect to our export system must come in the form of congressional legislation and it must focus
on our present regulatory agencies-the EPA, the CPSC, and the FDA.

96. Id.
97. 50 U.S.C. §§ 2401-20 (1976 & Supp. 1980). See also note 67 supra.

98. 1978

SuBcoMMIrrEE REPORT,

supra note 1, at 24.
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This legislation should address itself to current regulatory provisions

which should:
(1) provide the agencies with adequate authority to develop information on the nature, extent, and value of exports of banned products
and the country of destination;
(2) provide for adequate notification to foreign governments;
(3) give regulatory agencies adequate flexibility, and discretion in
dealing with the export of banned products;
(4) provide adequate protection to U.S. citizens from reimportation
of banned products; and
(5) provide adequate labeling of banned products which are
exported.
D. How Would
Countries?

a Restrictive Export Policy Affect

Developing

Essential to a comprehensive export policy are the requirements of
notification of product hazards by the exporter and certification (or acknowledgement) of notification by the importing government. But some
critics argue that stricter U.S. standards of notification and certification
would be an unacceptable intrusion on the sovereignty of foreign nations,
and might be interpreted as absolving American exporters of liability for
their products.19
From the standpoint of international law, foreign nations have no
sovereign right to purchase goods (in the absence of a contract or treaty)
produced in the United States. As one commentator has stated, "Every
country is ultimately entitled to determine within the limits of international morality, what it will provide and to whom. The use of this prerogative is entirely legitimate .... "100
The Subcommittee's position on this point was that an acknowledgement of notification by the foreign government regarding products about
to enter its country is not an approval of exportation, but merely a "return receipt requested" for information delivered.101 In response to the
State Department's position that "no country. . . should establish itself
as the arbiter of other's health and safety standards," the Subcommittee
believed that the United States was not trying to impose its health and
safety judgments on other nations, but simply trying to assume some of
the responsibility for the products it introduces into the world's market.10 2 The notification and certification requirements do not dictate what

99. Id. See also Hearings,supra note 1, at 240. (Statement of Sharon E. Ahmad, Director, Office of International Trade, Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, Department of
State).
100. Alston, supra note 22, at 455 n.272.
101. 1978 SutcoMMrrrTz

REPORT, supra note 15, at 24.

102. Id. Ironically, a representative of the State Department admitted there might even
be instances where some drugs, produced in the United States, should be banned from export consideration altogether. Hearings,supra note 1, at 250-51 (Statements of Rep. Benjamin S. Rosenthal, Chairman, Commerce, Consumer, and Monetary Affairs Subcommittee
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is or is not safe for the foreign country's own citizens. On the contrary,
these procedures would be imposed out of deference to the importing
country so that foreign governments can be aware of what products we
have determined to be deleterious or dangerous.
There is a separate justification for these requirements: When pertinent information on a product is exchanged between the exporting and
importing country, as it would be under the notification-certification procedures, guidelines to prevent indiscriminate product-use could be established, thereby providing a measure of safety for U.S. citizens who might
otherwise be affected through reimportation.
In addition, the interpretation that these requirements would absolve
the exporter of liability has no foundation in international law. However,
the "consent" nature of the certification requirement makes this concern-liability of the exporter-legitimate. This could be resolved by enacting legislation so that the certification requirements would not absolve
the contract liability between buyer and seller.'
Probably the most critical question a new export policy must answer
is whether it could accommodate those underdeveloped countries who are
financially and technologically unable on their own to make a risk-benefit
analysis of a potential import. Should our export policy prevent exportation when the importing country cannot make its own assessment? The
answer should be "no," for the following reason. When the product is
such that the risk of non-use in the importing country is greater than the
risk of use, the United States should permit its exportation. Scientific assessment of the risks and benefits could be conducted by the appropriate
U.S. regulatory agency in conjunction with officials of the importing country to ensure that a well-informed choice is made.'"
One of the most publicized cases which illustrates why this approach
could work (without any "backlash" from foreign officials) involved the
drug Depo-Provera. Depo-Provera, a long-term injectable contraceptive,
had been banned for domestic use in the United States. 05 Several Third
World leaders claimed that the drug would help reduce their over population problems and their associated illnesses and mortality rates. They argued that not only was this drug vitally needed in their countries, but
that, unlike the United States, they had no effective alternatives. Hence,
and Sharon E. Ahmad, Director, Office of International Trade, Bureau of Economics and
Business Affairs, Department of State).
103. Id. The Subcommittee further stated that the total number of export transactions
which would come under these proposed procedural requirements would be small. The Subcommittee believed that if losses did occur as a result of such controls, the impact on our
balance of payments would be minimal. Id. at 25.
104. See note 105, infra and accompanying text.
105. Id. at 25. Another important example involved the antibiotic chloromycetin.
Chloromycetin was severely restricted in the United States to a few serious diseases. The
FDA had determined that its risks greatly outweighed its benefits. However, in some less
developed countries the drug is widely used to combat a variety of serious diseases or infections which are uncommon in the United States. Hearings, supra note 1, at 5.
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the United States was faced with a dilemma: Should it permit the drug to
be exported, risking the harm it might cause to foreign consumers, or
should it deny exportation and risk diplomatic tension with the Third
World. The present regulatory system was without the tools to deal with
the highly volatile nature of this situation. Thus, the affair became primarily a matter of foreign policy with the export regulatory system taking a
back seat.
This case presents a clear illustration of the inadequacies of U.S. export policy. A more finely tuned and comprehensive policy would make
sound decisions possible on matters similar to the Depo-Provera case,
without the United States being forced into a diplomatic corner.
E.

What Reforms in the Export System Should be Instituted?

To ensure the greatest protection to foreign and U.S. consumers alike
without unfairly infringing upon the rights of U.S. exporters and of each
nation to establish its own national health and environmental standards,
the Subcommittee made the following proposals for a uniform export policy. New legislation should:
(1) provide all regulatory agencies with the necessary statutory authority to (a) determine whether a product banned from the domestic
market should be allowed to be exported; (b) collect data regarding
items banned or not in compliance with agency standards; (c) require
that exports be conspicuously and correctly labeled; and (d) totally
prohibit the export of a product that it has reason to believe would be
dangerous to any consumer;
(2) require the regulatory agencies to notify foreign governments of
all actions taken and all proposed actions which may affect the importing country;
(3) provide a means for giving technical assistance and training to
officials of developing countries to enable them to make sound regulatory decisions;
(4) require that foreign governments certify that they have received
notification and fully understand the status of the export product.'06
To guarantee that these proposed changes are carried out, the following measures should also be taken. First, there should be a permit system
in which prior to the export of a domestically banned product the exporter must obtain a permit from the appropriate federal agency.107 This
permit application should require the exporter to provide the agency with
necessary product data upon which the agency could make a unilateral
decision as to whether or not the product should be exported. This information would also be forwarded to the foreign government for their use in
determining whether to import such a product. The granting of a permit
would be contingent on the agency receiving certification from the appropriate foreign office, 'indicating that it received the necessary information

106. 1978 SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 15, at 24.
107. Schulberg, supra note 14, at 380.
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and approved of the importation. Second, the agency should be required
to notify the foreign government of "every action taken to revoke, amend,
or limit a permit, or registration to sell or use a product on the United
States market."1 8 Third, all exporters should be required to meet domestic quality control and labeling standards. This measure would attempt to
eliminate deceptive practices. '0 9 Fourth, Congress should commit the
United States to comply with internationally accepted standards, as long
as they do not conflict with U.S. standards. 1 Finally, the State Department should assist the three regulatory agencies in developing a working
relationship with their foreign counterparts.'
Alternatively, U.S. exports of domestically restricted or banned products to countries without the technical know-how to ascertain the health
and safety uses involved (the cost-benefit analysis) could be regulated
separately. Before exports would be permitted, the U.S. manufacturer
would be required to perform a cost-benefit analysis in the importing
country. The financial costs could be borne either by the U.S. company
alone, or by the U.S. company and the importing country. U.S. regulatory
bodies could provide the structure within which these negotiations and
analyses could take place-thereby ensuring the vitality of U.S. foreign
policy objectives with respect to the particular country and region.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Advanced industrial nations may be able to recognize and exclude
dangerous substances from importation, but less sophisticated governments lack the necessary knowledge and administrative capability to protect their citizens and environments. A tenuous equilibrium exists between the minimal concern presently shown by the United States and the
possibility of becoming the world's environmental policeman. Finding the
right balance will not be an easy task. An increasing number of developing countries object to becoming the dumping grounds for the industrialized world. Others object almost as loudly to having the developed
world's standards imposed upon them.
It is not clear whether the solution lies in the development of international standards. But it will be many years, if ever, before effective
world standards emerge. In the interim the United States must accept
some responsibility for its exports by establishing standards which are
compatible with its own and yet comport with the needs of developing
countries. Legislation on this issue must begin now. Lethal pesticides,
toxic chemicals, and dangerous drugs all have a way of returning to haunt
their makers. Mixed in the volatile brew of international relations, they
can become explosive.

108.
109.
110.
111.

Id. at 381.
Id. at 382.
Id.
Id. at 379.
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ICJ Advisory Opinion: 1951 WHO-Egypt
Treaty
This Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice' is only
the third one ever requested by a United Nations specialized agency, and
the only one ever requested by the World Health Organization.2 The
Opinion is also notable due to its subject matter: it dealt with a novel
attempt to use the transfer of a specialized agency office as a means of
political retaliation. The underlying political differences had no connection with the objectives and goals of the agency. Members of the Eastern
Mediterranean Region of the World Health Organization (WHO) sought
to transfer the site of the Eastern Mediterranean Regional Office

(EMRO) from Alexandria, Egypt, to Amman, Jordan, as a consequence of
their dissatisfaction over the Camp David Accords that Egypt had signed
with Israel. The Court held that regardless of any particular treaty provision, EMRO could be transferred, but that the WHO was required to give
Egypt reasonable notice of the transfer, and to negotiate in good faith so
that the transfer would be effected with minimal damage to Egypt's
interests.3

1. Advisory Opinion on the Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 Between
the World Health Organization and Egypt, [1980] I.C.J. reprinted in 20 INT'L LEGAL
MAT.

88 (1980).

2. The other two specialized agencies requesting advisory opinions were the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization and the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization. See [1979-1980] I.C.J.Y.B. 42-3, 46-50, 116.
3. The substantive part of the opinion read as follows:
a. their mutual obligations under those legal principles and rules place a duty
both upon the Organization and upon Egypt to consult together in good faith
as to the question under what conditions and in accordance with what modalities a transfer of the Regional Office from Egypt may be effected;
b. in the event of its being finally decided that the Regional Office shall be
transferred from Egypt, their mutual obligations of cooperation place a duty
upon the Organization and Egypt to consult together and to negotiate regarding the various arrangements needed to effect the transfer from the existing to
the new site in an orderly manner and with a minimum of prejudice to the
work of the Organization and the interests of Egypt;
c. their .mutual obligations under those legal principles and rules place a duty
upon the party which wishes to effect the transfer to give a reasonable period
of notice to the other party for the termination of the existing situation regarding the Regional Office at Alexandria, taking due account of all the practical
arrangements needed to effect an orderly and equitable transfer of the Office
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This development examines the background of the Opinion as well as
the Opinion itself. The analysis will center on the Opinion's relationship
to current international legal jurisprudence, and its possible precedential
value with respect to future requests for advisory opinions and future political retaliaton by specialized agencies. The conclusion will discuss the
Opinion's impact on international law and the Court's jurisprudence.
The background of the Opinion dates really to the time of the founding of the United Nations itself. The Constitution of the WHO was approved in 1946." Under Chapter XI, the WHO sought to integrate existing
regional health organizations as it was establishing its own regions and
regonal offices. The Alexandria Sanitary Bureau had already acquired a
regional role,5 and neighboring states agreed that Alexandria should be
kept as the WHO's regional office. 6 After substantial preliminary negotiations between the WHO and the government of Egypt,' EMRO started
functioning at Alexandria on 1 May 1949.8 As of that date, however,
Egypt had not yet signed the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies, nor had it concluded the treaty with the
WHO concerning its operations in Egypt. 9 Egypt granted temporary exemption from customs duties, and the treaty was finally concluded on 25
March 1951.10
The next significant development occured in 1954. Due to the hostility between Israel and its neighbors in the Eastern Mediterranean Region, EMRO formed two subcommittees, one of which-Subcommittee
A-excluded Israel from its membership."
The EMRO status quo remained fairly constant until the Camp
David Accords involving Egypt, Israel, and the United States. The other
regional members reacted with hostility to the Accords. 2 On 7 May 1979,

to its new site.
20 INT'L LEGAL MAT. at 100.
4. CONSTITUTION OF THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, opened for signature July 22,

1946, 62 Stat. 2679, T.I.A.S. No. 1808, 14 U.N.T.S. 185.
5. A Board of Health was established in 1831 to prevent the spread of disease by pilgrims going to or returning from Mecca. It became more international in character after
that. The Egyptian government became more active in the Sanitary Bureau starting in 1938,
but it remained internationally oriented. 20 INT'L LEGAL MAT. at 90-91.
6. A number of resolutions were passed by Arab quarantine experts calling for a regional organization of the WHO, with the regional office at Alexandria. Id. at 91.
7. The government of Egypt was involved, as was WHO and various of its divisions,
and the United Nations itself. Id. at 91-92.
8. Id. at 93.
9. Id.
10. Id. This temporary exemption was the only WHO-Egypt understanding governing
the EMRO until the 1951 Treaty was signed.
11. Id. at 94. Hostility had existed prior to 1954, of course, but prior to that time it had
not been deemed necessary to form two separate subcommittees.
12. Judge Morozov, in his dissent, argued that the Camp David Accords were the root
cause of the hostility. The case involved a much larger political issue than WHO internal
politics, he said, and the Court should have declined to give an opinion. Id. at 147.
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five EMRO members asked the Regional Director for a meeting to discuss
the transfer of EMRO from Egypt to another state. 8 Subcommittee A
passed a resolution to transfer the EMRO on 12 May 1979.'1
On 28 May 1979, the Thirty-Second World Health Assembly convened. The Assembly also adopted a resolution to transfer EMRO.' 5 The
Executive Board of WHO then established a working group to study the
matter. In its report, submitted on 16 January 1980, this group declared
that it could not ascertain whether section 37 of the 1951 Treaty was applicable.'" The report mentioned the possibility of requesting the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion on the matter."
In May 1980, Subcommittee A voted nineteen to one to transfer
EMRO to Amman as soon as possible.' 8 During subsequent World Health
Assembly discussions, two significant views arose. One was that transfers
of regional offices should not be used as a political weapon."9 The other,
raised by the members of Subcommittee A, was that the members of a
region should be allowed to transfer their regonal office if they so
desired. 0
The Assembly asked the Legal Division of the WHO whether section
37 of the 1951 Treaty applied. 21 Like the working group, the Legal Division could not decide. Finally, on 21 May 1980, the Thirty-Third
World
22
Health Assembly requested an advisory opinion of the Court.

13. Id. at 94.
14. Id. Egypt was not represented at the meeting during which the resolution was approved, and had tried to have the meeting postponed.
15. Due to allegations by Egypt, the Assembly established a committee to study the
matter. This committee felt that more study was needed and recommended that the Executive Board undertake such a study. Id.
16. Id. For the text of section 37 of the Treaty, see note 25 infra.
17. 20 INT'L LEGAL MAT. at 95.
18. Id. Egypt cast the opposing vote.
19. In his separate opinion, Judge Gros maintained that since the WHO Constitution
contained only health-oriented objectives, such a transfer for political reasons was essentially an ultra vires act. He would have preferred that the Court address that point. Id. at
102-03.
20. These members also argued that retaining EMRO in Alexandria would be harmful
to the WHO's work. Perhaps to fulfill that prediction, the majority of the members notified
the WHO's District-General three days later that they would "boycott" EMRO as long as it
remained in Alexandria. Id. at 95.
21. Id.
22. The Assembly posed two questions to the Court:
1. Are the negotiations and notice provisions of section 37 of the Agreement of
25 March 1951 between the World Health Organization and Egypt applicable
in the event that either party to the Agreefnent wishes to have the Regional
Office transferred from the territory of Egypt?
2. If so, what would be the legal responsibilities of both the World Health Organization and Egypt, with regard to the Regional Office in Alexandria, during
the two year period between notice and termination of the Agreement?
Id. at 89.
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The Court delivered its opinion on 20 December 1980.11 After

describing the historical and procedural background of the case, the
Court briefly discussed its discretion in deciding to issue an advisory
opinion on the matter."2
The arguments before the Court dealt with the applicability of the
1951 Treaty in general, and with section 37 in particular."5 Nevertheless,
in order to address the true legal problems at issue, the Court rephrased
the questions it had been presented with in the following manner: "What
are the legal principles and rules applicable to the questions under what
conditions and in accordance with what modalities a transfer of the Re-

gional Office from Egypt may be effected?"ss The Court maintained that
it might be misleading to address only the questions asked. 27 In the past,
the Court had occasionally rephrased questions, as had its predecessor,
the Permanent Court of International Justice."2
23. Id. at 88.
24. Id. at 95. The Court did not feel it should refrain from issuing an Advisory Opinion
merely because "political considerations" played a major role in the underlying situation.
Indeed, the Court felt that that could increase the need for an agency to obtain an advisory
opinion. Judge Morozov disagreed, note 12 supra.
25. Regarding the 1951 Treaty in general, one argument maintains that EMRO was
established on 1 July 1949. The 1951 Treaty was a separate and later transaction, which
merely provided for privileges, immunities, and facilities. The opposing view was that the
1951 Treaty was the culmination of a series of steps, and that EMRO was not finally established until the conclusion of the Treaty. Id. at 97.
Even assuming the 1951 Treaty were applicable, there was still disagreement as to
whether section 37 applied to a transfer of EMRO. Section 37 reads as follows:
Section 37. The present Agreement may be revised at the request of either
party. In this event the two parties shall consult each other concerning the
modifications to be made in its provisions. If the negotiations do not result in
an understanding within one year, the present Agreement may be denounced
by either party giving two year's notice.
One viewpoint holds that "revise," by its law dictionary definition, means a modification but not a termination or denunciation. Thus, since section 37 concerned revisions, the
entire section, including the two year notice, was inapplicable. Since there is no provision
for outright denunciation (as opposed to denunciation after unsuccessful attempts at revision), article 56 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, and its counterpart in the
International Law Commission's draft articles on treaties between states and international
organizations, is applicable. Essentially, article 56 and its counterpart allow for denunciations if the right is implied, but require 12 months notice. Id. at 97; see [1979] Y.B. INr'L L.
COMM'N

146.

The opposing viewpoint holds that "revise" really has a broader meaning, which includes termination. The travaux preparatoiresof section 37 in the ILO-Swiss negotiations,
for example, provide for denunciation after consultation and negotiation. That section is the
same as that in the 1951 Treaty, and thus the same rationale applies. See 20 INr'L LEGAL
MAT. 88, 97-98 (1980).
26. Although the Court articulated the arguments, as summarized above, it did not find
any of them controlling, and rephrased the question before discussing the arguments in detail. Id. at 96.
27. Id.
28. Id. Cf. Note, 22 H~Av. INT'L L.J. 429, 435 (1981), which distinguishes the cases cited
by the Court in that it nevertheless limited its holding to the questions asked, which it did
not do in the present Opinion.
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Regarding the right of specialized agencies to transfer offices, the
Opinion recognized that right, but stressed that it was not completely unfettered.2 9 Specialized agencies are still subject to rules of international
law. The establishment of EMRO at Alexandria (whether deemed created
by the 1951 Treaty or not) did establish a "contractual legal regime"80
between the WHO and Egypt. The essence of this regime was that both
parties owe the other a duty to cooperate and act in good faith.81 The
exact obligations would depend on the exact circumstances, but in a situation as complex and involved as transferring a regional office, the Court
indicated that the obligations would be substantial.32 Considering sources
other than the 1951 Treaty, the Court went on to state that before transferring EMRO, the transferring party would be required to give the other
party reasonable notice, and to have a reasonable regard for the interests
of the other party.8 8 To that end, both parties must cooperate to ensure
an orderly transfer. 8 '
The Court determined that there was a duty to provide "a reasonable
period of notice," 9 but it did not define how long "reasonable" was. What
was reasonable would depend on the circumstances in a given case, keeping in mind the "paramount consideration" of promoting "the objectives

29. Like states, international organizations are subject to international law in general,
as well as to their own constitutions and to international agreements. 20 INT'L LEGAL MAT.
at 95-96.
30. Id. at 98.
31. In addition to the existence of EMRO in Alexandria, both parties had mutual duties due to the fact Egypt was a member of WHO. Id.
32. While the practical problems to be resolved were the concern of WHO and Egypt,
their magnitude could have a bearing on the legal conditions under which EMRO could be
transferred. Id.
33. Id.
34. The substantive Court opinion concerning the duties and obligations under international legal principles came in three parts:
In the first place, those obligations place a duty both upon the Organization
and upon Egypt to consult together in good faith as to the question under
what conditions and in accordance with what modalities a transfer of the Regional Office from Egypt may be effected.
Second, in the event of its being finally decided that the Regional Office shall
be transferred from Egypt, their mutual obligations of cooperation place a duty
upon the Organization and Egypt to consult together and to negotiate regarding the various arrangements needed to effect the transfer from the existing to
the new site in an orderly manner and with a minimum or prejudice to the
work of the Organization and the interests of Egypt.
Third, those mutual obligations place a duty upon the party which wishes to
effect the transfer to give a reasonable period of notice to the other party for
the termination of the existing situation regarding the Regional Office at Alexandria, taking due account of all the practical arrangements needed to effect
the orderly and equitable transfer of the Office to its new site.
The ultimate purpose of the obligations was to transfer with a minimum of harm to the
interests of either party. Id. at 99-100. Paragraph 49 became the actual holding.
35. Id., part three of the substantive opinion.
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and purposes of the Organization as expressed in its Constitution."" Although the Court did not specify a period of time it would consider rea-

sonable (leaving that up to the parties), 7 it did mention section 3738 and
article 56 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, as adopted
by the International Law Commission's draft articles on treaties concerning international organizations.3'
The Court did not "make" any new law. Nor was any of its reasoning
without precedent. Nevertheless, the fact that the opinion was requested,

the fact that the Court went beyond the question asked, and the holding
itself, all have significance for the future.
With respect to the fact that the advisory opinion was requested by a
United Nations specialized agency, that in itself is significant. " Certainly,

a total of three such requests in the Court's history cannot be considered
a "trend." Yet this Opinion could induce other specialized agencies to
seek advisory opinions. Several agencies could face pressure to engage in
retaliatory moves having nothing to do with their specialized function. " '
If an agency could not decide what course of action were proper, it could

request an advisory opinion. Such a request also serves to diffuse the illfeeling a disappointed party may feel towards the agency. Regardless of
the nature of the question, or the party posing it, a greater use of the

advisory opinion function could make the Court a more viable and insti-

36. Id. But cf. the opinion of Judge Gros, supra note 19, where he argues a transfer for
political reasons is outside the WHO's Constitution.
37. 20 INT'L LEGAL MAT. at 100.
38. Section 37 provided for two years notice. The text is at note 25 supra.
39. This provided for 12 months notice. The article is summarized at note 25 supra.
40. This was only the third opinion ever requested by a specialized agency. Note 2
supra.
41. Five other specialized agencies are organized along the lines of WHO, with diverse
regional offices in areas with actual and potential serious political differences. If WHO were
allowed to be used as an instrument of political retaliation, several of the other agencies
might also face pressure to transfer regional offices for retaliatory purposes.
For example, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the International Development Association share offices in Nairobi, Abidjan, and Bangkok. However, fear of losing loans and contributions would probably inhibit any retaliatory moves.
The International Labor Organization (whose own Headquarters Treaty was discussed in
the WHO Opinion) has regional offices in Addis Ababa, Bangkok, and Lima, as well as 40
local offices. It could face regional partisan pressure for a move of its offices. The International Finance Corporation has regional offices in Manila, Nairobi, and Abidjan. It, too,
could face political pressure for office transfers.
Two other agencies, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) have regional offices in Cairo. FAO also has regional offices in Accra, Bangkok, Rome, and Santiago. ICAO's other offices are in Dakar,
Paris, Bangkok, Mexico City, and Lima. The WHO itself has other regional offices in Brazzaville, Washington, New Delhi, Copenhagen, and Manila. Several of the locations might
have received pressure for transfers had this opinion made retaliatory transfers easier.
The other U.N. specialized agencies have one principle office, without regional offices
over different parts of the world. See (1977] U.N.Y.B. 1067 et seq., which describes each of
the specialized agencies and their organization.
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tutionalized source of international law.4"
As the Court pointed out, not rephrasing a question posed could result in a misleading answer. However, as one commentator has pointed
out, such rephrasing may inhibit agencies or parties from requesting advisory opinions; they may not want to risk an answer to a question they did
not ask.'
The substantive portion of the opinion may prevent a pernicious manipulation of the specialized agencies as instruments of political retaliation to the detriment of their specialized functions. This manipulation
could be even more harmful when employed in short; term disagreements."' At the same time, however, the Court recognized the rights of
members to run the agencies, and their particular regional offices, as they
see fit, taking into account the rights of other parties. A drawback, however, is the use of other means of political retaliation."
The abstractness of the substantive portion of the opinion offers a
general standard to be considered, regardless of specific treaty provisions
in a given situation." The Court realistically states, for example, that reasonable notice is a function of the particular circumstances. Yet, it could
have perhaps suggested a more concrete period of notice i4 since the two
parties are unlikely to agree on the matter. Along similar lines, there is
the problem of defining good faith. Again, the two parties are unlikely to
agree.
This opinion has another potential problem in that the actual implementing parties did not request the Opinion.'" The WHO, as an institution, may be willing to follow the opinion, but the individual members of
the Eastern Mediterranean Region may not be. Egypt also may not be
willing to follow the Opinion, especially if it perceives that its neighbors
are not doing so.
42. While more advisory opinion activity may give the Court a greater role in formulating international law, the Court runs the risk of losing its status and prestige if it becomes
too active. M. POMERANCE, THE ADVISORY FUNCTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT IN THE
LEAGUE AND UNITED NATIONS ERAS (1973); Lalonde, The Death of the Eastern Carelia Doctrine: Has Compulsory JurisdictionArrived in the World Court?, 37 U. TORONTO FAC. L.

REV. 80, 99 (1979).
43. Note, supra note 28, at 435-36.
44. While the Israel-Arab hostility is long term, the Egypt-Arab rift is not necessarily
so.

45. In the Egypt-Arab rift, for example, the Economic Commission for Western Asia
recommended admitting Egypt and the Palestine Liberation Organization in 1977. However,
it later voted to suspend Egypt. [1977] U.N.Y.B. 604-07; W. LANDSKRON, ANNUAL REVIgw OF
UNITED NATIONS AFFAIRS 181 (1981).
46. Such provisions include the duties of good faith, cooperation, and, if appropriate,
notice. 20 INT'L LEGAL MAT. at 100, also listed in note 34 supra.
47. A compromise period of 18 months, for example, might have been workable and
appropriate. That would have split the difference between the periods in section 37 of the
WHO-Egypt Treaty and article 56 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
48. The WHO requested the opinion, not Egypt nor the EMRO members desiring the
transfer.
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Both the future of the specialized agencies and of the Court itself are
likely to be affected by this Opinion. Specialized agencies have the prerogative to transfer their offices, but they must consult in good faith and
give reasonable notice to the host state. 49 This duty exists regardless of
particular host agreement provisions. This should serve to stifle manipulation of regional offices as a means of political retaliation for extrinsic
differences. Moreover, other specialized agencies may now be more willing
to seek advisory opinions from the Court. By rephrasing the questions
asked, the Court was able to give a more complete answer, but it risks
deterring requests for opinions by agencies wary of rephrasing. In the
long run, this opinion should turn out to be a positive step for both the
Court and the specialized agencies, and ultimately for all member states
of the United Nations.
Charles A. Wintermeyer, Jr.

Risk of Loss in Shipping Under the
Hamburg Rules
INTRODUCTION

In March 1978, the United Nations held a conference on the carriage
of goods by sea in Hamburg, West Germany. Twenty-seven conference
participants signed the resulting convention.1 The rules embodied in the
convention dramatically changed and simplified the basic legal relationships between cargo shipper and cargo carrier in regard to allocation of
risk.
The purpose of this development is to examine the new rules of maritime shipping in light of historical experience and the contemporary environment. Inquiry will be made into the theoretical soundness and anticipated effects of the new rules. The prevailing pragmatic question of
whether the rules can expect widespread ratification will also be entertained. First, a brief examination will be made of the rules traditionally
49. See 20

INT'L LEGAL MAT. at

99-100.

1. The United Nations Convention on the Carriage of Goods by Sea, Mar. 31, 1978,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 89, reprinted in 27 AM. J. Comp. L. 421 (1979). The convention was
signed by Austria, Brazil, Chile, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, the Federal Republic of Germany, Finland, France, Ghana, the Holy See, Hungary, Madagascar, Mexico,
Norway, Pakistan, Panama, the Philippines, Portugal, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore,
Sweden, the United States, Venezuela, and Zaire.
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likely to be affected by this Opinion. Specialized agencies have the prerogative to transfer their offices, but they must consult in good faith and
give reasonable notice to the host state. 49 This duty exists regardless of
particular host agreement provisions. This should serve to stifle manipulation of regional offices as a means of political retaliation for extrinsic
differences. Moreover, other specialized agencies may now be more willing
to seek advisory opinions from the Court. By rephrasing the questions
asked, the Court was able to give a more complete answer, but it risks
deterring requests for opinions by agencies wary of rephrasing. In the
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Charles A. Wintermeyer, Jr.

Risk of Loss in Shipping Under the
Hamburg Rules
INTRODUCTION

In March 1978, the United Nations held a conference on the carriage
of goods by sea in Hamburg, West Germany. Twenty-seven conference
participants signed the resulting convention.1 The rules embodied in the
convention dramatically changed and simplified the basic legal relationships between cargo shipper and cargo carrier in regard to allocation of
risk.
The purpose of this development is to examine the new rules of maritime shipping in light of historical experience and the contemporary environment. Inquiry will be made into the theoretical soundness and anticipated effects of the new rules. The prevailing pragmatic question of
whether the rules can expect widespread ratification will also be entertained. First, a brief examination will be made of the rules traditionally
49. See 20
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1. The United Nations Convention on the Carriage of Goods by Sea, Mar. 31, 1978,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 89, reprinted in 27 AM. J. Comp. L. 421 (1979). The convention was
signed by Austria, Brazil, Chile, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, the Federal Republic of Germany, Finland, France, Ghana, the Holy See, Hungary, Madagascar, Mexico,
Norway, Pakistan, Panama, the Philippines, Portugal, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore,
Sweden, the United States, Venezuela, and Zaire.
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used in the international community for allocation of risk between shipper and carrier. Second, the contents of the new legislation will be explained. The third section will introduce and critique criticisms and support for the Hamburg rules. Finally, the prospects for ratification of the
new rules will be considered and a conclusion will be offered.
THE HAGUE RULES

The Brussels Convention of 1924 enacted the Hague rules, which
have been used for allocation of risk in shipping for the past half century.
The provisions of the Hague rules which bear the major burden of allocating the risk of cargo loss and damage between the cargo owner and
carrier are found in articles III and IV of the Brussels Convention. Article
III sets out the carrier's obligation to cargo:
1. The carrier shall be bound before and at the beginning of the voyage to exercise due diligence to:
a) Make the ship seaworthy
b) Properly man, equip and supply the ship
c) Make the holds, refrigerating and cold chambers and all other
parts of the ship in which the goods are carried, appropriate and
safe for their reception, carriage and preservation.
2. Subject to the provisions of Article IV, the carrier shall properly
and carefully load, handle, stow, carry, keep, care for, and discharge
the goods carried.

Under article III, a fault standard appears to be applicable. The carrier is to have a duty of due care towards the goods and to be liable for
any damage to the goods resulting from his negligence. Article IV modifies this obligation, however, and dilutes the standard, setting out seventeen exceptions to the articles regarding obligations.8
2. International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to Bills of
Lading, Aug. 25, 1924, 51 Stat. 233 (1924) T.S. No. 931, 120 L.N.T.S. 155 [hereinafter cited
as the Brussels Convention].
3. Id. Article 4(2) provides:
Neither the carrier nor the ship shall be responsible for the loss or damage
arising or resulting from:
(a) act, neglect, or default of the master, mariner, pilot or servants of the carrier in the navigation of the ship;
(b) fire, unless caused by the actual fault or privity of the carrier;
(c) perils, danger, and accidents of the sea or other navigable waters;
(d) act of God;
(e) act of war;
(f) act of public enemies;
(g) arrest or restraint of princes, rulers, or people, or seizure under legal
process;
(h) quarantine restrictions;
(i) act or omission of the shipper or owner of the goods, his representative or
agent;
(j) strikes or lockouts or stoppage or restraint of labor from whatever cause,
whether partial or general: provided, that nothing herein contained shall be
contrued to relieve a carrier from responsibility for the carrier's own act;
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The article IV exceptions in effect create two standards of liability in
addition to the article III fault standard. 4 First is the standard of nonliability for damage caused by errors in navigation, damage to deck cargo, or
damage to goods caused by delay in delivery of goods. Another liability
standard in the Hague rules is that imposed when there is damage to
cargo by fire. Article IV (2)(b), the fire provision, bases liability only on
the fault of certain employees.5 The provision states that the carrier shall
not be responsible for loss or damage resulting from "fire, unless caused
by the actual fault or privity of the carrier."' The prominent feature of
this exception is that it is necessary to distinguish between the negligence
of the shipowner and that of its employees. The negligence of the carrier's
employees will not necessarily result in carrier liability; the fault must be
that of the carrier itself. In the case of corporate shipowners, some decisions have held that only the negligence of a senior employee or officer
will result in carrier liability, not merely that of a mere employee or
agent. 7 The variations from the fault standard in the Hague rules make
them inconsistent, contradictory, and confusing to shippers, carriers, and
courts.*
The burden of proof under the Hague rules has also been problematic for the international maritime community. As was pointed out by
Chief Justice Beste, in the nineteenth century decision of Riley v. Horne,'
the events relevant to the liability of the carrier occur for the most part
out of the presence of the shipper, under circumstances making it exceedingly difficult for the shipper to ascertain or approve the cause of damage
or loss. Because of this, rules on the burden of proof are of utmost

(k) riots and civil commotions;
(1) saving or attempting to save life or property at sea;
(m) wastage in bulk or weight or any other loss or damage arising from the
inherent defect, quality, or vice of the goods;
(n) insufficiency of packing:
(o) insufficiency or inadequacy of marks;
(p) latent defects not discoverable by due diligence; and
(q) any other cause arising without the actual fault and privity of the carrier
and without the fault or neglect of the agents or servants of the carrier, but the
burden of proof shall be on the person claiming the benefit of this exception to
show that neither the actual fault or privity of the carrier nor the fault nor
neglect of the carrier contributed to the loss or damage.
4. Approaches to Basic Policy Decisions Concerning Allocation of Risks Between the
Cargo Owner and Carrier, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/63/Add. 1; reprinted in [19721 UNCITRAL
Y.B. 287, 288, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/Ser. A [hereinafter cited as U.N. study].
5. Id. at 289.
6. Brussels Convention, supra note 2, art. 4 (2)(b).
7. U.N. study, supra note 4, at 289. For a sample case, see Earle & Stoddart v. Wilson
Line, 287 U.S. 420, 425 (1932). See also GiLMORE & BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 698
(1957).
8. For other works on the inconsistencies of the Hague rules, see Villareal, Carrier's
Responsibility to Cargo and Cargo's to Carrier,45 Tm.. L. REv. 770, 774 (1971); Chrispeals,
Revision of the Hague Rules, 7 J. WORLD TRADE L. 252, 256 (1973).
9. [1828] Bing. 217.
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importance.
In countries using the Hague rules, the burden of proof is in some
situations placed on the carrier and in others on the shipper. Exactly
how the burden is allocated is often a matter of some uncertainty, and
may vary among countries.'0 Generally, the shipper must make out a
prima facie case of damage by proving delivery of the goods to the carrier
and receipt in bad order or nonreceipt.1 This done, the burden passes to
the carrier, who must show that it falls within an article IV exception." If
it manages to do so, the burden may shift back to the shipper.1 3 Once the
burden is back on the shipper he must prove that the carrier's fault or
negligence caused the exempted act or concurred with the exempted act
in producing loss or damage." The burden varies, however, from exception to exception and from country to country. For example, where there
are concurrent causes of damage, one of which is accepted and the other
not, courts are not in general agreement on the burden of proof.16
The Hague rules of the Brussels Convention of 1924 were widely
signed and ratified, and are still the standard for the world. During the
mid-1960's, the United Nations Conference for Trade and Development
(UNCTAD) determined that changes in the rules were necessary, and the
initiative for the drafting of the Hamburg rules was undertaken.
THE HAMBURG RULES

After ten years of discussion, debate, compromise, and painstaking
drafting, the combined efforts of UNCTAD and the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) produced the final
form of the draft submitted to the Hamburg conference in March 1978.
The final form of the liability standard reads as follows:
The carrier is liable for loss resulting from loss or damage to the
goods, as well as from delay in delivery, if the occurrence which
caused the loss, damage, or delay took place while the goods were in
his charge as defined in Article 4, unless the carrier proves that he, his
servants and agents took all measures that could reasonably be required to avoid the occurrence and its consequences."
The approach adopted by the drafters was heavily influenced by the
other international conventions. Article XVII (1) of the Convention on
the Contract for the International Carriage of Goods by Road (CMR)
would hold a carrier liable for all loss or damage occuring to goods in

10. See U.N. study, supra note 4, at 289.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 291.
16. United Nations Convention on the Carriage of Goods by Sea, supra note 1, art. 5,
para. 1.
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their charge." This provision is essentially the same as the first part of
the draft rules and neither is significantly different from the counterpart
provision of the other two international cargo conventions: the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air (Warsaw Convention)18 and the International Convention
Concerning the Carriage of Goods by Rail (CIM)."9
The second part of the first section changes the standard to a liability for fault section, since if the carrier can prove that it was not his negligence that caused the loss, he is not liable. This too is closely modeled
after the other conventions. The Warsaw convention of 1929 states that
the carrier is not liable if "he and his agents have taken all necessary
measures to avoid the damages or that it was impossible for him or them
to take such measures."' 0 The CIM convention (rail) states that the carrier is not liable if the loss or damage resulted "through circumstances
which the . . . [carrier] . . . could not avoid and the consequences of
which it was unable to prevent."'1 The wording of the CMR convention is
almost identical of that of the CIM convention." Also important to note
is the general rule under all three conventions that the carrier bears the
burden of proof. This in effect makes the carrier strictly liable for unexplained loss since he will be unable to meet the burden of proof.
The drafting committee felt that adapting the system of one of the
three conventions might facilitate the making of contracts for combined
transport operations in the preparation of uniform rules applicable to
such contracts. The committee pointed out that under the existing regimes, attempts at unification of the rules of liability encounter serious
difficulties because of the differences of liability rules for the different
modes of carriage.'8 It was believed that to the extent that the liability
rules regarding carriage of goods would be brought close to the rules of
other types of carriage, these problems would be alleviated.' 4 A provision
was also added to the Hamburg rule to oppose liability for damage to the
goods caused by delay in delivery. The 1924 Brussels Convention contained no provision addressing this issue; case law on the subject was conflicting and in most jurisdictions the problem had not been resolved ei17. Convention on the Contract for the International Carriage of Goods by Road, done
at Geneva, May 19, 1956, entered into force July 2, 1961, 399 U.N.T.S. 189, 204 [hereinafter
cited as CMR].
18. Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage
by Air, done at Warsaw, Oct. 12, 1929, 137 L.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter cited as Warsaw
Convention].
19. International Convention Concerning the Carriage of Goods by Rail, done at Berne,
Oct. 25, 1952, entered into force Mar. 1, 1956, 241 U.N.T.S. 357 [hereinafter cited as CIM].
20. Warsaw Convention, supra note 18, art. 20, para. 1.
21. CIM, supra note 19, art. 27, para. 2.
22. CMR, supra note 17, art. 17, para. 2.
23. Working Paper by the Secretariat, Annex 1 to the Report of the Working Group on
International Legislation on Shipping in the Fourth (Special) Session, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9,
annex; reprinted in [1973] UNCITRAL Y.B. 146, 155, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/Ser. A.
24. Id.
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ther by court decisions or legislation.25
ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE OF THE HAMBURG RULES

A.

Criticism of the Hamburg Rules

A major criticism leveled against the Hamburg rules is that by changing the language of the standard from "due diligence" in the Hague rules
to that which is used in the other transport conventions-"liable for loss
.. .unless [he]. ..proves that he took all measures which could be rea6
sonable required . .. "-clarity and predictability is being sacrificed.2 It
is argued that had the "due diligence" language of the Hague rules been
retained, the benefit of existing case law construing the standard and
clarifying its application could have been retained.2 As the rules presently stand, the meaning of the standard is vague and ambiguous.
This criticism fails to consider that due to the similarity between the
standard in the Hamburg rules and the other transport conventions, the
courts might analogize and apply decisions clarifying and construing the
standards of the other transport conventions to the Hamburg rules. Specific duties might be slightly different owing to the peculiarities of the
different modes of transportation. But the general nature of the duty of
care owed could easily be analogized.
Another criticism frequently made is that the Hamburg rules will increase total transportation costs.' 8 It is alleged that cargo insurance rates
will decrease to a considerably lesser extent than the increase in the rates
for carrier liability insurance, because of the cost of recovery actions
against the carrier or his liability insurer and the legal uncertainty resulting from the allocation of risk between carriers and cargo interests." As
was pointed out by one delegate in the working group, s' these increases in
transportation costs were feared with the enactment of the other transportation conventions, yet the increased costs never materialize. Also, it
has been pointed out that the insurance companies are competitive and
should be able to redistribute the risk among themselves without a signif31
icant increase in costs.

25. See Report of the Working Group on International Legislation on the Work of its
Sixth Session, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/88; reprinted in [1974] UNCITRAL Y.B. 113, 115, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.9/Ser. A.
26. Hellawell, Allocation of Risk Between Cargo Owner and Carrier,27 AM. J. Comp. L.
357, 359 (1979).
27. Id.
28. Report of the Secretary-General: Analysis of Comments by Governments and International Organizations on the Draft Convention on the Carriage of Goods by Sea, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.9/110; reprinted in [1976] UNCITRAL Y.B. 263, 272, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/Ser. A [hereinafter cited as Report of the Secretary-General].
29. Id.
30. Report of the Working Group on International Legislation on Shipping on the
Work of its Fourth (Special) Session, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9 (1974); reprinted in [1973] UNCITRAL Y.B. 137, 140, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/Ser. A.
31. Id.
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A related criticism is that the shipper is in effect obligated to take
out insurance coverage through additional liability insurance taken out by
the carrier, the cost of which would be passed to the shipper in a higher
freight charge. 2 It is argued that it would be preferable if the shipper
could decide whether to take out cargo insurance, how much coverage, at
what cost, and from which cargo insurer.8"
In answer to this charge, it may again be contended that no overall
increase in the cost of freight will attend the new rule since the carrier's
cargo insurance premiums will go down proportionately with the increase
in the carriers personal injury insurance. Furthermore, the argument that
the shipper should be free to decide whether or not to insure the goods
and for how much is weak; seldom if ever would a shipper insure goods
for less or more than their value.
The fire clause in the Hamburg rules has also been a source of criticism since it places the burden on the shipper to prove the cause of loss
in case of fire damage to the goods. This burden would be difficult for a
shipper to sustain since he normally would not be in a position to witness
the negligence at the time of its occurrence, and servants of the carrier
would be adversarial and probably of little help in determining the cause
of the loss. This criticism of the rules is valid, and little can be offered to
justify it other than that it was offered as a concession in a compromise
between two factions of the working group. One group sought to keep
exceptions to carrier liability for both fire and negligence in navigation;
the other wanted to abolish both.Y In the compromise, the exception for
negligence in navigation was eliminated, but the burden was placed on
35
the shipper to establish any negligence of the carrier in loss due to fire.
A final criticism of the Hamburg rules is that they do not take into
account the special conditions of carriage of goods by sea, that shipowners
are without continuous effect control over the captain, crew, and others
serving the ship." With communication as well developed and effective as
it is today, this argument would be no more convincing than for transportation of goods by rail, air, or road. Moreover, for an agency relationship
to be found in our law, it is not necessary for the principal to observe and
sanction every action of the agent. It is merely necessary that there be the
7
element of right to control the actions of the agent in the relationship.

32. Report of the Secretary-General, supra note 28, at 273.
33. Id.
34. Report of the Working Group on International Legislation on Shipping on the
Work of its Fourth (Special) Session, supra note 30, at 141.
35. Id.
36. Report of the Secretary-General, supra note 28, at 271.
37. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, Sec. 1, states: "(1) Agency is the fiduciary relation which results from the manifestation of consent by one person to another that the other
shall act on his behalf and subject to his control, and consent by the other to so act."

1981
B.

DEVELOPMENTS

Support for the Hamburg Rules

One of the strongest selling points of the present form of the convention is that the rules will simplify contracts and will apply to more than
one mode of transportation. Likewise, they should facilitate the eventual
formulation of a uniform multimodal transport convention. The rules
take into account the technological advances of shipping and navigation
and communication. Shipping by sea is not as perilous as it was at the
time of the passage of the Hague rules, and a higher standard of care
should be expected of carriers.
The carrier bears the risk of loss following from its own negligence
under the rules, and in cases where he will not be able to meet the burden
of proof, such as in unexplained losses, he will be liable without fault.
There will be more incentive for a higher standard care in navigation and
handling of goods. Finally, in the words of Hellawell:
The stringent standard of a strict liability would not be acceptable
today. The 1978 convention is therefore about the best compromise
one could reasonably expect. There is substantial improvement over
the Brussels Convention in that it simplifies and almost unifies the
rules on burden of proof and eliminates the multiple exceptions of the
Brussels Convention, especially the exception for navigation and management of the ship."
PROSPECTS FOR RATIFICATION OF THE HAMBURG RULES
A valid point that has been raised is that if the rules are not widely
ratified there will be forum shopping in current disputes concerning jurisdiction and applicable law. 89 Carriers might try to limit the recourse of
the shipper to a particular jurisdiction where the Hamburg rules are not
in effect. Thus, an important question concerns the outlook for widespread adoption of the rules. According to the U.S. Department of State,
of the original twenty-seven signatories and the six countries that have
subsequently acceeded to the agreement, only Egypt has ratified the convention.'0 From this information, the prognosis appears bleak, but as is
well known, legislative wheels turn slowly. The U.S. Senate has not yet
even been presented with the rules for discussion, and this is likely the
case in other countries as well.
A survey of official reaction to the Hamburg rules reveals that several
countries complained of possible increases in freight rates." A few countries, such as Finland, pointed out that the rules will create more need for
personal injury (liability) insurance for carriers and less need for cargo
insurance for shippers, thereby injuring the cargo industry and benefit38. Hellawell, supra note 26, at 367.
39. This information was obtained during a phone call to the State Department on
March 24, 1981. Department officials advised that delays in ratification of such conventions
are not at all unusual.
40. Report of the Secretary-General, supra note 28, at 272.
41. Id. at 271.
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ting the personal injury industry.42 Nations such as Finland do not have a
personal injury industry; in fact, that industry is concentrated in a few
maritime countries.4 3 Some maritime nations such as the Netherlands argued that removing the exceptions for error navigation would not cause
carriers to be more careful of their handling of cargo, as the danger of loss
or damage to the carriers' own property was already a sufficient
44
deterrent.
The vast majority of countries, however, found the convention "an
acceptable and workable compromise that takes into account the interest
of both shippers and carriers and technological advances in the carriage
of goods by sea."'45 This view appears to promise eventual widespread acceptance and ratification.
CONCLUSION

The Hague rules and predecessor codes were designed at a time when
shipping was a more perilous venture, when it was felt that carrier liability had to be limited in view of these perils and of the special nature of
ocean transport. Widespread disenchangement with the complexity, inconsistency, and inequities of the Hague rules provided the impetus for
the drafting of the Hamburg rules. Technological advances in shipping
made the "perils of the sea" and "special nature of ocean transport" arguments no longer viable for limiting carrier liability.
Economic and pragmatic considerations, however, prohibited the imposition of a strict liability standard; rather, a fault standard was preferred by the drafters of the Hamburg rules. A standard based on that of
other comparable conventions was adopted because of the potential for
facilitating multimodal contracts and because of the anticipation of a
multimodal transport convention in the future. The simplification, uniformity, and greater equity of risk distribution in the new rules are substantial improvements over the old rules, and despite some of the criticism of the rules, there are indications that they will eventually be widely
ratified.
David K. Schollenberger

42. Id.
43. Id. at 273.
44. Id. at 271. For an extended study of the comments of different governments and a
compilation of the data, see Report of the Secretary-General, supra note 28, at 263-98.
45. Report of the Secretary-General, supra note 28, at 271.
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The Settlement Claims Case: Dames &
Moore v. Regan
The recent Supreme Court ruling in Dames & Moore v. Regan' could
turn out to be a landmark in international law." The Justices of the Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision fashioned a narrow ruling closely
tied to the extraordinary events in Iran. The Court agreed that the President had the power to nullify judicial attachments, to order the transfer
of Iranian assets out of the country, and to rule that private claims by
American companies be settled by an international arbitration tribunal
rather than by American courts. The Court determined that the President's actions were fully within the parameters of the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977 (IEEPA).3 The importance of
this decision lies not only in its legal significance but in the political context in which it arose. The "Hostage Crisis" was the most sensitive issue
in the last Presidential election, yet few dared to criticize the President's
handling of it. The Supreme Court had an opportunity to make a political
quantum leap, but delicately avoided opening the Pandora's box and addressed only the legal issues presented to it.
On November 14, 1979, in response to the taking of American citizens as hostages at the U.S. embassy in Tehran, President Carter declared a national emergency pursuant to the IEEPA and blocked the removal or transfer of all Iranian property subject to the jurisdiction of the
-United States. 4 The Treasury Department then issued implementing regulations which invalidated any attachment of property obtained without
a license or authorization from the Secretary of the Treasury." Subse-

1. 49 U.S.L.W. 4969 (1981).
2. See Busiszss WEEK, July 20, 1981, at 62.
3.. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701 et seq. (Supp. I1 1979). Section 1702 (a)(1) provides in part:
At the times and to the extent specified in section 1701 of this title, the President may, under such regulations as he may prescribe, by means of instructions, licenses, or otherwise(A) investigate, regulate, or prohibit(i) any transactions in foreign exchange,
(ii) transfers or credit or payments between, by, through, or to any
banking institution, to the extent that such transfers or payments involve any interest of any foreign country or a national thereof.
(iii) the importing or exporting of currency or securities; and
(B) investigate, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent or prohibit, any acquisition, holding, withholding, use, transfer, withdrawal, transportation, importation or exportation of or dealing in, or exercising any right,
power or privilege with respect to, or transactions involving, any property in
which any foreign country or a national thereof has any interest; by any person, or with respect to any property subject to the jurisdiction of the United

States.
4. Exec. Order No. 12,170, 3 C.F.R 457 (1980), reprinted in 50 U.S.C.A. § 1701
(notes)(Supp. 1981).
5. 31 C.F.R. §§ 535.201, 535.203(a), 535.310, 535,502 (1980).
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quently, the Secretary granted a general license authorizing judicial proceedings, including prejudgment attachments against Iran, with the exception of the "entry of any judgment or of any decree or order of similar
or analagous effect. . .. "
On December 19, 1979, Dames & Moore, the petitioner, filed suit in
the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California against the
Government of Iran, the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), and
several Iranian banks, alleging that it was owed $3.7 billion for services
performed pursuant to a contract with AEOI.7 The district court issued
orders of attachment against the property of the defendants, and property of certain bank defendants was then attached to secure any future
judgment which later could be entered against them. On January 20,
1981, the American hostages were released pursuant to an agreement entered into the day before between the United States and Iran. This agreement was embodied in two declarations of the Government of Algeria: the
Declaration of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria, and the
Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic
of Algeria Concerning the Settlement of Claims by the Government of the
Islamic Republic of Iran.'
Under the terms of the Agreement, the United States is obligated to:
"terminate all legal proceedings in United States courts involving claims
of United States persons and institutions against Iran and its state enterprises, nullify all attachments and judgments obtained therein, prohibit
all further litigation based on such claims and bring about the termination of such claims through binding arbitration." The Agreement also
called for the establishment of an Iran-United States Claims Tribunal 0
to arbitrate all claims not settled within six months of the date of the
Agreement. The proceedings before the Tribunal will be subject to the
Arbitration Rules of the United Nations Commission on International
Trade Law (UNCITRAL) 1 except where modified by the Claims Settlement Agreement. Awards of the Claims Tribunal are to be "final and
binding" and "enforceable" in the courts of any nations. Additionally, the
Agreement required that all Iranian property then in the United States

6. 31 C.F.R, 535.504(a)-(b)(1) (1980).
7. Brief for Petitioner at 3, Dames & Moore v. Regan, 49 U.S.L.W. 4969, 4971 (1981).
8. Iran-United States: Settlement of the Hostage Crisis, reported in 21 INT'L LEGAL
MAT. 224 (1981).
9. 21 INT'L LEGAL MAT. at 227 (1981).
10. The tribunal has jurisdiction under the terms of the Agreement to decide claims of
U.S. nationals against Iran that arise out of (1) debts, (2) contracts, (3) expropriations, or
(4) other measures affecting property rights. Claims which are barred include those that
arise out of events occurring before January 19, 1981, and concerning: (1) the seizure of the
hostages in Iran; (2) their subsequent detention; (3) injury to U.S. property or property of
U.S. nationals within the U.S. Embassy in Iran after November 3, 1979; and (4) injury to
U.S. nationals or their property "as a result of popular movements in the course of the
Islamic revolution in Iran which were not an act of the Government of Iran." 49 U.S.L.W. at
2636. See also BUSINESS WEEK, May 4, 1981, at 58.
11. 46 Fed. Reg. 19,893 (1981).
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be transferred back to Iran. One billion dollars of these assets were transferred into a "security account" to be used for the payment of awards
made by the Claims Tribunal. Nearly eight billion dollars of the remaining unfrozen assets were transferred to a bank account in England in the
name of the Banque Centrale D'Alg~rie pending the safe release of the
American hostages. A total of about $3.7 billion were transferred to the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York to pay outstanding syndicated bank
loans. Another $1.4 billion went into an escrow account to pay outstanding loans as to which amounts may still be in dispute. The excess of the
assets in the escrow account was then transferred to Bank Markazi Iran."
On April 28, 1981, petitioner filed suit for declaratory and injunctive
relief against the United States and the Secretary of the Treasury, seeking to prevent enforcement of the Executive orders and Treasury Department regulations implementing the Agreement with Iran in a way that
would adversely affect its actions against the Iranian defendants."3 Petitioner alleged that these Executive orders and regulations were unconstitutional to the extent that they affect its final judgment against the Government of Iran and AEOI. The district court denied petitioner's motion
for a preliminary injunction and dismissed the complaint for failure to
state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The court, however, entered an injunction pending appeal preventing the federal government
from requiring the transfer of Iranian property that is subject to any writ
of attachment, garnishment, judgment, levy, or lien issued by any court in
favor of petitioner."' Upon granting certiorari before judgment, the Supreme Court of the United States held:
1. The President was authorized to nullify the attachments and order
the transfer of Iranian assets by the provision of the IEEPA 50 U.S.C.
§ 1702(a)(1)(B), which empowers the President to 'compel,' 'nullify,'
or 'prohibit' any 'transfer' with respect to, or transactions involving,
any property subject to the jurisdiction of the United States in which
any foreign country has any interest.
2. On the basis of the inferences to be drawn from the character of the
legislation, such as the IEEPA and the Hostage Act which Congress
has enacted in the area of the President's authority to deal with international crises, and from the history of congressional acquiescence in
executive claims settlement, the President was authorized to suspend
claims pursuant to the Executive Order in question here.
3. The possibility of the President's actions with respect to the suspension of the claims may effect a taking of a petitioner's property in
violation of the Fifth Amendment in the absence of just compensation, makes ripe for adjudication the question whether petitioner will
have a remedy at law in the Court of Claims. And there is no jurisdic12. TIME, June 1, 1981, at 37.
13. Dames & Moore v. Regan, No. 81-2064 (C.D. Cal. 1981) (complaint).
14. Id. (order of May 28, 1981).
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tional obstacle to an appropriate action in that court under the Tucker Act. 15
The President's power in the area of foreign policy was challenged in
Goldwater v. Carter," where the Supreme Court was presented with the
constitutional issue regarding the proper procedure for treaty termination. In Goldwater, the President's actions terminating the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954 with the Republic of China 7 without the advice or
consent of the Senate was challenged. Although the Court declined to
rule on the constitutional question presented to it and merely vacated the
prior judgment, the result was that the President was not precluded from
unilaterally terminating the Treaty. 6 While not expressly ruling on the
issue presented to it, the Supreme Court tipped the delicate balance of
power in favor of the Executive, when it found that it was politically expedient to do so. 19
It has been argued that the President has certain authority with respect to the disposition of foreign assets pursuant to IEEPA, 0 but the
issue in dispute is the nature and extent of the powers the President possesses under that Act. In Dames & Moore, the Supreme Court relied on
two recent appellate court cases which addressed the same issue. In Chas.
T. Main Int'l Inc. v. Khuzestan Water & Power Authority,' the Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit entered an order approving attachment of
Iranian assets on trustee process, and entered a temporary restraining order preventing the Iranian defendants from "selling, assigning . . . or in
any way disposing of any of the assets located in the United States." The
court remarked: "The language of IEEPA is sweeping and unqualified. It
provides broadly that the President may void or nullify the 'exercising
[by any person] any right, power or privilege with respect to . . .any
property in which any foreign country has any interest ... ",2
In American Int'l Group, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran,23 the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia similarly remarked:
The Presidential revocation of the license be issued permitting
prejudgment restraints upon Iranian assets is an action that falls
within the plain language of the IEEPA. In vacating the attachments,
he acted to nullify and void ... any exercising any right, power, or
privilege with respect to ... any property in which any foreign country ... has any interest ... by any person ... subject to the juris-

15. 49 U.S.L.W. at 4970. See also Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1976).
16. 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
17. Mutual Defense Treaty, Dec. 2, 1954, United States-Republic of China, 6 U.S.T.
433, T.I.A.S. No. 3178.
18. 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
19. See Note, Treaty Termination and the Separation of Powers: The Constitutional
Controversy Continues In Goldwater v. Carter, 9 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 239 (1980).
20. See, e.g., WAsH. PosT, June 25, 1981, at A25, col. 1.
21. 651 F.2d 800 (1981).
22. Id. at 807.
23. No. 80-1779, 80-1891 (D.C. Cir. June 5, 1981).
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diction of the United States." '
The Supreme Court rejected the petitioner's argument that the enactment of the IEEPA in 1977 limited the President's emergency powers.2 5 The Court stated that the operative provisions of section 1702 of

the IEEPA "basically parallels" section 5(b)(1) of the Trading With the
Enemy Act (TWEA) from which the language of the IEEPA is directly
drawn.2 6 Therefore, within certain limitations, the President
has the same
2
blocking powers under IEEPA as under the TWEA. '
In drafting the IEEPA, Congress observed that the TWEA had become "essentially an unlimited grant of authority for the President to ex-

ercise at his discretion, broad powers in both the domestic and international economic arena, without Congressional review."'18 Congress thus
determined that such extreme wartime powers were inappropriate in

peacetime emergencies. The IEEPA's legislative sponsor noted that
TWEA created "a dangerous situation in that it virtually conferred upon
the President what could have been dictatorial powers.. .. ,,29 To limit

the scope of Executive Authority, IEEPA substituted a "new set of international economic powers, more restricted than those available during
time of war. . .. "1,0
The TWEA confers upon the President two main powers: 81 1) the

power to freeze or block the transfer of foreign-owned assets in the
United States; s2 and 2) the power summarily to seize and permanently
vest title to foreign-owned assets and use them "for the benefit of the
United States."8

The IEEPA specifically excluded those portions of section 5(b) of the
TWEA which authorized the President "1) . . . to vest title to foreignowned assets; 2) to regulate purely domestic transactions; 3). . . to regulate gold or bullion; and 4) . . . to seize records." The Supreme Court

addressed this distinction in a footnote:

24. Nos. 80-1779, 80-1891, slip op. at 18-19 (D.C. Cir. June 5, 1981).
25. 49 U.S.L.W. at 4974.
26. Id. See also Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917, ch. 106, 40 Stat. 411 (1917) (current version at 50 U.S.C. app. § 5 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
27. Congress did impose certain limitations on the President's power under IEEPA that
were not imposed under section 5(b) of the TWEA. Under IEEPA, the President may not
"vest" foreign property, nor may he seize records or regulate solely domestic transactions.
See S. REP. No. 466, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1977).
28. H.R. REP. No. 459, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1977) [hereinafter cited as IEEPA
House Report].
29.

HOUSE COMM. ON ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,

REvISION OF TRADING WrrH THE

AcT, Markup on H.R. Doc. No. 7738, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1977).
30. IEEPA House Report, supra note 5, at 10.
31. Propper v. Clark, 337 U.S. 472 (1949).
32. 50 U.S.C. app. § 5(b)(1)(B) (1976).
33. Id. at § 5(b)(1). See Bishop, JudicialConstruction of the Trading With the Enemy
Act, 62 HAMv. L. REv. 721 (1949).
34. IEEPA House Report, supra note 28, at 15.
ENEMY
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Although it is true the IEEPA does not give the President the power
to 'vest' or to take title to the assets it does not follow that the President is not authorized under both the IEEPA and the TWEA to otherwise permanently dispose of the assets in the manner done here. 8
The Court buttressed its position by restating a previously recognized congressional intent that the purpose in authorizing blocking orders
is "to put control of foreign assets in the hands of the President. ...."'
A contrary view was taken by the United States District Court for
Northern Texas in Electronic Data Systems Corporation,Iran v. Social
87
Security Organization of the Government of Iran,
where the district
court, in interpreting the IEEPA, stated that it:
expressly excludes certain authority granted to the President under
the Trading With the Enemy Act, including 'the power to vest, i.e. to
take title to foreign property.' Thus, it is clear that under the IEEPA
the President may 'freeze but not seize' assets in which a foreign nation has an interest.8
The district court's interpretation was based on the assumption that
Congress passed the IEEPA in 1977 to replace the Presidential peacetime
emergency authority which previously existed under the TWEA. 89 One
must contrast this fundamental premise with the Supreme Court's determination that both Acts of Congress are to be construed simultaneously.
If both acts are to be interpreted simultaneously, one could arguably dispute the result reached by the Supreme Court. If, however, as the legislative history indicates, the IEEPA was enacted to specifically replace the
TWEA, then the validity of the Court's holding requires closer scrutiny.
One should examine the actual authority to freeze foreign assets as preserved by the IEEPA, contrasted with the vesting power which IEEPA
abolished. There is authority holding that a freeze, however uncertain its
precise duration, results in a temporary and not a permanent disposition
of foreign property. 0 The President's "transfer" order seeks to dispose of
Iranian assets by permanently divesting American creditors of their statutory rights. Once such a transfer occurs, the freeze order no longer retains the character of a temporary measure, but rather becomes a permanent vesting order.
Although the Supreme Court declined to conclude that the IEEPA' 1

35. 49 U.S.L.W. at 4974 n.5 (1981).
36. Propper v. Clark, 337 U.S. 472, 493 (1949), as quoted in Dames & Moore v. Regan,
49 U.S.L.W. at 4974 (1981).
37. 49 U.S.L.W. 2531 (N. Tex., Feb. 12, 1981).
38. 49 U.S.L.W. at 2532.
39. Id.
40. Neilson v. Secretary of the Treasury, 424 F.2d 833, 843 (D.C. Cir. 1970); see also
Markham v. Cabel, 326 U.S. 404, 411 (1945). See generally Littaver, The Unfreezing of
Foreign Funds, 45 COLUM. L.J. 132 (1945).
41. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701 et seq. (Supp. III 1979).
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or the Hostage Act42 granted the President specific authority to suspend
claims pending in American courts, it did conclude that Congress had approved the settlement of claims by executive agreement.'" The Court relied primarily on the International Claims Settlement Act of 19494 which
created the International Claims Commission, now the Foreign Claims
Settlement Commission. This Commission has authority to make final
and binding arbitration decisions with respect to claims by U.S. nationals
against settlement funds.' 5 The Court rejected the petitioner's argument
that by enacting the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976,' Congress divested the President of authority to settle claims by placing political commercial lawsuits in the hands of the courts. The petitioner further
asserted that by suspending its claims, the President had usurped the

jurisdiction of the U.S. courts in violation of Article III of the Constitution. The Court instead stated that by enacting Executive Order No.
12294 the President did not attempt to divest the federal courts of their
jurisdiction, but merely attempted to suspend claims, because "those
claims not within the jurisdiction of the Claims Tribunal will 'revive' and

42. Hostage Act, 22 U.S.C. § 1732 (1868). The Hostage Act provides:
Whenever it is made known to the President that any citizen of the United
States has been unjustly deprived of his liberty by or under the authority of
any foreign government it shall be the duty of the President forthwith to demand of that government the reasons of such imprisonment; and if it appears
to be wrongful and in violation of the rights of American citizenship, the President shall forthwith demand the release of such citizen and if the release so
demanded is unreasonably delayed or refused, the President shall use such
means, not amounting to acts of war, as he may think necessary and proper to
obtain or effectuate the release: and all the facts and proceedings relative
thereto shall as soon as practicable be communicated by the President to
Congress.
Id.
43. Since 1952, the President has entered into ten binding settlements with foreign nations, to wit: Settlement of Claims, May 11, 1979, United States-People's Republic of China,
30 U.S.T. 1957, T.I.A.S. No. 9306; Claims: Marcona Mining Company, Oct. 21, 1976, United
States-Peru, 27 U.S.T. 4214, T.I.A.S. No. 8417; Claims of United States Nationals, Oct. 27,
1976, United States-Egypt, 27 U.S.T. 4214, T.I.A.S. No. 8446; Settlement of Certain Claims,
Feb. 19, 1974, United States-Peru, 25 U.S.T. 227, T.I.A.S. No. 7792; Hungarian People's
Republic Settlement of Claims, Mar. 6, 1973, United States-Hungary, 24 U.S.T. 522,
T.I.A.S. No. 7569; Claims: Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, July 7, 1969, United
States-Japan, 20 U.S.T. 2654, T.I.A.S. No. 6724; Yugoslavia: Claims of United States Nationals, Jan. 20, 1965, United States-Yugoslavia, 16 U.S.T. 1, T.I.A.S. No. 5750; Bulgaria
Claims, July 2, 1963, United States-Bulgaria, 14 U.S.T. 969, T.I.A.S. No. 5387; Poland: Settlement of Claims of United States Nationals, July 16, 1960, United States-Poland, 11
U.S.T. 1953, T.I.A.S. No. 4545; Rumania Settlement of Claims of United States Nationals
and Other Financial Matters, Mar. 30, 1960, United States-Rumania, 11 U.S.T. 317, T.I.A.S.
No. 4451. 49 U.S.L.W. at 4976.
44. 22 U.S.C. §§ 1621 et. seq. (1955). The Act had two purposes: (1) to allocate to U.S.
nationals funds received in the course of an executive claims settlement with Yugoslavia,
and (2) to provide a procedure whereby funds resulting from future settlements could be
distributed.
45. 49 U.S.L.W. at 4978.
46. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602 et seq. (1976).
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become judicially enforceable in the United States courts. 4'17
The Court used an historical argument4 8 in concluding that the President had the authority to settle American claims. Although the decision
did not acknowledge plenary power in the presidency to settle claims
against foreign nations, it did acknowledge a grant of authority to the
President in settling claims which are a "necessary incident" to the resolution of a conflict between our country and a foreign nation.4 9 An impor-

tant consideration in the Court's decision was the fact that Congress acquiesced to the President's actions by not taking measures against the
Agreement when it had the opportunity to do so.5" Further corroborating
the Court's decision was the fact that the President provided American
litigants with an alternative forum, the Claims Tribunal, in which to seek
relief.51
The President's actions have not deprived American nationals from
obtaining relief for claims against the Iranian Government, but rather
have facilitated certain lawsuits by the creation of a ready made, internationally recognized forum. Moreover, if claimants are not within the jurisdiction of the Claims Tribunal, the same forums as originally sought-the
U.S. courts-are still available.
The Court did not address the question of whether or not the suspension of claims would constitute a taking of property in the absence of
just compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment, 2 stating that the
issue was not yet ripe for judicial review. The Court did leave open the
question whether companies that do not fare well in the arbitration proceedings will have an adequate remedy at law in the Court of Claims
under the Tucker Act.58
Much criticism has been spawned by what some believe to be the
subjugation of property rights to the liberal authority granted the President to conduct foreign policy.5 The fact that the Court's decision was
rooted in an express grant to the President of constitutional and statutory authority will certainly be considered, but the belief that the Court's
47. 49 U.S.L.W. at 4977.
48. In United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942), the Court upheld the validity of the
Litvinov Agreement whereby the Soviet Union assigned to the United States amounts owed
to it by U.S. nationals, which funds were then used to pay outstanding claims of American
nationals against Russia. The Court recognized that the "power to remove such obstacles to
full recognition as settlement of claims of our nationals . . . certainly is a modest implied
power of the President who is the 'sole organ of the federal government in the field of international relations.'" Id. at 229.
49. 49 U.S.L.W. at 4977.
50. Id. at 4978.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. 67 A.B.A.J. 647 (1981). See also Den. Post, June 24, 1981, at 26, col. 3.
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decision was motivated by political expediency will certainly not be denied. The full impact of the decision will rest upon the decisions of the
Claims Tribunal and resulting future litigation.
Sharon D. Liko

Spiess v. C. Itoh & Co. (America), Inc.:
Another Chapter in the Continuing Conflict

between FCN Treaties and Title VII
The Fifth Circuit, in Spiess v. C. Itoh & Co. (America), Inc.,' recently held that the 1953 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation (FCN) between the United States and Japan' grants wholly owned
American subsidiaries of Japanese corporations "the limited right to discriminate in favor of Japanese nationals" in filling managerial and technical positions.' By contrast, the Second Circuit in Avigliano v. Sumitomo
Shoji America, Inc.4 held that the Japanese Treaty does not exempt
wholly owned American subsidiaries of Japanese corporations from laws
prohibiting discrimination in employment.5 Spiess is unique because it
thrusts the Second and Fifth Circuits into discord regarding the applicability of domestic employment discrimination laws to wholly owned Japanese subsidiaries incorporated in the United States. Unlike Avigliano,
Spiess holds that "Article VIII [of the Japanese Treaty] does exempt C.
Itoh-America from domestic employment to the extent of permitting discrimination in favor of Japanese citizens in employment for executive and
technical positions."
1. 643 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1981).
2. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Apr. 2, 1953, United States-Japan,
4 U.S.T. 2063, T.I.A.S. No. 2863 [hereinafter cited as Japanese Treaty].
3. 643 F.2d at 355.
4. 638 F.2d 552 (2d Cir. 1981).
5. In Avigliano, female secretarial employees of Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc., a wholly
owned subsidiary of a Japanese commercial firm, appealed from an order entered by the
district court dismissing their claim of discrimination on the basis of sex and national origin
in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et
seq., the Civil Rights Act of 1966, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 et seq., and the Thirteenth Amendment
of the U.S. Constitution. 638 F.2d at 553. The Second Circuit held that the Treaty did not
exempt Japanese companies operating in the United States "whether or not they are incorporated in the United States, from American laws prohibiting discrimination in employment." Id. at 554. The present note should be read in conjunction with that published in
volume 10, number 2 of this journal on the Avigliano case. Development, The Impact of
Title VII Protection on FCN Treaties: Conflict and Interpretation, 10 DEN J. INT'L L. &
POL'Y 373 (1981).
6. 643 F.2d at 359.
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decision was motivated by political expediency will certainly not be denied. The full impact of the decision will rest upon the decisions of the
Claims Tribunal and resulting future litigation.
Sharon D. Liko
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thrusts the Second and Fifth Circuits into discord regarding the applicability of domestic employment discrimination laws to wholly owned Japanese subsidiaries incorporated in the United States. Unlike Avigliano,
Spiess holds that "Article VIII [of the Japanese Treaty] does exempt C.
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While Spiess and Avigliano reach opposing conclusions regarding the
applicability of domestic employment discrimination laws to wholly
owned American subsidiaries of Japanese corporations, the Second and
Fifth Circuits leave two major issues unresolved. First, may a less-thanwholly owned American subsidiary of a foreign corporation seek exemption from domestic employment discrimination laws by raising FCN
treaty provisions as a shield? Second, does Title VII supersede inconsistent FCN treaty provisions? These are the questions left open in the
wake of Avigliano and Spiess.
In Spiess, American male employees of C. Itoh-America filed a class
action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19647 and section 1981 of
the Civil Rights Act of 1866.8 The employees charged nationality discrimination, alleging that the company made "managerial promotions and
other benefits available only to Japanese citizens." In response, C. ItohAmerica filed a rule 12(b) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted. 10 C. Itoh-America argued that the language of article VIII(1) of the 1953 FCN Treaty, which permitted companies to "engage . . . executive personnel . . . and other specialists of their
choice,"1 granted absolute immunity to C. Itoh-America from American
employment discrimination laws. 2
As with Avigliano, the court of appeals in Spiess faced two difficult
issues. First, could a wholly owned Japanese subsidiary incorporated in
the United States take advantage of the provisions of the Japanese
Treaty? Second, if so, did the Treaty provisions exempt the Japanese
company from American employment discrimination laws?
The Spiess court began its discussion with a brief analysis of the history of friendship, commerce and navigation treaties."3 The court noted

7. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (1976).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 et seq. (1976).
9. 643 F.2d at 355.
10. Id.; see Spiess v. C. Itoh & Co. (America), Inc., 469 F.Supp. 1 (S.D. Texas 1979). For
a discussion of the background of the district court's holding, see Note, Commercial Treaties and the American Civil Rights Laws: The Case of Japanese Employers, 31 STAN. L.
REV. 947 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Note].
11. 643 F.2d at 355.
12. Id.
13. FCN treaties are commercial agreements "designed to create a legal environment
that encourages mutually beneficial trade and investment." Note, supra note 10, at 949. The
Japanese Treaty is one of many FCN treaties negotiated between the United States and
other countries on a bilateral basis beginning with the first FCN treaty with France in 1778.
See Walker, Modern Treaties of Friendship,Commerce and Navigation, 42 MINN. L. REV.
805, 806 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Walker, Modern Treaties];Walker, Provisions on Companies in United States Commercial Treaties, 50 Am. J. INT'L L. 373, 374 (1956) [hereinafter cited as Walker, Provisions on Companies]. In one of his articles, Walker outlined the
purpose and nature of FCN treaties:
These treaties . . . are 'commercial' in the broadest sense of that term; and
they are above all treaties of 'establishment,' concerned with the protection of
persons, natural and juridical, and of the property and interests of such per-
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that FCN treaties are self-executing, 4 "the Supreme law of the land,"
and supersede inconsistent state law.' The court also noted that federal
statutes should not be construed to "violate the law of nations if any
other possible construction remains," for "only when Congress clearly intends to depart from the obligations of a treaty will inconsistent federal
legislation govern."' 0 The court reasoned that article VIII(1) 17 of the
Treaty was not subsequently repudiated by Title. VII, for Congress did
not expressly repudiate the "of their choice" language of FCN treaties
when it enacted Title VII. Accordingly, the court was reluctant to act in
the absence of congressional mandate, for "[i]n the absence of Congressional guidance, we decline to abrogate the American government's solemn undertaking with respect to a foreign nation.""'
The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas, relying
primarily on article XXII(3) of the Treaty,10 denied C. Itoh-America's
motion to dismiss.2 0 The district court reasoned that since C. ItohAmerica was a New York corporation, it was a "company of the United
States"'" and did not have standing to assert the provisions of the Japanese Treaty. In the district court's view, "[ajrticle XXII(3) unequivocally
states that for the purpose of the Treaty the nationality of the corporation is determined by the place of incorporation. 2 On appeal, the Fifth
Circuit rejected the district court's construction of article XXII(3) of the
treaty, noting that treaties, unlike domestic legislation, "must create a
common ground between differing cultures before the rights of the parties
can be defined."' "2The court reasoned that the negotiating history of the

sons. They define the treatment each country owes the nationals of the other;
their rights to engage in business and other activities within the boundaries of
the former and the respect due them, their property and their enterprises.
Walker, Modern Treaties, id., at 805-06.
14. 643 F.2d at 356. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Electric Indus. Co., Ltd., 494
F. Supp 1263, 1266 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
15. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. II.
16. 643 F.2d at 356, citing The Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804),
quoted in McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 21
(1963). Since the Japanese Treaty was ratified after the enactment of section 1981, "it supersedes the Federal Statute." 643 F.2d at 362 n.2. See Hijo v. United States, 194 U.S. 315,
324 (1904).
17. Article VIII(l) of the Japanese Treaty provides: "[Nlationals and companies of either party shall be permitted to engage, within the territories of the other party, accountants and other technical experts, executive personnel, attorneys, agents and other specialists
of their choice." Japanese Treaty, supra note 2, art. VIII para. 1 (emphasis added).
18. 643 F.2d at 362.
19. Article XXII(3) of the Japanese Treaty provides: "[C]ompanies constituted under
the applicable laws and regulations within the territories of either party shall be deemed
companies thereof and shall have their juridical status recognized within the territories of
the other party." Japanese Treaty, supra note 2, art. XXII para. 3.
20. Spiess v. C. Itoh & Co. (America), Inc., 469 F. Supp. 1, 6 (S.D. Texas 1979).
21. Id. at 6.
22. Id.
23. 643 F.2d at 356.
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Treaty indicated an attempt to create a common ground between Japan
and the United States, as "the provision was intended, not to determine
which forms of corporate organization were entitled to assert Treaty
rights, but to ensure that unfamiliar organizations would be recognized as
'companies' by the legal institutions of the respective countries. 2 " The
court relied on various articles written by Mr. Herman Walker, a leading
authority on FCN treaties and former Advisor on Commercial Treaties to
the State Department. 5 The court cited Walker for the proposition that
the term "companies" in the FCN treaties had to be broadly interpreted
to encompass the "varied purposes of an FCN treaty. 2 6 The court noted
that the State Department has consistently recognized the right of American subsidiaries of Japanese corporations to enjoy full protection of the
provisions of the Japanese Treaty.27 C. Itoh-America concurred in this
view, maintaining that various Treaty provisions, when read together, create a right of "companies of Japan" to employ Japanese citizens "of their
choice." s The Fifth Circuit noted that the issue of corporate nationality
need not be considered, as it determined that C. Itoh-America could assert Treaty rights on other grounds.2 9
Both Spiess and Avigliano hold that a wholly owned American subsidiary of a Japanese corporation has standing to raise the Japanese
Treaty provisions. Like Avigliano, the Spiess court recognized that the
lower court's interpretation of article XXII(3), which denied standing to

24. Id. This intent was demonstrated in a memorandum prepared by State Department
negotiators. See Dispatch No. 13, Office of the United States Political Advisor for Japan, at
5 (Apr. 8, 1952).
25. According to a State Department cable, Mr. Walker formulated the modern concept
of FCN treaties. Walker also negotiated many such treaties on behalf of the United States.
See Airgram from Secretary of State Kissinger to American Embassy in Tokyo, No. 1-105
(Jan. 9, 1976), cited in 643 F.2d at 357 n.2. Walker is a former Foreign Service Officer and
former Advisor on Commercial Treaties, Office of International Trade and Resources, Department of State. See Walker, Treaties for the Encouragementand Protection of Foreign
Investment: Present United States Practice,5 Am.J. Coup. L. 229 (1956) [hereinafter cited
as Walker, United States Practice].
26. According to Walker,
A 'company' is defined simply and broadly to mean any corporation, partnership, company or association which has been duly formed under the laws of
one of the contracting parties; that is, any 'artificial personal acknowledged by
its creator, as distinguished from a natural person, whether or not for pecuniary profit.' Every association meeting this simple test of valid existence must
be accounted by the other party a company of the party of its creation, and
have its juridical status recognized without any reservation for the laws of the
forum.
Walker, Provisions on Companies, supra note 13, at 380-81.
27. 643 F.2d at 357-58. See Letter from Lee R. Marks to Herbert J. Hansell (Oct. 17,
1978), reprintedin 73 AM. J. INT'L L. 281 (1979). But cf. Letter of James R. Atwood to Lutz
Alexander Prager (Sept. 11, 1979), reprinted in 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 158 (1980). The Spiess
court viewed the latter letter as "an aberration in State Department policy." 643 F.2d at 358
n.3.
28. 643 F.2d at 358 n.4.
29. Id.
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C. Itoh-America, "would create an unreasonable distinction between
treatment of American subsidiaries of Japanese corporations on the one
hand, and branches of Japanese corporations on the other."3 0 Citing Avigliano, Spiess noted that such an interpretation of the Treaty provision
would create a "crazy quilt" pattern allowing Japanese corporations to
enjoy Treaty protection while wholly owned Japanese subsidiaries incorporated in the United States would only be able to secure minimum protection under the Treaty.31
The Spiess court differed from Avigliano on the issue as to whether
C. Itoh-America was bound by American employment discrimination
laws. While the plaintiff (Spiess) argued and Avigliano held that article
VIII(1) of the Treaty only provides for national treatment to Japanese
corporations, the Spiess court held that this provision did in fact exempt
C. Itoh-America "to the extent of permitting discrimination in favor of
Japanese citizens in employment for executive and technical positions."'
Citing Walker, the court noted that rights of foreign nationals under
these FCN treaties were measured by so called "contingent standards.' 3
The first-the "national treatment" standard-guaranteed foreign nationals "the same treatment afforded to native citizens."'" Article VII(1)
of the Japanese Treaty reflects this standard, for it provides that "nationals and companies of either Party shall be accorded national treatment
with respect to engaging in all types of commercial, industrial, financial
and other business activities." 5 The second-the "most favored nation"
standard-grew out of the nationalistic post-war period which "prevented
universal application of the national treatment rule."' The court suggested that this standard is found in several of the Japanese Treaty provisions.'" The court also noted that there were "absolute rules" which
were created "to protect vital rights and privileges of foreign nationals in
any situation, whether or not a host government provided the same rights
to the indigenous population."" The court quoted Walker for the proposition that, under these absolute rules, "foreign nationals were to receive not only equal protection, but also a certain minimum degree of
protection, as under international law, regardless of a Government's pos30. 643 F.2d at 358.
31. Id., citing Avigliano v. Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc., 683 F.2d 552, 556 (2d Cir.
1981).
32. 343 F.2d at 359.
33. Id., citing Walker, Modern Treaties, supra note 13, at 810-11.
34. 643 F.2d at 359.
35. Japanese Treaty, supra note 2, art. VII, para. 1.
36. 643 F.2d at 359, 360. See Walker, United States Practice,supra note 25, at 236.
37. The court cites the following Japanese Treaty articles as illustrative of the "most
favored nation" standard: art. VII(2) (granting most favored nation treatment for foreigners
who seek to operate a public utility in the host country, or who engage in shipbuilding and
other designated areas); art. XIII (granting this treatment to foreign travelers entering and
leaving the country); art. XIV(5) (granting this treatment in export and import matters).
643 F.2d at 360.
38. 643 F.2d at 360, citing Walker, Modern Treaties, supra note 13, at 811, 823.
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sible lapses with respect to its own citizens.""9 The court added that absolute rules could also be found in various provisions of the Japanese

Treaty. "
While Avigliano held that the "of their choice" provision of article
VIII(l) must be read as granting national treatment to companies of either party, the Spiess court reached the opposite conclusion:
National treatment was not the Treaty's exclusive measure of the
rights to be accorded to foreign nationals. It is apparent that article
VIII(1)'s 'of their choice' provision was intended, not to guarantee national treatment, but to create an absolute rule permitting foreign nationals to control their overseas investments. . . .The language of article VIII(1) makes clear that the of their choice provision was
designed to establish such a rule. Use of the phrase 'of their choice'
does not express the requirement that the parties are limited to national treatment. . . .Considering the Treaty as a whole, the only
reasonable interpretation is that article VIII(1) means exactly what it
says: companies have a right to decide which executives and technicians will manage their4 1 investment in the host country, without regard
to host country laws."

The Avigliano court had reasoned that the Japanese Treaty could be construed in accordance with American employment discrimination laws, for
the "bona fide occupational qualification" (bfoq) Title VII exemption is
"broad enough to encompass any rights that Japanese corporations legiti-

mately could assert under the Treaty.

4

The Fifth Circuit disagreed, not-

ing that "[this] argument misapprehends the nature of a right created in
the course of international bargaining,'4 since the purpose of the Treaty,
from the American perspective, was to "facilitate American private-sector
investment in foreign nations." The court further reasoned that Japa-

nese companies also have a right under article VIII(l) to pick and choose
5
their essential personnel in order to manage their own affairs.4

The plaintiff in Spiess had also argued that article VIII(l) would
conflict with article 55 of the Charter of the United Nations,' which ar-

39. Walker, United States Practice, supra note 13, at 232.
40. The court cites the following Japanese Treaty provisions to illustrate the prevalence
of "absolute rules" in the Treaty: art. I (permitting foreign nations to enter and leave the
host country freely); art. 11(2) (providing for notification of an alien's consulate in the event
of his arrest); art. VI(3) (guaranteeing just compensation for expropriated property); art.
XX(a) (guaranteeing freedom of transit through the host country for each party's nationals). 643 F.2d at 360.
41. Id. at 360-61.
42. 638 F.2d 552, 559. For further elaboration of the use of the "bfoq" Title VII exception in Avigliano, see Note, note 5 supra.
43. 643 F.2d at 361.
44. The Spiess court noted that the "of their choice" provision of the Japanese Treaty
sought to ensure domestic control of American businesses in host countries. 643 F.2d at 361.
45. Id. at 362.
46. Article 55 of the United Nations Charter provides, in part, that "the United Nations shall promote . . .universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and funda-
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guably prohibited employment discrimination. The court disagreed, noting that the "national origin distinction" at issue in the case did not fall
within the enumerated categories of "race, sex, language, or religion."
Second, the Charter, though ratified by the United States, "is not selfexecuting.' 7 Article 55 of the Charter was found to be inapplicable in
this case. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit permitted C. Itoh-America to assert the Treaty in its favor and the court reversed the district court holding and remanded the case with directions to dismiss.'8
The Second and Fifth Circuit holdings leave two major unresolved
issues in their wake. First, may a less-than-wholly owned American subsidiary of a foreign corporation seek exemption from domestic employment discrimination laws by raising FCN treaty provisions as a shield?
Second, does Title VII supersede inconsistent FCN Treaty provisions?
The notes to treaty trader regulations" may provide an answer to the
first question. According to the regulations, corporate nationality is determined by the nationality of the majority (more than fifty percent) stockholders, "regardless of the place of incorporation." 50 It is not clear
whether or not these regulations resolve the issue after Spiess. 1 Thus,
whether or not a less-than-wholly owned American subsidiary of a foreign
company may assert FCN treaty protection is still an open question.
The Second and Fifth Circuits came to opposite conclusions on the
question of whether or not Title VII supersedes inconsistent FCN treaty
provisions. Yet, the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of New York recently faced the same issue and reached a conclusion
which supports the Second Circuit's position. In Linskey v. Heidelberg
Easter, Inc.,52 a disgruntled employee brought a Title VII action against
an American subsidiary and its Danish parent. The defendants moved to
8
dismiss under Rule 12(b), arguing in part that the Danish FCN Treaty
exempts Danish corporations from the provisions of Title VII. Article
VII(4) of the Danish Treaty provides: "Nationals and companies of either
Party shall be permitted to engage, within the territory of the other
Party, accountants and other technical experts, executive personnel, at-

mental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion." U.N.
CHARTER

art. 55(c).

47. 643 F.2d at 363.
48. Id.
49. "Treaty traders" are aliens permitted by section 101(a)(15)(E)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 to enter the United States in a supervisory capacity pursuant to a commercial treaty. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(E)(i) (1976). The regulations cited to are
found in § 22 C.F.R. § 41.40 et seq. (1980).
50. 22 C.F.R. § 41.40(8) (1980).
51. The court stated in a footnote that "we do not reach or decide whether a corporate
subsidiary in which a Japanese trader owns less than a 100% interest should be considered
a company of Japan under the Treaty." 643 F.2d at 359 n.5.
52. 470 F. Supp. 1181 (E.D.N.Y. 1981).
53. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, with Protocol, Oct. 1, 1951,
Uniied States-Denmark, 12 U.S.T. 908, T.I.A.S. No. 4797, 421 U.N.T.S. 105.
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torneys, agents and specialized employees of their choice, regardless of
nationality.""
The parent company claimed exemption from Title VII restrictions
as plaintiff's job fell within the "executive personnel" category.5 8 Yet, the
district court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss, holding that the
Danish Treaty did not exempt a Danish corporation from the provisions
of Title VII. 6" According to the court, "while this defense to a Title VII
action is a novel one, the history of the provision belies any claim that a
foreign corporation has an absolute privilege to hire professional and
other specialized employees of their choice irrespective of the American
laws prohibiting employment discrimination. ' 7 The court added that the
purpose of the Danish Treaty's provision was to "exempt specialized employees of foreign countries and companies 5 8 from the admission requirements of the host country in special areas of employment. "It was
not intended to immunize foreigners from claims under the host country's
employment discrimination laws."5 Thus, the district court's interpretation in Linskey of the legislative history of Title VII directly conflicts
with that of the Fifth Circuit. According to Linskey, since Title VII was
enacted without reference to the "of their choice" provision, "the only
inference to be drawn is that such a provision was not intended to exempt
foreign countries and companies from the requirements of Title VII.""
Consequently, the Fifth Circuit's interpretation of the legislative history of the Treaty and Title VII and their subsequent analysis of the
interrelationship between treaty law and domestic employment discrimination laws is not widely ascribed to, as evidenced by the Avigliano and
Linskey decisions.
The Linskey decision further complicates the Avigliano-Spiess dispute because it strongly argues in support of the proposition that the "of
their choice" provision was not intended to supersede Title VII restrictions on employment discrimination. Although the Spiess court reached a
different conclusion, the Avigliano and Linskey holdings weaken its effect. As a result, the questions whether or not Title VII supersedes inconsistent FCN treaty provisions and whether a less-than-wholly owned
American subsidiary of a foreign corporation may seek exemption from
domestic employment discrimination laws have yet to be conclusively
resolved.
George M. Kelakos
54. Id. art. VII para. 4.
55. 470 F. Supp. at 1185.

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1186.
Id. at 1187.
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Union Insurance Society of Canton, Ltd. v.
S.S. Elikon-the Carriage of Goods by Sea
Act and Forum Selection Clauses
In its recent decision in Union Insurance Society of Canton, Ltd. v.
S.S. Elikon,1 the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that a forum selection clause in a bill of lading for marine shipment of goods from
the United States to Kuwait was overridden by the provisions of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA). 2 The court reasoned that Congress
specifically intended for COGSA to protect the rights of shippers by
preventing forum selection clauses that unfairly relieved or lessened the
liability of ocean carriers. The holding in Elikon thus creates new authority for an exception to the general rule that forum selection clauses in
contracts should be upheld.
The United States Supreme Court's decision in 1972 in Bremen v.
Zapata Off-Shore Co. s established the general rule and changed the
traditional negative attitude of U.S. courts toward forum selection
clauses. Bremen involved a forum selection clause stipulated in a contract
between Zapata, a U.S. corporation, and Unterweser, the Bremen's German owner, to tow a mobile offshore drilling rig from Texas to Italy. The
forum selection clause required any dispute arising under the contract to
be submitted to the High Court of Justice in London. When a storm in
the Gulf of Mexico damaged the rig, Zapata sued the Bremen and her
owner in U.S. district court in Tampa, Florida. The Supreme Court upheld the forum selection clause, approving of "a more hospitable attitude"' toward forum selection clauses and emphasizing the need to give
effect to the legitimate expectations of the parties. The Court established
the rule that forum selection clauses are to be prima facie valid and
should be enforced unless the resisting party can "clearly show that enforcement would be unreasonable and unjust, or that the clause .was invalid for such reasons as fraud or overreaching."'
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit attempted to reconcile
its decision in Elikon with Bremen by distinguishing the two cases on

1. 642 F.2d 721 (4th Cir. 1981).
2. 46 U.S.C. §§ 1300-1315 (1976). The Carriage of Goods by Sea Act represents the
American enactment of the Hague rules. These rules, which are an attempt at international
regulation of bills of lading used in international sea trade, have been given full or partial
effect by some 80 states. See O'Keefe, The Contract of Carriage of Goods by Sea: International Regulation, 8 SYDNEY L. Rav. 68 (1977).
3. 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
4. 407 U.S. at 10.

5. Id.
6. Id. at 15.
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their facts. 7 Elikon arose out of a shipment of General Electric air conditioners from Newport News, Virginia, to the Port of Kuwait on board the
S.S. Elikon, a German Freighter owned by the Deutsche Dampfschiffahrts-Gesellschaft (Hansa). Hansa executed and delivered two clean bills
of lading for the cargo to General Electric. When the cargo was discovered to be damaged on delivery in Kuwait, the Union Insurance Society
of Canton, Ltd., as marine insurer, was forced to pay a large claim to the
Middle Eastern consignee of the cargo. The Society sued Hansa to recover its loss.
The suit was brought in admiralty in the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia, despite a clause in the bills of lading requiring such actions to be brought exclusively in the Court of Bremen in West
Germany. The district court refused to accept jurisdiction, ruling that the
forum selection clause should be controlling as long as the Society could
maintain its action in the German court. The Court of Appeals reversed,
holding that COGSA applied to the bills of lading and superseded the
unfair forum selection clause.
The forum selection clause in Elikon was part of the preprinted form
bills of lading and was not the product of hard bargaining; instead, it
represented "the form clauses of an adhesion contract."8 In contrast,
Bremen involved a drilling rig owner who requested bids from towing
companies and negotiated the terms of the cont-act with the eventual
winner. Elikon also dealt with a forum (the Court of Bremen) that was
possibly an unfair and unreasonable choice, since Hansa's headquarters
are located in Bremen. Bremen v. Zapata involved a forum (the High
Court of Justice of London) which was a reasonable compromise between
the wishes of the American rig owner and the German tug operator.
The greatest distinction between Elikon and Bremen is that Elikon
involved bills of lading which specifically stated in Clause 1 that
COGSA's provisions would apply to the bills, while the Supreme Court in
Bremen found that COGSA was inapplicable to the towage contract
before it. The Elikon opinion relied heavily on the authority of Indussa
Corp. v. S.S. Ranborg,10 which involved a bill of lading governed by
COGSA; that case was distinguished in the Bremen decision."
In Indussa, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit invalidated a

7. 642 F.2d at 724.
8. Id.
9. Bremen did not arise out of a contract of carriage, and is more an expression of
general public policy than a comment on the validity of forum clauses governed by the
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act. See O'Hare, Cargo Dispute Resolution and the Hamburg
Rules, 29 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 213, 219 (1980).
10. 377 F.2d 200 (2nd Cir. 1967). Indussa involved a bill of lading with only a forum
selection clause; the court in Elikon also relied on Knott v. Botany Worsted Mills, 179 U.S.
69 (1900), which, like Elikon, involved a bill of lading with both a forum selection clause
and a choice of law clause. 642 F.2d at 724 n.2.
11. 407 U.S. at 10.
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forum selection clause in a Norwegian carrier's bill of lading which required suit to be brought in Norway for damages to a cargo shipped from
Antwerp to San Francisco. The court held that the lessening of liability
provision of COGSA, section 3(8), overrode the conflicting forum selection clause:
A clause making a claim triable only in a foreign court would almost certainly lessen liability if the law which the court would apply
was neither the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act nor the Hague Rules.
Even when the foreign court would apply one or the other of these
regimes, requiring trial abroad might lesson the carrier's liability since
there could be no assurance that it would apply them in the same way
as would an American tribunal subject to the uniform control of the
Supreme Court, and § 3(8) can well be read as covering a potential
and not a simply a demonstrable lessening of liability. . . . We think
that Congress meant to invalidate any contractual provision in a bill
of lading for a shipment to or from the United States that would prevent cargo able to obtain jurisdiction over a carrier in an American
court from having that court entertain the suit and apply the substantive rules Congress had prescribed."
Cases since Indussa and Bremen have been decided primarily on the
basis of whether COGSA does or does not apply on its face to a particular
contract. In Roach v. Napag-Lloyd"3 and Zima Corp. v. M. V. Roman
Pazinski, 4 as in Bremen, the facts precluded the application of COGSA
and section 3(8) of that act. Other cases which have involved contracts
governed by the provisions of COGSA have followed Indussa and have
upheld the paramountcy of section 3(8).15
The First Circuit Court of Appeals has suggested in its opinion in
Fireman's Fund Insurance Co. v. Puerto Rican Forwarding Co.1 6 that
Bremen casts some doubt on the validity of Indussa's underlying rationale, because the Supreme Curt in Bremen disapproved of the "parochial
concept that all disputes must be resolved under our laws and in our
courts."1" However, the Indussa opinion alleviated this concern by stating
that the holding did not "outlaw any other tribunal than our own."1 8
Elikon goes further toward eliminating this problem by allowing the district court to apply on remand the principles of forum non conveniens19
and thereby determine the proper forum for hearing the case. The district
court was instructed to apply the principles of forum non conveniens laid

12. 377 F.2d at 203-04.
13. 358 F. Supp. 481 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
i4. 493 F. Supp. 268 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
15. See Pacific Lumber & Shipping Co. v. Star Shipping A/S, 464 F. Supp. 1314 (W.D.
Wash. 1979); Mitsui & Co. v. M/V Glory River, 464 F. Supp. 1004 (W.D. Wash. 1978);
Northern Assurance Co. v. M/V Caspian Career, 1977 A.M.C. 421 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
16. 492 F.2d 1294 (1st Cir. 1974).
17. 407 U.S. at 9.
18. 377 F.2d at 204.
19. 642 F.2d at 725.
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down in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert,20 and to take into consideration the
nationalities of the parties, the law to be applied, the fact that the bills of
lading were written in English, and the availability and location of possible witnesses.
The Elikon decision is significant because it provides new authority
for the Indussa approach to the disputed issue of forum selection clauses.
Although this approach is an exception to the general rule of upholding
the validity of forum selection clauses, it is consistent with the provisions
of Restatement (Second) of the Conflict of Laws21 and the Model Choice
of Forum Act.22 Both the Restatement and the Model Choice of Forum
Act allow the courts to declare forum selection clauses invalid when there
is a violation of public policy, or when the transaction is otherwise unfair,
unjust, or unreasonable. 2 While Bremen recognized this exception, Indussa and Elikon have gone further by directly applying the exception to
bills of lading governed by COGSA and invalidating forum selection
clauses which relieve or lessen the liability of ocean carriers.
Wade H. Gateley

Eain v. Wilkes: Establishing the Parameters
of the Political Offense Exception in
Extradition Treaties
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit recently upheld the
extradition of a member of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)
accused by Israel of exploding a bomb that killed and injured over thirty
people.1 After fleeing to this country, the PLO member had sought a writ
of habeas corpus to prevent the Secretary of State from extraditing him
to Israel. The court, in a strongly worded opinion, rejected the petitioner's argument that the bombing constituted a political offense-a determination which would have blocked his extradition to Israel. Eain v.
Wilkes is noteworthy for several reasons. First, the court reiterated the
traditionally important role the judiciary plays in extradition proceed-

20. 330 U.S. 501 (1947).
21. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT oF LAWS § 80 (1971).
22. MODEL CHOICE OF FOEUM ACT (National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform

State Laws, 1968).
23. See Nanda, Forum Selection and Choice-of-Law Agreements in InternationalContracts, THE LAW OF TRANSNATIONAL BusiNEss TRANSACTIONS § 8 (V. Nanda ed. 1981).

1. Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504 (7th Cir. 1981).
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1. Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504 (7th Cir. 1981).
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ings, particularly with regard to the "political offense" exception found in
many extradition treaties. Second, the court indicated that those crimes
which fit within the political offense exception must be aimed at the political, and not the social, structure of a country. Third, the court empha-

sized that the United States would not be a safe haven for terrorists who
come to this country to avoid answering for their crimes.
On May 11, 1979, Abu Eain, a member of the PLO, travelled to the
restort town of Tiberias, Israel, to find a place to hide a bomb. Three
days later, on the celebration of Israel's independence day, he returned to

Tiberias and placed a bomb in a refuse bin in the center of town. The
subsequent explosion killed two boys and injured thirty other persons.

Eain then obtained a visa to enter the United States and arrived in Chicago, where on August 22, 1979, he was arrested by the F.B.I. on the basis
of information supplied by Israeli authorities. Shortly thereafter, Israel
sought his extradition under the terms of its 1962 Extradition Convention

with the United States.'
After a hearing, a magistrate found that Eain should be extradited to
Israel to stand trial for murder, attempted murder, and causing bodily
harm with aggravating intent.8 Eain sought a writ of habeas corpus from

2. Convention on Extradition, Dec. 10, 1962, United States-Israel, 14 U.S.T. 1707,
T.I.A.S. No. 5476, 484 U.N.T.S. 283 (entered into force Dec. 5, 1963) [hereinafter cited as
the Extradition Convention].
3. In Re Abu Eain, No. 79 M 175 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 18, 1979). The Extradition Convention
specifies that:
Persons shall be delivered up according to the provisions of the present Convention for prosecution when they have been charged with, or to undergo sentence when they have been convicted of, any of the following offenses:
1. Murder.
2. Malicious wounding; inflicting grievous bodily harm.
Extradition shall also be granted for attempts to commit or conspiracy to
commit any of the offenses mentioned in this Article provided such attempts
or such conspiracy are punishable under the laws of both Parties by a term of
imprisonment exceeding three years.
Extradition Convention, supra note 2, art. II.
The procedure in this country for extradition is governed by 18 U.S.C. § 3181-95 (1976).
The statutes require that a country seeking extradition submit a request through proper
diplomatic channels. That request must be supported by sufficient evidence to show that
the individual is the person sought for the crimes charged, that the crimes are among those
listed as extraditable offenses in the treaty, and that there is sufficient justification for the
individual's arrest if the charged crime had been committed in the United States. After
evaluation and approval by the Department of State, the necessary papers may be forwarded to the U.S. Attorney in the district where the person sought to be extradited may be
found. The U.S. Attorney may then file a complaint and seek an arrest warrant from a
magistrate. If a warrant issues, the magistrate then conducts a hearing under 18 U.S.C. §
3184 to determine "[iff, on such hearing, [the magistrate] deems the evidence sufficient to
sustain the charge under the provisions of the proper treaty or convention. .. ." It is fundamental that the person whose extradition is sought is not entitled to a full hearing. The
person charged is not to be tried in this country for crimes he is alleged to have committed
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an Illinois federal district court to prevent the Secretary of State from
extraditing him in accordance with the magistrate's determination, but

the court denied his writ.'
On appeal to the Seventh Circuit," Eain argued that the evidence
against him failed to establish probable cause to believe that he commit-

ted the crimes Israel charged. The court of appeals rejected this argument s on the technical basis of its limited scope of review on this issue.'
The court then proceeded to examine Eain's alternative argument that
his extradition should be blocked, since his crime constituted a political
offense. 8
Under article VI of the United States-Israel Extradition Convention,
extradition shall not be granted "[w]hen the offense is regarded by the
requested Party as one of a political character or if the person sought
proves that the request for his extradition has, in fact, been made with a
view to trying or punishing him for an offense of a political character."'
Prior to reaching the merits of Eain's arguments, the court reviewed
the government's suggestions that the role of the judiciary in applying the

political offense exception should be limited one. The government argued
that the determination of the political nature of a crime is itself a politi-

cal question which should be resolved by the legislative and executive-the political-branches of government.10 Judge Wood, writing for

in the requesting country. That is the task of the civil courts of the other country.
Under section 3184, should the magistrate either determine that the offense charged is
not within a treaty's terms or find an absence of probable cause, the magistrate cannot
certify the matter to the Secretary of State for extradition. If the case is certified to the
Secretary for completion of the extradition process it is in the Secretary's sole discretion to
determine whether or not extradition should proceed further with the issuance of a warrant
of surrender. See 4 G. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTMRNATIONAL LAW, 49-50 (1942); Note, Executive Discretion in Extradition, 62 COLUM. L. RaV. 1313, 1323 (1962).
4. As mentioned in 641 F.2d at 507.
5. There is no statutory provision for direct appeal of an adverse ruling by a person
whose extradition is sought. Instead, that person must seek a writ of habeas corpus. Collins
v. Miller, 252 U.S. 364 (1920).
6. 641 F.2d at 509-12.
7. The scope of habeas corpus review in extradition cases is a limited one, according
due deference to the magistrate's initial determination. Fernandez v. Phillips, 268 U.S. 311,
312 (1925). "[H]abeas corpus is available only to inquire whether the magistrate had jurisdiction, whether the offense charged is within the treaty and, by a somewhat liberal extension, whether there is any evidence warranting the finding that there was reasonable ground
to believe the accused guilty." Id. at 312.
8. Eain also argued that Israel's "indictment" of him for the alleged crimes amounted
only to a subterfuge in order to have him returned for trial, not for the alleged offenses, but
instead for the political offense of membership in the Al Fatah branch of the PLO. The
court of appeals held that the determination whether the request for extradition amounted
to subterfuge by Israel is a decision clearly within the sole province of the Secretary of
State. 641 F.2d at 518. See also Laubenheimer v. Factor, 61 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1932); In re
Lincoln, 288 F. 70 (E.D.N.Y. 1915), afl'd per curiam, 241 U.S. 651 (1916); Sindona v. Grant,
461 F. Supp. 199 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
9. Extradition Convention, supra note 2, art. VI, para. 4.
10. 641 F. 2d at 513-17.
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the court, noted that there was no case precedent for the proposition that
only the political branches should decide whether a crime is a political
offense."1 Rather, it is the judicial branch which usually determines
whether the political offense exception applies. 2 The court found support
for this view in the extradition statutes which require a hearing to determine whether there is sufficient evidence "to sustain the charge under the
provisions of the proper treaty."' s
While the court concurred in the government's analysis that, in general, the Constitution places foreign policy and international affairs in the
hands of the executive,1 4 it rejected the government's conclusion that the
political nature of these areas renders them unsuitable for judicial consideration." As the court pointed out, "it is error to suppose that every case
or controversy which touches foreign relations relies upon judicial competence."'" The court went on to recognize the need for "special sensitivity"
in the area of foreign affairs,' 7 but declared that "[t]his sensitivity does
not preclude the Judiciary from having a part of the process of determining whether the political offense exception applies. That determination
involves an approach to factfinding that is traditional to the courts."'"
The court refused to accept the government's argument that the extradition treaty with Israel, by its own terms, left the determination of
whether a crime was a political offense to the executive branch."9 Article
VI, paragraph 4 of the Extradition Convention-"extradition shall not be
granted... when the offense is regarded by the requested party as one
of a political character" 2 0-suggested that such an interpretation was
plausible. On the other hand, such an interpretation would destroy the
procedural safeguards established to protect defendant's rights in extradition proceedings."'
Having established the role of the judiciary in applying the political
offense exception, the court of appeals moved to the merits of Eain's arguments. The petitioner pointed out the distinction between "pure" and
"relative" political offenses 2 and contended that the Tiberias bombing

11. Id. at 513.
12. Id. Sayne v. Shipley, 418 F.2d 679 (5th Cir. 1969), is the only case where the executive was permitted to make the initial determination in extradition matters that the crime
charged was committed and that the person sought to be extradited commited it. However,
Sayne is unique because it involved a treaty that implicated the special relationship between the Canal Zone and the Republic of Panama. Id. at 686. The Sayne court went on to
indicate that executive determination to extradite is still subject to review on habeas corpus.
13. 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1976) (emphasis added).
14. 641 F.2d at 514.
15. Id.
16. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962), qucted in 641 F.2d at 514.
17. Id. at 515.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 517-18.
20. Extradition Convention, supra note 2, art. VI para. 4 (emphasis added).
21. 641 F.2d at 518.
22. Id. at 512.
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was a "relative" offense. Since the political aspects of his crime were so
interwoven with the bombing itself, the entire offense should be regarded
as political. In rejecting this argument, the court held that the definition
of political offenses in extradition treaties "limits such offenses to acts
committed in the course of and incidental to a violent political disturbance such as a war, revolution or rebellion." 2 s
In order to interpret this definition, the court focused on those cases
which had prevented extradition on the grounds of a political offense and
distinguished the "ongoing organized battles between contending armies"
in those cases2 4 and the "dispersed nature" of the PLO. 25 Therefore, despite Eain's membership in the PLO, his crimes were not political offenses given the nature of the conflict between Israel and the PLO.
More significantly, the court noted that the definition of "political
disturbance" was aimed at acts that disrupt the political rather than the
social structure of a state.2 6 In the Seventh Circuit's view, terrorist activity seeks to promote social chaos by attacking the social structure and
does not fit within the political offense exception:
The exception does not make a random bombing intended to result in
the cold-blooded murder of civilians incidental to a purpose of toppling a government, absent a direct link between the perpetrator, a
political organization's political goals, and the specific act. Rather, the
indiscriminate bombing of a civilian populace is not recognised as a
protected political act even when the larger "political" objective of
the person who sets off the bomb may be to eliminate the civilian
population of a country. Otherwise, isolated acts of social violence undertaken for personal reasons would be protected simply because they
occurred during a time of political upheaval, a result7 we think the
political offense exception was not meant to produce.'
Several aspects of the case deserve brief mention. First, the court's
rejection of the government's argument that the executive should decide
whether the political offense exception applies seems warranted for political reasons. With the frequently sensitive nature of foreign affairs, a determination by the executive concerning the application of the political
offense exception might be based on facts wholly irrelevant to a proper
determination. For example, the executive might be influenced in its decision by the quality of the relationship shared with the country requesting
extradition, granting the exception more frequently when the requesting
country was not a close ally. In theory, the judiciary would not be subject

23. Id. at 518.
24. Id. at 519. Ramos v. Diaz, 179 F. Supp. 459 (S.D. Fla. 1959) (members of organized
revolutionary army with established chain of command operating within the country);
United Staes v. Artukovic, 170 F. Supp. 393 (S.D. Cal. 1959) (military government installed
by Nazis during World War II; discussed in dicta).
25. 641 F.2d at 519.
26. Id. at 520-21.
27. Id. at 521.
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to such influences and could assure the high degree of objectivity required
to guarantee the rights of persons in extradition proceedings. In a similar
vein, the court of appeals noted that the United States' present system of
extradition provides the executive flexibility by allowing it to defer to the
judiciary's decision. 8 This, in turn, "permits the executive branch to remove itself from political and economic sanctions which might result if
other nations believe the United States lax in the enforcement of its
treaty obligations." 2
One troublesome aspect of Eain v. Wilkes involves the court's definition of political offenses and its distinction between the "ongoing organized battles between contending armies" in cases which upheld political
offense exceptions and the "dispersed nature" of the PLO-Israeli conflict
in Wilkes. 80 In effect, the court suggests that the political offense exception will be applied more readily, if not exclusively, in the more traditional warfare situations. However the court's distinction ignores the reality of modern warfare, where revolutions and rebellions are less often
conducted in an organized fashion. If the court's analysis were to be rigidly followed, then few people would ever qualify under the exception,
since so few people could ever claim to have fought in organized battles.
In any event, it is difficult to understand how a particular type of warfare,
by itself, could form the basis for a decision to grant or deny a political
offense exception.
The court's analysis is also questionable when it distinguishes offenses aimed at the political structure of a government and offenses
aimed at the social structure that established that government.8 ' In a
footnote, the court acknowledges "that it may not be 'textbook' political
science and sociology to distinguish between disagreement with a government and with the society that establishes it."" Unfortunately, the court
fails to resolve this dilemma, and merely concludes that "we are concerned here only with a violent act focused at the social structure."3
By using this questionable distinction as the major basis for its decision, Eains v. Wilkes gives rise to speculation concerning the real basis
for its holding. That basis may very well lie in the often brutal history of
the PLO and the court's refusal to legitimize in any way such semingly
senseless acts. In a rather emotional passage, the court reveals its feelings
on this issue, stating that if a mere presentation of evidence that the PLO
seeks the destruction of the Israeli political structure and directs its destructive efforts at a defined civilian populace was
all that was necessary in order to prevent extradition under the politi-

28. Id. at 513.
29. Lubet & Czaczkes, The Role of the American Judiciary in the Extradition of Political Terrorists, 71 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY, 193, 200 (1980), quoted in 641 F.2d at 513.
30. Id. at 519.
31. Id. at 520-21.
32. Id. at 521 n.20.
33. Id.
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cal offense exception nothing would prevent an influx of terrorists
seeking a safe haven in America. Those terrorists who flee to this
country would avoid having to answer to anyone anywhere for their
crimes. The law is not so utterly absurd. .

.

. We do not need them in

our society. We have enough of our own domestic criminal violence
with which to contend without importing and harboring with open
arms the worst that other countries have to export.'
While the court may have correctly upheld Eain's extradition in this
case, the strong emotions which pervade the opinion may also have
spawned an analysis which would deny the political offense exception to
worthy individuals. Rather than the court's analysis, which emphasizes
the type of warfare and the aim of the particular offense, a more flexible
test is required if political offense exceptions are to have any real meaning. Undoubtedly, future cases will arise where the Seventh Circuit's test
will have to be modified or abandoned if justice is to prevail. While the
United States should never become a safe haven for foreign terrorists and
criminals, neither should it slam the door on those individuals who, for
legitimate reasons, seek refuge from political oppression.
Bernie M. Tuggle

34. Id. at 520.

BOOK REVIEW

Multinational Enterprises in the West and
East
Reviewed by Jeffrey L. Brown
MultinationalEnterprises in the West and East, by Leon Zurawicki.
Sijthoff & Noordhoff International Publishers, Alphen aan den Rijn,
The Netherlands (1979); available in the U.S. from Sijthoff &
Noordhoff, 20010 Century Blvd., Germantown, MD 20767. ISBN 90286-0419-7. Pages xi, 207. $27.50. (hardbound).
Rarely outside the classrooms of Macroeconomics 405 can pages of
algebraic equations be found devoted to the principle that by artificially
controlling certain assumptions, an interesting result can be obtained.
Programmed into the computer at the University of Warsaw are such assumptions as "buyers' decisions are taken at random," 1 and "firms may
reduce their deliveries and production to any extent. . without any cost
increase per unit of produce."'3 If the first assumption is true, even in a
so-called commodity market, the purchasing departments of most multinational enterprises are grossly overstaffed. Admittedly the latter assumption fails to take into account economies and diseconomies of scale.
The formula goes on and on and, assuredly, is of unquestioned value to
someone sophisticated in such matters. For an international attorney concerned with multinational commerce, other aspects of the book are likely
to be more relevant.'
In an overview, the book is devoted to a detailed description of the
perceived characteristics and motivations of the Western multinational
enterprise (MNE) and a comparison with those of the so-called Socialist
common enterprise (SCE). In the atmosphere of competing demands, the
author analyzes examples of East-West industrial cooperation and discusses the potential for East-West-South initiatives.

Jeffrey L. Brown is associate corporate counsel and director of international law, JohnsManville Corporation, Denver Colorado. B.A., 1964, Penn State University; J.D., 1967, University of Denver College of Law.
1. L.

ZURAWICKI, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES IN THE WEST AND EAST

13 (1979).

2. Id. at 17.
3. For an analysis and comparison of variable, marginal, and average costs and their
effect on pricing, see Areeda & Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under
Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARv. L. REV. 697 (1975).
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An MNE, according to the author,' typically enjoys a dominant position in more than one national market. It exists in an oligopolistic industry characterized by "soft" competition in which defensive behavior is
preferred to offensive reaction, and price competition is kept at a minimum by adherence to the "rules of the game." Global marketing and capital strategies of MNE's allow for geographical mobility: an international
presence economically independent and outside of individual countries
within which they operate. Through devices such as transfer pricing,
management fees, royalties, research and development charges, and credit
policies, profits can be allocated among related companies owned or controlled by the MNE in such a way as to maximize earnings within jurisdictions having favorable tax laws and strong currencies.
Exports are explained as a reflection of the higher fixed costs typical
of large Western MNE's and their corresponding need to expand into
other markets and utilize excess capacity. This applies particularly in a
stagnant or highly competitive domestic economy.
Differences in cost of living (for example, raw material and labor)
frequently dictate the desirability of foreign investment or supplement
diminishing export markets. The author regrets that MNE's are better
organized than international labor, but recognizes the difficulty of organizing workers in another country where the living standards are disparate and differences are accentuated by distance and culture.
The author adopts the position attributed to trade unions that in the
long run, activities of MNE's tend to reduce employment opportunities at
home even though foreign subsidiaries often provide a short-term source
for exports of components, materials, and intellectual property used in
the manufacturing process. This assumes, of course, that the host country
will be content to import foreign goods and services indefinitely, a proposition which is clearly contrary to the goals the author describes for the
Socialist countries, that is, the members of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON).5
In summary, the author sees MNE's as a threat to the economic sovereignty of the countries within which they operate, both developed and
developing. Against the concerns of MNE's for maximizing profits, exploiting local markets, repatriating earnings, safeguarding investments,
and control over management, is the interest of the host country in raising employment prospects (particularly in depressed areas), utilizing domestic sources of supply, maximizing tax revenue, increasing exports, providing technological advancement, and minimizing foreign control. While
in the short term, foreign investment will bring needed capital; in the
long term, 6 profits will exceed initial investment and there will be a re-

4. The author received his doctorate in 1971 from the Netherlands School of Economics, and now teaches at the Institute of Economic Science, University of Warsaw.
5. The author uses the abbreviation CMEA instead of COMECON.
6. Approximately five years.
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suiting negative flow of capital. 7 The author concludes as to the mutual
relations between MNE's and the states within which they operate, "one
cannot foresee much." s
While disclaiming any universal model, the author describes the SCE
as a large-scale, diversified entity characterized by a sharing of skills, lack
of competitiveness, and high efficiency. "In the framework of the planned
economy, the state as the owner of the productive capacities of the country is in the position to use its investment funds in a way which enables
their optimal utilisation and allocation, whereby the economies of scale
are realized. '"'
Western prices, according to the author, rely less on the cost of manufacture than the principle of supply and demand (an intrinsic or social
value greater than the sum of its parts). By comparison, the main objective of the SCE should be production at reduced costs on as large a scale
as possible, with price predicated on the lowest cost of production within
COMECON countries.
It is, of course, difficult to describe SCE's, as they are stated to be a
relatively recent phenomenon 0 and still in the formative stage." The author would like to see COMECON-wide ownership of SCE's, providing
common Socialist goals while recognizing employment, revenue, and other
interests peculiar to the host country. In 1976, the Comprehensive Program for the Development of Socialist Economic Integration and the Uniform Principles of Creation and Functioning of the International Economic Organizations were worked out. In the words of the author, these
were "rather vague and flexible."'
The author also poses the question whether or not foreign investment
is prompted by the initiative of the host country or that of the MNE. 1' In
the case of the Eastern European countries, the recurrent theme is a need
for hard currency-money with which to buy Western goods and technology. Hence the stress is on compensatory trade, counter-purchases, buyback arrangements, and even barter transactions. In any agreement to
transfer technology to the East, the level of reciprocal purchases will determine the available limits of royalties and sales into socialist countries.

7. This conclusion seems to ignore the benefit of an ongoing operation in terms of employment, reduction of imports, capital growth, etc.
8. In fact, the respective goals of each may not be as antagonistic as they appear at first
glance.
9. L. ZURAWICKI, supra note 1, at 99.
10. Within the last six years.
11. As of 1978, there were no more than a dozen SCE's.
12. L. ZURAWICKI, supra note 1, at 115. Actually, the Comprehensive Program was formalized in 1971. The best analysis of these documents in the overall Socialist context is R.
BysTmCKy, LE DROIT DE L'INTEGRATION ECONOMIQUE SocIAusT (1979). (Ed. note: Professor
Bystricky's book will be the subject of a review in an upcoming issue of the Denver Journal
of InternationalLaw and Policy).
13. Generally, a country's efforts to encourage foreign investment are inversely proportionate to full employment and a favorable balance of payments.
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These purchases often take the form of component sales to the Western
licensor-in the words of the author, the Eastern producer becomes a
"peripheral supplier of marginal components for the final product. 1 4
This, the author claims, is inequitable to the licensee since it is presumed
that the end product is more profitable than the individual component.
On a dollar invested basis, this premise might be challenged, particularly
when one views the relative profits made by the suppliers of small vendor
items to the auto industry in the United States. To better neutralize the
balance of payments, the author suggests that a list of components be
prepared and ranked by value, with the Eastern partner getting its fair
share of the higher value components.
"Ideological antagonisms" stand in the way of extensive joint ventures and capital cooperation between East and West. Capital investment
normally carries the expectation of ownership participation-a concept
incompatible with state-owned enterprises. MNE's are generally unattracted by passive investments and will not normally favor minority participation in the control of the venture, even with a more positive division
of profits. The limited duration of joint venture participation in
COMECON countries is an additional feature which discourages participation by Western MNE's, and in Yugoslavia repatriation of profits is
limited to a percentage of foreign exchange earned by the venture. Essentially, central economic planning, which is a prerequisite of socialist economies, forecloses any large-scale equity participation by Western enterprises.15 More realistic is the possibility raised by the author of an EastWest joint venture, limited to research and development, whereby technological exchange benefits both parties without the stress of foreign
intrusion.
The discussion ultimately points to the dilemma faced by developing
countries in attracting capital and technology and acquiring foreign-made
goods, while at the same time maintaining consistency with national eco-

14. L.

ZURAWICKI, supra note 1, at 146.
15. While it is probably unfair to review economic projections with the benefit of hindsight, it is interesting to note that the author refers to certain advantages of capital investment in Socialist countries, including "labourers, who as a rule do not go on strike," id. at
155, and "the fact that the socialist countries h'ave a good payment record, especially with
respect to large contracts," id. at 163. The former requires little comment in light of the
threat of Soviet intervention in Poland occasioned by chronic strikes over a number of
months. With respect to the record of payment, the Wall Street Journal has reported: "Together with Poland's staggering foreign debt and near bankruptcy, the shortages make economic conditions here among the worst faced by any industrial nation in recent history."
Wall St. J., June 18, 1981, at 1, col. 1. Summarizing the status on both points, a recent
newsbrief reported:
Moscow stepped up pressure on Poland, as Soviet Marshal Viktor Kulikov
said the Eastern bloc's military unity is needed 'to protect Socialist gains.' Poland's debt problems, meanwhile, are due to be addressed by Western creditors
in Paris. U.S. bankers favor freezing repayment until year-end if Poland discloses financial data.
Id., June 22, 1981, at 1, col. 3.
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nomic goals. Fundamental differences in underlying philosophies
(planned economy versus private enterprise) accentuate stresses inherent
in uneven rates of economic growth. Still, accommodation of competing
interests is more likely if motivations are clearly understood. In addition,
economic planning can be facilitated by introducing a level of predictability to the market place. Unfortunately, such an analysis is only as good as
the underlying premises, and not even pages of formulae can reduce market behavior to a mathematical science. In balance, the exercise is probably worthwhile, but ultimately the author concedes: "It is by no means
easy to plan in advance the volume of sales in Western markets as much
depends upon business cycles, the strategy and particular steps taken by
rivals, as well as on other more or less random factors."'

16. L.

ZURAWIKI,

supra note 1, at 166.
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BOOTH, V.E.H., & SELLS, P., BaRITISH EXTRADITION LAW AND PROCE1; Sijthoff & Noordhoff, International Publishers, Alphen aan
den Rijn, The Netherlands (1980); available in the U.S. from Sijthoff &
Noordhoff, Germantown, Md. 20767; $35.00 (cloth); ISBN 90-286-0079-5,
LC 79-90516; lix, 351 p.; footnotes, appendices, tables, index.
DURE VOL.

This book is intended to fill the gap in available literature on the
subject of British extradition between the United Kingdom and foreign
states, the Commonwealth and dependent countries, and the Republic of
Ireland. It seeks to provide useful material for the practitioner, as well as
to make some suggestions for future development in this field.
To cover the subject fully, the author covers three aspects: the history of the law, its current state, and its future. These broad categories
are developed in four parts, with the aid of an introduction. The history
of extradition is related only in brief historical outline, with such information as is necessary for a proper understanding of the subject. The
book provides a clarification of procedural and practice rules, including
all that a practitioner requires regarding substantive law. Some suggestions are made to modify existing British Extradition Law. The book also
addresses the legal provisions for extradition existing in Commonwealth
countries and in the Republic of Ireland.
Part I, "Extradition Between Foreign States and the United Kingdom," provides for definitions and for the initial stages of the extradition.
It proceeds through the committal proceedings, through the rules of
habeas corpus and appeal, and through the surrender. Part I ends with
lawful extradition to the United Kingdom from foreign states. Part II,
"Extradition Between Commonwealth and Dependent Countries and the
United Kingdom," and Part III, "Extradition Between the Republic of
Ireland and the United Kingdom," address special considerations which
the U.K. gives to these countries historically unique to it. The section
furnishes procedures for extradition to the U.K. from those countries.
Part IV, "The Future of Extradition Law in the United Kingdom," suggests reforms in the law. It addresses the need for consolidation in committed proceedings, provides for exclusions from surrender, questions the
sufficiency of habeas corpus, ties together miscellaneous problems, and
merges the Extradition Acts and the Fugitive Offenders Act.
Most of the detailed works on British Extradition Law were written
in the late 19th and early 20th Centuries, an occurrence requiring a much
needed update. This volume brings together all the relevant data needed
by a practitioner in the field. A second volume contains a list, country by
country, of current extradition arrangements and suggestions for reform.
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V.E. Hartley Booth and Peter Sells are both Barristers of the Inner

Temple.

t
GLENNON, M.J., and FRANCK, T.M., UNITED STATES FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW: DOCUMENTS AND SOURCES, VOL.

1, EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS;

Oceana Publications, Inc., N.Y. (1980); $40.00 (cloth); ISBN 0-379-203553; ix, 474 p..
The materials contained in this volume deal with the foreign relations power of the U.S. government. For the most part they consist of
documents presenting the views of the executive and legislative branches

concerning the scope of their authority. This volume (and its two companion volumes) explore the threshold question in foreign relations of
what constitutes an international agreement. Confusion exists due to the

complete silence of both statutory and case law on the topic. The only
relevant statute-the "Case Act," which requires the transmittal of international agreements to the Congress-sets forth no definition of what it is
that must be transmitted. With the exception of an I.C.J. Judgment in
1974 (the Nuclear Test Cases, Australia v. France and New Zealand v.
France, [1974] I.C.J. 253, 457), no court has yet addressed the question.
Volume 1 explores United States foreign policy as guided by the criteria prescribed by the executive branch. In this framework, two documents have special significance: the "Rush Letter," a communication of
the Acting Secretary of State to other Department heads setting forth
criteria for compliance with the Case Act and "Circular 175" procedure,
and a communication of the Department of State Legal Adviser which
describes criteria employed by the State Department for deciding what
constitutes an international agreement.
In the absence of more authoritative criteria, United States practice
has been guided for the most part by criteria prescribed by the executive
branch. The information included in this book includes the legal and historical rationales underlying Congressional concern with the idea that the
President should be accountable to Congress with respect to executive
agreements; the search for standards and for some functional accommodation between the branches; and recent Congressional proposals to control the use of executive agreements.
Professor Franck is the Research Director of UNITAR and is Director of the Center for International Studies, New York University School
of Law. Professor Glennon teaches at Wayne State University Law
School.
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GREENFIELD, J., CHINA AND THE LAW OF THE SEA, AIR, AND ENVIRONMENT; Sijthoff & Noordhoff, Alphen aan den Rijn, The Netherlands

(1979); $32.50 (hardbound); ISBN 90-286-0429-4; pp. I-XX, 362 pp.; footnotes, bibliography, table of cases, index, tables, maps, seventeen appendices, preface, introductions to each section.
The book examines and compares the current practice in the People's Republic of China (PRO) in three topical areas of public international law: the law of the sea, the airspace, and the environment. The
extent of the PRC's participation in the development of international
law, generally, is also examined. Attempts are made to arrive at possible
solutions to problems currently facing China in those three topic areas, all
within the larger context of international law.
The text concerns itself essentially with China's relation to what the
author terms "the law of peace." The book contains an introductory
chapter on historical background and attempts to list completely all Chinese treaty participation in the three areas under discussion, gathering
information from numerous sources.
The major primary source material for the book is derived from the
United Nations Committee on Peaceful Uses of the Seabed and Ocean
Floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction; the Third Conference
on the Law of the Sea, New York Session 1973, Caracas and Geneva Sessions 1974-75, New York Sessions 1976-77, Geneva and New York Sessions 1978, and the U.N. Stockholm Environmental Conference 1972.
The conclusion drawn is that China's contribution to and application
of international law is, to a degree, limited. The traditional absence of
individuals trained in international law, and even in law generally, is one
reason hypothesized for the failure of China to make any significant impact on the development of international law. The book points out, however, that China has made concrete and influential contributions in some
areas, and continues with a discussion of these contributions.

Of the three sections, that section on the law of the sea is the largest,
primarily because China's interest in the sea has been more involved and

of longer duration than have its interests in the airspace and the environment. The reasons for the phenomenon are also explained.
The book arose out of a doctoral dissertation undertaken at Cambridge University.

t
KAYE H.,

HERTZBERG,

M.

AND PLAIA

P.;

INTERNATIONAL TRADE PRACTICE

(2

Vol.); Shepards/McGraw-Hill, P. 0. Box 1235, Colorado Springs, Colo.
80901 (1981); $150.00 (looseleaf); ISBN 0-07-033404-8; 1200 p., footnotes;
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International Practice Series.
This two-volume work contains practical information for attorneys
whose clients include manufacturers, importers, distributors, retailers,
trade unions, licensees and licensors. It is written for attorneys who represent American companies and foreign businesses operating in the
United States. The book covers practice before the International Trade
Commission and other related federal agencies; the Tariff Act of 1930, the
Trade Act of 1974, and the Trade Agreement Act of 1979. Procedural and
substantive explanation of relief available to American industry for injury
caused by import competition is discussed. The authors also include a
section on the law governing duty-free importation under the Generalized
System of Preferences.
Harvey Kaye is a patent attorney, and is a partner in the Washington, D.C. law firm of Spencer and Kaye. He is the author of numerous
articles on international trade and patent law. Paul Plaia, formerly with
the office of the General Counsel of the International Trade Commission,
is a partner at Plaia, Schaumberg & Taubman in Washington, D.C.
Michael Hertzberg, lecturer and author of many articles on trade regulation, was formerly a partner in Spencer & Kaye. He practices actively in
the international trade field, and is now a partner in the law firm of Graham & James, Washington, D.C.

KUMAR, K., (editor),

TRANSNATIONAL ENTERPRISES: THEIR IMPACT ON

THIRD WORLD SOCIETIES AND CULTURES;

Westview Press, Inc., 5500 Cen-

tral Ave., Boulder, Colo. 80301 (1980); $26.50; ISBN 0-89158-852-3, LC
80-16759 pp. I-XI, 337 pp.; footnotes, select bibliography, tables, overview
by editor and editorial notes for each section. One of series of fifteen
books: Westview Special Studies in Social, Political and Economic
Development.
This book endeavors to explain the social and cultural impact of
transnational enterprises on non-industrialized host nations which have
not followed a socialist model of development. The analytical discussion
focuses on the larger macro-level issues and only on those impacts which
have been stressed in the related literature.
The central thesis advanced in the book is set forth in the preface:
"TNE's not only affect the economic and political systems of a nation but
by internationalizing production processes and facilitating the movement
of products across national boundaries, they influence social structures
and organizations, lifestyles, and the cultural identities of the people."
The book is organized into three textual sections, each containing
several articles by well-known scholars. Those sections highlight, respectively, impacts on social classes and inequality of development, on knowledge systems, and on consumption patterns and values.
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The articles in Part I discuss "the role of TNE's in the disintegration
of social classes in Latin America", and present a class analysis of TNE
growth in conjunction with a discussion of the relationship of TNE's to
"managerial bourgeoisie." The third article in the section discusses the
ways in which offshore sourcing of TNE's has affected the status and role
of women employees in Malaysia and Singapore, and the final article
deals with the issue of TNE contribution to inequalities of development.
The second section, dealing with impacts on knowledge systems, contains articles discussing transnational book publishing and its role in diffusing intellectual knowledge, the effects of transnational news service on
information dissemination in Latin America, articles on the. effects of
TNE's on educational and cultural processes in Africa, and the role
TNE's play in vocational training.
Part 3 contains writings on the role of TNE's in promoting "bottle
feeding" in developing countries, the sociocultural consequences of TNE's
within the framework of North-South economic relations, as well as an
article on the role of TNE's in the greater context of cultural and ideological dependence.
Dr. Krishna Kumar coordinates a study and research program on
transnational interactions for the East-West Center in Honolulu, where
he is a staff member.

KIRCHNER, C., ET AL., MINING VENTURES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES,
PART 1: INTERESTS, BARGAINING PROCESS, LEGAL CONCEPTS (English Ver-

sion by William J. Mahoney); Kluwer B.V., Deventer, The Netherlands;
Alfred Metzner Verlag GmbH, Frankfurt/Main, Germany (1979); $58.00
(cloth); ISBN 90-268-1037-7 (Kluwer B.V.), ISBN 3-7875-1151-2 (Alfred
Metzner Verlag GmbH); x, 191 p..
This book is the first part of an effort to investigate the evolution of

transnational mineral contracts between transnational corporations and
developing countries. This English version is a revised edition of the German study, "Rohstofferschliessungsvorhaben in Entwicklungslaendern.
Teil ," published in 1977. In cooperation with the authors, William J.
Mahoney has undertaken the difficult task of translating, revising and updating the German edition.
The authors have sought in this initial volume to elaborate the economic, political, social, environmental, and legal framework of transnational mineral contracts. In their analysis they rely on a model which introduces and explains the relevant participants, their interests, and
behaviour.
The book is presented in six chapters. Chapter 1 serves as an introduction, providing definitions and explaining the problem formulation
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and method of inquiry. Chapter 2 discusses the economic, social and political framework of raw material investment. Chapters 3 and 4 discuss
the various parties and interests concerned with the investment contract.
These include the Home/Host countries, the investor, credit institutions,
international organizations/agreements and concern with assisting,
financing and protecting foreign investments. Chapter 5 addresses the
functions of the contract and the negotiation process, and discusses the
object and stages of the negotiations, congruence and conflict of interests,
the power relation of the investor and the host country, and strategy and
tactics. Chapter 6 explores the various forms contractual arrangements
can take; discussing the analytical framework of legal forms and contractual/corporate cooperation.
A second study, to be published at a future time, will address specific
problems of contractual formulation in the mineral sector, and a bibliography of the relevant literature concerning the transnational law of natural resources will also be published.
Five of the authors have received their LL.M.'s from such prestigious
law schools as Harvard (3), the University of Michigan (1) and Georgetown University Law Center (1). Another author is a Fellow of the
Institute for Law and Economics Education at Frankfurt. Of the remaining authors, one has an M.A. from the Department of Political Science,
the University of Chicago, and the other is an attorney and Fellow at the
Institute for International and Foreign Trade Law.

t
MEZNERICS,

I., INTERNATIONAL

PAYMENTS, WITH SPEcIAL REGARD TO

MONETARY SYSTEMS; Sijthoff & Noordhoff, Alphen aan den Rijn, The

Netherlands (1979); available in the U.S. from Sijthoff & Noordhoff, Germantown, Md. 20767; $25.00 (cloth); ISBN 90-286-0119-8 (Sijthoff &
Nordhoff), ISBN 963-05 1698-5 (Akad6miai Kiado); 265 p.; footnotes.
International payments are closely connected with, and dependent
on, the monetary systems existing in various parts of the world. As advancing technology in transportation accelerates the movement of goods,
e.g., containerization, it becomes necessary to search for new devices in
the technical field of international payments, by simplifying and standardizing the content and form of traditrade documents and speeding up
the flow of information, without neglecting the points of security and law.
This is the theme on which Professor Meznerics writes: the possibilities
or prospects of a "harmonization" between the various monetary systems.
InternationalPayments is presented in six chapters. Chapter 1 discusses the "Scope and Legal Aspects of International Payments." Chapter
2 explores the "Most Usual Methods of International Payments," discussing documentary credits, collections, bank guarantees, transfers abroad
and payments through clearing, the role of money orders, and other in-
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struments for effecting payments. Chapter 3 has an historical slant in
showing the development and recognition of foreign exchange legislation.
Chapter 4 presents the Uniform Payment System in Trade Between Socialist Countries (the principles of which were laid down in 1971 in the
"Comprehensive Programme" of the CMEA countries). Chapter 5 discusses the "Work of UNCITRAL in the Field of International Payments"
(and how it has requested the ICC to further the "uniform rules" in cooperation with countries not represented in the ICC, in particular with
the socialist countries). Chapter 6 concludes with a general survey of "International Payments and Monetary Systems," recounting developments
in Western International Monetary Co-operation, in Socialist Countries,
and other Regional Monetary Co-operation endeavors, and offering perspectives for a Universal Monetary System.
Professor Meznerics has authored several books and studies on the
banking business and has participated in the work of international organizations dealing with questions of unification of the law and practice relating to international payments.

t
MIKAELSEN, L., EUROPEAN PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS; Sijthoff &
Noordhoff, Alphen aan den Rijn, The Netherlands (1980); available in the
United States from Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 20010 Century Blvd., Germantown, Md. 20767; $42.50 (hardbound); ISBN 90-286-0409x; xiii, 271 p.;
footnotes, bibliography, appendices.

This book is subtitled The Practice and Procedure of the European
Commission of Human Rights on the Admissibility of Applications from
Individuals and States.
Because almost ninety-eight percent of applications before the European Commission of Human Rights are rejected, the author's purpose is
"to describe an applicant's sticky job of finding his way through to those
organs established for the very purpose of protecting human rights in Europe." Mikaelson examines the context of human rights protection, the
rights of individuals and states t6 plead in ECHR petitions, and the procedures followed. He then discusses admissibility and inadmissibility of
petitions, both on procedural and substantive grounds. After his conclusions and suggestions, he has several documentary appendices concerning
the ECHR. The appendices then deal with applications to the Commission, including a number of sample form letters. A selected bibliography
and table of cases concludes the work.
Mikaelson, the author, is legal advisor at the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Copenhagen. He has published two books and a number of
articles dealing primarily with the protection of human rights.
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NANDA, V., ed., THE LAW OF TRANSNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS;
Clark Boardman Co., Ltd.; New York, N.Y. (1981); $75.00 (cloth), $25.00
(paperback); ISBN 0-87632-342-5; LC 81-2392; xxii, 632 p.; footnotes, appendices, tables, index.
This book presents a collection of essays by practitioners and scholars of international law on a wide variety of legal problems encountered
in transnational business transactions. According to the book's introduction, the book is intended, to be a reference work for U.S. lawyers experienced in domestic commercial practice who need an introduction to international transactions. It is also, however, a book that would be highly
suitable for a law school course in international business transactions and
is available in a paperback "student edition."
The book is divided into thirteen discrete chapters, each developing a
particular topic in international commercial law. Applicable laws to international commercial transactions and practical considerations in relation
to the laws are detailed alike. Step by step procedures are often included
as a guide for the practitioner.
The thirteen chapters discuss the following areas: the role of U.S.
lawyers in international business transactions; foreign business organization; U.S. taxation of foreign investors; selected clauses in transnational
contracts; international technology transfers; foreign natural resource investment; forum selection and choice of law agreements in international
contracts; antitrust aspects of international business operations; jurisdictional problems in the application of the antitrust laws; enforcement of
the EC's antitrust laws; foreign trade and economic injury; and international boycotts.
Ved Nanda is Professor of Law and Director of the International Legal Studies Program, University of Denver College of Law.

NORBURY, P., BOWNAS, G., eds., BUSINESS IN JAPAN; Westview Press,
5500 Central Ave., Boulder, Colo. 80301 (1981); $25.00 (cloth); ISBN 086531-059-9; LC 80-51364; 210 p.; bibliography, glossary, index.
This book is a revised edition of the book which was first published
in 1974. It is a collection of twenty-five essays by high-level Japanese businessmen, concerning the main practical elements of doing business with
the Japanese.
The premise of the book is that doing business in Japan depends on
the depth of one's understanding of the Japanese people. It holds that
any approach to the Japanese market-whether with reference to law,
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finance, joint ventures, distribution, or trading in general-must be
grounded in a knowledge of the broad sociocultural context of the country
and an emotional as well as intellectual grasp of who the Japanese are.
The book is divided into six sections. Section one is an introduction
to understanding the Japanese. Section two is a history of Japanese industries, and a view of the new industrial policies of Japan. Section three
discusses approaches to the Japanese market. Section four explains
finance and Japanese banking. Section five concerns strategy and management in Japan. Finally, section six gives advice on adjusting to Japanese lifestyle and business practices.
Paul Norbury was educated at the Universities of London and
Manchester, and after two years in secondary teaching became a freelance writer and journalist. Later he became a Publications Editor for
Esso Europe, Inc., and Managing Editor of the Publication Division for
David Williams and Ketchum where he launched Tsuru, an international
quarterly journal on Japan for Japan Air Lines. In 1972 he started his
own publishing company. Additionally, since 1975 he has acted as a consultant to the Japanese Embassy. His books include two volumes for the
University of TObingen: Aspects of the British Way of Life and British
Institutions and The Japanese Businessman.
Geoffrey Bownas learned Japanese during the war and lectured in
Chinese and Japanese studies at Oxford from 1954 to 1966. He has been
Professor of Japanese Studies and Director of the Centre of Japanese
Studies, University of Sheffield, since 1966. His books include, The Penguin Book of Japanese Verse, New Writing in Japan, and The Asian
Phoenix.

REMBE, N., AFRICA AND THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA; Sijthoff
& Noordhoff, Alphen aan den Rijn, The Netherlands (1980); available in
the U.S. from Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 20010 Century Blvd., Germantown
Md. 20767; $42.50 (hardbound); ISBN 90-286-0639-4; xix, 251 p.; notes,
appendices, abbreviations, index, table of cases. Sixth in the series
"Sijthoff Publications on Ocean Development," Shigeru Oda (general
editor).
Subtitled "A Study of the Contribution of the African States to the
Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea," this work is
the sixth volume in a series of studies on the international, legal, institutional, and policy aspects of ocean development, edited by Shigeru Oda.
The author of this volume, Dr. Rembe, is a Lecturer in Law at the University of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. He has been involved with several
international meetings and conferences on the law of the sea, principally
with those that dealt with African impacts and implications.
Dr. Rembe emphasizes the African attitudes at UNCLOS III, which
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reflect their attitudes toward traditional international law in general.
Most African nations are still developing, and only recently independent,
by comparison. Dr. Rembe also discusses the UNCLOS III negotiations in
terms of the New International Economic Order. He also addresses the
increasing African interest in maritime matters.
The first chapter of this volume examines the African view of international law and how it affected their UNCLOS III positions. The middle
three chapters discuss the actual positions taken by the various African
nations at the Conference. Dr. Rembe stresses the adoption of a continental negotiating position as a major reason the African contribution to the
Conference was so important. The final chapter evaluates the African
contribution, both with respect to contributions dealing directly with the
Law of the Sea, and with respect to contributions falling outside the
scope of UNCLOS III, such as disarmament and decolonization. The appendices include "Proposals on the Seabed Regime," "Regional Declarations" (primarily OAU resolutions), a list of significant African proposals
on maritime matters from 1970-1975, African voting records on selected
LOS resolutions, and a list of African parties to Maritime Geneva
Conventions.
Dr. Rembe's work offers a unique perspective of a very significant
area of international law. The importance of LOS can only increase, and
the African impact on its development is likely to increase as well.

SCHMITTHOFF, C.M., SCHMITTHOFF'S EXPORT TRADE-THE LAW AND
PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE (7th ed.); Stevens & Sons Limited, 11

New Fetter Lane, London (1980); available in the U.S. from Carswell Legal Publications, 2330 Midland Ave., Agincourt, Ont., Canada MIS 1P7;
$62.25 (paper), also available in hardback; ISBN 0-420-45410-1, Paperback 0-420-45740-2; xxxvii, 480 p.; footnotes, tables of Cases, Statutes
and International Conventions, indexed, appendices.
This new edition of an international work [previous editions have
been translated into Russian (3d ed., 1955), Japanese (4th ed., 1962) and
French (5th ed., 1969)] on the law of international trade continues to
serve its dual function: to give a concise account of the law and practice
of international trade and to explain how modern export trade is transacted. The need for a new edition, and not just simply a revision, is to
give proper treatment to the legal problems of containerisation, long term
contracts, new I.C.C. terms (e.g., "f.o.b. Airport,"), and to account for recent Acts and Conventions (e.g., the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules of
1976), which chart the future course of international trade.
Schmitthoff's Export Trade is conveniently divided into five parts.
Part I concerns itself with the International Sale of Goods and discusses
special and standardized trade terms, the formation and frustration of
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international contracts, and foreign and uniform laws on International
Sales. Part II offers insight on representatives abroad; and discusses various distribution arrangements, restrictive trade practices, and competition law. Part III explores "matters incidental to exporting": financing,
insurance, the carriage of exports, protection of intellectual property, and
arbitration and litigation. Part IV introduces a new topic: long term contracts-contracts which have as their object the construction of works
and installations abroad. Part V concludes the text part of this work by
discussing the government regulation of exports: customs law.
Major Acts discussed in the text include the Unfair Contract Terms
Act of 1977 (with its definition of international supply contracts), the
State Immunity Act of 1978, the Arbitration Act of 1979, the Carriage by
Air and Road Act of 1979, the Customs and Excise Acts of 1979, and the
Carriage of Goods by Sea of 1971, to which are appended the HagueVisby Rules relating to bills of lading. Also discussed are the Hamburg
Rules on Bills of Lading.
Like the preceding editions, Schmitthoff's Export Trade is kept up to
date by notes in the section on Export Trade in the Journalof Business
Law, published by Stevens & Sons Limited of London.

f
SHAPIRO, M., COURTS: A COMPARATIVE AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS;

The

University of Chicago Press, 5801 S. Ellis Ave., Chicago, Ill. 60637 (1981);
$20.00 (cloth); ISBN 0-226-75042-6, LC 80-18263; ix, 245 p.; footnotes,
index.
In this book, Shapiro challenges the traditional model of legal scholars and political scientists that an independent judge applying preexisting
legal norms in an adversary proceeding imposes a winner-take-all judgment in which one party is assigned the legal right and the other party
the wrong. Shapiro proposes a new model for the study of the courts, one
that emphasizes the different modes of decision making and the multiple
political roles that characterized the functioning of real courts in various
political systems.
The book is divided into five chapters. The first chapter examines
the prototype of courts and briefly surveys social control and lawmaking
by the courts. The proposition is submitted that appeal, which is usually
viewed as a process for the vindication of individual legal rights, is more
properly seen as a device by which central political regimes consolidate
their control over the countryside.
Chapter 2 places the author's challenge to the judicial independence
theme of the conventional prototype of courts in the context of English
judicial experience. The author does so because he states that the conventional wisdom proclaims that it is in England that judicial independence
has most clearly developed and flourished.
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Chapter 3 places the conventional prototype's insistence that judges
decide by application of preexisting legal rules in the context that appears to be the most favorable to the author's questioning of it-the civil
law system in which judges are supposed to be strictly bound by codes.
Chapter 4 examines the assertion of the author in Chapter 1 that
mediation and litigation invariably intermingle rather than maintain
themselves as distinct alternatives. Chapter 4 deals with the traditional
Chinese legal system, which is often presented as having chosen the mediation and rejected the litigation alternative.
Finally, Chapter 5 is a study of one major legal system that is reputed not to have appeal at all: traditional Islam. This is included in relation to the author's argument in the first chapter that appeal is all but
universal because it serves the purposes of hierarchical regimes. Martin
Shapiro is Professor of Law at the University of California, Berkeley,
where he teaches in the Jurisprudence and Social Policy Program. Formerly a Professor of Government at Harvard University, he is President
of the Western Political Science Association.

TOWNSEND,

J. B.,

EXTRATERRITORIAL ANTrIRuST: THE SHERMAN ANTI-

TRUST ACT AND U.S. BusiNEss ABROAD. Westview Press, 5500 Central Ave-

nue, Boulder, Colo. 80301 (1980); $27.50 (cloth); ISBN 0-89158-483-8, LC
79-18802, xiii, 253 p.; footnotes, appendices, tables, bibliography, table of
cases, index.
The focus of this book is upon the connection between international
business and government relations. More specifically, the author examines the influence of the Sherman Antitrust Act on U.S. business overseas, particularly the U.S. multinational corporations (MNC's). Of particular interest is the effect extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust law
has had-upon the market-entry strategy of U.S. MNC's, and whether the
application of antitrust law has made U.S. MNC's more, or less,
competitive.
The author used a descriptive survey methodology, eliciting responses from seventeen U.S. based MNC's, all with at least $2 billion in
sales in 1974. From the information obtained the author sought to illuminate the current state of affairs vis-i-vis U.S. MNC's and U.S. antitrust
law, providing a description of the actual impact of the law on corporate
policies and strategies.
The early chapters in the book set forth the necessary general information. The author discusses the history of and the ideology behind the
Sherman Antitrust Act; the developing case law and the resulting interpretive rulings; the growth and expansion of the U.S. MNC; and the limited legal base of extraterritorial antitrust. Later chapters present data
concerning U.S. MNC's, arraying this data against the legal alternatives
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available to a U.S. MNC considering overseas market entry. The public
policy issues, both as they impact upon the law and the MNC, are then
discussed. Finally, the author summarizes the finding of the book and
states his conclusions and projections of public policy.
The author concludes that extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust law does impact upon and to an extent nullify the market entry
strategies of U.S. MNC's engaged in manufacturing. To this extent it
would seem, he argues, that U.S. business abroad is adversely affected.
James B. Townsend is Assistant Professor of Business Administration at Kansas State University.

WILSON, D., INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS IN A NUTSHELL;
West Publishing Co., P. 0. Box 3526, 50 W. Kellogg Blvd., Saint Paul,
Mn. 55165 (1981); $7.95 (paperback); ISBN 0-8299-2119-2, LC 80-39793;
lvii; 393 p.; index.

This book, a West "Nutshell," attempts to trace the legal aspects of
an international business transaction from the first idea to the negotiated
conclusion. The following topics are considered: the multinational enterprise and its legal counsel, selection of assisting counsel in other countries, international rulemaking systems and international business transactions in the EEC, EEC business competition rules and Articles 85 and
86 of the Treaty of Rome, extraterritorial laws and international business
transactions, moving goods across national borders, movement of people,
money, and information across national borders, traumatic investment
loss, insuring against risk of loss, act of state, sovereign immunity, dispute
settlement, and negotiating a written agreement.
The book operates on the premise that the particular forms and special objectives may vary, but the shared purposes of enterprises in moving
goods, information, money, people and services across national boundaries have not changed significantly during the past two centuries. The author believes that enterprises seem to move about in relatively predictable ways. The book, with this theme, is necessarily general in nature,
and would not be appropriate as a final authority on the topics discussed.
Donald T. Wilson is Professor of Law at the Loyola Law School in
Los Angeles, California.

YOUNG,

A. K.,

THE SOGO SHOSHA: JAPAN'S MULTINATIONAL TRADING

COMPANIES; Westview Press,

5500 Central Avenue, Boulder, Colo. 80301

(1979); $20.00 (cloth); ISBN 0-89158-425-0, LC 78-18935; xxiii, 247 p.;
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footnotes, bibliography, tables.
This book represents the first book-length study of Japan's sogo
shosha in English. Sogo shoshas have been referred to as "probably the
world's most efficient marketing channel." They are the large general
trading companies that handle a large percentage of Japan's export .and
import business. They have played a key role in Japan's extraordinary
growth since World War Two.
The book has three principal parts. Part one examines the sogo
shosha's core business, describes the origins and defining characteristics
of the ten largest sogo shoshas and explores the extended network of services and resources they provide for conducting business. Part two describes the growth trends and business strategies of the general trading
companies from 1960-73, elaborates on their roles in the post-World War
II Japanese economy, and looks in detail at their overseas natural resource development projects. Part three examines the strategic changes
the sogo shoshas have made since 1973, with their new emphasis on management efficiency and global reach and portrays their present role and
likely future place in world commerce.
Alexander K. Young is Professor of International Relations at the
College of New Paltz, State University of New York. A graduate of the
College of Law of the National Taiwan University, he received a Ph.D
from Columbia University, where he is currently an associate of the University Seminar on ModerA Japan.

